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Should the limits now established to de­
fine those areas of the waters lying off the 
United States coast over which national 
control is exercised be abolished in favor of 
a less restrictive delimitation of American 
territorial waters as a means of protecting 
the domestic fishing and mining industries 
from encroachment on the part of other 
nations? Or should the present boundaries 
defining the offshore zones controlled by 
nations bordering on the sea be retained 
so as to allow the United States Navy the 
greatest possible latitude in approaching 
and maneuvering near foreign coasts? 
Should there be an international agency 
charged with supervising and regulating 
the many and diverse activities occurring 
daily on the high seas—an agency that 
would serve both to allow for the freest 
possible international use of the sea and 
to safeguard the right of sovereign nations 
to exclusive exploitation of the resources 
of their own territorial waters? 
It is to such questions that the papers in 
this volume are addressed. Written by au­
thorities representing a wide variety of 
fields—law, marine science, business, gov­
ernment, and the social sciences—they 
were delivered initially at the first annual 
conference of the Law of the Sea Institute, 
convened in 1966 to afford an opportunity 
for increased exchange of ideas and in­
formation on matters relating to the use 
and control of the sea and its resources. 
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FOREWORD

The Law of the Sea Institute was established at Kingston, Rhode Island, 
in February, 1965, for the purpose of exchanging ideas and information 
on matters relating to the control and use of the sea. As its first project, 
the Institute sponsored a week-long conference at the University 
between June 27 and July 1, 1966. It was attended by over one hundred 
persons from the fields of law, marine science, business, government, 
and the social sciences. A second conference is planned for June of 1967, 
and it is anticipated that one will be scheduled in each year thereafter. 
The papers presented at the first conference are printed in this volume. 
Following each group of papers, or panel, there was considerable dis­
cussion from the floor. Rather than reproduce the discussions verbatim, 
it was necessary, in the interests of space, to reduce the material to a 
summary of the salient points for each morning and afternoon session. 
Support for the first conference was received from the Office of Naval 
Research, the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries, and the Environmental 
Science Services Administration. The Institute is indebted to these 
organizations for helping to make possible the 1966 conference. It also 
is grateful to the Mershon Social Science Program of the Ohio State 
University for its assistance in the publication of these Proceedings. 
Present members of the executive committee of the Law of the Sea 
Institute are William T. Burke, Francis J. Christy, Jr., John A. Knauss, 
Dale Krause, and Lewis M. Alexander. 
LEWIS M. ALEXANDER 
University of Rhode Island 

PREFACE 
Rhode Island is the most watery of all the United States on a percentage 
basis. Of our total area of 1,214 square miles, 156 square miles—not 
counting the offshore waters—are presently under water. There are 
384 miles of shoreline, which is pretty good for a state of such small size. 
Rhode Island also has a nautical tradition which makes its selection 
for this meeting even more appropriate. Newport was one of the major 
seaports of this nation in the eighteenth century, leading at one point 
in its history both New York and Boston. Oliver Hazard Perry was 
born near where we are today in South Kingstown. Another hero of 
the War of 1812, James DeWolfe, was born in Bristol. And our 
Narragansett Bay is one of the largest deep-water harbors in the North 
American continent. It has been estimated that all the Allied fleets of 
World War II could have been comfortably moored, at one time, in our 
own bay. 
This is, indeed, a timely occasion for Americans—and I understand 
we have a few guests from abroad, from Russia and from other 
countries—to be discussing the Law of the Sea. As you may know, on 
June 15, 1966, the Senate passed a bill to establish a contiguous fishing 
zone beyond the territorial seas of the United States to a limit of twelve 
miles. Also in the Senate last week my own Sea Grant College bill was 
reported out of the full committee and went to the floor of the Senate. 
We are waiting for a companion bill which we hope will come over 
shortly from the House. We are not sure that we will get it through 
this session, but we are going to do our very best. 
It is timely also to hold this conference because the newspapers 
brought out last week an example of what might be called "double 
piracy." The pirate radio station in the Thames estuary off England was 
seized by pirates. I don't quite know what "double piracy" means, but 
I should think this would be an interesting subject for one of the talks. 
I think we will see more and more of problems of this sort developing. 
I know that as I have worked on my Sea Grant College legislation, 
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which calls for the practical exploitation of the knowledge of the basic 
research that we have, one could see the problems that will arise—the 
man-made islands that will be created way outside the continental limits; 
the mining settlements that will exist under the seas where people will 
be living for months on end. What happens in these areas if murder is 
committed ? What kind of law prevails ? These are the kind of questions 
that are absolutely without answer as of now, and it is a conference 
like this that can create a climate and a direction that will set the tone 
for the answers that will come. I saw the effect of a conference like 
this just about eight months ago, when the Southern New England 
Marine Science Association, (SNEMSA), held its meeting in Newport 
calling for practical legislation to develop the knowledge of the seas 
we have. It is really out of that conference that a lot of the support for 
my Sea Grant College bill developed, and it is in great part thanks to 
that conference that we have been able to get it as far as we have. 
The United States has the most extensive nautical coastline, almost 
13,000 miles, of any nation. Russia has, as I guess Russia is more 
fully aware than I, a longer coastline, but a great deal of the coastline 
touches on the Arctic Sea. But we maintain that we have the longest 
navigable coastline of any country in the world. Foreign fisheries are 
aware of the riches on our shores and are coming to exploit them in 
ever increasing numbers. Ten years ago we could expect only about one 
hundred foreign vessels off our shores during the summer fishing. Now, 
at the height of this summer season, 1966, we can expect a huge fleet 
of more than twelve hundred ships, more than twelve times the number. 
These foreign vessels keep moving in closer and closer to our own coast. 
At the moment not many of them fish within twelve miles of the main­
land. Still it is a good time to be setting the twelve-mile limit before 
they do move in and establish a historic fishery. 
As you are aware, too, all but twenty-five coastal fishing nations 
have already extended their fishing jurisdiction to twelve miles and 
many have gone far beyond. Those that have gone further include 
the South American nations and Guinea in Africa. But we accept the 
twelve mile limit of such countries as the United Kingdom, France, 
West Germany, and Norway, and they would accept our twelve-mile 
limit if we established one. The basic reason that we have all joined 
together in this twelve mile fisheries limit is not just for conservation 
of fishery resources; what is more important, we are trying to give 
protection to the coastal fleets of small fishing vessels against large 
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foreign ships which can force them off their ground. Larger fishing 
vessels use very different techniques; for example, they may trawl across 
the surface where smaller boats will be conducting stationary fishing 
and thus literally make it impossible for the smaller boats to oper­
ate. I understand that last year alone, 1965, there were sixteen 
separate verifiable incidents, in which sixty-five units of fishing gear 
owned by U.S. fishermen were destroyed by foreign trawlers. The 
world's fisheries have grown, as we all know, into a much larger 
operation than they used to be. I remember in the middle of World 
War II when I was given the responsibility of the rehabilitation of the 
Sicilian fishing industry that we went in there and found the job was 
really very simple. That fishery consisted of corrals that stretched out 
into the sea to catch the fish as they went along and were attracted by 
the fishermen's fires or bright lights. All we had to do was to provide 
a few lines, a few hooks, and just very basic materials indeed. 
But now when foreign fisheries are becoming so mechanized, it 
requires far more complicated and advanced techniques and more 
capital than before. Although the twelve mile limit will not solve 
all the problems of foreign interference currently facing our fisher­
men and those of other nations, it is a fair, necessary, and beneficial 
step in the right direction. Perhaps the next move, and this may come in 
part as a result of your conference, would be to consider another Geneva-
type conference on the law of the sea relating to fisheries rights and 
jurisdictions, such as those that took place in 1958 and 1960. A very 
useful exercise here would seem to me to be some sort of recommenda­
tion as to when such a conference should occur, where it should occur, 
and with what problems it should be concerned. This would be very 
beneficial not only for our nation but for all the countries of the world, 
and I would hope might be one of the results of this conference. 
There are various interesting ideas to be examined here too. I was 
particularly struck by the idea that our offshore fisheries limits should 
not be set on a longitudinal but on a depth basis such as the 100-fathom 
line. I'm not sure whether this could work practically; it might be worth 
examining in this conference. And I am sure it probably will be. 
As the nation with the longest fishable coastline, it would be fitting 
for the United States to take the lead in urging the United Nations to 
address itself again to this question of fishing rights and jurisdictions 
off the coastal states. Many are familiar with this problem that we face 
in the Congress concerning the continental shelf. What resources, basi-
IX 
PREFACE 
cally fisheries, belong to the country that adjoins the shelf, and what 
belongs to the "first come first served"? I remember we had a very 
complicated debate in the Senate one time, and it finally developed that, 
under the continental shelf theory, oysters would belong to the country 
to which they adjoin, but crabs or lobsters that leave the surface of the 
sea bed would not. They belong to anybody who comes and catches them. 
We are faced with another problem too. When speaking in the Senate 
I am also very conscious that I am a senator from a strong Navy, 
as well as fisheries, state. We have a very real interest on the one hand in 
enlarging our fisheries interests but on the other hand in making sure 
that the territorial limits in the sea are kept as narrow as possible. With 
a strong Navy we want to make sure that the waters of the world are 
as free as possible to our ships. One would find, if one stretched the 
three-mile limit to six or twelve miles that many waters which at present 
are considered open to the use of the world would become closed. Many 
straits would become closed, including Gibraltar and those in Indonesia. 
So we are torn here. On the one hand, we ought to keep the limit as 
narrow as possible for the commerce of the seas, and, on the other hand 
we want to extend it from the viewpoint of fisheries resources. It seems 
to me that we are trying to get the best of both worlds when we say 
that there should be a longer fisheries limit than there is a territorial one. 
But this is natural because it is in line with our own interests. I would 
think, too, that the Soviet Union, which is developing a strong Navy and 
also has its own fishing industry to consider, would not feel too different 
from us in this view. 
I note that on today's agenda it is planned to take a new look at the 
1958 Geneva Conference, and I hope that from this look and from 
examining some of these problems that I have mentioned, you may 
come up with positive recommendations. Already today there is con­
siderable international co-operation in ocean affairs. As oceanologists 
know, some of the most productive international programs today are in 
the ocean science fields and in conservation. The International Maritime 
Consultative Organization, IMCO, at whose original meeting I had the 
honor of representing the United States as a delegate appointed by 
President Eisenhower, has faced up to the problems of merchant marine 
sanitation, pollution, and safety. But I think that IMCO could be a great 
deal more active. One of your recommendations might well be that 
IMCO, along with its Committee on Merchant Marine Safety Standards, 
might also concern itself with some of the problems of international law. 
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In this way all the problems of the law and the problems of the sea 
would be basically in one particular place. Because the sea is interna­
tional, no one nation can use or exploit it without regard to the needs, 
the practices, and the historical claims of others. Most nations recognize 
this; some do not, but the outlook in general is hopeful. I think it is 
possible that the nations will solve the difficult problems of conflicting 
interests in the global sea long before full peace and harmony are 
achieved on land. 
And in conclusion, I would like to say a word about the legal ob­
stacles we Americans face with our expanding ocean technology. It is 
vital in this conference that experts like you focus on this problem with 
all your imagination and sagacity. Incidentally, the Sea Grant College 
program that I have been working on with the help of many of you in 
this room should provide an increasing flow of skilled manpower and 
scientific innovation to boost this technology. Since technology has not 
yet reached the stage that deep-sea mining is feasible these questions 
of who owns the sea and what law applies are doubly important. If we 
wait until the problems actually arise then we will be guided by the 
situation of the moment—by what each individual nation's local concern 
and immediate self-interest is—but if we examine these problems ahead 
of time perhaps we can have a more objective viewpoint. This is some­
what in line with the idea that the reason we senators are elected for 
six years is that we are perhaps able to handle problems that come to 
us a little more objectively than if we have the heat of an election every 
two years. And I think it is for this same reason that these problems of 
international law could best be examined before the heat builds up and 
before the actual crisis has arisen. 
It seems likely, too, at least now, that public opinion is ready for any 
kind of recommendations or thoughts along this line. I think that as Dr. 
Horn said earlier, there is a general realization that we must learn 
to live together or hang separately; and there is a willingness, particu­
larly in areas where vital national interest is now concerned, to 
accept law—international law—international reason, and international 
order. So, for all these reasons, I wish this conference well and 
believe that out of these various subjects that will be discussed, and 
particularly the one or two thoughts that I have advanced here, will 
come recommendations that will lead perhaps to a quick reconvening of 
another conference on the international law of the sea. From this con­
ference may also come some definite recommendations for our own State 
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Department and our own government about what shall be our policies 
in the field of international law—some conclusions concerning how we 
can have the best of two worlds with a wide fishing limit and a narrow 
territorial sea. As you wrestle with these problems I wish you good 
luck, and I'm very glad to welcome you all to my state. Thank you. 
T H  E HONORABLE CLAIBORNE PELL 
Senator from Rhode Island 
xu 
CONTENTS

Chapter One:
Chapter Two:
Chapter Three:
Chapter Four:
Chapter Five:
Chapter Six:
 International Law and the Law of the 
Sea 
Myres S. McDougal 3 
Discussion of McDougal 24 
 The Convention on Fisheries and 
Conservation of Living Resources: 
Accomplishments of the 1958 Geneva 
Conference 
William C. Herrington 26 
 The 1958 Conference on the Law of 
the Sea: What Was Accomplished 
William R. Neblett 36 
 Factor Analysis as a Tool in Studying 
the Law of the Sea 
Robert L. Friedheim 47 
 Offshore Claims of the World 
Lewis M. Alexander 71 
Discussion of Herrington, Neblett, 
Friedheim, and Alexander 85 
 Fishery Resources in Offshore
Wilbcrt McLeod Chapman
 Waters 
 87 
CONTENTS 
Chapter Seven: 
Chapter Eight: 
Chapter Nine: 
Chapter Ten: 
Chapter Eleven: 
Chapter Twelve: 
Chapter Thirteen: 
Chapter Fourteen: 
The Distribution of the Sea's Wealth 
in Fisheries 
Francis T. Christy, Jr. 106 
Discussion of Chapman and Christy 122 
A Symposium on National Interests 
in Coastal Waters 
Wilbert McLeod Chapman, Francis T. 
Christy, Jr., Richard Baxter, Edward 
W. Allen, and Giulio Pontecorvo 125 
Geological Aspects of Sea-Floor 
Sovereignty 
K. 0. Emery 139 
Mining in the Sea 
Willard Bascom 160 
A Symposium on Limits and Conflict­
ing Uses of the Continental Shelf 
William T. Burke, Northcutt Ely, 
Richard Young, Bernard E. Jacob, 
Bruce A. Harlow, and Quincy Wright 172 
Freedom of Navigation 
Bruce A. Harlow 188 
International Regulation of Communi­
cations for Oceanographic Equipment 
Gerard E. Sullivan 195 
Law and the New Technologies 
William T. Burke 204 
Discussion of Harlow, Sullivan, and 
Burke 228 
xiv 
CONTENTS 
Chapter Fifteen:	 Jurisdictional, Administrative, and 
Technical Problems Related to the 
Establishment of California Coastal 
and Offshore Boundaries 
F. J. Hortig	 230 
Discussion of Boundary Problems 
and Delimitation 242 
Chapter Sixteen:	 The Law of the Sea Conference, 
1958-1960, and Its Aftermath 
Arthur H. Dean 244 
Chapter Seventeen:	 A Symposium on the Geneva Con­
ventions and the Need for Future 
Modifications 
Henry Reiff, Ralph Johnson, 
L. F. E. Goldie, John L. Mero, 
and Alexander A. Melamid 265 
Chapter Eighteen:	 Comments on International Control of 
the Sea's Resources 
Clark M. Eichelberger and 
Francis T. Christy, Jr. 299 
Chapter Nineteen:	 Reflections on the Meeting of the 
Law of the Sea Institute 
Giulio Pontecorvo 310 
Notes on the Contributors	 315 
Index	 319 
xv 

FIGURES 
1.	 Plot of nations' factor scores. Factor 1: East-West, territo­
rial sea and contiguous zone. Factor 2: \Torth-South, fishing. 58 £­
2.	 Plot of nations' factor scores. Factor 3: supranationalism. 
Factor 4: legal conservatism. 62 CJ 
3.	 Plot of nations' factor scores. Factor 2: North-South, fishing. 
Factor 5: East-West, direct cold-war issues. 65 C 
4.	 Positions of mean sea level during the past 19,000 years for 
the Atlantic Coast of the United States and Canada. 142 C 
5.	 Positions of the shoreline along the Atlantic Coast of the 
United States during the past, present, and future. 143 t~f 
6.	 Simplified geological map of the United States and adjoining 
parts of Mexico and Canada and adjacent sea floors. 146 hi 
7.	 Selected geological profiles across the continental margin off 
the Atlantic Coast of the United States. 147 <* 
8.	 Physiographic provinces of the North Atlantic Ocean shown 
in profile. 152 *» 
9.	 Distribution of continental shelves, trenches, and mid-ocean 
rift throughout the earth. 153 n 
10.	 The generalized direct air route flown by P.S.A. between San 
Diego and Los Angeles. 233 ' 1 
11.	 The generalized air route flown by P.S.A. between Los 
Angeles and San Francisco. 234 ^' 
12.	 Possible alternative baselines. 237 fH 
13.	 Exhibit incorporated in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, 
1848. 239 M 
14.	 Possible alternative locations of the international boundary 
between the United States and Mexico in the territorial sea. 240 »°| 

TABLES 
1.	 Territorial and Contiguous Fishing Zones Claimed by States. 42

2.	 Rotated Factor Matrix for Conflict Issues: UN Law of the

Sea Conferences. 49

3.	 Offshore Claims of the World Arranged according to

Breadths of the Territorial Sea. 72

4.	 Kinds of International and Interstate Political Boundaries on

Land. 140


THE LAW OF THE SEA


Myres S. McDougal 
Chapter One: 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE LAW OF THE SEA*

Unhappily, I find myself in disagreement with some of the points Senator 
Pell has just made. I am not at all sure that it is either in the interest 
of this country or in the common interest of mankind that this country 
should claim a twelve mile contiguous zone for fisheries. I think it may 
take a hundred years for the law of the sea to recover from the last two 
international conferences which dealt with it, and I would regard the 
immediate call of another conference as an unmitigated disaster. Let me 
say, also, that the very function of the law of the sea is to protect and 
secure the common interests of the peoples of the world. Its entire 
purpose is to serve the common interests, both inclusive and exclusive, 
of the different communities and to reject all claims of special interest. 
This is indeed the function of law in any community, national or inter­
national. Thus, when one contraposes international law and the vital 
interests of states, one is creating an apposition that we simply cannot 
live with. International law is established and maintained only because it 
secures and protects the vital interests of states. 
The task assigned to me is to get back to fundamentals. I am instructed 
to talk about the interrelations of international law and the law of the 
sea and to suggest something of the broad framework of policies which 
should guide and control the making and application of the law of the 
sea. As I reviewed some of the recent literature, much of it written by 
members of this audience, it struck me that I should emphasize that more 
than a framework of guidelines is involved in our inquiry. The larger 
processes of world effective power do in fact impose severe constraints. 
There are limits within which those who clarify and implement the law 
of the sea must operate. It would appear a part of my task to emphasize 
some of these limits. 
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If we are to get back to fundamentals, it is necessary, first, that we 
consider the nature and role of law in any kind of a community; next, 
that we apply this understanding to observe the nature and function of 
law in the larger world community; then, that we mark out the special 
features of the constitutional or, more precisely "constitutive" processes 
of international law; and, finally, that we then come back and relate the 
main features of the public order of the oceans, or the international law 
of the sea, to this larger context. 
Let us begin with the notion of law in any community. By a com­
munity we mean a territorial group in which there is interdetermination, 
reciprocal impact, interdependence. If we observe any community of this 
kind, we can see an effective power process in the sense the decisions are 
taken and enforced, whether people like them or not, by high indulgences 
and severe deprivations. Some of these decisions are of course taken by 
naked power, or by a mere calculation of expediencies, in the arrogant 
insistence on "sovereign" rights. Others of these decisions are, however, 
taken from perspectives of authority. Such decisions are taken by the 
people who are expected to make them, in accordance with community 
expectation about how they should be taken, in established structures 
of authority, and by authorized procedures. The people who make these 
decisions have enough effective control, enough bases of power, that they 
can put their choices into effect in a consequential number of instances. 
There is, thus, in any community a process of authoritative decision as 
well as a process of naked power. By "law" what we commonly mean, 
if pressed to comprehensive and realistic description, is decision that is 
taken in accordance with authority and that has effective control. 
Whatever our purpose, law is, then, most usefully regarded as a 
conjunction of authority and effective control. Whether we are scholars, 
advocates, or decision-makers, we are not interested simply in rules 
or words—what is written in the books. The rules, the words, are often 
highly abstract or ambiguous and always travel in pairs of opposites. 
We are interested in the whole process of decision, how these rules, 
these policies, are made and continually remade and in fact applied 
in particular instances. We are interested not only in describing the 
past, but also in projecting into the future. We seek to understand the 
past, the conditions affecting past decisions, in order to anticipate and 
control the future. Our concern with the past is only for the more 
effective projection of policies for the more secure realization of basic 
community goals in the future. 
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Let us now transfer these perspectives to the international level, to 
the world arena. If we can take the point of view of the man from Mars, 
or the anthropologist, or the observer who identifies with the whole of 
mankind, I believe we can see in the larger earth-space arena today a 
community process that is entirely comparable to that which we have 
in the more mature national societies. It is of course largely an un­
organized, decentralized process, but it exhibits the same kinds of inter-
determinations, the same kinds of interdependences, as our national 
processes. If we look more closely into the social process, the inter-
determinations, we can see that there is, similarly, a process of effective 
power. No state in the world today is free to do what it wants to do, 
not even the United States, Russia, or Communist China. We are all 
caught in the constraints of this effective power process; the network of 
continuing impacts, of potential reciprocities and retaliations, circum­
scribes the globe. 
When we realistically examine this world process of effective power, 
we can observe also that it includes, along with the naked power 
decisions, a process of authoritative decision. Decisions with transnational 
participation and of transnational impact are in fact made by the people 
who are expected to make them, in accordance with people's expectations 
about how they should be taken, and in established structures of au­
thority, and by authorized procedures. Many of these decisions, further, 
are attended by sufficient effective power to be put into controlling prac­
tice. The principles of the United Nations Charter, the laws of war, the 
law of the sea, the law of diplomacy—all these authoritative prescriptions 
of general community policy are honored in a very high degree in 
particular applications. We can also observe that these prescriptions, 
these policies, are continuously being made and remade. 
What we mean by international law, when we speak comprehensively 
and realistically, is then this process of authoritative decision which 
transcends the boundaries of any single state. If we look closely at this 
most comprehensive process of authoritative decision, we can see that 
it is composed of two different kinds of decisions. First, there are the 
decisions which establish the process of authoritative decision—the 
constitutional or "constitutive" decisions. Secondly, there is the whole 
flow of particular decisions emerging from this constitutive process which 
establishes, secures, and protects the important features of the different 
community value processes and a public order. These latter decisions 
are those which regulate the production and distribution of goods and 
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services, clarify and protect civil liberties or human rights, encourage 
the flow of enlightenment, protect health, and so on. 
An example, familiar to most, may clarify what we mean by public 
order decisions. The principal function of what we call private inter­
national law has long been recognized as that of organizing the world 
into an international economy. This objective is sought, for increasing 
the production of goods and services for all mankind, by prescribing 
and applying principles, which both grant competence to particular states, 
such as the principles of jurisdiction—the principles of territoriality, 
nationality, protection of interests, impact territoriality, passive person­
ality, and so forth—and principles which impose limits upon the compe­
tence, such as the traditional principles about the responsibilities of 
states—the Bill of Rights of international law—with provisions against 
expropriation and mistreatment of foreigners and for securing access 
to the courts and fair procedures in courts. 
I have used this analogy of private international law because I think 
it relates to processes of decision most comparable with what we have in 
the law of the sea. The law of the sea is, from this perspective, a flow of 
particular decisions, projected by the larger constitutive processes of the 
world arena, designed to establish an ordered, economic, effective way for 
the peoples of the world most fully to exploit the oceans of the world 
in their common interest. International law as a whole is composed of 
the two kinds of decisions, both those that set up the process of authori­
tative decision and the particular decisions emerging from the process 
and establishing a public order. The law of the sea, as important as it 
is, is merely a part of these latter or public order decisions. 
Let us now examine more carefully what I call the constitutive process 
of the larger, world arena. A complete exposition would describe how 
this process identifies appropriate decision-makers, clarifies basic com­
munity policies, establishes structures of authority, maintains bases of 
power, authorizes implementing procedures, and projects all the many 
different types of decisions necessary for the making and application of 
community policy. It is the features of this process which constitute the 
context that constrains your choices about the law of the sea and 
determines in large measure what you can and cannot do in creating 
and maintaining a public order of the oceans. 
One striking feature of this constitutive process is that the most 
important decision-makers are still largely the officials of nation-states, 
with few third-party decision-makers whose writs are compulsory. There 
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is of course an increasing, though still modest, role for the officials of 
international governmental organizations as in the United Nations, the 
specialized agencies, and the regional organizations, as well as for arbitral 
and judicial bodies. In some of the important types of decisions, political 
parties, pressure groups, private associations, even the individual human 
being, have begun, as we will see, to play significant roles. 
When we turn to the basic policy objectives for which the effective 
elites of the world maintain this constitutive process, these can, I think, 
be most realistically described in terms of promoting the common 
interests of all peoples and of rejecting all claims of special interest. In 
the broadest sense, this is the function of law in any community: to 
maintain a uniformity in decision in clarifying and implementing com­
mon interest and to minimize arbitrary decisions, taken without regard 
to the consequences for others. The common interests which are sought 
to be protected can be conveniently categorized into two broad groups: 
first, the inclusive and, second, the exclusive. By inclusive interests I 
refer to demands and expectations about activities that have a high 
degree of collective impact, that have important consequences across 
community lines on a transnational or global scale. By exclusive interests 
I refer to demands and expectations about activities whose impact is 
primarily upon the peoples of a single territorial community. 
From a global perspective, the inclusive interests of the peoples of 
the world certainly include the maintenance of minimum order—the 
minimization of unauthorized violence and other coercion. The various 
provisions of the United Nations Charter merely reflect the continuing 
aspirations of the peoples of the world with respect to this interest. It is 
the one interest indispensable to any community governed by law. Our 
very notion of law as uniformity of decision in accordance with com­
munity expectation is compatible with arbitrary decision by coercion. 
So conceived, minimum order has of course for some centuries been a 
basic goal of the public order of the oceans. 
Beyond minimum order, however, the peoples of the world have 
more extensive interests in what we may call optimum order: the 
greatest production and widest distribution of all demanded values that 
can be obtained with available resources. You will recall that this is 
the basic goal we ascribed to private international law—the promotion 
of an international economy for increase in the aggregate of goods and 
services and fairness in the distribution of such aggregate. Of more 
immediate relevance, the same goal has long infused what we call the 
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law of the sea. For three centuries, the effective elites of the world 
have maintained a law of the sea, a constitutive process for the oceans, 
because they perceived that in this way the peoples of the world could 
produce more goods and services—a greater production and wider 
distribution of all values-—for the whole of mankind. The history of 
achievement during the last three centuries also certainly documents 
the wisdom of this judgment. With the oceans of the world kept open 
for the shared use of all having the necessary capabilities and skill, and 
for the utmost specialization in skill and resources, the aggregate product 
has been greatly enhanced for the benefit of all. 
By an exclusive interest, which requires protection as a common 
interest, I refer to interest with respect to which states share a com­
mon concern—because of the unique impacts of the activities involved— 
not precisely in the same modality. For example, every state of the 
world has an interest in protecting the community processes on its land 
masses from dangers and threats from the oceans. It has, thus, an 
interest in the waters closely proximate to it which will permit it to 
preserve the security, the minimum order of its own social processes, 
and to encourage an internal optimum order, the greatest productivity 
and fairness in distribution. No two states of the world have, however, 
precisely the same interest in proximate waters. Canada has different 
interests in the waters immediately off its coast from those we have in 
the waters off our coasts. Senator Pell rightly pointed out that because 
of the length of our coastlines we have most extensive interests of 
this kind, but many other states have comparable interests, even if in 
different degree. Because of this comparability in interest it has long 
been regarded as in the common interest of all states that every state 
be given at least a modest control of proximate waters. 
By a special interest—the kind of interest that constitutive process 
is maintained to reject—I refer to a claim which is destructive in its 
impact upon others and bears no rational relation to a genuine exclusive 
interest which can be shared with others. Thus, the claims that some 
of our Latin American neighbors have made to expansive territorial 
seas are claims of special interest made without regard for their impact 
on others and with highly destructive consequences for the total pro­
duction and distribution of goods and services. Such claims do not 
represent genuine exclusive interests because they cannot be made with 
promise of reciprocity. The only argument our Latin American friends 
have made to justify these claims is that if they can have an extensive 
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territorial sea they will sell the privilege of fishing and make money. 
Their chance for ultimate advantage, however, depends upon the assump­
tion that everything else will remain the same. Should other states make 
comparable claims, there would be complete disintegration of the com­
mon interest and the Latin American states would suffer inestimable 
loss along with everybody else. Once states depart from the criterion 
of common interest, the only alternative is naked force. If a state makes 
a claim which it cannot make with promise of reciprocity to other states, 
it is inviting resort to coercion and violence. What we mean by a special 
interest is, then, this interest which is asserted against the community, 
irrespective of its impact upon all, and one of the principal purposes 
for which the larger constitutive process is maintained is to reject all 
these claims of special interest and to secure a public order based on 
common interest. 
It is for these reasons that I am not sure, as indicated above, that 
it is in the common interest of all mankind, including ourselves, for us 
to claim a twelve mile contiguous zone for fisheries. It is not at all clear 
that a state can effectively control, conserve, and harvest fish with any 
kind of a contiguous zone, even one that embraces a whole continental 
shelf. As I am presently informed, fish just don't move, breed, or live 
this way. Hence, what we make is not only a claim of special interest, 
but an ineffective one. Further, we set a bad model to the rest of the 
world—a model that our Latin American neighbors and others may 
emulate. We should not make claims that cannot be documented in 
terms of the scientific facts of the fishing industry to be in the common 
interests of all mankind. I'm not now suggesting a dogmatic judgment 
on this, I'm merely trying to indicate the kinds of considerations which 
should be taken into account, in the light of the best, up-to-date infor­
mation that can be obtained. 
The structures of authority, the arenas of decision in constitutive 
process within a nation-state are commonly described in terms of exec­
utive, legislative, judicial, and administrative. On the global level, I 
believe it is better to talk in terms of diplomatic, parliamentary-
diplomatic, parliamentary, adjudicative, and executive. The structures 
of international law do not fit the neat categories inherited from 
Montesquieu and others. The great bulk of interaction in the global 
authoritative process of decision is still foreign office to foreign office. 
This is what we mean by diplomatic. Occasionally, such interactions 
are parliamentary-diplomatic, as in great multilateral conferences, such 
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as the recent conferences on the law of the sea or the earlier confer­
ences on the laws of war. The parliamentary institutions are more 
continuous, such as in the General Assembly or the Security Council 
of the United Nations. The adjudicative include the International Court 
of Justice and the thousands of arbitral tribunals. The executive include 
the secretariats of international governmental organizations—general, 
specialized, and regional—and perhaps some of the interactions of exec­
utives from within nation-states. The general community policies sought 
with respect to institutional structures are, of course, those of adequacy 
and economy, as well as of openness in access and compulsoriness in 
jurisdiction. The movement toward these policies of adequacy, economy, 
openness, and compulsoriness is perforce slow. 
Among the bases of power which the general community puts at the 
disposal of decision-makers for sanctioning purposes, the most important 
in international law, as in national law, is authority itself: people's 
expectations about who is authorized to make and enforce what deci­
sions. In addition to authority, in this sense of community expectation, 
we may also observe a broad global distribution of other bases of power, 
such as in effective control of the military instrument, or of wealth, 
enlightenment, skill, health, or other values. Both authority and the 
values which affect control are distributed inclusively in the organized 
general community and exclusively among the different nation-states. 
For realistic orientation we need to know the distribution, inclusive and 
exclusive, of authority in the sense of the expectations of the peoples 
of the world about who is authorized to make what decisions. We need 
to know also their expectations about control, what they think will 
actually happen if decisions are taken in accordance with authority. 
Finally, we need to know the distribution of capabilities in fact. Unfor­
tunately, even the established decision-makers may not have accurate 
perspectives of either their authority or control. 
The basic policy being sought on the global level in the organization 
of bases of power is, of course, that of putting enough authority and 
control into inclusive decision-making—into the United Nations and 
other intergovernmental organization and even into unorganized inclu­
sive decision-making, such as from foreign office to foreign office—to 
identify and protect inclusive interests but not in a degree to permit a 
monopolization of power or domination over the different territorial 
communities. Most of us continue to believe in a pluralistic world, 
composed of a large number of territorial communities with equality 
in access to authority. We do not want a monolithic, centralized super­
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state. We also demand, I am sure, that one of the basic policies for 
which constitutive process is maintained is to make certain that the 
different territorial communities do have enough authority and enough 
capabilities to secure their independence and to preserve a modest 
pluralism and experimentation in world social process. 
The strategies that are authorized by constitutive process for both 
inclusive and exclusive use in the making and enforcing of decisions 
are those which political scientists describe as the diplomatic, the ideo­
logical, the economic, and the military. We can observe their unilateral 
or combined use, and their general or regional use. Sometimes they 
are employed persuasively, sometimes coercively. The general com­
munity preference in maintaining the process is, again, to emphasize 
persuasive use, as against the coercive. Most of us do not demand the 
maximization of coercion even in governmental processes. The more 
common emphasis is upon communication—the use of diplomatic and 
ideological instruments in the formulation of policies and rules. What 
we call legal process is largely an ideological exercise in which com­
munity policies or prescriptions—the so-called rules—are projected into 
the community in an effort to affect the expectations of people and the 
character of their interactions. Hence, the tremendous contemporary 
emphasis is on the importance of communication, the employment of 
the diplomatic and ideological instruments. Unfortunately, our experi­
ence in our national communities suggests that the coercive employment 
of the economic and military instruments cannot be entirely eliminated. 
Expectations of control must be made to accompany expectations of 
authority if government is to be effective. Movement toward putting 
effective control of the economic and the military instruments in the 
hands of inclusive decision-making has, however, been minimal. We 
must still rely upon voluntary commitments from the different states, 
the different territorial communities. 
The different kinds of decisions taken within the constitutive processes 
of nation-states are commonly described as legislative, executive, and 
administrative. As indicated above, these terms, however, refer more to 
structures of authority than to types of decisions. The most general 
notion is that of the making and application of law. If we expand this 
notion into a comprehensive, detailed picture, we must talk of a variety 
of types of decisions, or authority functions. 
First, there is an intelligence function—the acquisition, processing, 
and dissemination of the information that can guide rational decision. 
This is a function whose improvement is, for example, badly needed 
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with respect to the law of the sea. We just don't begin to have the 
information about fish, the riches of the sea bed, or contemporary 
security problems which can guide rational choice in distinguishing 
between common and special interests and in making plans for the 
better securing of common interests. 
Next, there is a "promotion" or recommending function, which 
includes the formulation of demands, the mobilization of support, and 
the propagation of demands. The question is who takes effective initia­
tive to get policies projected as authoritative community prescription. 
This is a function in which international governmental organizations, 
pressure groups, political parties, and the individual human being all 
play important roles. 
Most importantly, there is the prescribing or "legislative" function: 
the projection into the future of community policy which is both authori­
tative and controlling. Its proper performance includes the exploration 
of relevant facts and possible policies, the detailed clarification and choice 
of policy, and the communication of expectations of authority and con­
trol. Historically, this function has been performed both deliberately, 
through multilateral agreements and the resolutions of international gov­
ernmental bodies, and implicitly, through the creation of expectations 
by co-operative behavior. The basic policies sought have been those of 
comprehensiveness and dependability in the exploration of facts and 
possible policies, of rationality in the choice of policies, and of effective­
ness in communication. 
Another important function is that of invocation, the provisional 
characterization of facts in terms of community prescription and the 
setting in motion of the processes of decision. In one arena or another— 
international or national—most participants in the processes of effective 
power have access to this function. The basic policies sought include 
promptness in initiation, dependability, and minimization of provocation. 
The function of putting community prescriptions into controlling 
effect in particular instances is commonly referred to as that of "appli­
cation." This includes, in the minimum, the examination of potentially 
relevant facts and policies, a final characterization of the facts and a 
choice of policies, and enforcement measures. Since facts are always 
potential and community prescriptions, such as in the law of the sea, 
commonly travel in pairs of opposites, there are often great difficulties 
both in the final characterization of the facts and in the interpretation 
and integration of prescriptions for relation to the facts in ultimate 
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choice. The basic policies sought include promptness in the anticipation 
of crises, comprehensiveness and realism in the examination of facts, 
conformity of decision to basic community policies, and effectiveness in 
enforcement measures. 
Another indispensable function is that of "termination," that of 
putting an end to prescriptions and to arrangements effected under the 
prescriptions being terminated. This requires assessment of the facts 
alleged to condition the need for termination, the cancellation of the 
prescription or arrangement, and the adoption of measures designed to 
ameliorate the damages done by termination. The basic community 
policies sought include promptness in initiation, comprehensiveness and 
dependability in assessment, conformity of cancellation to basic com­
munity policies, and effectiveness in amelioration. 
A final function of "appraisal" includes the gathering, assessing, and 
disseminating information about the actual operation of the whole 
decision process. The same participants in effective power process who 
play an important role in the intelligence function obviously have a 
comparable role in appraisal. The basic policies sought include impar­
tiality, comprehensiveness, credibility, and persuasiveness. 
Such, then, are the main features of the comprehensive constitutive 
process of authoritative decision established and maintained by the effec­
tive elites of the world for securing their common interests in all aspects 
of world public order. It is this process which makes and applies what 
we call the international law of the sea. If we had the time, we could 
review, spotlight, and emphasize the features of this process that are 
particularly significant for the problems of making and applying the law 
of the sea. One obvious feature, for a quick recast, is in the still prim­
itive decentralization of the process—in the fact that nation-state officials 
still make most of the important decisions in relatively unorganized 
arenas and, hence, that all such decisions must be made with a promise 
of reciprocity and mutual tolerance for the other participants. One state 
cannot effectively claim what it is not willing to concede to others in 
comparable situations. 
It may require emphasis also that in the larger community, as in 
the component national communities, the ultimate sanctions of law are 
in the predispositions of human beings—the perspectives of the effective 
elites. To be effective one has to affect these perspectives. Resources, 
military hardware, raw materials—all these are important only as they 
affect the perspectives of living, breathing, human beings, the members 
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of audiences which are sought to be persuaded or controlled. The 
principal task in sanctioning, in securing conformity, is to affect the 
predispositions—the demands, identifications, and expectations—of peo­
ple and to cause them to want to clarify common interest and to reject 
claims of special interest. 
Another obvious feature (and this accounts for my animus against 
conferences) is that historically most international law has been made 
by custom—by people creating expectations in each other about the 
requirements for future decision by simply co-operating or engaging in 
collaborative activities. Such co-operation creates expectations about the 
uniformities in decision that are expected and required. The great bulk 
of our inherited prescriptions in the law of the sea had their origin in 
this way, and when the community achieves legislative prescription of 
this kind there is some guarantee of its rationality. That the same per­
sons—nation-state officials—must be both claimants against the com­
munity and decision-makers offers some safeguard against exaggerated, 
inflated claims. If what I claim I must concede to you, and if I am, in 
turn, a judge as well as a claimant, there is, the history of the law of 
the sea suggests, a chance to clarify common interest. In the present 
posture of world affairs, when a great conference is called and the 
representatives of the states gather around the table, they come with 
all of their perspectives, with instructions about the total policies of 
their states, the policies that relate not only to the law of the sea but to 
other things. Thus, a change in the customs duties charged by the 
United States on copper, the peculiar difficulties in relation to the Gulf 
of Aqaba, and a great variety of cold war issues are, all, alleged to 
have had impacts upon decision in the most recent conferences upon 
the law of the sea. The point is that when statesmen sit down at these 
great conferences, the total policy of all the major participants is at 
stake and a conference on the law of the sea is not the best place to 
dispose of, and reconcile, the total policies of such participants. There 
are so many intrusions of considerations that have no relation to the 
law of the sea that even the people who are most competent to make 
the law of the sea are not allowed to do so. Hence, until we can, by 
traditional customary processes, secure a greater consensus, a greater 
degree of clarity about what the common interests of peoples of the 
world are in relation to the important contemporary problems in the 
public order of the oceans, I think we should go very slow in encour­
aging a call for more conferences. 
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Let us return now to your primary interest and examine more 
closely the main features of our inherited international law of the sea. 
As some of you know, Professor Burke and I, in the long book with 
which I hope you are familiar, suggested that any realistic consideration 
of this subject must begin with the peculiarities of the social or com­
munity process by which the seas are exploited and enjoyed. There are 
in fact very great peculiarities in this process. The sea—in much higher 
degree than the land masses—is an easily sharable resource. It is tre­
mendously vast—its expanses are great. Most of its resources that we 
presently know are renewable, flow resources. Similarly, where one 
ship has just been, another, with proper roles of accommodation, can 
soon come. There are tremendous numbers of the peoples of the world 
who are capable of exploiting this resource, peoples who have the skills 
and other bases of power to make an effective contribution. There is a 
great range of objectives that can be satisfied from the exploitation of 
the seas. Familiar items are transportation, communication, and the 
production of food. Every value that we cherish in a free society may 
be affected by the use of the oceans, and scientific knowledge may dis­
close still new uses. The strategy in the use of this resource may be 
co-operative, non-competitive: what one gets, others may also get. For 
three centuries the important outcome of this co-operative enjoyment 
of the oceans has been a tremendous production of goods and services 
for distribution to the whole of mankind. 
It is from this community process in the enjoyment of the oceans 
that claims are made to the world constitutive process for the settlement 
of disputes and management of problems in co-operative use. For 
the better clarification of basic community policies—for sharpening our 
distinction between common and special interests and for the more 
economic accommodation of inclusive and exclusive interests—it is 
indispensable that we sharpen our categories of the claims that are 
made to processes of authority about the enjoyment of the sea. 
It is most convenient to think roughly in terms of three broad 
categories of claims. First, there are claims to access—to use and 
enjoyment. Secondly, there are claims to competence, to jurisdiction. 
By this reference I include both the making of law and the applica­
tion of law with respect to activities on the oceans. It is necessary to 
keep quite distinct the making and applying of law to activities on the 
ocean from the comparable functions with respect to other activities in 
world community process. Finally, there is the claim to resources. 
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These three different types of claims may be made with respect to 
any of the waters of the globe. They are made with respect to what 
we call internal waters. They are made with respect to what we call 
the territorial sea. They are made with respect to what we call the 
contiguous zones and more recently with respect to continental shelves 
or equivalents. They are also made with respect to what we call the 
high seas. 
You will observe my caution in using these words: internal waters, 
territorial sea, contiguous zone, continental shelf, and high seas. These 
are normative, ambiguous words. They refer both to facts and to legal 
consequences. They purport both to describe and to state preferences. 
It is better to think simply in terms of the geographical distribution of 
these types of claims to waters. The labels are too often merely reasons, 
justifications, that are given for different types of decisions or choices 
among competing claims. 
When we begin our task in clarifying basic community policies we 
can observe that for every state of the world, the exclusive interests are 
greater the closer one is to the shore. The farther one moves out from 
the shore, the more the inclusive interests predominate; and in the 
light of several centuries of highly successful co-operative enjoyment 
of the oceans it would appear that we should begin with a strong pre­
sumption in favor of the inclusive interest. Where there are many people 
capable of engaging and willing to engage in production, where the 
resource is sharable in high degree, and where the utmost production 
can be had from the sharing, we should begin with a presumption in 
favor of sharing. This does not mean, of course, that exclusive interests 
should be totally disregarded. What we require for rational decision is 
a way of balancing the exclusive interests of the coastal states in proxi­
mate waters and the inclusive interests of all the states in the utmost 
enjoyment of all waters which will take due account of differences in 
context. What Professor Burke and I have suggested is that we try to 
identify more sharply the change in exclusive interest as we move in 
successive stages out from the shore. 
If we begin closest to the shore—with what are called internal 
waters—I believe we can observe that the state has much the same 
interest in controlling activities in these immediately proximate waters 
as it has on its land masses. Even the control of access is commonly 
regarded as arbitrary. Incidentally, this has not always been so. Many 
of the founding fathers of international law believed in freedom of 
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access; remember that Vitoria wanted freedom of access to the Indians 
in order to convert them to Christianity. I know, however, of only one 
recent decision, the Saudi Arab-Aramco Arbitration, in which the court 
has held that there is a customary right of access, independent of explicit 
consent, to the internal waters of a state. The control of resources is 
also put largely in the hands of the coastal state, and the coastal state 
is honored in an assertion of exclusive competence, if it chooses, to 
make and apply law to any activities within these waters. 
Still I must remind you that this competence of the coastal state in 
internal waters is not absolute. Even on the land masses a state must 
make and apply its law subject to certain limitations imposed by inter­
national law. It is forbidden to abuse diplomats or to violate the law 
for the protection of aliens, the principles about responsibility of states. 
When questions are raised about the law of the sea, it is well to remem­
ber that states are confined to an inclusive, shared competence even on 
the land masses. This inclusive, shared competence is easily demon­
strated with respect to internal waters. Many states of the world honor 
a large competence in the state of registration to control activities on 
board a ship, even when within internal waters. There are activities 
which affect the internal constitution of the ship. Ships, like nation-
states in the larger community, have their own internal constitutive 
process. By and large these activities are left to the control of the state 
of registration. There are other activities which involve interactions with 
other people around the world—the making of agreements, the imposi­
tion of deprivations, and such like. The control of such activities is 
widely diffused by the traditional principles of jurisdiction. Competence 
may be accorded on the basis of territoriality to the coastal state. But it 
may also be accorded to the state of registration, or to the states of 
the nationalities of the actors, or to the states upon which the activities 
have impacts. This again is a widely shared competence. Other activities 
may uniquely affect the social process on the coast, on the land masses. 
It is agreed that the coastal state may control, may make and apply its 
law, to any such activities. 
When we move out from internal waters to the territorial sea, 
exclusive interest is still high but the inclusive interest begins to be 
more insistent. The principal modification is in relation to access. The 
ships of other states are said to have a right of innocent passage, but 
within this geographic zone the burden is put upon such ships of prov­
ing their innocence. The competence of the coastal state otherwise is 
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comparable to what it has on the land masses and within internal waters, 
but states seldom in fact exercise such competence in the same degree 
of comprehensiveness. 
When we move beyond the territorial sea to contiguous zones, coastal 
states, which regard themselves as uniquely affected or uniquely threat­
ened by specific activities on the oceans, may assert a competence to 
make and apply law in control of such activities, even though they are 
the activities of the nationals—the ships—of other states. In such geo­
graphic zones, however, the burden is put upon the coastal state to 
justify the reasonableness of what it does. The demonstration of reason­
ableness—of unique impacts and potential harms—requires a complete 
contextual examination of who is doing what to whom, under what 
circumstances, with what instrumentalities, with what assertions of 
authority, and with what alternatives for minimizing loss. Though it 
is impossible to outline briefly all the relevant indexes of "reasonable­
ness," it may be emphasized that the requirement imposes the exact 
opposite of arbitrary decision. The disciplined, systematic examination 
of all the features of the context is designed to facilitate a fair and 
economic accommodation of all the exclusive interests of the coastal 
state in protecting itself with the inclusive interests of all states in the 
enjoyment of the oceans. 
The concept of the continental shelf, in terms of its contemporary 
legal significance, had its origin simply as a way of allocating to the 
coastal state the resources of the proximate ocean bed. From the way 
the Dutch are now using this concept, as I gather from the papers I 
have seen by some of you, it would appear that an effort is being made 
to generalize it to embrace a more comprehensive set of legal conse­
quences. It would seem that the Dutch are really claiming a large 
portion of sovereignty over the continental shelf. This is a complete 
perversion of the original notion. The original notion accorded priority 
to the inclusive interest in all uses of the ocean waters other than for 
exploitation of the minerals, the riches of the sea bed. The concept of a 
contiguous zone could very easily have protected the interests of the 
Dutch which you describe. The difficulty may have been caused by 
certain recent restrictive attitudes toward the availability of contiguous 
zones. It may be recalled that some English writers give little explicit 
recognition to contiguous zones. The English employ the concept but 
don't like to admit it. Similarly, the Convention on the Territorial Sea 
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and Contiguous Zone purports to put an arbitrary twelve mile limit on 
contiguous zones and greatly to limit the purposes for which they may 
be employed. Hence, the Dutch may have felt that under such highly 
limited interpretations of our past experience, they had no recourse for 
stopping attacks from the outside other than by inflation of the conti­
nental shelf device. It could be a minor tragedy that they did not, 
instead, adopt a more rational conception of contiguous zones. 
When we get out to what are called the high seas, the assumption 
is that the inclusive interest prevails. It is commonly agreed that states 
have complete equality of access, with none being able to bar the others; 
that each state makes and applies law to its own ships; and that no 
state can apply its unilateral competence to the ships of other states 
except for violations of international law. The intellectual task is largely 
that of balancing and accommodating potentially conflicting inclusive 
interests. We do this in many ways—both by customary prescriptions 
defining reasonableness and by conventions of all kinds, such as those 
establishing the rules of the road. 
In this emphasis upon an areal organization of claims I have left out 
certain important types of claims which relate to the demarcation of 
such areas. The first problem is that of fixing the limits of internal 
waters. The criteria by which such limits should be fixed depend of 
course upon what difference it makes how we fix them. In the light 
of our discussion above, such criteria must require a careful balancing of 
inclusive and exclusive interests. If one extends internal waters far out 
into the oceans, one only increases exclusive interest—the control of 
the coastal state—to the detriment of inclusive interests. Unfortunately, 
some provisions in the 1958 conventions, in extending internal waters 
out beyond any previous conception, do just this. The Norwegian 
Fisheries case, of course, had set a model for this parochial arrogance. 
On its facts and closest reasoning, the Norwegian Fisheries case was 
perhaps not too much subject to criticism. The essential policy estab­
lished was that if a coastal state can show a unique exclusive interest 
in the management of certain immediately adjacent waters, then it can 
assert and protect this interest. In other words, a state is authorized to 
run a line for demarcating internal waters in the general direction of 
its coast if there is a history of exclusive fishing, if there are rocks and 
bays and other configurations which affect internal security, and if 
there is special economic need. This decision was, however, much 
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inflated in the 1958 conventions. It has been even more inflated in 
subsequent claims. The consequence has been a tremendous damage to 
inclusive interests. 
The next type of demarcation claim relates to the width of the 
territorial sea. I remain a diehard on this. It seems to me that if our 
experience upon the oceans has demonstrated anything, it is that it is 
in the best interests of the peoples of the world to have the narrowest 
possible territorial sea. I sometimes tell my class that this should be 
the low-tide mark. There isn't any need even for a three mile terri­
torial sea. I say this for two reasons. First, in terms of military security, 
the width of the territorial sea is today almost wholly irrelevant. Sec­
ondly, it is probably no less irrelevant for fishing; if the habits of fish 
are such as are commonly described, the control of a territorial sea 
has very little to do with the rational exploitation of a fishery. The one 
function then that a territorial sea might serve in the contemporary 
world is that of protecting a very petty minimum order. It might assist 
in protection against small intrusions—such as violations of the immi­
gration laws, or of customs and health regulations, and so on. It is 
possible, however, that a flexible concept of contiguous zones could 
offer even better protection against such intrusions. In fact, an appro­
priate balancing of inclusive and exclusive interests might suggest that 
there is today just no rational ground for a territorial sea at all. 
The next claims relate to the width of the contiguous zone and the 
continental shelf. What are the contemporary limits on these tradi­
tionally very rough and flexible areal delimitations? During World 
War II, when our purpose was the protection of military security and 
neutrality, we claimed as far as 1,300 miles. Other states have also 
made extensive claims. For customs, I believe there are statutes on 
our books making claims for as much as 150 miles. I wonder if these 
statutes have been repealed by the enactment of the 1958 Convention. 
It seems to me utterly incredible that anybody could ever have voted 
for a twelve mile limit on contiguous zones. We are not living with 
such a limit; we couldn't live with it! I don't know any major state 
which could live with it. It does not, furthermore, make matters any 
better that "security" was omitted from the 1958 Convention as a per­
missible purpose for contiguous zones. The suggestion was made at 
the 1958 Conference that states don't need contiguous zones for security 
because they can employ self-defense anywhere. It should need little 
argument, for anyone who has followed the discussion on Vietnam or 
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Cuba, that self-defense, with its requirements of necessity and propor­
tionality, is a much more difficult concept than that of contiguous zone, 
which requires a showing only of reasonableness. 
With specific reference to the continental shelf, as we all know, the 
geographic configurations around the world are very, very different; 
but here the geographers and lawyers are in great disagreement. The 
achievement on this was of course the highlight in brilliance of the 
1958 conventions. What was the provision: to a depth of 200 meters 
or as far as one can dig? How far one can dig, if one can trust the 
New York Times, is apparently changing every few minutes. This is 
again the kind of legislation which emerges from these great conferences. 
The important tasks in the accommodation of inclusive and exclusive 
interests are left to the future. 
The final type of claim is that which relates to the nationality of 
ships. The whole structure of authoritative decision about which we 
have been talking is, as was noted, a highly decentralized, unorganized 
structure, in which the laws are made and applied by the officials of 
states. Such a structure will work only if there are certain simple rules 
by which everybody abides. There have been a few such rules, cast in 
both positive and negative form, which have made this process work 
for three hundred years. The most important is, as suggested above, 
that every state has complete freedom of access to the high seas and 
that no state can preclude the ships of any other state from access. A 
second is that each state may make and apply law to its own ships— 
that is, to the internal constitution of its ships—and that no state may 
make and apply law to the ships of other states except for violations 
of international law. The linch-pin in this simple system has been the 
further rule that no state may question the competence of another state 
to confer its nationality upon a ship. If a ship has acquired one nation­
ality, it cannot acquire another or be treated as having another until 
it loses the first. 
This system worked very well prior to the 1958 Conference on the 
Law of the Sea. The conferees, however, took from the Nottebohm 
decision the mysterious concept of genuine link, which has never been 
defined and clarified even with respect to individual human beings, and 
purported to apply it to ships. Human beings can go up on a land 
mass and circulate in the different territorial communities; ships, ordi­
narily, cannot. The concept of "genuine link" must perform a very 
different function when related to the human rights of the individual 
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human beings and when related to effectiveness in the enjoyment of 
the oceans. It would appear quite arbitrary to borrow the concept from 
the one context for application in another, especially when it had not 
even been appropriately tested in the first. Nobody has ever suggested 
any empirical idexes, or policy relevance, of what the words "genuine 
link" could mean as applied to a ship. The traditional policies that 
nation-states have employed in conferring nationality on ships have 
little or nothing to do with the international enjoyment of the oceans. 
The only rational policy about the nationality of ships in the interna­
tional arena, must be that which promotes the effectiveness, the har­
monious functioning, of our inherited law of the sea. Should one state 
be given the competence to question, on any ground, another state's 
competence to charter ships for the enjoyment of the oceans, there 
would be grave risk of subverting the whole process. A premium would 
be placed upon naked power, rather than authority, in the maintenance 
of access to the oceans. 
The most general theme which I suggest to you as a framework 
for guiding your inquiries about the various problems in the law of the 
sea is, then, that of the necessity for relating all your considerations 
and recommendations to the basic policies for which the peoples of the 
world maintain a comprehensive constitutive process of authoritative 
decision: to clarify and secure their common interests and to reject all 
claims of special interest. Your task is to relate the claims of states, 
about every particular problem, to their inclusive and exclusive interests 
and to recommend solutions which will both accommodate and integrate 
such common interests and reject all claims of special interest, which 
do not admit of reciprocity and shared enjoyment. The adequate per­
formance of this task will require of you a systematic and disciplined 
examination of the larger context which affects every particular problem. 
Precisely who is claiming to do what to whom, for what objectives, 
in what domains, by what strategies (of what degrees of coerciveness), 
and with what value consequences? Who claims injury and a right of 
response, with respect to whom, and so on? What competence to make 
and apply law is asserted on each side? What is the relation of the 
claims on each side to basic community interests, inclusive and exclu­
sive? What are the alternatives open to a decision-maker, identified 
with common interests, for accommodating the claims and ameliorating 
injuries? The problems become no easier when posed in such a con­
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textual framework, but the mere asking of the relevant questions may 
point us toward more appropriate solutions and encourage the gathering 
of the kind of information necessary for such solutions. 
It does not escape me that this basic policy criterion of securing and 
protecting the common interests of all mankind in the shared enjoyment 
of the oceans is likely to have a hard time in the calculable future. The 
conditions of interdependence or interdetermination and the fantastic 
improvements in global communication do of course work toward the 
better securing and clarification of common interest. Unfortunately, how­
ever, the public order of the oceans is deeply affected by the more 
comprehensive models of world public order demanded by the effective 
elites of the world, and we do not today have a single projected world 
public order—embodying only the values of human dignity or a free 
society—but rather a number of contending world public orders, all 
aspiring to be universal, but honoring the values of security, freedom, 
and abundance in very different degree. The kind of future public order 
of the oceans we can achieve must of necessity be a function of the 
outcome of this larger struggle. When it is added that even the pro­
ponents of a public order of human dignity—both rich and poor, North 
and South—can sometimes mistake their long-term common interests 
and make claims of special interest, your task can be seen to become 
even more formidable. 
I suppose, however, that few of us would be here if we were wholly 
pessimistic. My predecessor at Yale, Professor Edwin Borchard, had 
a saying that a man is an optimist who thinks the future is uncertain. 
The future public order of the oceans would not yet appear completely 
foreclosed for claims of special interest and monopoly. You would 
appear still to have opportunity to influence it. I wish you and your 
conference the greatest success in doing so. 
* A transcription. The basic themes here discussed are developed in more 
detail in McDougal, Lasswell, and Reisman, "The World Constitutive Process of 
Authoritative Decision" (a chapter in Black and Falk, The Future of the Inter­
national Legal Order, to be published late in 1967, with separate publication in 
the Journal of Legal Education, Vol. XIX, Issues 3 and 4, 1967) and McDougal 
and Burke, The Public Order of the Oceans (1962). 
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1. Why is precision necessary in regard to nationalities of ships at 
sea but not so necessary in terms of boundaries? The function of 
nationality is to insure all people freedom of access to the sea; if you 
permit anybody to question someone else's competence to confer nation­
ality on a craft, then freedom of the sea is gone. But in many boundary 
problems precision is undesirable until you're sure first what a particular 
line is for, and second that within a short space of time it may not be 
necessary to change it in the light of new developments. 
2. Has not the development of technology meant that freedom of 
the seas is no longer a valid rule? Under conditions of complete freedom, 
the technologically advanced countries of the world are going to rapidly 
deplete the resources of the sea. We've got to evolve from the principle 
of freedom of the seas to a principle of common interest for mankind 
in a regulated high sea, carried out by some general international 
organization. 
But the major states of the world are not going to put control over 
the sea's resources in the hands of an international organization. And 
it is possible that more benefits can be obtained through give and take 
than through dictation from above. The development of the resources 
of the high seas will not take place in a vacuum, but rather under the 
laws of the particular states which are doing the exploiting. Rather 
than systems of regulation, the important question will be what are the 
reasonable indexes of effective control over these resources ? 
3. From the viewpoint of economics, does not freedom of access 
to a resource lead to economic waste in the future? Not in the case of 
space extension resources, where the principle use is communications 
or travel. And for other resources, waste may be part of the price for 
the achievement of total goals—social as well as economic. Even the 
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concept of maximum sustainable yield must be viewed within the con­
text of the existing socio-economic conditions within an existing area. 
By utilizing the criteria of flexibilty and reasonableness the principle 
of maximum freedom of the seas can be made to work. 
4. The Geneva Conventions resulted in considerable expansion at 
the expense of the high seas. The acceptance of the straight baseline 
regime, the twelve mile contiguous zone, the ambiguity of the outer 
limits of the continental shelf—such principles are eroding away the 
extent of the areas which remain free to all nations. 
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Chapter Two: 
THE CONVENTION ON FISHERIES AND CONSERVATION 
OF LIVING RESOURCES: ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF 
THE 1958 GENEVA CONFERENCE 
The subject of international law confuses and baffles most laymen, since 
the procedure by which it is developed, although having some similarities 
to the formulation of domestic law, has even more dissimilarities. Inter­
national law of fisheries has been developing at an increasing pace during 
the past several decades to reach a climax—at least a temporary climax— 
in the 1958 Geneva Fishery Convention. I shall attempt to review the 
events which led to this convention, its principal contents and some­
thing of their significance. I hope that this will shed some light on the 
interests, influences, and procedures which go into the development of 
international law—at least of international law on fisheries. 
The 1958 Fisheries Convention had its genesis in the developing 
international fishery situation of the late forties and fifties. During these 
years certain problems affecting fishery jurisdiction had been brought 
to the United Nations and referred to the International Law Commission, 
which was charged with the study of Law of the Sea. This Commission 
in its annual sessions had labored on these problems and had embodied 
its conclusions, which at this stage might be construed as preliminary 
and tentative, in reports which were circulated to governments for 
comment. For reasons I shall presently mention, at that time U.S. 
officials concerned with fisheries paid little attention to the reports of 
the International Law Commission. 
The United States, beginning with the Fur Seal Convention in its 
first limited form, later in the forties and fifties through the Halibut 
and Salmon Conventions, and finally, the Inter-American Tropical Tuna 
Convention, the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Convention, and the North 
Pacific Fisheries Convention, had acquired considerable experience in 
the development and operation of fishery conventions dealing with con­
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servation and in determining how they might be made effective. In the 
light of this experience the early International Law Commission pro­
posals seemed directed backward toward the situation of the thirties 
rather than forward to the developing problems of the fifties and sixties. 
For this reason, it did not seem likely that these proposals would lead 
to conclusions that would be very helpful in contemporary or future 
fisheries situations or that they would enlist much support from interested 
countries. At this time, also, the United States was having considerable 
difficulty stemming from the efforts of certain countries to impose by 
force on United States fishing vessels operating on the high seas off 
their coasts, their extreme claims to jurisdiction. These countries gen­
erally argued that their claims were justified by the requirements of 
conservation, that jurisdiction was necessary in order to prevent the 
destruction of resources by the long ranging fishing fleets of other 
countries (also ecosystems and biomes). They refused to consider as 
the solution of the conservation problem the accepted procedure of 
international co-operation in research and joint regulation. 
Early in 1954, it occurred to some of us in the Department of State 
that instead of taking a negative attitude toward the work of the 
International Law Commission it could be more productive to get this 
Commission to consider some of the newer concepts evolving from 
experience with the several international fishery commissions. Such 
action would stimulate the development of a forward-looking legal 
system which would serve the growing needs of the international com­
munity. This question was discussed repeatedly in meetings of the 
Department's Fishing Industry Advisory Committee where it was 
viewed with considerable mistrust as leading into an area beyond our 
control and initiating developments that would be disadvantageous to 
us. There was a widespread conviction that when the United States 
became involved in broad international deliberations we usually lost 
more than we gained. After considerable debate, the opposition to the 
proposed procedure was quieted to the extent that opposition and 
support were at an approximate stand off. In this situation we decided 
to proceed with caution in sounding out the international support we 
might enlist on such a project. 
We first consulted with officials of a number of countries, particularly 
those of the United Kingdom and Canada, to sound out their reaction 
toward promoting a world conference with the objective of incorporating 
in a broad international convention some of the principles we had found 
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useful in bilateral and multilateral conservation conventions. We 
reasoned that unless some effective international rules on fishing and 
conservation were agreed upon, unilateral actions would create increasing 
chaos. The officials of both countries, after several discussions and a 
careful review of the situation, were in substantial agreement with the 
proposed objective. 
In the fall of 1954 the United States placed on the agenda of the 
United Nations the proposal to convene a joint technical and legal 
conference to seek to develop agreement on international rules for 
dealing with conservation of high seas fishery resources. The United 
States proposed that because of its technical nature the item be referred 
to the Economics Committee. However, this proposal was viewed with 
some suspicion by the United Nations legal experts and was shifted to 
the Legal Committee of the United Nations. The international lawyers 
were not inclined to allow the technical people to intrude upon their 
world of international rule-making. The Legal Committee gave short 
shrift to the proposal for a joint meeting of technical and legal experts 
to consider international law on fisheries. However, after much dis­
cussion, maneuvering and lobbying by those interested in including 
scientists and administrators in a conference dealing with international 
law and conservation, agreement was finally reached that the United 
Nations would convene an international technical conference on living 
resources of the sea. The United Nations resolution specifically pro­
vided that the conference was "to make appropriate scientific and 
technical recommendations and shall not prejudice the related problems 
awaiting consideration by the General Assembly" and "Decides to refer 
the report of the said scientific and technical conference to the Inter­
national Law Commission as a further technical contribution to be taken 
into account in its study of the questions to be dealt with in the final 
report which it is to prepare pursuant to resolution 899 (IX) of 
14 December 1954." We considered it highly desirable to convene the 
conference at a very early date to forestall attempts at development of 
fragmented or regional international law. Although conference experts 
advised that it would take at least a year of preparatory work, the United 
Nations in December, 1954, agreed to convene the conference at Rome 
in April, 1955. 
A committee of international fishery experts was convened by the 
United Nations staff on short notice in mid-December, 1954, to work 
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out an agenda for the conference. It completed its work prior to the 
Christmas recess. A number of background papers were solicited from 
experts in the field to be available prior to convening the conference. 
The United Nations Technical Conference on Living Resources of 
the Sea was convened by the United Nations in Rome on April 18, 
1955, with the FAO playing host (but not sponsor). Forty-five countries 
sent representatives and six sent observers. This included practically all 
countries with a sea coast and a number that were landlocked. Many 
of those countries, which at the United Nations had strenuously opposed 
having technical experts join with legal people in considering inter­
national law regarding fisheries, were represented by their legal experts. 
Most of the fishing nations, particularly the European and North 
American nations, were represented by their principal fisheries people 
with many of the leading fishery scientists of the world included as 
advisers. So in point of fact we had achieved a conference of scientists 
and legal experts, which had been an original United States objective. 
Klaus Sunnana of Norway, a well-known fisheries administrator, was 
elected Chairman, and Francisco Garcia-Amador of Cuba, Chairman of 
the United Nations Legal Committee and a member of the International 
Law Commission, was elected vice-chairman. 
In the early stages of the conference the issue of coastal countries' 
jurisdiction, without regard to realistic conservation requirements or 
co-operation of the fishing countries, played a dominant role. However, 
as the conference progressed the influence of the scientists became an 
increasingly important factor in defining the kind of scientific information 
required for effective conservation of high seas resources and the extent 
of international co-operation needed to achieve this objective. In the 
course of the three weeks plus of the conference wide agreement was 
reached regarding the definition of conservation and the principles and 
policies that would lead to effective international co-operation in 
conservation programs. 
Following the termination of the Rome conference the results were 
taken to the meeting of the International Law Commission in Geneva 
(which convened about a week after the Rome conference closed) by 
Dr. Garcia-Amador, vice-chairman of the Rome Conference, and were 
used as the basis for a new set of articles on fisheries. Understandably, 
it came as a shock to most of the International Law Commission mem­
bers who had not been involved in the United Nations and Rome 
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activities that they should throw out the fishery articles on which they 
had been working for several years and consider a new approach to the 
problem. However, as those members came to understand that serious 
consideration of the International Law Commission proposals by the 
United Nations was unlikely unless they took into account the con­
clusions of the Technical Rome Conference, they accepted the new draft 
as the basis for their further deliberations. 
Several of the technical people who had attended the Rome Con­
ference moved on to Geneva so that they would be available for con­
sultation by members of the International Law Commission. Perhaps 
they played a part in convincing some members of the realities of 
the situation. 
The conclusions from the 1955 sessions of the International Law 
Commission were circulated and the comments of governments solicited. 
The proposals, influenced by the Rome conference, had evolved sub­
stantially toward the ideas we had in mind when the United Nations 
operation was initiated. The United States government examined the 
International Law Commission report and made a point of commenting 
at length on the further changes that we considered essential and the 
reasons therefor. Other interested governments did likewise. At its 
1956 session the International Law Commission reviewed its 1955 
draft in the light of the comments received. Once again a number of 
fishery experts were on hand for consultation as needed. After exten­
sive debate and drafting, a new report was completed and circulated to 
governments for study and comments. 
The 1956 report of the International Law Commission was substan­
tially in line with the objectives of the United States and of the other 
countries interested in conservation which had joined with the United 
States in encouraging the work. The United States then took the lead 
in the United Nations in proposing a world conference to be convened 
at Geneva in 1958 to seek agreement on fisheries as well as other Law 
of the Sea matters. The principal background material for this confer­
ence was to consist of the report of the International Law Commission, 
together with the comments of governments. 
Prior to the convening of the 1958 Geneva Conference, United 
States experts spent considerable time consulting with the officials of 
other countries, particularly in the field of fisheries, to develop agree­
ment on objectives and co-operation in working for their attainment. 
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This was the principal preparatory background which contributed to 
the fisheries work of the Geneva Conference. 
The United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea convened at 
Geneva, Switzerland, on February 24, 1958, and closed on April 27, 
1958. Eighty-six countries were represented (the family of nations had 
grown somewhat since 1955). The basic work of the conference was 
divided among four committees: First Committee—Territorial Sea and 
Contiguous Zone; Second Committee—High Seas: General Regime; 
Third Committee—High Seas: Fishing; Conservation of the Living 
Resources; Fourth Committee—Continental Shelf. I shall comment 
primarily on developments in the Third Committee which dealt with 
fisheries. 
The countries which played an active role in the Third Committee 
might be divided into three groups based on their general attitudes 
toward high seas fishing. The first might be termed conservatives, since 
their interest was primarily in maintaining the past freedoms to fish 
with the minimum of restrictions on such activities; the second group 
might be termed radicals or extremists since their efforts were directed 
toward completely overturning the established order for the purpose of 
securing maximum control by coastal states over the fishery resources 
in waters adjacent to their coast (regardless of the extent to which 
they were utilizing these resources or the likelihood that they would 
utilize them in the foreseeable future). A third group, which I shall 
term moderates, sought some modification of the established order pri­
marily for the purpose of securing a sound and practicable international 
conservation system that would assure the continued productivity of 
the resources of the high seas. As the issues became clear and delegates 
became convinced of the need for an effective world conservation sys­
tem, the group of moderates increased somewhat in number. This was 
encouraged by the conclusions of some of the more reasonable con­
servatives and extremists that they could not secure adequate support 
for their preferred objectives and that they had better settle for a sound 
conservation system in preference to nothing (or chaos). 
The United States fishing industry includes important fisheries on the 
high seas off foreign shores as well as off our own coast, and this helped 
us to work out a United States position which to a considerable extent 
represented a blending of the interests of the overseas and coastal types 
of fishing. Thus, the United States interests lay with the moderates and 
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the generally united backing of our fishing industry helped to make it 
possible for the United States representatives to play an important role 
in leadership of the moderate faction. 
As the conference developed, it became clear that the various delega­
tions were principally concerned with three issues: (a) the kinds of 
limitations on freedom of fishing on the high seas, (b) the obligations 
which fishing nations have with respect to conservation measures for 
the stocks of fish they are harvesting, (c) the special interests of the 
"coastal states" over the resources off their coasts. Another lesser issue, 
finally settled on the basis of the Rome conference conclusions, was the 
definition of conservation. 
From the above issues, a number of intense controversies developed, 
outstanding among which was the drive for additional jurisdiction by 
"coastal states." The coastal states justified their claims on various 
grounds, great emphasis being placed on the argument that only in this 
way could conservation be assured, that only the coastal states were 
sufficiently concerned with conservation to enforce the necessary restric­
tions on fishing. (Pseudo-scientific arguments based on ecology did not 
impress many delegations.) The opponents of the jurisdiction proposals 
maintained that effective conservation could be achieved only through 
the co-operation of all concerned countries in an effective research and 
management program. 
The second area of contention evolved from the first; most of the 
moderate group and finally some of the conservatives were prepared to 
concede the special interest of the coastal states in conservation of the 
fish stocks off their coasts and the special rights that derived from this, 
provided these rights were strictly related to the needs of conservation 
and could not be used to discriminate against foreign fishermen. These 
delegates were much concerned to prevent abuses by the coastal states 
of any new powers that might be agreed upon and as a practical matter 
could not agree upon these new powers unless adequate safeguards were 
included. 
Out of these needs came the proposal for technical and scientific 
criteria to assure that the special authority of the coastal state would be 
properly used. Many of the "fishing states" were concerned that these 
criteria might not be strictly observed, while on the other hand the 
coastal states were concerned that the generally superior research facili­
ties of fishing states would be devoted primarily to demonstrating that 
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strict limitations on fishing were unnecessary. This controversy led to 
the development of a procedure for settlement of disputes regarding the 
interpretation of the scientific and administrative evidence bearing on 
the need for conservation measures and the kind of measures to be 
adopted. The development of this procedure, spelled out in articles 9, 
10, and 11, made it possible finally for most of the fishing states to agree 
upon the new powers for the coastal states and for most of the coastal 
states to accept the strict criteria which would prevent abuse of these 
new powers. 
The three principal issues I have mentioned above are reflected in 
the fisheries convention as follows: Freedom to fish is covered in Article 
1, paragraph 1; Obligations of Fishing States are covered in Article 1, 
paragraph 2 and Articles 3, 4, and 5. Special interests of coastal states 
are covered in Articles 6 and 7. Definition of conservation is included 
in Article 2. 
Since the special powers of the coastal states could be accepted by 
most of the conservatives and many of the moderates, only with the 
protection provided by the arbitral procedure, the committee agreed 
that these articles must be accepted or refused as a whole. This require­
ment is included in Article 19 which stipulates that no reservations can 
be made to Articles 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, and 12. Finally, the draft articles 
were put to the vote which was 45 in favor, 1 against, and 18 abstentions. 
Representatives of the Soviet Union and other bloc countries expressed 
support for all of the articles except the provisions for obligatory settle­
ment of disagreements. They abstained in the voting. 
There was one other important proposal submitted by the United 
States and Canada, the "abstention" principle or procedure. This prin­
ciple, incorporated in its essentials in the North Pacific Fisheries Con­
vention, was described in the United States-Canada submission to the 
1958 Geneva Conference as follows: 
The "abstention" concept, as described above, relates to situations where 
Coastal States have, through the expenditure of time, effort, and money on 
research management, and through drastic restraint on their fishermen, increased 
or maintained the productivity of stocks of fish, which without such action 
would not exist or would exist at far below their most productive level. 
Under such conditions and when the stocks are being fully utilized, that is, 
under such exploitation that an increase in the amount of fishing would not 
result in any substantial increase in the sustainable yield, then States not 
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participating, or which have not in recent years participated in exploitation of 
such stocks of fish, excepting the coastal States adjacent to the waters in which 
the stocks occur, should be required to abstain from participation in such 
fisheries. 
The abstention procedure takes into account the fact that under the conditions 
stated above, the present, the continuing or the growing productivity of the 
stocks of fish is the result of and dependent on past and current action of the 
participating States, and that the participation of additional States would result 
in no increase in the amount of useful products. Rather than increasing pro­
duction the advent of additional States is almost sure to stimulate the deteriora­
tion or stagnation of such conservation activities through removing the incentive 
for maintaining the conservation programmes. 
In recognition of a "special interest" on the part of a coastal State, the 
adjacent coastal State should be excepted from the operation of the rule 
regarding abstention. Strict and precise criteria should be laid down in the 
qualifications of a fishery for the rule, and questions arising as to qualifications 
referred to the arbitral procedure contemplated by International Law Com­
mission articles 57-59. 
After considerable discussion the Fisheries Committee approved this 
proposal as a resolution, by more than a two-thirds vote. However, 
when it came before the plenary session it became involved with other 
issues (the Israel-Arab controversy) and failed to obtain the two-thirds 
majority required for adoption by the conference. (However it obtained 
a good majority vote.) This was the only important United States 
proposal on fisheries which we were unsuccessful in having adopted by 
the conference. 
Prior to the Law of the Sea Conference in 1958 there was very little 
that one could conclude with respect to accepted rights and duties bearing 
on conservation of fish. (The Rome Conference in 1955 began the pro­
cess of formulating world-wide agreed-upon practices.) The Geneva 
Fisheries Convention was the first to develop an international code 
respecting fisheries. The United States has ratified the convention which 
came into effect in March, 1966, when the Netherlands provided the 
twenty-second ratification. However, the convention cannot be considered 
to represent international law, at least in total, until substantially more 
ratifications are obtained. Nevertheless, even prior to its effective date, 
the convention has done much to provide precedents and standards for 
bilateral and multilateral agreements. There is no doubt that should there 
be disputes between countries regarding certain of the rights and duties 
spelled out in the convention, and the dispute taken to the World Court, 
that court would give great weight to the provisions of the convention. 
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Now, eight years since the Geneva Fisheries Convention was nego­
tiated, we must admit that much of the world has not yet caught up with 
its provisions, in practice at least. With this in mind the United States 
has recently begun to talk up a proposal that the FAO convene a World 
Fishery Conference that would consider, among other fishery matters, 
how the convention could be most effectively implemented and en­
courage more ratifications. Such a conference could also consider 
auxiliary procedures, such as the development of joint enforcement 
measures, which would make the provisions of the Geneva Fisheries 
Convention more effective. However, those interested in conservation 
will have to be on the alert to forestall attempts to muster support for 
modifications which would reduce the effectiveness of the convention. 
It is unfortunately true that while amendments to an agreement can 
make such an agreement more effective, they can also serve to weaken it. 
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Chapter Three: 
THE 1958 CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA: 
WHAT WAS ACCOMPLISHED 
I. Introduction 
In preparing this paper, I confess to a point of view based on the 
interests of United States commercial fisheries, particularly the domes­
tic shrimp fishery. It has been to the interest of the shrimp fishery to 
accent the doctrine of freedom of the seas for fishing1 because the 
shrimp fishery is classified in part as a distant fishery, as is also true 
with tuna. This position also explains in advance the apprehension of 
this fishery as to attachment to any continental shelf doctrine. Despite 
this concern, it is still possible to speak objectively on the influence of 
the several Law of the Sea conventions on developing international law. 
This paper is scheduled to follow a presentation made by William C. 
Herrington, the man I consider most eminently qualified to discuss the 
1958 Geneva Convention on Fisheries,2 so I confine this discussion to 
other topics at Geneva in 1958 and 1960: (1) the Territorial Sea and 
Contiguous Zone, (2) the High Seas, and (3) the Continental Shelf. 
II. Preparatory Work—The International Law Commission 
For eight years preceding Geneva, 1958, the International Law 
Commission studied, debated and formulated what they considered to 
be the traditional law of the sea. The conventions here under discussion 
show generally no radical departure from the commission's recommen­
dations. Without the commission's "stirring up the waters" and pro­
viding a springboard, it is doubtful that any accord could have been 
reached in 1958. 
CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 
Some writers have criticized the work of the commission as too 
stylized, or vague, or lacking imagination.3 It appears that the commis­
sion did not conceive of itself as a legislative body. The report ended 
in being an annotation of majority and minority views with some 
attempt to balance the equities. 
I am an admirer of Dr. Francisco Garcia-Amador, chairman of the 
commission, whom I first met at Havana during the negotiation of a 
convention between the United States and Cuba for the conservation 
of shrimp.4 I also consider his book, The Exploitation and Conserva­
tion of the Resources of the Sea,5 a must reading on that subject. 
In my own preparation for the 1958 Conference, I am also indebted 
to Professor S. A. Bayitch of my alma mater, the University of Miami 
School of Law, who provided me with his Inter-American Law of 
Fisheries6 while it was still in manuscript form. 
III. What Makes Them Vote as They Bo? 
The topic assigned is "What Was Accomplished," but in relating to 
some extent "How It Was Accomplished," we should show the action 
and interaction that took place then in a condensed fashion within a 
short time, but which continues to bubble in a more leisurely manner 
around the world today. 
To a neophyte like me, this world conference had some revelations. 
One was the mass of A/CONF documents ground out endlessly by 
duplicating machines.7 These reflected the patent moves, countermoves 
and positions of individual states or blocs. There was the constant 
attempt to lobby certain delegates concerning certain points. There was 
Lesson Number One: That the real reason for a state voting in a 
certain fashion must be learned if one would become proficient in the 
grim game of estimating how that state would vote on hypothetical 
proposals.8 Number Two: How did you slightly alter your pet proposal 
to make it inviting to more voters? 
Then there were the blocs; the Europeans, the Latin Americans, 
the Africans. There were the peacemakers, principally the Indians, who 
sought harmony for the sake of harmony. The international lawyers of 
renown outnumbered the scientists, and many important decisions were 
decisions for reasons of state. These reasons were varied. Some were 
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internal policy of the particular state, and many were grounded on 
national pride. Not enough, for my liking, were truly based on science; 
yet it must be admitted that the sciences of fisheries and oceanography 
are infants. 
The same action and interaction go on today. You cannot move in 
this area from any narrow point of view, whether it be legal, economic, 
or scientific. You need a combined and broad view plus an inner view 
of the self-interest of each state involved. 
Geneva, 1958, was a real step forward in the Law of the Sea, despite 
the unresolved matters remaining. First, in certain areas it codified 
existing law and by large majority votes put an end to speculative and 
argumentative theories. Second, it focused attention on other subjects 
and crystallized thinking to a sharp point by the interaction of opposing 
theories in debate. Third, often where full accord was not reached, it 
provided some weight of authority by actual votes recorded as greatly 
in favor of certain premises and opposed to others. Fourth, the enunci­
ating of principles has made it easier for later bilateral and multilateral 
agreements between states. Fifth, it has placed restraints upon states 
who would move against the principles enunciated, whether or not those 
states ratify the respective conventions. 
Let us examine a few of the positive accomplishments of the 1958 
Conference. 
IV. The Regime of the High Seas 
Of all the 1958 Conventions at Geneva, the one on the High Seas 
contained more "codification" than any other. We fishermen especially 
note the preservation of the principle of the right to fish;9 then the 
definition of piracy; anti-pollution measures; protection of cables; the 
right of states without sea coasts to use the seas freely. I recall the most 
troublesome matter as being concerned with flags of convenience, and 
the strong language of Article 5 of this Convention: "There must 
exist a genuine link between the state and the ship; in particular, the 
state must effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control in adminis­
trative, technical and social matters over ships flying its flag." It does 
appear that this well-intentioned language is a step forward, but it 
cannot be said that genuine results have followed the exhortation. 
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V. The Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone 
This convention helped to crystallize international law in the con­
fused area of "straight baselines," a matter which had been greatly 
stirred up by the recent Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case decision in 
1951.10 This is no dead issue today. Canada's recent unilateral move 
to a twelve mile fishing sea is partially cloudy because of uncertain 
baselines and because of claims to historic bays, another item on the 
Geneva agenda. 
The conference denied the extreme claims for special baselines for 
archipelagoes advanced by Indonesia and the Philippines. It set reason­
able distances for determining bays as historic waters and devoted a 
great deal of attention to the serious subject of innocent passage. The 
Territorial Sea Convention defined low-tide elevations as distinguished 
from islands. 
While the idea of a Contiguous Zone was not new, and states had 
previously declared such zones for sanitation or antdsmuggling, this 
convention provided a measurement of twelve miles seaward from the 
baseline by which the territorial sea was measured and the conference 
gave effective recognition to the outward reach of coastal states for 
fishery reasons, although failing by one vote in 1960 to reach a final 
decision, of which more later. 
One triumph at Geneva, 1958, was in keeping separate the subject 
matter of the four conventions. There were strong moves in the Fishery 
Committee, and even in the Committee on the Continental Shelf, to 
delay decisions and even activity pending the resolution of the vexing 
problems of the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone. Although some 
problems are interrelated, the separation of subject-matter allowed many 
accords to be reached which would otherwise have been irreconcilable. 
Following the failure of the 1958 Conference to reach accord on the 
problem of the territorial sea and contiguous zone,11 some states took a 
vigorous approach to the problem. In 1958, the Canadian and United 
States positions were quite divergent. In 1960, Canada came armed 
with "The Canadian Proposal,"12 and toward the end of the 1960 
conference, the United States and Canada joined hands and submitted 
a proposal based on three major points: 
1. A territorial sea of six nautical miles, measured from applicable baselines. 
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2.	 A contiguous fishing zone consisting of an additional six miles. 
3.	 Preservation of historic rights for those states previously fishing in the area 
with a gradual phasing out in ten years. 
The coastal states were not happy with this formula's standing alone; 
so prior to the final vote on the United States—Canadian proposal, an 
amendment was adopted giving the coastal states further preferential 
fishing rights in any areas of the high seas adjacent to their exclusive 
fishing zone when it could be scientifically established that a special 
situation or condition made the exploitation of the living resources of 
the high seas in that area of fundamental importance to the economic 
development of the coastal state or the feeding of its population. This 
amendment was accepted as a desperate do-or-die conciliation by the 
United States and Canada and was subsequently disavowed by the 
United States as a separate principle. Nevertheless, the disavowal was 
not heeded by the coastal states, who continue to hang their hats on 
this as a principle. 
Despite the adoption of the amendment, the main proposal failed to 
get two-thirds majority required for approval in plenary session by 
one vote, there being 54 in favor, 28 against, and 5 abstentions.13 
It appears that the following principles, having obtained substantial 
support, may be said to represent a majority view: 
1.	 A territorial sea of six miles is acceptable. 
2.	 A coastal state may seek extension of exclusive fishing rights to 
twelve miles. 
3.	 A coastal state may have an interest in fishing for specific reasons 
in adjacent areas farther removed than twelve miles from its 
baselines. 
4.	 When nations have traditionally fished in waters whose regu­
lation is proposed, their rights to continue doing so must be 
recognized. 
5.	 Wild and unsubstantiated claims for exclusive jurisdiction over 
fisheries is not countenanced by world opinion. 
VI. Present Moves in the United States 
The uproar now in the United States is over the near approach of 
large fleets of modern factory fishing vessels from Japan and the Soviet 
Union. There is a clamor in the northwest and in the northeast for 
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more protection for United States-based fisheries. Committees in Con­
gress are considering legislation to establish a twelve mile fishing sea.14 
It appears that because of the movement of fishery stocks very little 
protection is gained by domestic fisheries in moving to twelve miles.15 
The matter in the United States is further complicated by the fact 
that it is known that large stocks of fish16 which are not now usable 
commercially in the United States are available in areas adjacent to our 
own coasts. It does not appear that foreign fishing fleets are actually 
depleting those stocks of fish which form the present basis for the 
livelihood of United States fishermen;1T however, in the absence of full 
scientific information on the ecology of these fisheries and their possible 
interdependence, alarm is felt that either (a) the foreign fleets will 
deplete commercial stocks fished by United States fishermen, or (b) the 
taking of large tonnages of adjacent fish may disturb nature's balance 
and result in a detriment to United States fishermen. Further, the 
awakening realization of the importance of the food resources of the 
ocean in the face of a growing population gives rise to the feeling that 
it should be a matter of national concern to look ahead and preserve 
these nearby fishery resources. This concern is illustrated by Senate 
Joint Resolution 29, introduced recently by Senator Magnuson and 
others to authorize and finance a crash scientific study of these adjacent 
stocks of fish. This appears to be tailored to meet the Geneva formula 
that claims beyond twelve miles should not be made in the absence of 
scientific information and the establishment of a need by the state claim­
ing especial interest in the resource. There is a new awareness that the 
living resources of the sea are not inexhaustible. 
In this connection, it is noted that fishery products benefit mankind 
in more than one way; first, as a direct nutritive food; second, as an 
industrial product needed for the fertilization of land crops or the feed­
ing of domestic animals destined for human consumption. In addition, 
there has recently evolved an overwhelming interest in oceanography 
and marine technology which has served to focus attention and interest 
on ocean products. In this atmosphere, whatever principles are recog­
nizable as such in connection with the law of the sea become increas­
ingly important. 
VII. The Move to Increased Jurisdiction 
Many states have moved unilaterally to larger territorial and contigu­
ous fishing zones (see Table 1). In March, 1958, the Secretariat of the 
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United Nations prepared a draft synoptical table,18 at the request of 
the First Committee (Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone). This indi­
cated the territorial, customs, and fishing seas claimed by various states. 
The changes since then are extensive. Many of the European states, the 
Middle Eastern states, the British Commonwealth states, and several 
Asian states have increased their territorial or fishing seas to twelve 
miles. I have counted twenty-three such extensions19 and find that most 
of the emerging states of Africa have joined the trend. The movement 
toward establishment of twelve miles is obvious, and technology is now 
seeking answers to those problems posed by the use of zones larger than 
twelve miles that may very well influence future developments. 
TABLE 1 
TERRITORIAL AND CONTIGUOUS FISHING ZONES 
CLAIMED BY STATES 
Conservative Middle Radical 
Position Position Position 
States holding territorial sea, including fishing, 
from 3 to 10 miles 19 
States adhering to the 12 mile territorial sea, 
including fishing .  . 26 
States adhering to the territorial sea of 
3 to 10 miles but claiming 12 miles for fishing .  . 29 
States claiming beyond 12 miles .  . .  . 12 
Total 19 SS 12 
VIII. The Continental Shelf 
It is probable that no new doctrine of international law has received 
universal recognition so rapidly as has that of the continental shelf. Its 
being an extension of the border endeared it to nationalistic pride, a 
matter evidenced by the hours spent in discussing the nature of sover­
eignty or jurisdiction, which ended by according the state "sovereign 
rights" over the natural resources. These were further defined as being 
exclusive and unshared rights. 
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As in the matter of the territorial sea, the area of control was 
difficult to define, and it is probably only a matter of time before 
technology triumphs over the 200 meter depth for exploitation purposes. 
If there was legislation at Geneva, this convention may be said to 
be new law created, although several unilateral declarations preceded 
Geneva. 
There is a hangover fisheries connection with the continental shelf 
which really should no longer exist after the distinctions made in 
Geneva in 1958. The United States bears some guilt because in the 
Truman Proclamation of September 26, 1945,20 a policy was enunci­
ated with regard to "coastal fisheries." We fishermen do not like to 
miss any opportunity to point up the need for additional national concern 
with fisheries. Mr. Truman spoke of fish in these terms: 
. . . having due regard to conditions peculiar to each region and situation and 
to the special rights and equities of the coastal state and of any other state 
which may have established a legitimate interest therein. 
However, the association of fish with the continental shelf grieves me, 
in view of the particular emphasis on the sea bed and subsoil, and the 
careful language of the convention itself, which states: 
Article 2, paragraph 4. The natural resources referred to in these articles 
consist of the mineral and other non-living resources of the seabed and subsoil 
together with living organisms belonging to sedentary species, that is to say, 
organisms which, at the harvestable stage, either are immobile on or under 
the seabed or are unable to move except in constant physical contact with the 
seabed or the subsoil. 
This language is no accident.21 Yet, there remain a few states which 
continue a fish-shelf association, which actually connotes a widespread 
control area for the state fortunate enough to have a large shelf, but 
which is at odds with the other concepts upon which there is general 
agreement.22 
The exploitation of the sea bed and subsoil is receiving serious atten­
tion at this very moment. The Marine Technological Society is even 
now meeting in Washington in a three day conference studded with 
speaker-luminaries and backed to the hilt by large United States corpo­
rations ready to go. It is fortunate that there are some international 
guidelines in the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf, and we 
have long had domestic legislation in this area in the Submerged Lands 
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Act23 and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act.24 Persons seeking 
treasure-trove in wrecked Spanish galleons in my home state of Florida 
are having some trouble with ships lying outside the three-mile limit. 
One very clear use of the above-quoted Article 2, paragraph 4, of 
the Convention on the Continental Shelf occurred recently when the 
burgeoning king crab industry of Alaska was disturbed by the trawling 
activities of Japanese and Soviet fishing fleets. An artificial twelve mile 
fishing zone would afford little or no protection to this valuable industry. 
It was found, after scientific investigation, that the king crab, at the 
harvestable stage, is in constant physical association with the conti­
nental shelf, and thus classifiable, as the oyster, sponges, coral, conch, 
and the sacred chank of India and Ceylon, as a part of the shelf. The 
other states involved have accepted this interpretation as a resolution of 
an intricate and sore controversy. 
IX. Conclusion 
It is evident that although we progress slowly in the field of the law 
of the sea, there are definite gains from sitting down to the conference 
table and going over these many problems with our neighbors in the 
community of states. Bilateral and multilateral agreements have been 
facilitated because of the guidelines set forth in the Geneva Conventions. 
Fourteen European states have amicably resolved a number of problems 
in the North Sea. It seems likely that further international discussions 
concerning fishery matters will be held not later than 1968 at a confer­
ence to be hosted by the United States, the avowed purpose of which 
will be to give implementation to principles already enunciated at 
Geneva in 1958. We can never overstress the importance of having 
some indicia of international agreement as the basis from which to 
argue and settle, rather than finding ourselves speaking in different 
tongues. 
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Chapter Four: 
FACTOR ANALYSIS AS A TOOL IN STUDYING 
THE LAW OF THE SEA* 
As Quincy Wright has pointed out, international law as an intellectual 
discipline has reached the crisis stage. The concepts of traditionalists are 
obsolete, and replacements worked out by modernists may be "prema­
ture."1 Efforts have been made recently to modernize and change inter­
national law to fit contemporary circumstances. But the substance of 
law can itself be subject to conflict, although many lawyers think of it as 
the chief means of settling conflict. 
Negotiations at the two UN Law of the Sea Conferences, 1958 and 
1960, are a case in point. At Geneva, traditionalists and modernists alike 
worked assiduously to mold the conference results—in the form of con­
ventions—to their liking. But the results were conventions fully satis­
factory to no one. Failing to settle the key problem—breadth of the 
territorial sea and contiguous zone—the conferences left a critical gap 
in the law of the sea. But more important to those who wanted to link 
the new concepts of the law to the old was the attack on traditional 
concepts by the "dissatisfied" states at the conferences. This attack, in 
the opinion of many Western delegates who were themselves eminent 
traditional international lawyers or trained by them, if continued in the 
future, will destroy the very foundations of the law.2 
If international law is to be salvaged, not only might it be necessary 
to restructure the law but tailor it to the particular economic, political, 
and social context in which it might be expected to operate. The past 
and the present should contain some useful clues on what might be 
appropriate for the future. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the conflicts over law which 
arose at the two United Nations law of the sea conferences. These con­
flicts, once analyzed, should demonstrate not only the substantive conflict 
patterns which developed, but also the position of states thereon. With 
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this analysis as a basis, we can then make reasonable assumptions about 
why the states took the positions they did, and the likelihood of the 
positions they would take on the conflict issues in the same or different 
contexts in the future. 
I. 
Since we are discussing the attempt to create law in what is essentially 
a parliamentary-diplomatic setting, we have in the proceedings of the 
conferences a ready-made body of analyzable data.3 The eight published 
volumes of documents faithfully record the debates, discussions, and 
arguments of delegates, and their votes when a roll-call vote was 
requested. In addition, many delegates often gave an explanation or 
apology for their vote and made clear what they thought the vote of their 
opponents represented. Two methods now in fairly common use in the 
behavioral sciences seem appropriate in looking for conflict patterns in 
this large body of materials: factor analysis of the roll-call votes and 
content analysis of the debates. 
Since roll-call votes were usually requested only on contentious issues 
—both procedural and substantive—the voting records supply a wealth 
of material on conflict. Because of their compact form and availability, 
and because there is ample precedent in the analysis of United Nations 
voting, this paper will attempt a factor analysis of the votes at the UN 
law of the sea conferences.4 
Factor analysis is a statistical technique for clustering variables into 
groups according to their intercorrelations. Variables correlating high 
among themselves and low with other variables cluster together and are 
said to determine a single underlying factor. The particular factor-
analysis technique used here, called R-analysis, uses the votes at the law 
of the sea conferences as the variables. In the factor pattern obtained, 
each vote is described in terms of underlying issues of conflict. Each 
conflict issue represents a cluster of votes on which particular nations 
and groups of nations manifest a similar voting pattern. Each cluster 
(factor) when interpreted should help us pinpoint the areas of conflict 
which arose at the conferences. By use of the factor scores (giving 
nations relative standing on each of the factors), we can determine the 
position that nations and groups of nations took on the issues.5 
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FACTOR ANALYSIS AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 
We are here trying to determine the underlying issues of conflict by 
first finding an "unrotated" factor pattern matrix by the principal com­
ponent method. This matrix was then rotated both orthogonally and 
obliquely in an attempt to approximate the best "simple structure" 
solution.6 The ideal simple structure solution is one in which each vari­
able loads on only one underlying factor. However, with a large number 
of variables (in this case seventy-eight votes) and only a few factors, it 
is unreasonable to expect every vote to be explainable in terms of only 
one underlying factor. For example, our analysis (as will be shown 
later) indicates that one underlying factor is clearly related to the East-
West conflict while another factor concerns the voting on the North-
South issues. However, on several votes both an East-West conflict and 
a North-South conflict were involved; hence, although ideally these votes 
should be the result of a single underlying dimension, obviously because 
of the nature of these votes, their interpretation depends on two di­
mensions. 
The completed unrotated, orthogonally rotated, and obliquely rotated 
factor matrices were examined, and it was decided that the orthogonally 
rotated matrix provided the best description of the underlying dimen­
sions in terms of the voting record. The first two factors in the unrotated 
matrix were interpretable, but because most votes loaded highly on one 
or both of these first two factors (Xi = 32.99; \  2 = 11.61) the remain­
ing factors were difficult to interpret. The oblique rotation gave us 
results very similar to those obtained from the orthogonal rotations, but 
for reasons of succinctness (the factors are independent), it was decided 
to use the orthogonal solution. 
All of the 78 votes at the conference were used to construct the 
principal factor matrix. Selection of certain key votes was not necessary.7 
Nor was elimination of unanimous votes necessary because there were 
only two unanimous roll-call votes at the conferences, and the factor 
they defined provided significant data. Only one other roll-call vote 
even approached unanimity. Of the 78 votes, 67 were substantive votes 
while 11 were procedural. Results of a subanalysis demonstrated that 
there were no distinctly different dimensions of conflict for procedural 
and substantive votes. In fact, the procedural votes factored directly 
into the clusters on substantive issues.8 Another way of putting this is 
that the delegates were using procedural motions to fight out substantive 
issues on other grounds. 
Essential for the success of the factor analysis is the conversion of 
the nominal voting categories (yes, no, abstention, and absence) into 
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some meaningful ordinal relationship. The ideal ordinal scale would 
have a no vote at one end of the continuum, a yes vote at the other 
extreme, and an abstention or absence somewhere in between. Other 
investigators9 elected to give a no vote a rank of 0, a yes vote a rank 
of 2, and both an abstention and absence a rank of 1. While the scale 
thereby constructed does provide the desired relationship between voting 
categories, the author did not feel it adequately reflected the significance 
of a nation's vote with regard to all other votes cast on the same ballot. 
If, for example, in an assembly containing eighty members three nations 
vote no and the remaining seventy-seven nations vote yes on a particular 
issue then quite probably the issue has considerable significance for the 
three nations voting no. In spite of a sizable majority favoring the 
issue these three nations felt strongly enough about the question to 
vote against this majority. Even if the issue is a trivial one, examining 
why the opposing nations took the stand they did could reveal important 
information about the voting policy of these nations. Since we are 
relying on the factor analytic procedure to sort out the important issues 
underlying a large number of ballots, it is crucial that the ordinal ranks 
assigned to these votes do reflect the significance of the votes to each 
nation. Therefore, we would do well to assign our ranks in a manner 
such that nations which do take "extreme" positions in the face of a 
sizable majority (on a particular vote) do receive more "credit" for 
their stand on the vote in question. A convenient method for assigning 
ranks which provides the desirable properties described above is pre­
sented by Alker and Russett in their book, World Politics in the 
General Assembly. The method for assigning ranks outlined below is 
similar (but not identical) to the one employed by Alker and Russett. 
Originally, each yes vote was assigned a rank of 9, each no vote a 
rank of 1, and each abstention a rank of 5 (absences will be discussed 
later). Notice that an abstention was considered to be halfway between 
a yes vote and a no vote, and hence no more negative than positive on 
a particular question. For each ballot, the voting categories are replaced 
by the ranks assigned above. These ranks are summed for all nations 
voting on a particular ballot and this sum is divided by the number of 
nations voting to determine the average rank. Deviate scores are found 
for each nation's vote by subtracting this mean rank from the original 
assigned rank. Since for this analysis no assumptions were made con­
cerning the position of an absent nation on a particular ballot, absent 
nations were given a "neutral" rank equal to the mean rank. The 
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standard deviation for these deviate scores now including absent nations 
(with a deviate rank of 0) was determined and standardized voting 
ranks were finally obtained by dividing the deviate scores by the 
standard deviation. 
A short example will illustrate that this method of ranking has 
accomplished what we desired and gives "credit" (in the form of 
larger deviate scores) to nations which take extreme positions. 
Let us suppose that on a particular vote in our hypothetical assembly 
consisting of 80 members we have: 60 who vote yes; 10 who vote no; 
5 who abstain; and 5 who are absent. Then, 
The mean rank = 7.67 
The deviate scores for those voting yes = 1.33 
The deviate scores for those voting no = —6.67 
The deviate scores for those who abstain = —2.67 
The deviate scores for those who are absent = 0.00 
The standard deviation of the deviate scores = 2.73 
The standardized voting ranks for those voting yes = . .  . 0.48 
The standardized voting ranks for those voting no = . .  . —2.71 
The standardized voting ranks for those abstaining = . .  . —0.98 
The standardized voting ranks for those absent = 0.00 
Notice that the neutral point of our scale, the rank of an absent vote, 
is 0. Therefore, any rank above 0 can be considered a vote in favor of 
the issue (obviously yes will always be greater than 0 and no always 
less than 0), and any rank below 0 can be considered a vote against 
the issue. The significance of the vote to the voting nation is indicated 
by the distance of the standardized voting rank from 0. The greater the 
deviation from 0, the greater the significance of a particular vote to a 
nation. In the above example, the ten nations voting against the issue 
took their extreme stand possibly because of some vital characteristic 
of the issue important to them. Note that the size of the voting rank 
of those voting no (—2.71) reflects this extreme position compared 
with the size of the rank of the nations voting yes (.48). Note also that 
an abstention in the face of a large majority voting yes received a 
negative rank (—.98) implying that for this ballot an abstention is not 
a neutral position but one that does indicate some opposition. 
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The validity of the above assumptions concerning the significance of 
a vote to a particular nation is certainly open to question and the 
author is not implying they apply in every circumstance. There is no 
implicit ordinal "significance" scale isomorphic to a nation's assigned 
voting rank when the rank is based only on the relationship between 
that vote and all others cast on the same ballot. In addition, there are a 
number of motives other than "significance of the issue" that may 
cause a nation to take an extreme stand (bloc affiliation, swapping votes, 
political reasons, and so forth). However, regardless of the inaccuracy 
of the ranking system or the motives of the voter, the above schema for 
assigning ranks can provide some rough quantitative information about 
the relative importance of a particular issue to a nation. With the 
help of the factor analysis, even these rough estimates will serve to 
illuminate some of the basic issues underlying the conferences. 
II. 
From the rotated factor matrix seven clusters or factors were selected 
for analysis. Each represented a significant conflict issue or issues which 
arose at the conferences. They are: (1) a North and West versus a 
South and East struggle (plotted for convenience as East-West in 
Figure 1) primarily on the territorial sea and contiguous zone; (2) a 
North versus South conflict on the fishing rights of coastal states; 
(3) a clash on supranationalism; (4) a conflict over legal theory inter­
preted as a sign of discontent of "legal conservatives"; (5) an East-
West struggle over direct cold-war issues; (6) a second conference 
contest over the rights of coastal states to control fishing in their con­
tiguous zones and adjacent seas; and (7) a muted quarrel over how 
to solve the problem of landlocked countries' right of access to the sea. 
These clashes are described in Table 2. 
The dominant struggle of the conferences was principally over what 
settlement to make of the question of the breadth of the territorial sea 
and contiguous zone. No hard data is needed merely to identify this 
issue as the key issue of the conferences. Our data verified this appraisal 
of many participants, observers, and commentators. But it also did more. 
This issue was not only the critical one, but the statistically dominant 
one. The first cluster in the rotated matrix, containing the territorial 
sea, contiguous zone, and related votes, had an eigen value of A = 23.38. 
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While this dominance shows up in the rotated matrix, as we have seen, 
it is even more obvious in the unrotated matrix. In addition, the line-ups 
on the territorial sea and contiguous zone questions importantly in­
fluenced the voting on a number of allied issues. 
The highest loadings in the cluster—both positive and negative— 
were on votes in which a proposed breadth of the territorial sea was 
tied in the same proposal with a proposed contiguous zone. None of 
these proposals received the two-thirds majority vote needed for passage 
and inclusion in the Convention on the Territorial Sea. The probable 
reason for the failure of any proposal to receive a requisite majority 
was in the very attempt to combine two distinct issues in hopes of 
compromises. The territorial sea, while it has many legal ramifications, 
was viewed at the conferences by many states principally as a security 
zone in which the coastal state exercises complete sovereignty. The 
contiguous zone, on the other hand, is supposed—for states with a 
narrower territorial sea—to provide control of fishing rights in a belt 
adjacent to the territorial sea without giving the coastal state full 
sovereign control. Doubtless it was hoped by those who wanted to keep 
the breadth of the territorial sea at a minimum that a contiguous zone 
would satisfy a number of states who wanted to expand their sea 
frontiers for primarily economic reasons, that is, to gain firmer control 
over offshore fishing. The combined proposals succeeded only in allying 
against it opponents of both measures: those whose concern was fishing 
thought the limitation stated in most of the contiguous zone clauses too 
restricting; those whose concern was security would still accept no 
breadth less than twelve miles. 
As Figure 1 shows, the struggle on this question was basically between 
the Soviet bloc, the "neutralists," the Arab group, and about half of the 
Latin American states at one pole, and the United States, a heterogene­
ous collection of U.S. friends and allies, the conservative European 
group, and the remaining Latin American states at the other.10 Because 
of the consistent Soviet bloc position, the negative factor scores represent 
an East vote. Juxtaposing factors 1 and 2 in Figure 1 helps us interpret 
the meaning of these clusters. Since the Soviets voted consistently 
"North" or with most of the states with high fishing or shipping 
capabilities in factor 2, it seems probable that their votes in factor 1 were 
directed toward the creation of a sea security zone of maximum breadth. 
With low factor scores on factor 2, it is also probable that the Arab 
group had more of a security than economic basis for their votes. This 
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FIG. 1.—Plot of nations' factor scores. Factor 1: East-West, territorial sea and 
contiguous zone. Factor 2: North-South, fishing. 
is not the case for the leading neutralist and Latin American states, 
which had high negative scores on factor 1. Given the fact that they 
also loaded "South" on factor 2, it is probable that economic consider­
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ations were of considerable importance on their high loadings on 
factor 1. Thus the states with negative scores on factor 1 comprised an 
East and South grouping. Notice in Table 2 that these states supported 
proposals for a twelve-mile territorial sea and adamantly opposed any 
attempt to set a uniform breadth at any lesser distance. They also 
opposed compromises in a number of related areas. With a twelve-mile 
territorial sea within which the coastal state would have been able to 
exercise complete control—including control over fishing—no contiguous 
zone was necessary (except in vote 33 where Colombia proposed to give 
the coastal state a territorial sea of twelve miles and a fishing contiguous 
zone of another twelve miles beyond the territorial sea). For those who 
opted for less than a twelve mile sea (not that any would be likely to), 
the broad-sea advocates would allow a twelve mile contiguous zone 
measured from the same base line. While appearing to compromise, 
actually this group was adamant. 
The opposing coalition, a West and North grouping, supported 
U.S.-led compromise packages on the territorial sea and contiguous 
zone, and opposed South and East attempts to legitimize recent coastal 
states' attempts to increase their control of extensive water areas off 
their coasts. Most of this group voted North on factor 2, and the 
chief proposal they supported—a relatively narrow territorial sea and 
a fishing contiguous zone hedged with limitations—had both security 
and economic elements. A narrow territorial sea had extremely important 
security connotations for those states with surface navies or those who 
were depending upon transoceanic U.S. support. In addition, states 
with large merchant navies also had economic grounds for preferring 
a narrow territorial sea; they did not wish to see many traditional sea 
lanes swallowed up in enlarged territorial seas of coastal states. Some of 
these states were willing to compromise on fishing rights off the shores 
of other states, but they still had important economic interests at stake 
and would not surrender them completely. 
The factor scores of those states who supported the proposals loading 
positively on factor 1 and opposed the proposals loading negatively 
also illustrate a frequent dilemma of a state that proposes compromise 
measures. This trap is offering something to everybody, and not enough 
to anybody. This is precisely what happened to the United States when 
it attempted to play a leadership role at the conferences. Its offer of a 
six mile territorial sea was more than its more conservative allies 
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preferred, and less than what its opponents would accept. The contiguous 
zone in the U.S. proposals had a clause which allowed other states to 
fish in the outer portion of the coastal state's contiguous zone for a 
stated period of years. Its opponents referred to this pejoratively as 
"historic rights." Because the privilege was only temporary, U.S. 
friends were not fully committed to it. The result was consistent opposi­
tion to U.S. compromise measures by opponents of these measures, and 
only inconsistent support from U.S. friends. While the Western coalition 
could count on support of the more conservative European states in 
opposing East and South proposals, it could not always count upon 
these states to support U.S. compromise proposals. 
The second most important conflict at the conferences, having an 
eigen value A = 12.36, was a straight North-South conflict over the 
right of coastal states to control fishing off their shores. More pre­
cisely, it was a conflict between developed states with large distant-
water fishing fleets that traditionally fished far from home—often off 
the coasts of underdeveloped states—and underdeveloped states with 
primitive short-distance fishing fleets, some of them with rich fishing 
grounds anywhere from several to several hundred miles off their coasts, 
sometimes exploited by developed states. 
All of the votes on factor 2 directly or indirectly concerned fishing. 
The various mutations of the Icelandic proposal, loading above .88 on 
the factor, served as a symbol for what the supporters of the South 
position wanted. The Icelandic proposal would have given a coastal 
state the right to limit other states' catch of fish in fishing grounds off 
its coast when its people "is overwhelmingly dependent upon its coastal 
fisheries for its livelihood or economic development."11 In a world of 
shrinking resources, this would have assured a number of states living 
in dire poverty that well-equipped fishing states would not exhaust their 
last under-utilized food resource. But while the South states feared 
exploitation by others, they were not always capable of exploiting these 
resources themselves. Nevertheless, the "rights" of coastal states became 
an article of faith for them; preferably stated as vaguely as possible so 
as not to cut down on their tactical mobility. 
Consistent supporters of the South position had positive factor scores 
(Figure 1). They were drawn mainly from leading Neutralist states and 
the Latin American group. The opponents, with negative factor scores, 
were European Community states and members of the Communist bloc. 
Between these two extremes, with both low positive and low negative 
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factor scores, were the Arab group, the U.S., and a heterogeneous 
collection of U.S. friends. 
The reasons for the extremes are obvious. The Europeans and the 
Soviet Union had important distant-water fishing interests, while a 
number of the South states had rich coastal fisheries. The position of 
the states between the extremes is more interesting, since they might 
in the future either throw their votes one way or the other or attempt 
to reconcile the extremes. The former seems more likely, because 
attempts at the latter, principally by the United States, were made 
and failed. 
This can be seen as well in factor 6, which clustered together the 
votes at the second conference on fishing questions. Although the second 
conference was called only to solve the problem of the breadth of the 
territorial sea and contiguous zone, all fishing problems were again 
aired. The compromises that went into the United States proposal on 
the contiguous zone and the decisions made concerning fishing at the 
first conference were soon under attack (factor 6, Table 2). This attack 
was led by the entire Arab group, with factor scores ranging from 
—2.44 to —.99, a few leading neutralists, and a number of Latin 
American states. The outstanding defenders of the compromises, with 
high plus factor scores, were Canada and the remaining Neutralists, 
and Latin American states. Defenders of the compromises did not 
include many of the states that were active in proposing compromises 
or who had important fishing interests. Thus the compromises seemed 
not to be particularly satisfactory to the great states of the world. 
Since these fishing matters were not finally resolved at the second 
conference, they may well be opened again. Those interested in learning 
from past failures should look at the voting pattern of the Arab group 
in this instance. At the first conference, the Arab states did not show 
a significant interest in coastal rights of fishing states (factor 2, Figure 
1), nor were they committed with more vociferous Latin American 
states to rejecting third-party solutions to disputes over fishing rights 
(factor 3, Figure 2). In fact, they showed mild support for supra-
nationalist settlement means. Their position hardened at the second 
conference. I do not know why.12 But if it increases support for addi­
tional coastal states rights, and the great fishing states show as much 
reluctance to compromise in the future as they did at the conferences, 
fishing problems may become even more intractable when they come 
up for settlement again. 
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FIG. 2.—Plot of nations' factor scores. Factor 3 : supranationalism. Factor 4: 
legal conservatism. 
Another voting pattern displaying a significant conflict dimension 
concerned supranationalism. This is defined here as the willingness of 
states to bind themselves in advance to third-party settlement of disputes 
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which might arise. It also means a willingness to defend rights common 
to all through law rather than support proposals which would increase 
the scope of national sovereignty. Unlike Alker's work on supranation­
alism, which found a supranationalist element spread across several 
factors, we have found supranationalism defined by a single factor 
(factor 3, Table 2).13 This factor, with an eigen value of k = 5.52, 
indicates that supranationalist votes accounted for a significant amount 
of variance in voting. Supranationalist settlement of conflict of states 
is still a popular nostrum among those with a legal point of view. Sadly 
for those who would like to depend on such means of settling disputes, 
most states represented at the conferences were not willing to put too 
many of their security or economic eggs in this basket. Figure 2 shows 
the relative standing of states on this factor. Factor 3 was plotted East-
West, because most of the West states had positive factor scores, while 
the Communist bloc had negative factor scores. Consistent support for 
supranationalism was forthcoming only from a relative handful of major 
Western states, European neutrals, Scandinavians, and Neutralists. Con­
sistent opposition came from the Communist bloc and those states— 
mostly Latin America—who wanted no control at all over their attempts 
to dominate fishing off their shores. Most states fell in the middle, with 
low positive and negative factor scores. It is difficult to interpret the 
future of supranationalist measures from this plotting. Pessimists could 
point to the fact that the United States, the United Kingdom, many 
major European states, the Arabs, and some Neutralists, were not here 
willing to commit themselves clearly to supranationalism. On the other 
hand, optimists could say that it might be significant for the future that 
many otherwise vehemently nationalistic new states now trying to find 
their place in the world did not take a strongly onii-supranationalistic 
stand. They could even point to the fact that the Arabs and most 
Neutralists had positive factor scores, possibly indicating some support 
for supranationalism. 
Factor 4, Table 2 shows a dimension, related particularly to fishing, 
but distinct in itself. It is called here legal conservatism. Two types of 
votes were involved. (1) Compromise measures which accorded coastal 
states a minimum degree of their demands. These were usually unspe­
cific as to particular rights, broad generalizations, and in general without 
teeth. (2) Proposals involving possible threats to the ideal of freedom 
of the seas. Frequently the two overlapped. 
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As factor 3, Figure 2 shows, the major European states with very 
high positive factor scores were the legal conservatives. They would 
have none of the attempts to give coastal states what the compromisers 
thought were harmless rights if such compromises upset their theory 
of the freedom of the seas. They would not even concede that the 
continental shelf concept should be brought into the contemporary law 
of the sea. These votes on seemingly innocuous issues also aroused some 
ardent supporters of the rights of coastal states—Uruguay, the Philip­
pines, Iran, Argentina, Korea, Peru, and Chile. They too had high 
positive factor scores, but unlike the European states who were pro­
testing that the conference had gone too far, were saying that it had 
not gone far enough. They were not satisfied with a statement of vague 
rights; they wanted strong and specific coastal states' rights written 
into international law.14 
On the other hand, the archetypical supporters of these measures 
were the United States, the United Kingdom, "White Commonwealth," 
and Scandinavian states. Indicating that they would accept these general 
coastal rights, but without enthusiasm, were states with low negative 
factor scores, principally Arab, Neutralist, and Communist states. 
No multilateral conference in the contemporary international system 
is complete without a direct U.S.-Soviet clash on a wide range of 
issues. The law of the sea conferences were no exception. Factor 5, 
with an eigen value of A. = 5.23, picked up the variance accountable 
to the cold-war clash across the seventy-eight votes. The votes that 
loaded high on the factor typified the struggle between the bipolar 
giants. Almost all of these direct cold-war issues fought out at the first 
conference had important security implications. 
The major arena in which the great cold-war adversaries and their 
allies used the law to defend their own vital interests and attack those 
of their opponents was the Second Committee, which was charged with 
considering the regime of the high seas. A critical question vigorously 
debated was the use of the high seas for testing atomic weapons or as 
a dumping ground for atomic wastes. In particular, the United States 
and the United Kingdom were concerned with Article 48 of the Inter­
national Law Commission draft, which would have required states to 
draw up regulations to prevent atomic pollution and also would have 
required states to co-operate in drawing up regulations to prevent pol­
lution of the high seas from atomic "experiments." The Anglo-American 
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FIG. 3.—Plot of nations' factor scores. Factor 2: North-South, fishing. Factor 5: 
East-West, direct cold-war issues. 
states counterattacked, proposing that these provisions be deleted and 
a non-binding resolution be substituted. Even though this proposal was 
accepted, the Communist bloc states and some of the major Neutralists 
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did not let the West have an easy victory. They sponsored vaguer 
proposals which would have accomplished the same thing as did Article 
48 (e.g., the Polish proposal requiring states to be "bound to refrain 
from acts on the high seas affecting others") and also proposals pro­
hibiting naval maneuvers from interfering with navigation and prohibit­
ing defense installations—Texas towers, etc.—on the continental shelf. 
The bitterest fight, however, was over the U.S.-sponsored proposal that 
the conferences not take any position on the credentials of the Hungarian 
delegation—the tail-end of a persistent United States harassing tactic 
stemming from the Hungarian revolution. 
Figure 3 shows a different pattern from the previous figures. Most 
notable was the inability of the United States to hold onto the votes 
of its European friends—allies and neutrals alike—when the issues 
had cold-war implications. The United States record was not as bad 
as Figure 3 indicates, since the factor scores here include more than 
the votes that loaded particularly high on factor 5; nevertheless, her 
record of attracting the votes of allies on cold-war related issues was 
not good. While the United States should not have expected support 
from Japan—given her understandable sensitivity on atomic questions— 
more consistent support from France (who was absent from votes 47 
and 48), NATO members from Scandinavia and the Low Countries, and 
a number of European neutrals might have been hoped for. If these 
direct cold-war issues had gone against the United States, she would 
indeed have been embarrassed. But the United States received support 
on these and other votes with cold-war implications from a group which 
had on other issues vehemently opposed her: Latin America. Of the 
Latin American states, 13 had positive factor scores on the fifth factor; 
7 had very high positive factor scores. Among those who rescued the 
United States on cold-war questions were states such as Colombia, 
Ecuador, Panama, Venezuela, Uruguay, and Mexico, all among her 
bitterest opponents on coastal fishing rights, the territorial sea, and 
contiguous zones. 
As might be expected, the East position had as its core the Commu­
nist bloc, and those neutralist states usually associated with the anti­
colonial caucusing group in the General Assembly. 
The spread in the factor scores of the Communist block is interesting. 
A certain amount of divergence in the structure of the bloc can be seen 
from the votes with cold-war implications. On votes loading high on 
66 
FACTOR ANALYSIS AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 
factor 5, no bloc member voted against the bloc on direct cold-war 
issues, and only Poland abstained (once). But on votes that did not 
load as high, there was divergence within the bloc. Both Czechoslovakia 
and Hungary were more "Soviet" than the Soviets; Czechoslovakia has 
always been noted as a faithful bloc member, and Hungary probably 
was "behaving" to demonstrate loyalty two years after her abortive 
rebellion. Because Albania's absence rate was high for a Communist 
state (12.8 per cent), we cannot tell whether her deviance was significant 
for policy (the difficulties with Moscow had been brewing since 1956, 
but there was no open break until 1960). But the low factor scores of 
Poland (—.25) and Bulgaria (—.42) may indicate that there were 
some real differences over policy within the bloc. 
The seventh and final factor, a muted dispute over the rights of 
landlocked countries, demonstrates that factor analysis can reveal con­
flict situations even in certain unanimous votes. There were only two 
votes here, both on the Swiss proposal for landlocked countries' rights 
to use and have access to the seas, taken at two different times. A 
moderate proposal, this generally affirmed only those rights of landlocked 
countries that were already widely accepted. It was accepted over an 
eighteen-power proposal which went much further to give landlocked 
states stronger rights of transit to the sea across the territory of coastal 
states. (The stronger proposal was rejected because of the lack of 
support from a combination of coastal states and powerful maritime 
states.) While the Swiss measure was adopted by what was called under 
conference rules a unanimous vote because no state voted against it, nine 
or ten states abstained once or both times. Among the abstainers were 
both landlocked countries who felt the measure was too weak, and coastal 
states who were afraid it granted the landlocked too many rights. While 
the conference was able to paper over these differences, mainly because 
the problem was a highly specialized one, it did not come up with a 
solution fully satisfactory to either interest. 
III. 
Factor analysis, like any other analytical tool in the growing repertoire 
of social scientists, cannot solve the substantive problems of those con­
cerned with constructing policy. Factor analysis cannot foretell what a 
better or perfect international law of the future will or should be. But it 
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can provide an international lawyer with a better understanding of why 
past attempts at getting nations to agree have broken down. This may 
result, on the one hand, in providing him with the basic data necessary 
to make proposals to reconstruct the law that will be tactically successful 
and strategically wise. On the other hand, it may provide him with data 
that would indicate to him that the problem was insoluble and that no 
solution would be adopted in circumstances similar to those where 
other proposals failed. 
This is not to say that without a technique like factor analysis the 
substantive specialist cannot by carefully reading the documents, for 
example, derive a tolerably accurate picture of the issues and alignments. 
But more precise techniques like factor analysis give the investigator 
more precise results. Factor analysis simply can give us a better profile 
of the issues that states perceive as similar and therefore vote upon in a 
consistent pattern. For example, it would have been easy to overlook the 
different coalitions which were formed on the two parts of the Canadian 
proposal on the territorial sea and contiguous zone without the aid of 
factor analysis. When voted upon separately, the six-mile territorial sea 
clause showed up in factor 1 (vote 27, loading .46) indicating another 
alignment. Thus, although Canada intended this combined proposal to 
solve one over-all problem, the delegates chose to deal with it as two 
separate and distinct issues, and two separate and distinct groups of 
nations formed. 
Since factor analysis groups together the votes of states that vote 
a similar pattern, we have a better starting point for investigating the 
depth of a state's commitment. My own previously published comments, 
based on an analysis of the debates, pointed out that the European 
"conservatives" were very vocal about any modification of the law of 
the sea which would have eroded a basic commitment to the concept of 
the freedom of the seas.15 But this could be explained, as it was by many 
Latin American, Asian, and Soviet-bloc detractors, as a mere smoke 
screen to cover European fears of losing real rights and privileges. But 
factor 4, where the Europeans consistently voted against compromise 
measures which would have stripped them of very few actual rights, 
belies this interpretation. The commitment of the Europeans to an ideal 
was deep and abiding. 
Finally, because factor analysis is quantitative, it can tell us which 
issues and alignments were dominant, which were secondary. At the 
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law of the sea conferences the basic alignment was East-West (even 
though many "West" states were not as consistently "West" as they 
might have been), since it showed up in factor 1—the factor with the 
highest eigen value—and factors 3 and 5. The North-South alignment 
was the most important secondary alignment. 
Because the United States government may soon begin preliminary 
discussions on reopening some of the issues which the United Nations 
law of the sea conferences did not solve or solve satisfactorily, perhaps 
a prognosis of the chances for such an effort is in order, however 
unscientific. 
Unless there are some unique new solutions that will not arouse old 
hostilities, or unless states have softened their stands within the last six 
years, the voting data does not foster optimism. While the East-West 
conflict may have to a large degree subsided, the territorial sea is still 
considered an important security problem by both U.S. and U.S.S.R. If 
this emphasis continues to dominate, it will affect a whole host of allied 
issues. On the North-South quarrel, the present data indicate that the 
struggle has gone beyond real interests into the realm of the symbolic. 
If the South states take fishing rights as synonymous with economic 
development, and the European states continue to see concessions as 
abandonment of an ideal theory, this conflict may remain insoluble. 
Finally, the failure of "splitting-the-difference" compromises (particu­
larly U.S. proposals on the territorial sea and contiguous zone, and 
fishing) bodes ill for any new attempts to compromise. 
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Chapter Five: 
OFFSHORE CLAIMS OF THE WORLD 
An idealized diagram of the pattern of national control in offshore waters 
would involve the delimitation of three zones: the high seas which are 
free to the use of all nations; a narrow territorial sea over which 
coastal states have sovereignty, subject to the right of innocent passage 
by foreign vessels; and internal waters, over which national sovereignty 
is absolute. But the diagram if it conforms with reality, should also 
portray two additional truths: first, that states are far from agreed as to 
the method for measuring the extent of the internal and territorial 
waters off their coasts; and second that many states have claims to 
control in the waters beyond territorial limits. This paper attempts to 
summarize the nature of claims in offshore waters throughout the world. 
As a geographer I am concerned primarily with the extent of the 
territory involved in a nation's offshore claims, with the particular char­
acteristics of the water areas which are claimed, and with relationships 
existing between the communities lying along the coast and the offshore 
waters over which a coastal state may seek control. One country, for 
example, may press its demands for a twelve-mile territorial sea, and 
yet possess only ten miles of seacoast, while another, holding to the 
three-mile breadth, may border on the ocean for thousands of miles. 
The sea areas involved in offshore claims can vary widely in importance. 
Some may include rich fishing grounds or be located at strategic straits, 
while other areas, for the present at least, are of little economic, military, 
or political significance. Finally, the nature of land/sea interaction may 
be of consequence in cases where coastal states seek special rights in 
their offshore waters on the grounds of peculiar economic interests. Such 
variations from place to place throughout the coastlands of the world 
have had a significant, though frequently underrated, place in the 
literature on the law of the sea. 
THE LAW OF THE SEA 
There are in the world at present 135 independent countries. The 
exact number may vary according to one's definition of "independence"' 
but this figure will be taken to form the basis for subsequent statistics. 
Of the 135 national states, 28 are land-locked, while 107 border on the 
TABLE 3

OFFSHORE CLAIMS OF THE WORLD

ARRANGED ACCORDING TO BREADTHS OF THE TERRITORIAL SEA

Three miles: 
Argentina

Australia

Belgium

Brazil
 3,692 12 
Canada

Cuba

 12 
Denmark

 15 
France

 38 
Ireland

 274 
 280 
Japan

 5 
 247 
 290 
Malaysia

 50 
 12 
Muscat and Oman

 198 
 12 
Nicaragua

 12 
 241 
South Vietnam

 470 
United Kingdom

 12 
 308 
Dahomey
 65
Dominican Republic
 325
Gambia

Ivory Coast

Jamaica

Jordan

Kenya

Liberia

Malta

Morocco
 863
The Netherlands

New Zealand
 2,770
Pakistan
 750
Poland

Taiwan

United States
 11,650
West Germany

Four miles: 
Finland
 735

 12
Norway
 1,650
Sweden
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Length of Fishing Limits 
Coastline* (in Nautical Miles)
 2,120 10
 15,091 
 34 12f 
 11,129 12f 
 1,747 
 686 12f 
 1,373 12f 
 663 12f 
 4,842 
 1,853 
 1,005 
 445 200
 865 20 km. 
 2,790 12f 
 1,359 12f

 Other Limits 
 Continental shelf 
 Continental shelf 
OFFSHORE CLAIMS OF THE WORLD 
TABLE 3—Continued 
Five miles: 
Cambodia
Six miles: 
Cameroon
Ceylon
Colombia

Greece

Haiti

India

Israel

Italy

Mauritania

Senegal

Spain

Thailand

Tunisia

Turkey
Union of South Africa
Uruguay
Twelve kilometers: 
Honduras
Nine miles: 
Mexico
Ten miles: 
Albania
Yugoslavia
Twelve miles: 
Algeria
Bulgaria
China (the mainland)
Cyprus
Ecuador
Ethiopia
Ghana
Guatemala

Indonesia

Iran

Length of
Coastline* 
Fishing Limits (in Nautical Miles) Other Limits 
 210 12 Continental shelf 
to 50 meters 
 187 
 650 Right to conserva­
tion zones to 
100 miles offshore 
 1,022 12 
 1,645 
 584 
 2,759 100 
 124 
 2,451 
 360 
12t 
12 
 241 
 1,494 
 1,299 
 555 
12t 
12 
12 To 50 meters 
isobath 
 1,921 
 1,430 
 305 
12 
12 
12 
 374 
 4,848 
 155 12 
 426 
 596 
 134 
 3,492 
 290 
 458 200 
 546 
 285 Conservation zone 
out to 100 miles 
 178 
 19,889 
 990 
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TABLE 3—Continued 
Iraq

Libya

Malagasy Republic

North Korea

North Vietnam

Panama

Rumania

Saudi Arabia

Sierra Leone

Soviet Union

Sudan

Syria

Tanzania
Togo
United Arab Republic

Venezuela

Fifty kilometers: 
Chile
One hundred thirty miles: 
Guinea
Two hundred miles: 
El Salvador
No specified territorial limits : 
Costa Rica

Iceland

Lebanon

Maldive Islands

Peru

Portugal

South Korea

No information available: 
Burma

Congo (Brazzaville)

Congo (Leopoldville)

East Germany

Gabon

Guyana

Kuwait

Monaco
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Length of
Coastline* 
 10

 910

 2,155

 578

 382

 979

 113

 1,316

 219

 23,098

 387

 82

 669

 26

 1,307 
 1,081 
 2,882 
 190

 164

 446

 1,080

 105

 251

 1,258

 398

 712

 1,230

 84

 22

 191

 399

 232

 115

3

Fishing Limits(in Nautical Miles) Other Limits 
Continental shelf 
Plus a 6-mile 
"supervision" 
zone 
200

200

12

6

6

200

12t

20-200 Continental shelf

OFFSHORE CLAIMS OF THE WORLD 
TABLE 3—Continued 
Length of Fishing Limits 
Coastline* (in Nautical Miles) Other Limits 
Nigeria
The Philippines
Singapore
Somali Republic
Trinidad and Tobago
Western Samoa
 415 
 6,997 
 28 
 1,596 
 254 
 241 
Yemen 244 
Landlocked countries: 
Afganistan 
Andorra 
Austria 
Bhutan 
Bolivia 
Botswana 
Burundi 
Central African Republic 
Chad 
Czechoslovakia 
Hungary 
Laos 
Lesotho 
Liechtenstein 
Luxembourg 
Malawi 
Mali 
Mongolia 
Nepal 
Niger 
Paraguay 
Rwanda _ 
San Marino 
Switzerland 
Uganda 
Upper Volta 
Vatican City 
Zambia 
* In nautical miles. Statistics are taken from Sovereignty of the Sea, Office of the 
Geographer, U.S. Department of State, Bulletin No. 3, April, 1965. 
t Historic rights provided for. 
sea. Although only the latter group have offshore areas to which they 
can claim control, the land-locked countries may also be involved in 
such claims; first, because they too have interests in the use of sea and, 
second, because they may be represented at international law of the sea 
conferences. A dozen land-locked countries, for example, had delegations 
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at the 1958 Geneva Conference and were given the opportunity to dis­
cuss and vote on the breadth of the territorial sea and other aspects of 
offshore control. 
Each of the independent countries of the world is, in a sense, unique— 
in terms of its historical development, its political and legal systems, 
and its commitment to and dependence on the resources of the sea. If a 
cartographer were able to portray such national diversities graphically, 
he would have a highly complex map of the world's land areas. To this 
map he could then add the diversities of the marine environment, such 
as length and configuration of the coast, breadths of the continental 
shelf, and the distribution of living and non-living resources of the sea. 
It is against such a background of diversities that the problems of off­
shore claims must be considered. 
The two Geneva conferences attempted to bring order out of 
chaos, and while recognizing geographic, historic, and other differences 
throughout the world, to provide uniform procedures governing national 
rights in, and use of, the marine environment. The high degree of 
success achieved by the first conference has been well publicized. But 
in the years since 1958 national claims have continued to encroach on 
the high seas. As the areal extent of these claims becomes ever greater, 
the extent of the free seas of the world diminishes. More important, 
perhaps, the marginal seas, to which these claims are advanced, are often 
of greater economic or strategic value than are areas of commensurate 
size in mid-ocean. For the sake of discussion we shall divide offshore 
claims into two types—those involving territorial waters and those 
concerned with extraterritorial rights. 
The extent of a country's territorial sea depends both on the breadth 
which is claimed and the position of the baselines from which the breadth 
is measured. Turning to the latter problem first, we may note that the 
1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea makes rather complete provi­
sions for the delimitation of "normal" baselines, following the tidelines, 
but that complications arise in the use of straight baselines. Article 4 
of the convention lays down certain guidelines, both for determining 
when the straight baseline regime may be adopted and for delimiting 
individual baselines, but in both cases the language is imprecise. How, 
for example, can one determine the cut-off point at which islands along 
a coast do not constitute a "fringe" or when economic interests peculiar 
to a coastal region do not justify liberal baseline delimitations? Such 
imprecision may give rise to sweeping claims to straight baselines along 
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rugged coasts or coasts fringed with islands, with little regard paid to 
whether or not the sea areas lying within the lines are sufficiently closely 
linked to the land domain to be subject to the regime of internal waters. 
Certain it is that the straight baseline regime, adopted originally for a 
peculiar situation in northwest Europe, may lead in time to the closing 
off of extensive areas of the marginal sea as internal waters. 
The Geneva conventions made no mention of straight baselines in 
archipelagoes, but here again claims have been made to extensive inter­
island water areas as being internal in nature. By analogy perhaps the 
sea areas enclosed by straight baselines in archipelagoes should be so 
linked to the land domain as to be subject to the regime of internal 
waters, but such a requirement has received little legal attention. And the 
Geneva conventions themselves are silent as to what the actual criteria 
are for justifying an internal waters regime. Claims to straight baselines 
in archipelagoes may be held as contrary to international law, and other 
states need not recognize them. But foreign ships operating within what 
a coastal state maintains are its own waters run the risk of arrest, fines, 
and confiscation of catch or gear. How often in the present world com­
munity can conditions be permitted to exist in which warships of a 
protesting country stand guard over the ships of their nations which are 
operating in disputed inter-island waters? A point worth noting is that 
most of the colonial territories on the mainland of the continents have 
become independent, and now it is the island territories which will be 
achieving self-rule. In many cases island groups are administered as one 
political unit and, when attaining independence, will continue as unified 
countries. But some of these island groups are spread across thousands 
of square miles of ocean. Will they, too, demand that their inter-island 
waters be treated as internal ? 
Straight baselines may also be used to close off historic bays. Again 
the Geneva conventions are silent on the bases of claims to historic 
waters, but such claims exist and seem likely to grow in number. An 
interesting point here concerns the newer states of the world whose 
former mother countries never considered their colonies' coastal inden­
tations as being uniquely a part of the national territory. After how 
many years of independence may such a former colony be in a position 
legitimately to advance its claims to certain offshore waters as belonging 
to it historically ? 
Where, specifically, are the sea areas of the world which are claimed 
as internal, and are closed off by straight baselines from territorial 
77 
THE LAW OF THE SEA 
waters ? I know of no single map or series of maps yet compiled which 
show the global extent of internal waters, although I feel that such maps 
would be highly meaningful to law-of-the-sea studies. The maps prob­
ably should show two categories: those waters which would be recog­
nized as internal, according to the Geneva conventions, and those "gray" 
areas where unilateral claims have been made which do not conform to 
the Geneva articles. 
From baselines and internal waters we turn to the breadth of the 
territorial sea. In 1950, Dr. Boggs, then Geographer to the Department 
of State, compiled a list covering sixty-one independent countries, 
which showed the breadths claimed for their territorial sea. Of these 
sixty-one countries, forty claimed three miles, three claimed twelve 
miles, and the remaining eighteen claimed between three and twelve miles. 
A list, compiled by this author, covered eighty-five coastal states. Of 
these, thirty-two claimed three miles, twenty-six claimed twelve, and 
twenty-four had territorial breadths between three and twelve miles, 
sixteen of the breadths being fixed at six miles. In addition, there was 
one claim each of SO kilometers, 130 miles and 200 miles. No data was 
available for the territorial claims of the remaining twenty-two coastal 
countries of the world. 
Let us look more closely at the changes which have taken place 
in territorial claims since 1950. The number of three-mile countries 
declined from forty to thirty-two, although it is interesting to note 
that many of the great maritime powers, such as Britain, France, the 
Netherlands, Japan, and the United States have continued to adhere 
to the three mile principle. Thirteen of the three mile countries in 1950 
have now gone to greater breadths, ranging from six to 200 miles. 
The growth of the twelve mile bloc from three in 1950 to twenty-six 
in 1966 has been occasioned in part by the rise of newly independent 
states, many of which were the former colonies of the traditional three 
mile countries. Since the end of World War II, some sixty-two new 
states have come into existence, forty-eight of which border on the 
sea. A dozen of these new states now claim twelve miles as their 
territorial limits although another dozen of the new ones opted after 
independence for retention of the three mile breadth. One can hardly 
speak of a head-long "rush" to the twelve mile limit, particularly after the 
demise of the 1960 Geneva Conference, if even today only one-quarter 
of the coastal states of the world have claims to that breadth. 
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Two related questions are: first, how long are the coastlines of the 
countries which claim three miles, twelve miles, or some other distance; 
and, second, do some of these claims place important straits or channels 
entirely within the regime of territorial waters? Figures for coastline 
lengths range from over 23,000 miles for the Soviet Union to three for 
Monaco and five for Jordan. The accompanying table gives figures for 
the lengths of coastline for the coastal countries of the world, and from 
this one may estimate the amount of high seas areas which would be 
involved, for example, in a country's extension of its territorial limits 
from six to twelve miles. But such computations would not take into 
account whether or not rich fishing grounds are involved in this exten­
sion, or whether the move would place an important strait entirely 
within territorial waters. It is less than twenty-four miles, for example, 
across the entrances to the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, and the Baltic 
Sea, and between Hainan Island and Mainland China. Again, the most 
meaningful way to relate territorial claims to the narrow seas would be 
by a series of maps showing the actual location of territorial waters 
claimed throughout the world. 
Beyond territorial limits are the various special use zones. We pass 
over the contiguous zone, provided for in the Geneva conventions, as 
well as the problem of national rights to the resources of the sea bed 
and subsoil of an adjacent continental shelf. The most important extra­
territorial claims are those involving fisheries control. 
There are two separate aspects of an extraterritorial fishing zone to 
be considered; the geographic extent of the zone, and the type of 
control which is claimed for it. Some countries have zones which are 
delimited from the same baseline as the territorial sea, and extend 
three, six, nine or more miles seaward of the territorial limits. For 
other countries, the fisheries zones are not only greater in breadth than 
the territorial sea, but are measured from different baselines—generally 
straight baselines which themselves may be considerably seaward of the 
low water line from which the territorial zone was measured. Since the 
Geneva articles made no provisions for extraterritorial fishing zones 
(with one exception, to be noted later), countries are not bound by 
any set procedures in delimiting these zones. 
A variation in delimiting fisheries zones is the designation of certain 
depths as the outer limit: as, for example the 50-, 100-, or 200-meter 
isobaths. Some countries refer merely to the "continental shelf" as 
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marking the zone over which their rights extend. Presumably such 
references imply that the 200-meter isobath marks the outer edge of 
the shelf. There is a possible distinction here between the continental 
shelf as viewed by the fishermen, and the shelf as it appears to lawyers 
or mining engineers. The Geneva definition of the shelf is that it extends 
to a depth of 200 meters, or beyond that limit to where the depth of the 
superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources 
of the said areas. As the outer limits of this "legally-defined" shelf move 
into deeper and deeper waters would the fishermen expect their shelf 
to expand accordingly, or might governments eventually find themselves 
talking about two continental shelves? 
On our maps of internal and territorial waters of the world we should 
now add extraterritorial fisheries zones, taking note to distinguish, first, 
whether the restrictions in these zones apply to all countries or only to 
certain ones; and, second, what the particular restrictions on freedom 
to fish are. Certain countries may agree among themselves to adopt 
restrictions on their fishing effort within a particular offshore area, but 
such restraints are not binding on non-signatory powers. It seems prob­
able, in years to come, that more and more bilateral and multilateral 
agreements will be made concerning fishing activities and the prob­
lem of compliance by non-signatory states may become an extremely 
serious one. 
There are various types of control a coastal state may seek to exercise 
in an extraterritorial fisheries zone. The most drastic claim is to exclu­
sive fishing rights, a claim which may be tempered by the recognition 
of the historic rights of certain other countries to exploit the fisheries of 
the zone. Thirty countries of the world, out of eighty-five with specific 
territorial breadths, have extraterritorial exclusive fisheries zones, with 
or without the recognition of historic rights. Of these, twenty-four coun­
tries, with territorial breadths ranging from three to ten miles, claim 
exclusive fishing rights out to twelve miles. Two other countries, with 
no clearly defined territorial limits, also claim exclusive fishing rights 
out to twelve miles. If we add to these the twenty-six countries with 
twelve mile territorial belts, we find that foreign fishermen are generally 
forbidden to come within twelve miles of the coasts of fifty-two coun­
tries, or nearly half the coastal states of the world, either because of 
territorial or exclusive fisheries limits. In addition, foreign fishermen 
must stay more than twelve miles from the coasts of eleven other nations. 
A coastal state may not only recognize certain countries' historic 
rights, but go even further and permit entry into the fisheries of the 
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extraterritorial zone by all nations, subject to the licensing regulations 
of the coastal state. By issuing licenses this state can still control entry 
by foreigners into its offshore fisheries and thereby maintain what it 
feels to be a rational management program. But there may be genuine 
disagreement among governments as to what constitutes a "rational" 
management program for those particular offshore waters. From this, 
two questions arise: for what purposes is the management program 
intended and on which party or parties rests the burden of proof of 
the need for and efficacy of the program? 
Limiting foreign entry into offshore fisheries may be done primarily 
to protect the economic interests of the coastal state's fishermen; it may 
also be done for biological reasons, that is, in an effort to achieve maxi­
mum sustainable yield. In either case the restrictions which are placed 
on the operation of foreign vessels have generally not, up to this time, 
applied equally to the operations of the coastal state's nationals. Later 
on in this conference we shall hear more concerning the need for ration­
alizing the ocean fisheries of the world through large-scale management 
programs. Such programs would, for the most part, exist without regard 
for the fixed boundaries marking the outer limits of a coastal state's 
fisheries zone. Our purpose in this paper is not to conjecture about 
future management programs but to describe what exists in practice. 
The North Pacific fisheries treaties do indeed place restrictions on the 
freedom to fish certain species throughout a wide expanse of ocean 
(although even here certain territorial boundaries still existj but the 
more common form of fisheries protection involves restraints on all 
fishing within a specified geographic area. 
The least drastic of the extraterritorial fisheries claims is contained 
in the Geneva Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living 
Resources of the High Seas, whereby a coastal state has the right to 
unilaterally adopt conservation measures in the waters beyond its terri­
torial limits. Such measures must not discriminate against foreign fish­
ermen, but must be adhered to by foreigners, under a set of carefully 
phrased conditions which, among other things, permit the foreigners to 
appeal to an international body. This represents a far more rational 
approach to the world fisheries problem than are unilateral proclama­
tions of exclusive (and often ineffective) fisheries zones, although the 
latter situation appears to be on the increase rather than decline. 
There are, of course, examples of other types of extraterritorial 
claims, such as those of neutrality zones extending several hundred 
miles out from the coast, or the reserving of certain ocean areas for a 
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specific length of time for military or scientific testing. Our point here 
is not to catalogue all the unusual types of claims, but rather to ask, in 
the light of the various seaward expansions of national control which 
have been cited in this paper, whether or not our original diagram, 
showing the high seas, a narrow territorial belt, and the internal waters, 
is still a valid one? 
As an idealized model, I believe that it still has validity. It conforms 
closely to the provisions of the 1958 Geneva Convention, except that it 
should also note the contiguous zone and the fisheries conservation zone, 
noted above, which lie beyond the territorial limits. But these two zones 
are not what the political turmoil is about. 
There may be situations in which the idealized diagram might justi­
fiably be modified. For instance, the zones of a particular country's 
sovereignty might be enlarged due to peculiar geographic or historical 
conditions or because of biological or economic need a coastal state's 
special rights to fisheries control beyond territorial limits might be 
extended. But such situations should be the rare exception, rather than 
the rule, and the burden of proof of the need for such rights should 
rest with the nation which seeks them not with the world community. 
We must avoid such rigid adherence to the "free seas" concept that in 
the light of changing conditions the law of the sea, as it now stands, 
becomes hopelessly outmoded. Every year sees the creation of new 
independent states, new technological advances in the use of the sea, 
new additions to the world's population, and new demands by segments 
of that population for a better way of life. As a political reality the law 
of the sea cannot remain static; but we must also avoid the haphazard 
partitioning of the oceans into a mosaic of national zones of control. 
We hear, for example, the pleas of certain countries for special rights 
in their offshore waters on the basis of "overwhelming dependence" or 
"peculiar economic interests." Much attention has been paid to unique 
cases of land/sea interaction, or "marine orientation" as the process is 
coming to be called, in the coastlands of northwestern Europe. But if 
demands in other parts of the world grow for the recognition of special 
rights on the basis of unusual dependence on, or commitment to, the 
resources of the offshore waters, it seems clear that more precise guide­
lines will have to be worked out for determining what constitutes an 
unusually strong case of marine orientation. We may, of course, claim 
that under no conditions should such special rights be allowed, but with 
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the growing complexities of the world they will certainly be proclaimed. 
Might we be helping to prevent anarchy if we tried to establish certain 
conditions under which such claims to special rights might at least be 
considered by the world community ? 
One of the problems arising for students of the law of the sea is to 
gain a perspective of the world as it is—of the various oceans and seas, 
each with its own unique characteristic, of the great variety of coun­
tries bordering on these oceans and seas, and of the pattern of national 
claims to offshore control around the globe. Maps will help, but maps 
alone cannot provide perspective. If one adopts a world view of the 
law of the sea, interesting concepts may emerge. For example, it soon 
becomes apparent that most of the historic fishing countries and fishing 
grounds lie north of the Tropic of Cancer, that is 23^° north latitude. 
Yet if the traditional grounds of the Northern Hemisphere are in danger 
of becoming overutilized, at least in terms of currently desirable species, 
there are productive grounds in the Southern Hemisphere that have 
considerable opportunities for exploitation. And for the past several 
years the leading fishing nation of the world has been a South American 
one. The sea may represent the world's last frontier, but frontiers also 
exist within the sea itself. 
Another concept involves marine regions, such as the Northwest 
Atlantic, or the Caribbean/Gulf of Mexico area. Within such marine 
regions, countries may have certain interests in common in the use of 
the sea, and multilateral agreements may be worked out among the 
governments interested in the region. The idea of regionality is not 
new, but I would suggest within these regions that one try looking at 
the land areas from the sea; that is, consider what exploitable resources 
there are available there, what countries are engaged in the free use 
of the region's resources. Looking landward from the sea has proved 
highly effective in several geographic studies relating to law of the 
sea matters. 
A third approach, for want of a better term, might be called a 
"geopolitical" one, emphasizing the dynamic nature of the various coun­
tries and groups of countries which border on the sea. What economic, 
military, or other problems do these countries face which might in some 
way affect their use of the sea? Are multinational blocs likely to form 
in order to seek special regimes for certain water areas ? What colonial 
territories are scheduled for independence? Remember that at a future 
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law of the sea conference, it is theoretically possible that 130 or more 
delegations may be in attendance. How might these delegations line up 
in voting blocs? 
"The pursuit of the global view is the geographer's intellectual 
adventure," one of my colleagues once wrote, but the need for such a 
perspective is not limited to geographers. The encroachment of national 
claims out into the high seas concerns all of us; only by perceiving 
the marine environment as an interacting world-wide phenomenon can 
we appreciate the impact any single claim or group of claims is likely 
to provide. 
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Discussion of Herrington, Neblett, Friedhcim, and Alexander 
1. Despite the failure of the abstention principle to be adopted at 
the 1958 Geneva Conference, it continues to be the policy of the United 
States to recognize this principle, and a provision to this effect was 
attached to the treaty of ratification of the Geneva conventions. 
2. The means by which some of the Latin American states effectively 
control foreign fishing in their extraterritorial waters is by harassing 
certain fishing vessels, and the resultant economic loss to the fishing 
fleet acts as a deterrent to other vessels. 
3. Are countries such as Ecuador, Peru, and Chile violating inter­
national law by protecting zvliat they feel to be their special interests 
in extraterritorial waters—interests zuhicli they jeel are necessary for 
their economic life? The criteria for their actions, some speakers held, 
are not based on scientific evidence, but are an attempt to extend 
sovereignty over these waters. Jurisdiction is a part of sovereignty. 
What constitutes conservation is not the desire of one state to preserve 
something they have no scientific data on, but to act after the scientific 
data have been assembled—that is, after examination of the species has 
been completed, and there is proof that the species is being overfished. 
Another view, however, was that the Declaration of Santiago cannot 
be interpreted as claiming sovereignty out to 200 miles, but had as its 
sole object the conservation of the fisheries resources for the benefit of 
the coastal countries. The theory of the freedom of the seas may be 
made to work for the advantage of countries with large navies, merchant 
marines, and fishing fleets. 
4. Conservation, as presently defined, may be based on the principle 
of maximum sustainable yield, but in specific cases, such as that of the 
haddock fisheries on Georges Bank where there is evidence that more 
than the maximum sustainable yield was harvested during the past year, 
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what specific steps will be taken by the federal government in the 
direction of conservation ? 
5. With respect to Professor Friedheim's paper, is there not a 
danger here of becoming too precise in setting down how countries 
behave, and are going to behave with regard to international law? 
Not necessarily. The social sciences must project on the basis of the 
data and techniques which they have available. Obviously, if the data 
or techniques used are insufficient for the purpose, then unwarranted 
conclusions may be reached. Since men are fairly consistent in their 
thoughts and actions, one can have some idea, although not with 
mathematical precision, how they are likely to act in the future. 
Why cannot a more precise method of evaluating voting patterns at 
a future international conference be obtained through a systematic 
analysis of what the individual country's interests are as regards security, 
the cold war, etc.? Because this system, even before you start your 
evaluations, gives you a range of states to look to as possible allies, 
possible opponents, possible fence-sitters. The system may also point up 
votes that you did not see as related to, or having a similar pattern to, 
some voting arrangement you are already intuitively aware of. 
6. The United States and the north European countries sent lawyers 
and fisheries specialists to the Geneva conferences, while most of the 
other countries sent persons with General Assembly experience, who 
were specialists in negotiation. The two groups talked at, rather than to, 
each other. Within the former group, particularly, there tends to be 
something of a "bifocal" type of approach—considering matters both 
from the viewpoint of long-range ideals and of the immediate demands 
of national interest. But most delegates to international conferences, it 
was pointed out, support first and foremost the national interest. 
7. Since many persons, particularly from the developing countries, 
fear for the future in terms of population explosion, or of the historic 
rights and technological developments of the more technically-advanced 
countries, international law does not hold the same place in their social 
values as it does for us. They have more concern for short-range 
problems. How then can reciprocity be made meaningful to them? 
Possibly by tying in some form of tangible benefits to their support of 
concepts such as freedom of the seas, even though such actions might 
be looked upon by some as a form of coercion. 
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Chapter Six: 
FISHERY RESOURCES IN OFFSHORE WATERS 
Two terms in the title given me to discuss are vague, and their vagueness 
illustrates the difficulty in dealing with the law of the sea and obtaining 
agreement on its parts. They are "Fishery Resources" and "Offshore 
Waters." It is necessary to define what I mean by each. 
I. Fishery Resources 
By fishery resource, I mean any living resource of the ocean capable 
of being harvested practically by man and used by him for food or 
other purposes. 
In 1964, 45 million metric tons of such resources plus 73,194 whales 
were harvested by man from the world ocean. In 1954 this harvest had 
been 23.6 million tons plus 60,983 whales. Thus the marine harvest had 
approximately doubled in ten years. But in the same period, ocean 
research had indicated that of the kinds of living resources of the sea 
that some groups of men were harvesting, or of kinds as large and 
amenable to harvest and use as those, the ocean was actually producing 
about 2 billion tons per year. Thus in 1954 about 2 per cent of this 
potential was taken, and in 1964 about 4 per cent. The rest that the ocean 
was producing died and decayed back to the web of life in the ocean 
unused by man. As a matter of fact, the actual harvest, for which we 
have reasonably good records, is not as large as the probable error for 
the rather crude, and conservative, estimate of 2 billion tons per year 
of potential production from the ocean. 
The point in mentioning this is to note that at present we are 
studying what to do about governing the harvest of the living resources 
of the sea on the basis of rather minimal knowledge of, and experience 
with, the kinds of resources available for harvesting, their distribution 
in time and space, their life histories and behavioral characteristics, 
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their resiliency to fishing pressure, and the groups of people likely to 
need or desire to harvest and use them. This renders policy decisions 
on these matters at this time risky, and I, for one, am quite conservative 
about making changes in the present public order of the ocean that 
would affect the harvesting until we have more knowledge and experi­
ence of these matters. 
II. Offshore Waters 
By Offshore Waters, I mean the ocean waters in which these 
resources are found, or in which they migrate or move from, through, 
and to. Man, for his convenience, has split this water into five juridi­
cal categories: inland waters, territorial sea, contiguous zone, fishery 
jurisdiction zone, and high seas. The living resources, however, move 
through the whole ocean at will, suiting the convenience of their natural 
habits instead of that of man. 
The salmons come down out of the streams and mix thoroughly in 
the ocean, those from Asiatic streams coming over close to the American 
continent and those from American streams moving over toward the 
Asiatic coast; those from New England and Scotland mix in the sea 
off Greenland. Albacore are born somewhere in the western central 
Pacific, migrate over to the California coast where they are fished by 
Americans who have tagged them. We have found that such tagged 
fish move to the Asiatic coast the next year, or the year after. They 
are fished there by Japanese, who catch some of those tagged off Cali­
fornia. Skipjack tuna tagged off Mexico are caught off Hawaii; bluefin 
tuna tagged in the Bahamas are caught in the North Sea; those tagged 
in the North Sea are caught in the Mediterranean. The cod of the Arctic 
feed off Russia and spawn off Norway. Sable fish are tagged in Puget 
Sound and returned from Bering Sea. Etc., etc. 
The point in mentioning this is that there is no line that can be drawn 
on the ocean that separates living marine resources into convenient 
spatial categories, either as to species or as to groups of species. The 
cyclic pulsing of warming and cooling of the eastern Pacific, for instance, 
which occurs at irregular intervals of seven to ten or eleven years, shifts 
whole ocean communities north and south by long distances, or draws 
them toward the equator. 
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The more we tag fishes and follow their migrations, and the more 
we study the climate of the upper mixed layer of the ocean, the more 
kinds of fish we find making long and complex migrations, and the 
more we find out about shifting boundaries between not only surface, 
but subsurface currents, in an irregularly cyclical fashion ranging in 
time intervals from diurnal to some hundreds of years. 
It is not usually the case that fish spawn where they feed. They may 
only move out a few miles and deeper, or they may move some hundreds 
of miles, or they may move some thousands of miles for this purpose, 
as do salmons, tunas, freshwater eels, cods, sardines, hakes, fur seals, 
gray whales, sperm whales, etc. 
III. The Origins of Fishery Resources 
Increasing knowledge of the ocean and its processes has brought us 
to expect heaviest concentrations of fishable resources near where up­
welling of subsurface ocean water is greatest. The nutrient rich water 
from currents which have been below the photic layer (and sometimes 
not so very deep or for so very long) fertilizes the surface waters anew, 
and where the nutrients come close enough to the surface to reach where 
the light of the sun has penetrated, there flourish the plants of the ocean 
—the phytoplankton. Upon the phytoplankton graze the animals of the 
sea, and upon them feed the carnivores. Upon the small carnivores feed 
the large carnivores, and so on up to the enormous sperm whale. 
These areas of extraordinary production of this primary food are 
the centers out from which radiate the great volume fisheries. Adjacent 
to the areas of heaviest primary production are the greatest available 
volumes of usable resources. The western sides of continents and large 
land masses are areas where such prolific abundance of food production 
are typically found. The Humboldt Current, Peru Current, California 
Current, Benquela Current, Canary Current, West India and West 
Australia are examples. 
But the mixing areas in the higher latitudes on the eastern sides of 
continents, where the cold currents from high latitudes brush against 
warm currents coming from the tropics with resultant turbulence and 
vertical circulation, are also areas of high productivity and heavy fish 
production. Examples are provided by the meeting of the Oyashio and 
Kuroshio in the Japanese island area, that of the Labrador Current and 
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the Gulf Stream over the Grand Banks, the Patagonian Current and the 
Brazilian Current off southern Brazil, Uruguay, and Argentina. 
As the research ships and fishing vessels have moved offshore, areas 
of mixing of this sort have been found stretching across whole oceans, 
with consequent increasing food and fish production. Examples are 
found in the equatorial current systems of the Pacific, Atlantic, and 
Indian oceans, the convergence zone that completely surrounds Ant­
arctica, the area south of the Aleutian Islands, and so forth. 
Additionally, areas of eddies of a rather persistent nature are found 
well offshore where subsurface waters dome up into the photic layer 
and become substantial sources of productivity without breaking to the 
surface. Examples are provided by the Costa Rica Dome and the Angola 
Dome. 
Where island groups or ocean ridges interfere with the broad and 
often infertile surface currents of the open ocean, some turbulence 
and vertical circulation occur. Examples are provided by the numerous 
arcs of islands in the central Pacific, the Windward islands of the 
Antilles, the Seychelles, the Laccadives and Maldives, the Andamans, 
and the great archipelago that is Indonesia. Downstream from these 
island groups is increased production of phytoplankton, and a little 
farther are concentrations of zooplankton and larger carnivores that 
are supported by it. 
The continental shelves have been typically where great fisheries have 
developed. Not only do they occur where many of the above upwelling 
situations occur, but by trapping the nutrients up in, or near, the photic 
layer they contribute much themselves to the effective utilization of the 
enormous quantities of plant nutrients in the reservoir of the deeper 
ocean. They also participate in the whole process of turbulence, vertical 
circulation, etc., in ways that are not very well understood as yet. For 
instance, the edge of the continental shelf appears to be heavier than 
usual fish producers in many areas of the world. The processes that 
govern this are not at all well understood. There is some thought that 
their interference with the enormous internal waves typical of those 
areas is a factor as that results in turbulence which reaches close to 
the surface. 
As fishing techniques have developed, more has been found out 
about the considerable fertility of the continental slope in many areas of 
the world ocean, and fisheries at depths of 200 to 300 fathoms are be­
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coming less uncommon. Experimental fishing on the bottom in the 
eastern Bering Sea to depths of 500 to 600 fathoms have recently been 
initiated by the Russians with a good deal of promise. 
The point in mentioning all of this is that the rapidly expanding 
knowledge and understanding of the ocean, its resources, the dynamic 
nature of each, and the relationships among them, are all changing our 
thinking about these things so rapidly that it is a little difficult to 
assimilate the new understanding into the old forms of human thought 
and action in this field. 
The ocean is beginning to appear to be a welter of richly productive 
valleys, broad, open, reasonable productive plains, great stretches of 
almost sterile "deserts," oasis of high production in otherwise sterile 
areas, and similar situations. These terms taken from our land experience 
do not fit our beginning ocean experience well at all, because productiv­
ity in the ocean is three-dimensional, rather than two-dimensional as on 
the land. The areas of heavy productivity are not necessarily related to 
land masses. Where they are, they may be a few miles broad, or they 
may be several hundred miles wide. 
The upshot of all of this is that the productivity structure of the 
ocean does not at all fit well the juridical structure we have constructed 
for the governance of the harvest of marine resources because the 
juridical structure to date has really risen from our land experience and 
from needs arising therefrom, not from ocean experience or needs. 
IV. The Fisheries 
Until this very generation man has gone about the harvest of the 
ocean by empiric means. Modern ocean science began only 100 years 
ago with the "Challenger" expedition. The International Council for the 
Exploration of the Sea is less than seventy years old. The fisheries 
work of FAO began only in 1945. The great growth in ocean knowledge 
is a thing of the past twenty years, and perhaps more has been found 
out about the ocean and its resources in the past ten years than in the 
previous history of man. 
This new knowledge has begun to revolutionize the ocean fisheries 
since about 1950 and its force upon them in the past five years has been 
immense. This continues to go on and will so continue. Since we are 
still using only a few per cent of the ocean's productivity, and that has 
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been mostly in northern temperate waters until quite recently, we can­
not estimate with any precision how the world ocean fisheries will 
develop. Our experience is too short and small. It can be said that 
modern technology is permitting fishermen increasingly to go where 
the fish are, wherever that may be, and the fishermen have become as 
migratory as the fish. 
The Japanese initiated the use of this new knowledge rather crudely, 
but effectively, in the expansion of their long-line tuna fisheries on a 
fully world-wide basis since 1952. They built valuable fisheries of this 
kind everywhere there were tuna, and in many places where the nearest 
dry land was 1,000 miles away. They have continued to advance into 
other productive resource habitats also by other fishing means and by 
continually more sophisticated application of ocean science and modern 
technology to world-wide fishery development problems. 
In the past ten years, the Russians have surged forward mightily with 
the most sophisticated and massive application of modern science and 
technology to ocean fishing that has yet been developed. They are seek­
ing out and utilizing one by one these particularly fertile ocean areas on 
a world-wide basis. By different means the Poles, Rumanians, English, 
Norwegians, Germans, French, Spanish, Italians, Greeks, Americans, 
Canadians, Koreans, and Taiwanese and others are intensifying and 
expanding their long-range fishing capabilities. 
From the volume standpoint, the greatest relative expansion of fish­
ing effort has been by the developing countries coastal to the tropical 
and subtropical ocean. The prime example of this has been Peru, which 
came from being almost a non-fishing country in 1954 to the greatest 
fish producing country in the world in 1964, when it produced by 
volume about 20 per cent of the total ocean production. This general 
process is going on elsewhere in the developing world, appears to be 
accelerating, and the likelihood is that it will continue to do so under 
the increasing assistance from the United Nations family of specialized 
agencies and bilateral aid programs. 
As these developing countries develop coastal fisheries, they trend 
almost at once into becoming longer and longer range fishermen as well, 
fishing off the coasts of other countries as a part of their necessary 
fishery economies just about as naturally and necessarily as the fish 
migrate for biological necessity. Examples are provided by Mexico, 
Panama, Ecuador, Peru, Chile, Guayana, Cuba, Senegal, Ivory Coast, 
Ghana, Pakistan, and Thailand. 
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V. The Nature of Fisheries Juridical Problems 
The strong development of long-range fishing simultaneously with an 
even stronger development of short range fishing by riparian nations is 
going to continue for the reason that the whole world is short of animal 
protein to fill its needs or desires, and the ocean is full of underutilized 
resources of animal protein that are enormous in extent and susceptible 
of relatively cheap harvesting. It is obvious that the best general interest 
of man will be served by a set of conditions that will permit the greatest 
possible use of these needed resources. It is equally obvious that this 
strong and almost universal striving to develop the ocean fisheries will 
cause great strife among the nations. Conflict over ocean fisheries has 
been the cause of war among sovereigns for almost all of modern history; 
major conflicts just short of war have occurred in our generation; and 
there is scarcely a week goes by that armed force is not used, or threat­
ened to be used, in fishery conflicts somewhere in the world. It can be 
confidently expected that these problems will increase in intensity, 
number, and variety before they become less. 
The prime source of conflict is that the living resources of the high 
seas are the common property of all nations under present international 
law. Fish of the high seas become the property of him who first reduces 
them to his possession. Since this law was made by man it can be 
changed by him. The difficulty is that laws of nature which cannot be 
changed by him interfere with reaching a rational solution to these 
problems. 
The chiefest of these are the laws of population dynamics. Every 
population of living things, including those of man, is governed by the 
same natural rules. The number and volume of living things in a par­
ticular population are governed by the dynamic relations among the 
number of new entrants into the population from each succeeding genera­
tion and their rates of growth, on the one hand, balanced off against the 
rate of mortality in the population, on the other hand. 
This applies to fisheries in this manner: When a fishery is instituted 
on the population this is simply an increase in the rate of mortality as 
far as the population is concerned. Either the rate of growth or the 
rate of entry from new generations into the population must increase or 
the level of the population decreases. 
In practice the rate of growth is not affected in a substantial manner 
by the introduction of a higher mortality (fishery). Neither does the 
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survival rate increase by enough to counteract the newly increased 
mortality rate. Always upon the inception of a fishery the total number 
and weight of fish in the population of fish decrease. 
But the population does have natural resiliency provided by nature 
to deal successfully with the wide variability in natural mortality in­
duced by fluctuation in natural conditions. The total number of the fish 
in the population, their total weight, their average size, and their average 
age decrease as the production of the fishery increases. This process con­
tinues until a certain point beyond which all of these things continue 
except the yield of the fishery, which beyond this point begins, also, to 
decrease no matter how much effort is put into the fishery. This is called 
the point of maximum sustainable catch. It is the point at which the 
resource is yielding the maximum amount of food or other product 
useful to man on a sustainable basis. 
The existence of this immutable law of nature complicates man's 
governance of the harvest of marine living resources horribly. If a man, 
or a group of men, owned a particular resource he would manage its 
harvest ordinarily in such a manner that the economic yield from the 
resource would be maximized. The difficulty is that the resources are 
not so owned and that the economic systems of various of the multiple 
owners of these resources are so different that there is no common level 
of population strength in the resource which will yield equal economic 
yields to all of the sovereign owners. Thus maximum economic yield 
cannot be successfully used as the standard for managing international 
fisheries, and all major fisheries are international in character. 
The nations, realizing this after extensive debate in the course of the 
1958 Law of the Sea Conference, retired for agreement to the standard 
governed by nature—the point of maximum sustainable yield. It was 
agreed that the harvest of the commonly owned resources of the high 
seas would be governed in such a manner as would render possible the 
optimum sustainable yield from such resources so as to secure the 
maximum supply of food and other marine products. This is the 
definition of conservation in the 1958 "Convention on Fishing and the 
Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas," to which the 
United States is a party, and which is now in force. The convention 
further states that all nations have the duty to adopt, or to co-operate 
with other nations in adopting, such measures for their respective na­
tionals as may be necessary for the conservation of the living resources 
of the high seas. 
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This does not at all solve the problems of conflict over the fisheries. 
It merely provides a framework in which the natural laws can be made 
amenable to this objective. But the nations, and their nationals, still have 
the problem of dividing the benefits that flow from such conservation 
activities. There is also the deeper-seated desire to block other nationals 
from the harvest of particular resources either to gain trade advantage, 
secure tax revenue, build local industry, or to satisfy general perverse­
ness and cupidity. The fish so far have defeated these objectives by their 
variety of occurrence and migration as briefly hinted at above. 
The nations agreed that certain waters of a coastal country, the 
internal waters, are the sovereign territory of the country in which the 
nationals of other nations have no right to fish without the consent of 
the sovereign. They have also agreed, for quite other purposes, that 
each coastal country has a band of territorial sea outside internal waters 
in which the coastal state also has unique jurisdiction over fishing and 
substantially everything else but the innocent passage by the vessels of 
other nations. But they have not agreed on what the breadth of the 
territorial sea is, other than it needs to be reasonably narrow and thus 
reasonably uniform. There is agreement by the vast majority of nations 
that the breadth of the territorial sea is between three and twelve 
marine miles and does not extend to a greater distance than that. This 
leaves most of the ocean as high seas, and the common property of all 
nations. This is nearly 70 per cent of the earth's surface. 
It is also agreed that the coastal nation has special interest in the 
living resources of the high seas adjacent to its respective territorial sea 
and these interests are secured in carefully specified rights. This does 
not, however, give the coastal nation any right to adopt measures for 
the conservation of those resources which are, in form or fact, discrim­
inatory against foreign fishermen engaging in the fishery for such 
resources. 
Most living resources supporting major fisheries do not stay within 
a zone twelve miles broad from land, and practically none stay within 
three miles of land. Many important ones, such as salmon, freshwater 
eels, river herring, shad, shrimp, not only move farther than that off­
shore, but also penetrate beyond the territorial sea into the inland 
waters and are dependent in their life histories upon doing so. 
The salmon are particularly annoying in this respect because they 
ascend rivers perhaps 1,000 miles from the sea to spawn, and then 
when the young come back to the sea they not only undertake migra­
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tions several thousand miles from the river mouth, but are dependent 
for life on being able to do so, and are readily captured by a commercial 
fishery in these long migrations away from the home streams (to which 
they normally return). To protect their welfare the nation with salmon 
streams must often interfere in a major way with its other use of the 
river. It feels, therefore, a proprietary interest in the salmon which it 
cannot protect when the fish gets into the ocean. 
But the completely oceanic resources are not any more tractable to 
management through this system of narrow territorial sea. The Nor­
wegian cod, which conducts the major part of its spawning in the 
internal waters of Norway, or at least within the territorial sea, moves 
out and is fished for throughout the Arctic, north of the Atlantic, wher­
ever the water conditions are right. 
The sardine, anchovy, saury, hake, bluefin, and albacore off the coast 
of Mexico and California typify the complexity that occurs off most 
coasts. Most of the spawning of sardine and anchovy in this region takes 
place well to sea offshore both countries, and the fish are available there 
for fishing, although most of the actual fishing to date is done reasonably 
close to shore. Presumably the anchovy do not make very long migra­
tions, but the sardine may. The hake spawn in this area also, but ap­
parently move north to feed and grow along the coast up as far as 
British Columbia. Although generally coastal and demersal, they do not 
always stay close to the bottom, and may often school at or near the 
surface. Also they can be readily caught off shore more than twelve 
miles. The jack mackerel form a large population, which is fished on 
mostly near the coast, but the spawning area extends at least 1,000 
miles off the coast, and the fish can be caught out there if large adults 
are wanted. The saury are found all over the northern part of the North 
Pacific, and we know nothing of their population structure. It appears 
to be continuous across the ocean. The albacore spawn thousands of 
miles from Mexico and California in the west central Pacific, and after 
coming over to where we can fish them off our coast, go back over to 
Japan where they can be fished there. The bluefin tuna are commonly 
caught in the territorial sea of Mexico and California but do not spawn 
in the eastern Pacific at all. They spawn south of Japan and north of 
the Philippines, and individuals tagged off Mexico are captured the 
other side of Japan, in the Sea of Japan. Fur seals feed off California 
and sometimes as far south as northern Mexico. Their nearest breeding 
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ground is the Pribilof Islands in the Bering Sea. Gray whales pass 
through the territorial sea of southern California proceeding to their 
calving grounds in the internal waters of the lagoons of northern Mex­
ico ; and, having fulfilled this biological purpose, migrate back across the 
Pacific to the feeding grounds off Kamchatka and the western Bering 
Sea. 
There is no system of lines or barriers that can be erected to provide 
a sensible system of ownership over these resources by Mexico and 
California. The problem of conservation of these resources is simply 
not tractable to this sort of management system. Yet both countries 
quarrel over extensions of fishery jurisdiction as between themselves, 
with their neighbors, and with nations whose long-range fishermen come 
into the area. They are not fully utilizing these resources, but they seem 
not to want others to do so. The problem posed by the resources of 
Mexico and California is just one example; others could easily be found 
in other parts of the world. 
There are four quite severe problems involved in the control of the 
harvesting of marine resources: 
1.	 At some stage in its development, each fishery must restrict its 
operation so as not to harvest a given resource beyond the point 
of maximum sustainable yield. 
2.	 The profits derived from such conservation must be divided among 
the fisheries harvesting the resource since each is one of its owners. 
3.	 Ownership of a given resource in a particular area does not neces­
sarily result in effective control of that resource since it itself is 
not a stable factor, in that the fish population in that area may 
move from it for obvious biological reasons. 
4.	 Because various fish populations migrate in different patterns and 
respond in different ways to the pressure of fishing within the 
area, each individual population constitutes its own problem. 
The mechanism for settling any conflict arising over the use of 
marine resources in response to the need to conserve those resources 
is provided in the 1958 Convention on Fishing and the Conservation of 
the Living Resources of the Sea. Its successful implementation depends 
on co-operation among those owners and users that are involved, since 
only the sovereign governs his own fishermen on the high seas. 
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There is no way to attend to the division of the profits of such con­
servation among the nations except by agreement on that among the 
sovereign users. This has not been tractable to general settlement yet, 
as has the conservation problem, because there are no universal criteria 
upon which the nations can agree. So far this has been tractable only to 
case by case negotiation among the sovereign owners. Examples are 
provided by the North Pacific fur seals (among Russia, Japan, Canada, 
and the United States), and the Fraser River sockeye and pink salmon 
(between Canada and the United States). In the one case the owners 
of the breeding ground do all the managing and harvesting of the re­
source and divide the skins to others on the basis of proportions 
established in a treaty. In the other case the responsibility for managing 
the resource and its harvest is in the hands of a joint commission, and 
the allowable harvest is split evenly between the two countries under 
treaty. 
There is no general solution in sight for the third sort of problem 
because there is no practical way to split up the ownership of the re­
sources and provide for conservation and rational management. 
VI. Effects on the Law of the Sea 
Freedom of the seas is essential to the social and economic welfare of 
man, and the world has now become so full of people and so closely knit 
together that there is no nation unaffected by this. If sea trade were to 
be interrupted in any considerable manner for any considerable length 
of time (as was commonly the case up until the seventeenth century), 
the whole human population would necessarily shrink back to con­
siderably reduced levels either from the wars which would result, or 
from the famines that would result until the population came into 
balance with the new circumstances. 
Public order on the ocean has never been kept except through military 
power, and it has been sea power in the hands of one or a few powers 
that has preserved the freedom of the seas over the past two hundred 
years, thus permitting the human population to come to its present stage 
of development. This military power must be able to reach into all 
corners to keep down the piracy that always pops up with its removal. 
These facts are so plainly evident to all that the nations agree that 
the high seas must be free to the passage of all, that the air space above 
must also be similarly free to transit, that the territorial sea must be 
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narrow, and that even within it there must be rights of innocent passage 
for all. Only the inland waters are subtracted from that part of the 
ocean which cannot be freely navigated. 
It is a major concern that the nations have not been able to agree 
upon a breadth of the territorial sea because this continues to be a source 
of friction among them. The United States as a principal power pre­
serving world peace feels this keenly as did England before her. To 
preserve world peace it is highly desirable, if not necessary, to keep the 
territorial sea to a minimum breadth of near three miles so that presently 
international straits will remain that way, as well as for related military 
reasons. Thus the United States, in the worst way, wishes to preserve 
the three mile territorial sea or as close thereto as possible. 
It was unable to get agreement by a necessary majority to a three 
or six mile territorial sea at either the 1958 or the 1960 Conference on 
the Law of the Sea. It fears that without such agreement there will be 
a continual erosion away from that standard toward the twelve mile 
territorial sea, which would render its military tasks more difficult and 
trend toward reducing the freedom of the sea. 
It was unable to get an agreement at the 1958 conference because it 
was unable to dissociate the problem of the territorial breadth from the 
problem of the jurisdiction by the coastal state over fisheries in the 
adjacent high seas. It sought and obtained a second world conference in 
1960 to consider only these two remaining points: the breadth of the 
territorial sea and the jurisdiction by the coastal state over fisheries 
lying in the adjacent high seas. It had made up its mind by this time that 
the military issues involved in the narrow territorial sea were so over­
riding to it that as necessary it would sacrifice its fishing interests in 
seeking a solution to the territorial problem. 
It did not realize then, and it does not realize now, that those prob­
lems are inseparable diplomatically and cannot be solved separately. 
The United States stands so strongly among its allies and other countries 
that its allies assumed that in a military showdown the United States 
would find a successful solution to the military aspects of the freedom 
of the seas. In the interval, they needed to eat and strengthen their 
economies, and they did not feel that they depend upon the United States 
to attend to these functions for them to their satisfaction, and they did 
not wish to be dependent in such a manner. Accordingly they wished to 
have maximum access to the resources of the sea, and they voted in such 
a manner as to protect this right. 
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The effect of this was that the United States tried every form of 
compromise, diplomatic pressure and persuasion at the 1960 Law of the 
Sea Conference and was still not able to quite get a two-thirds majority 
for any proposal. It did succeed, however, in doing two things which 
have continued to work toward eroding its desired position on the 
breadth of the territorial sea. 
It moved, for compromise purposes, to a six mile territorial sea posi­
tion hoping to influence required votes by this means. It did not get 
enough. In fact it is questionable if it got many. Upon the failure of the 
conference it reverted to a three mile policy, and it has since defended 
this militarily (Matsu Island and the Gulf of Tonkin). But the tempo­
rary move away from the three mile position (drawing United Kingdom, 
Canada and others with it) forever weakened that concept. 
Secondly, and more importantly, it permitted (also for compromise 
purposes) the breadth of the territorial sea and the limits of fishery 
jurisdiction concepts to be separated in its policy. It hoped by this 
compromise to get rid of the fishery problems so that it could concen­
trate on solving the breadth of the territorial sea problem. It failed to 
do this but by casting loose the fishery limits problem from its firm 
anchor to the territorial sea problem it lost its ability to control the 
outward surging of the fishery limits. 
Thus in the ensuing years there has been a continuous drift among 
the nations toward a twelve mile limit for fisheries. Now there is strong 
consideration in the United States Congress, and passivity in the 
executive department, for the United States also to adopt a twelve mile 
limit for fisheries. Again there is the wishful thinking that if the United 
States did this it could get agreement on a twelve mile limit for fisheries 
among the nations, stabilize that drifting front, and thus stabilize at the 
same time the narrow territorial sea front. 
The delusion in this strategy is fully illustrated by the testimony 
received by the appropriate committees of the Congress this year on 
these bills. The proponents of the twelve mile fishery limits freely admit 
that it will not solve the problems with which they are concerned. Those 
problems are discriminating against foreign fishermen now fishing adja­
cent to our territorial sea in competition with our own fishermen. They 
freely admit that the twelve mile fishery limit is "only a step in the right 
direction" and will have little or no beneficial effect on their problems. 
They represent clearly and concisely the position of the inshore, 
small-boat, relatively inefficient fisherman all over the world who wants 
100 
FISHERY RESOURCES IN OFFSHORE WATERS 
his competitive situation relieved not by becoming more efficient him­
self, but by doing away with more efficient fishermen. To think that a 
twelve mile fishery limit will stabilize this internal political and external 
diplomatic front is day-dreaming. A 200 mile limit will not, in the long 
run, satisfy this urging nor would it solve the conservation problems. 
Once the fishing limit boundary is separated from the territorial sea 
boundary, there is no good place for it to stop for reasons noted above. 
Since the real fishing problems cannot be solved by an artificial, generally 
applicable boundary anywhere in the sea, what this strategy has done is 
not contribute to the settlement of the territorial sea breadth problem, 
but has instead delayed and prevented its solution while opening new 
sources of conflict among the nations. 
There is no easy and simple way out of these law of the sea conflicts. 
While the United States for the past twenty years has thought of these 
conflicts principally in terms of their military consequences, it is rea­
sonable to predict that as fishing effort upon the ocean continues its 
rapid surge forward, to take care of the world need and desire for animal 
protein, the quarrels among nations over these fishery limit problems 
will become the important half of the over-all remaining problem in the 
law of the sea. In my view the United States would be well advised to 
work more energetically toward the solution of the fishery problems. 
As noted above, the key part of the fishery problems is the scientific 
aspect. The rate of growth, the rate of annual increment to the popula­
tion, and the rates of mortality must be assessed and continuously kept 
track of in order to know when an overfishing problem is going to result 
and what to do about it when it does. Much other biological and physical 
oceanographic research must be done to back up these studies and to 
interpret them. This needs to be done for every fish population where 
an overfishing problem is expected. The results of such studies on one 
fish population do not carry over to another. This is hard, slugging, 
difficult and costly science and there is no other way to attend to the 
conservation aspect of the fishery conflicts. 
As long as a fishery is exploiting a fish population at less than the 
level permitting the maximum sustainable productivity from it, it is 
contrary to world public policy for restrictions to be placed on the 
fishery. To do so would be to restrict the amount of food or other 
product from that resource which it is naturally capable of producing. 
When the fishing effort has increased beyond the point of maximum 
sustainable yield, the fishery can ordinarily be permitted to expand with­
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out serious damage to the resource. The reason for this is that ordinarily 
the fishermen go broke before the fish do. The exceptions are few and 
restricted to high unit value resources that are easy to catch and not 
very numerous, such as mammals. This is only wasteful economically 
and is no worse than the food waste that premature regulations bring 
by restricting fishing effort and letting the resource die unused by man. 
The sensible thing to do, and what the nations agreed to do in the 
1958 Convention on Fishing and the Conservation of the Law of the 
Sea, is to permit fishing to be free up to the point of maximum sustain­
able productivity in each fishery situation and then regulate fishing effort 
jointly so that it remains at that point indefinitely for that resource, 
while the excess fishing effort is diverted to building up a fishery on 
another under-utilized resource. 
At this point there are two things to do: (a) to establish quotas for 
the fishery applicable to everyone and let the fishery go to those who are 
the most efficient; or (b) to divide the quota that can be taken by all 
fishermen by some agreed formula between the different nations involved. 
But there will be a quota to divide up only when the population is 
husbanded by regulations which will keep it at the point of maximum 
sustainable yield. The nations have so far been very chary of providing 
the funds with which to support the research at sea upon which all of 
this depends. 
So far as I can see, there is no practical way to divide the fishery 
jurisdiction over the world ocean among the nations. There is no way 
to extend fishery limits out a little way, or even quite a ways, into the 
high seas and thus solve these fishery use and management problems. I 
see no way available at present to settle these matters by general agree­
ment any further than attending to the conservation part of the problem 
through the mechanism provided by the 1958 Convention on Fishery 
and the Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas. Beyond 
that point each problem (dividing up the profits from the conservation) 
will have to be worked out diplomatically among the nations at issue 
individually on its own merits. 
One can reasonably expect to see these problems exacerbated as fish­
ing effort continues to develop on a world-wide basis. For this reason 
the apparatus with which to attend to such problems in the United 
Nations organization and its specialized agencies, as well as in the 
sovereign governments themselves, will need to be strengthened con­
tinuously. 
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There is a general reluctance in government, both the national and 
international level, to face up realistically to these rapidly accumulating 
problems and, particularly, to the cost of dealing with them. 
The great tizzy about the twelve mile fishery limit presently in our 
Congress, which all hands recognize as an inconsequential and unreal­
istic approach to these problems, is a good example. Instead of meeting 
the real problem head on, we choose to do something that is politically 
palatable back home and sweep the real problems under the rug. 
Another example is provided by a recent recommendation made by 
an advisory group to the United Nations that title to the ocean and its 
resources should be vested in the United Nations so that it could charge 
fees for using the ocean, thus support itself, and thus provide for the 
husbanding of its resources. How this would contribute to the solution 
of any of the real problems involved in enhancing the rational use of 
the enormous resources of the world ocean quite escapes me. It would 
add to the cost per ton of harvest, when what is needed to enhance the 
harvest is lowering the cost per ton of production so that the product 
can be got to those who need it, at a price they can pay. It would put 
sovereigns under the regulation of the United Nations, because only 
sovereigns (not individual citizens) have rights under the law of the 
sea to use the ocean. It would put a policing job for 70 per cent of the 
world's surface on the United Nations, when two or three minor policing 
jobs on land are what is now breaking the organization. 
VII. Conclusions 
1. The harvest of the living resources of the sea has about doubled 
in the last ten years. It presently takes about 5 per cent of the maximum 
sustainable yield of such resources which the ocean is capable of produc­
ing. The need and desire for animal protein in the world is enormous 
and increasing. It is likely that the harvest of such resources from the 
ocean will increase steadily for a long time to come to fill this need. 
2. The maintenance of public order on the ocean has been rendered 
difficult throughout modern history by conflicts over fishing rights in 
the ocean. Such conflicts have increased in frequency as fishing effort 
has increased, and this is likely to continue. 
3. Such conflicts have been made minimal with respect to land re­
sources by dividing into segments those owned by some group of 
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sovereign people. This solution has been introduced to ocean problems 
recently as they concern the non-migratory resources of the sea bed. 
It is difficult, however, to see how this solution can be practically applied 
to the living resources of the ocean because of the exceedingly migratory 
nature of so many of the important ones. 
4. From the standpoint of living resource productivity in the ocean, 
there is no convenient breaking point which can be used to demarcate the 
offshore from the distant water areas and resources. The migration areas 
of the different principal resources overlap badly. The very centers of 
primary productivity do not conform to any regular areal pattern. 
5. Overfishing must be eliminated from world public policy. This 
cannot be arranged with any particular resource unless the whole area 
in which the resource can be caught is covered by the regulatory mea­
sures. Most resources supporting major fisheries can be caught at greater 
distance than three to twelve miles from land and many of them at 
greater than 200 miles from land. Most of them that are really strictly 
coastal occur off the coasts of at least two countries, and often off 
several. Accordingly, nearly all conservation activities concerning major 
fisheries must be conducted under international auspices. 
6. A suitable framework for attending to all such conservation prob­
lems has been provided by the 1958 Convention on Fishing and the 
Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas. The nations 
are still chary of contributing the funds to support the research required 
to implement this convention or to require their nationals to abide by 
the regulations that such a treatment of the conservation problems gives 
rise to. 
7. Internal political pressures often incline a nation to seek to extend 
its jurisdiction out to sea beyond its territorial limits in order to hamper 
foreign fishermen in their operations and thus favor local fishermen. 
This tends toward favoring inefficiency, toward underutilizing resources, 
and to causing conflicts among nations because other nations do not 
wish to give up freedom of fishing on the high seas. Such conflicts thrive 
in an atmosphere of lack of scientific facts about the fish and the effect 
of the fishery on the population, they smother and often die when 
illuminated in the full glare of adequate and public scientific fact. 
8. No easy or cheap way is apparent out of these problems nor would 
it be expected that there should be. Conflicts concerning ownership of 
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land resources have been the subject of costly and intensive activity for 
a good many thousands of years. The ocean covers more than 70 per 
cent of the earth's surface, yet miniscule amounts of money are being 
spent by the nations in scientific inquiry concerning the ocean and its 
resources. 
9. Our experience in dealing with living marine resources is limited 
to only a few cases. Those we know about indicate a remarkable diver­
sity in the life habits, migratory ranges, reactions to fishing pressure, 
and other vital parameters of various fish populations. Until recently, 
fisheries have largely restricted themselves to harvesting those resources 
that are highly prized as food, and these have been those available in the 
northern temperate area. The vast resources of the lower latitudes and 
those of the Southern Hemisphere have only recently been tapped, and 
we have gained as yet only very little experience with them. 
10. It is recommended, finally, (a) that no drastic change be made 
in the existing regime of the high seas as it affects husbandry of living 
resources until such time as we have acquired a far more comprehensive 
knowledge concerning the ocean and its resources and such a change is 
definitely proved desirable; (b) that nations increase their support of, 
and co-operation in, the conservation of the resources of the high seas 
as prescribed by the 1958 convention by expanding research directed 
toward increasing our knowledge of the ocean and its resources; and 
(c) that the nations of the world strengthen not only their own agencies 
devoted to such matters, but also the international commissions on fishery 
and the FAO Fishery Department, so as to assure that administrative and 
scientific machinery will be available both to prevent conflicts and to 
bring about the resolution of those that have already occurred. 
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Chapter Seven: 
THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE SEA'S 
The fundamental purpose of this seminar is to discuss the distribution 
of the sea's wealth. We are examining, as is appropriate for every nation, 
the gains and losses to be obtained from alternative formulations of the 
law of the sea. Each nation, of course, desires to maximize its own net 
gain. But, since the resources of the sea are scarce, and since they are 
shared by the world community, one nation's gain may mean another 
nation's loss. This is exemplified by the extension of a nation's limits 
of exclusive rights. 
The reaching of decisions among nations will be based upon the 
trade-offs of gains and losses. It is essential, therefore, that the terms 
of the trade-offs be understood as fully as possible. It is to be hoped that 
the analysis of gains and losses will be comprehensive and foresighted, 
and not the reflection of immediate problems and narrow goals. 
It is impossible in a single paper, or for a single observer, to discuss 
fully all of the complex elements that will make up the trade-offs under­
lying the distribution of the sea's wealth. One can but suggest some of 
the dimensions of the problem and propose certain views that might be 
considered in future discussions. In my case, I am limiting my remarks 
to fishery resources, and to the economic implications and consequences 
of various alternatives for wealth distribution. To a certain extent, some 
of the things said about fisheries also apply to mineral resources—the 
chief difference between the two being that the former are mobile and 
the latter are fixed in place, and therefore easier to describe and place 
within boundaries. 
In both cases, however, one conclusion is inescapable; and that is that 
there is a great need for more research, study, and discussion. And basic 
to this need is the requirement for increasing the number of highly 
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qualified persons with an interest and a competence in the economic and 
political aspects of the sea's wealth. 
In this paper, I am assuming that all the world seeks international 
arrangements that will meet three objectives: scientific management, 
economic efficiency, and acceptability. Arrangements to be viable over 
the long run must conform to the characteristics of the resource, par­
ticularly to the characteristic of mobility. The objective of economic 
efficiency has been given short shrift in past arrangements. It should 
receive special emphasis, not only because of its neglect in the past but 
also because future arrangements will inevitably have to deal directly 
with the problems of economic costs and returns. The third objective— 
acceptability—is obvious, but in considering this goal, it is necessary to 
face not only the short term interplay of forces but also the changing 
conditions over the long run and how these may affect a nation's views 
of its gains and losses. 
There are some questions about the meaning of the wealth of the 
seas and about the different interpretations of ownership. These are 
multifaceted questions for which there are no clear answers. But discus­
sion is important because different interpretations of ownership and of 
wealth have considerably different implications for the three goals of 
scientific management, economic efficiency, and acceptability. In this 
discussion, I shall postulate certain interpretations that may seem some­
what radical, but the reason for these postulates will become evident in 
the discussion that follows. 
Turning from these questions, which essentially deal with the distribu­
tion of the sea's wealth, I shall then discuss some of the questions about 
the production of the sea's wealth. Under current conditions, and guided 
by the current conservation regulations, the sea's wealth is dissipated; 
because open access to the resource leads to the applications of redun­
dant amounts of capital and labor. This is the basis of a long-waged 
argument between biologists and economists, the former choosing the 
goal of maximum physical output and the latter the goal of maximum 
net economic revenue. It should be stated, however, that both the 
biologists and the economists, as a result of the decade of discussion, 
have retracted from their extreme positions. Their goals are not in 
direct conflict and the problem is not so much one of choice of ends 
as it is the choice of means. The conclusion of the argument is critical; 
and that is that, somehow or other, it will be necessary to limit the num­
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ber of fishermen that can participate in the fishery. Such limitations can 
only be achieved by further restricting the "freedom of the seas"; by 
excluding the excessive amounts of capital and labor. Such exclusions 
and restrictions place the spotlight very directly on questions about the 
meaning of the "freedom of the seas" and about the distribution of the 
sea's wealth. 
And, finally, having discussed the question of the distribution of 
wealth and the question of the production of wealth, I shall turn to 
three alternative arrangements for international fisheries and sketch out 
some of the implications of these for a rational and acceptable fisheries 
regime. The first alternative would be by a direct license limitation 
scheme that would permit the participants to gain the economic rent 
that is produced. The second would prevent excessive entry by remov­
ing the economic rent from the fishery, by the use of yield taxes or 
perhaps, by an appropriate license fee. The third alternative would be 
by appropriating the resource itself, either by unilateral extension of 
exclusive rights, or by some form of international agency. In each case, 
some, though by no means all, of the advantages and disadvantages will 
be raised. And, if there is any validity to my conclusions about the 
desirability and inevitability of entry restrictions, then it is these 
advantages and disadvantages that should receive the greatest amount 
of study and discussion. 
I. Who Gets What? 
As mentioned above, the essence of this seminar lies in the distribu­
tion of the sea's wealth. This is quite clearly the case if we are discussing 
the further extension of exclusive fishing limits. It is certainly the case 
if we are discussing restrictions on entry, which will give exclusive 
rights to some and not to others. It is even the case for most, if not all, 
conservation regulations; for these inevitably work to the benefit of 
some and to the detriment of others.1 
But note that in the three instances mentioned, different items of 
wealth are being distributed to different sets of nations. The question 
can be simply stated: "Who gets what?" But the answer, or alterna­
tive answers, are far from clear. For the moment, I will try to discuss 
these questions without reference to the criteria of economic efficiency 
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or acceptability, although inevitably these criteria must be included in 
the negotiations for future fisheries arrangements. 
What are the characteristics of ownership of international fisheries? 
Who has ownership rights, what do these rights include, and how can 
ownership rights be evaluated and priced in economic terms ? To begin 
with the most general aspect, there is question as to whether the fishery 
resources of the high seas belong to no one or, conversely, are the com­
mon property of the world community. If the first interpretation is 
accepted without qualification, then the resources are up for grabs. Any 
nation feeling capable of it could assert unilateral authority over a high 
seas fishery far distant from its shores, or would have no compunction 
in depleting or completely extinguishing a fishery resource. In certain 
instances, some nations appear to have adopted this interpretation. 
Conversely, the resources might be considered to be the property of 
the world community as a whole. This appears to be the general trend 
in interpretation. At least, some feeling for world ownership may be 
serving to restrain unilateral appropriation of fisheries. The basis for 
this feeling may be mixed. It may, in part, be an unwillingness to incur 
unpopularity. It may be fear of retaliation. It may be that a nation finds 
world ownership advantageous to its own interests. Or, indeed, it may 
be from some sense of equity. But whatever the motivations, the evi­
dence is that world fisheries are coming to be considered as belonging 
to the world community, at least this is implied in the conservation 
agreements that impose an obligation upon nations to "conserve" fishery 
resources. 
If, then, the resources are the common property of the world com­
munity, how can each nation define its share of this property? This 
cannot be discussed without discussions of the rights that are attached 
to ownership. Are these rights simply a generalized right of access, with 
every nation having an opportunity to participate in the direct exploita­
tion of the fishery? Or is there an exclusive aspect to the right of access? 
Is it a right to share the resource? Or a right to dispose of the resource? 
And how can the right, whatever it is, be measured in economic terms ? 
It is this last question that the economist finds most interesting, since 
value depends upon scarcity and upon exclusion. If a resource is bottom­
less and no one can exclude anyone else from sharing the resource, there 
is no market place for the resource and no price that can be directly 
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attached to it. Sunshine is obviously important to everyone, but it cannot 
be bought and sold except under certain conditions where scarcity and 
exclusion become involved. For example, construction of a high rise 
building may exclude a neighbor's garden from sunshine thereby destroy­
ing his crops and creating a cost that is measurable. 
Similarly, a generalized right of access to fisheries has no value unless 
scarcity and exclusion become attached to the right. Under these condi­
tions, wealth, such as it is, is distributed on the basis of nations' abilities 
and willingness to exploit fisheries. Those that do not exploit, do not 
share in the wealth. They do, however, keep the option for exploiting 
sometime in the future, and cannot be excluded from exercising this 
option. As pointed out later, this generalized right of access, preserving 
the freedom to exploit a fishery, is accompanied by severe impediments 
to the goal of economic efficiency. 
In some cases, rights of access have acquired scarcity and a semblance 
of exclusion, or at least, sufficient exclusion so that the rights have been 
bought and sold. The Japanese and the Canadians have sold their rights 
to catch fur seals.2 The United Kingdom and the Netherlands (or indi­
vidual firms therein) have sold their rights to take whales in the 
Antarctic.3 And the adoption of the doctrine of abstention in 1952 
involved the sale of rights by the Japanese to fish for salmon in the 
eastern North Pacific.4 To be sure, other words and terms have been 
used in describing these cases, but essentially, they involve the giving 
up of a fishing right in return for something of value. The value may be 
explicitly stated in monetary terms; it may be in terms of physical 
quantities; or it may be a non-quantifiable reward completely unrelated 
to the fishery resources. But whatever the terms of trade, the right of 
access in these instances has been valued and has become an item of 
wealth. 
The difference between the generalized rights mentioned above and 
the specific, saleable rights is that the latter rest on an historic right of 
access to the resource. That is, the selling nations have made use of their 
freedom of opportunity to exploit a fishery and thereby have established 
a right that has a recognized value. Other nations that have not exercised 
their rights presumably have no marketable stake in the resource. The 
basis for the value is the presumption that other nations will not take 
up their option to participate and that they are, in fact, excluded from 
exploiting the resource. If the exclusion is not maintained, then the value 
of the right diminishes. If, for example, Peru chose to exercise its right 
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of access to fur seals, the shares to the four parties of the treaty would be 
decreased. The parties may choose to buy out Peru by bringing it into 
the convention, but if other nations follow Peru's lead, exclusion becomes 
ineffective and the right of access devalued. 
Where historic rights are maintained and become effective forces for 
exclusion, the wealth of the fisheries is distributed not only to those 
nations that are exploiting the resource, but also to those nations that 
have exploited the resource. As pointed out later, this concept of historic 
rights, because of its exclusive properties, may facilitate improvements 
in economic efficiency, but it raises difficult questions about acceptability. 
Another concept of ownership rights is postulated as follows: that 
world ownership of the resource carries the right of exclusion, and that 
the rights of individual nations are to shares in the resource rather than 
to exploitative access to the resource. This may appear to be a radical 
postulate. It gives the world community (which is not recognized as an 
individual entity, except perhaps by other planets) an explicit property 
right—the right to exclude its constituents, or part of its constituents, 
from participating in the exploitation of the resource. It also gives the 
individual nations a right to share in the resource itself, which is a more 
general right than that of the opportunity to exploit. Under this concept, 
a nation's share in the resource may be expressed as the nation's share 
in the wealth that is produced, just as each nation has a share in the in­
formation produced by weather satellites. 
This step from a right of access to a right in the resource is admittedly 
a major one, although there are precedents and there are analogous situ­
ations that indicate its merits. To paraphrase another student of ocean 
resources, I suggest that we have available a better analogy, in the laws 
of grazing lands, evolved in the western United States, than we can find 
in any facet of the law of the sea. Up until the first quarter of this cen­
tury, western grazing lands were treated as common property resources, 
a treatment that was initially established because it was felt that the 
grazing lands were inexhaustible. However, as demand increased, the 
common use of the resource led to depletion, congestion, and conflict (the 
same consequences that are occurring on the high seas. The range wars 
provided dramatic evidence of the attempts of individuals to appropriate 
the resource for their exclusive use (reflected in unilateral attempts of 
nations to appropriate fishery resources). Peace on the range was 
achieved only by an uneasy collusion (reflected on the seas by multi­
lateral and exclusive agreements). 
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By the turn of the century it was clear that open access to the resource 
would destroy it, and President Theodore Roosevelt, among others, 
called for the exercise of exclusive rights by the federal government and 
the leasing of these rights to the individual users. In essence, the public 
lost the freedom of opportunity to exploit the resource but gained a share 
in the wealth that is produced. 
In summary, I have attempted to indicate some of the different in­
terpretations of ownership of the sea's fisheries and the implications of 
these for distribution of wealth. Where generalized rights of access per­
tain, the distribution of wealth is on the basis of willingness and ability 
to exploit the resource. Under historic rights that exclude new entrants, 
the wealth goes to those who exploit, or who have exploited, the fisheries. 
But if ownership is interpreted as a right to share in the resource, then 
the wealth would be distributed to all nations. Obviously, there are diffi­
culties with each of these interpretations—difficulties with respect to the 
goal of economic efficiency and to the goal of acceptability. The im­
portance for considering these alternative views is set forth in the 
following remarks, beginning with a discussion of the necessity for re­
stricting open access to international fisheries. 
II. The Question of Rationalisation 
Turning to the objectives for fishery management, I mentioned the 
argument between biologists and economists; the former advocating the 
maximization of the sustainable yield from the fishery, and the latter 
advocating the maximization of the net economic revenue. The economic 
argument points out that the common property characteristics of a fishery 
result in uncontrolled access, and, therefore, lead to the attraction of 
greater amounts of capital and labor than are economically justified.5 
Where a resource is unowned, or owned in common, no one can prevent 
others from participating in the exploitation of the resource. The eco­
nomic rent of the industry is a profit that is shared by all participants 
rather than one that can be appropriated by a single managing agency. 
And since it is shareable, more and more producers will enter the in­
dustry until all the rent is dissipated. At this point, the industry will be 
operating where total costs and revenues are equal rather than where 
marginal costs and revenues are equal. No businessman, if he had control 
of the resource, would select this point of operation. He would, instead, 
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invest only as much capital and labor as would produce the maximum 
net revenue. But since there is common ownership of a fishery, and there­
fore no control on the amount of capital and labor, the inevitable result 
is gross economic waste. 
Three recent studies indicate the magnitude of this waste. A study of 
the Sacramento River salmon fishery has shown that $3.3 million worth 
of annual catch could be taken with $300,000 worth of effort under 
rational management.6 For the Puget Sound fishery, it has been estimated 
that half of the current amount of effort would be sufficient to take the 
permissible catch, at an annual savings of between $2 and $4 million per 
year.7 And for the Georges Bank haddock fishery, it has been estimated 
that "the point of maximum profit would be at a level 50 per cent or less 
of the recent average [amount of effort]." 8 The prevention of this waste 
can only be achieved by simulating the conditions under private enter­
prise; that is, by suitable rationing of exploitation rights to reduce the 
number of producers. 
The biologists have a different view of waste. To them a resource is 
being wasted if it is producing less than the maximum physical yield that 
can be sustained over time. In order to prevent this waste, they seek con­
trols on the amount of catch, rather than on the amount of effort. The 
economists reject this objective for several reasons. 
First, a physical objective (a certain number of pounds of fish) is not 
a meaningful guide for an economic industry. No farmer seeks to pro­
duce the maximum amount of corn that can be grown on an acre of 
ground, because the increased costs of production are greater than the 
increased revenues. 
A second reason for rejecting the maximum sustainable yield as a 
desirable objective is that it offers no guidance for the management of 
two fisheries that may be ecologically related. If two species in demand 
compete for the same food source, the yields from both cannot be 
maximized simultaneously. 
A third and more important reason lies in the methods of control 
that are generally sought to achieve a maximum sustainable yield. Most 
of these methods tend to increase the costs of the industry—for ex­
ample, by prohibiting the use of technologically efficient gear. This is 
the reason for the prohibition of salmon traps in the Pacific Northwest, 
and for the law that oysters in Maryland can only be dredged by sail 
boats. It should be pointed out, however, that such stringent methods are 
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frequently chosen not so much to prevent depletion as to preserve the 
fishery for the present participants. In essence, therefore, they are a 
system for distributing the wealth of the seas. 
But the differences of opinion over the objectives for rational fishery 
management may be becoming academic. The participants in the de­
veloped fisheries are becoming more and more aware of the declines 
in catch per unit of effort. The stocks of fish, such as those on the Grand 
Banks, are limited in supply. But as the demand for these fish increases, 
the fisheries attract more effort, so that the available supply is shared 
by more producers. Therefore, each fisherman's share of the total catch 
becomes reduced. None of the conservation regulations can prevent this 
from occurring. 
In the future, in the absence of entry restrictions, the waste will 
inevitably become more severe and more extensive. The demand for 
fish products is growing at the rate of about six per cent per year. 
Technology is advancing and reducing the costs of harvesting as well 
as increasing the ability to take fish. These two pressures will attract 
greater amounts of effort. Even if technological innovation is prohibited, 
the presently developed fisheries will become more severely depleted and 
those fisheries that are less developed at present will begin to feel the 
costs of declining catches per unit of effort. With technological innova­
tion and no control on the number of users, whole stocks of fish might 
be wiped out in a single season. This would be especially true if some 
of the advanced techniques, described in popular literature, become 
feasible. Or if, for example, it becomes feasible to increase the fertility 
of a high seas area, what entrepreneur will undertake the capital invest­
ment if he has no exclusive rights to the fruits of that investment? 
The necessity for restricting entry into a fishery is becoming more 
widely recognized. The Report of the Third Meeting of the Northeast 
Atlantic Fisheries Commission9 pointed out that a 50 per cent reduction 
in effort would lead to a 10 per cent increase in the total catch of 
Arctic cod. It then emphasized one of the difficulties of regional, rather 
than international, approaches to effort reduction. If its sister com­
mission on the other side of the Atlantic (ICNAF) initiated entry reduc­
tion schemes, some of the excluded effort would enter the Northeast 
Atlantic area, and create further depletion and economic waste. 
In summary, it is clearly both inevitable and desirable that means 
be found to reduce open access to fishery resources and to prevent the 
application of excessive and redundant amounts of capital and labor. 
This is the first criterion for future regimes for marine fisheries, and 
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it is one that has significant implications for the distribution of the 
sea's wealth. 
III. Other Criteria for Fisheries Management 
In addition to the necessity for preventing economic waste, other 
criteria will have to be considered in the formulation of international 
fishery regimes. I shall mention a few of these briefly, in order to 
indicate the complexity of the tasks and the need for additional research. 
First, no matter what objective for fisheries management is chosen, 
management must be technically possible. The prime distinction between 
minerals of the sea floor and the fisheries of sea waters is that the former 
are fixed in place and the latter are mobile. The freely swimming fish 
pay no respect to national boundaries or other artificial divisions of 
the oceans. Some fish, such as salmon and tuna, may cover several 
thousand miles during their brief life span, and may appear in the 
territorial waters of various nations. Other species may be homebodies, 
but even in these cases, their environment may be influenced by actions 
far from their habitats. In all cases, it is necessary to define a viable 
management unit. For those fish that roam great distances, it may be 
the stock itself. In other cases, a regional approach, covering several 
interrelated species may be most desirable. It is clear that there will be 
great difficulties involved in defining management units, particularly if 
the fish enters the territorial waters of an unco-operative coastal state. 
Another criterion is that the regime be sufficiently flexible to deal 
with changes in the patterns of demand. Currently, there are only a 
relatively few species of fish that are sought by fishermen. Vast quanti­
ties of so-called underutilized species exist in the oceans simply because 
the market for these species is not sufficient to warrant investment in 
catching them. It is a common plea of commercial fishermen that every 
effort be undertaken to increase the demand for these "underutilized" 
species. If, as is probable, these "underutilized" species are closely related 
ecologically to species currently in demand, some decisions will have 
to be made on the relative economic values of the different species, in 
order to determine how much of each species to produce. 
Not only will flexibility with respect to species be required, but also 
flexibility with respect to the amount and kind of effort. This is particu­
larly important with respect to technological innovations. On the one 
hand, techniques that reduce the cost per unit of effort will make it 
economically feasible to increase the amount of effort. On the other 
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hand, techniques that reduce the cost per unit of catch, will call for 
reductions in the amount of effort. Such reductions may have to be 
severe if some of the anticipated technologies become practical. If, for 
example, it becomes possible to attract fish in great quantities (by lights, 
electric fields, herding techniques), competition between two or more 
vessels would lead to obvious wastes. It would be as if there were no 
control over entry into the radio spectrum. Two units using the same 
frequency in the same area would result either in impossible congestion 
or a race to build the biggest tower with the greatest output. Just as 
radio frequencies are allocated, it is clear that new fishery technologies 
will require allocation among fishing units. 
Other criteria besides the ones mentioned will suggest themselves. 
The regime should be enforceable. It should not stifle growth. It should 
encourage the development of scientific knowledge. But in addition to 
these, and of far greater importance, the regime should be acceptable. 
Since a prime requisite is the exclusion of excess producers, the question 
becomes one of determining who shall be excluded and who shall be 
permitted to participate. And this leads directly to the question of the 
distribution of the sea's wealth. 
IV. Alternative Methods jor Controlling Entry 
I have attempted to demonstrate the inevitability and the desirability 
for controlling entry to marine fisheries. The difficulty lies not in the 
determination of the goal, but in its implementation. Three techniques 
will be discussed: that of direct license limitation; that of the appropri­
ation of economic rent; and that of the appropriation of the resource. 
Each of these techniques calls for a greater degree of authority than now 
exists on the sea, but this is inevitable no matter what shape the future 
regime will take. Each technique also will undoubtedly be accompanied 
by transitional hardship, as participants find themselves excluded from 
the fishery. There are, however, ways in which these hardships can 
be ameliorated.10 
License limitation.—One possible method is by the direct limitation 
of the amount of effort. The most effective way would be by granting 
licenses only to that number of producers that would yield the greatest 
net revenue to the industry. In this case, as in the case of the New York 
taxicabs,11 the economic rent would accrue to the holders of the licenses. 
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There are many difficulties with such a scheme. First, since the fisher­
men come from different nations with different wage/price structures, 
conclusions as to the potential net economic revenue and the appropriate 
amount of effort are likely to vary. In many cases, however, the vari­
ations may not be great, but even, if they are, it may still be possible 
to arrive at a compromise that leaves each of the participating nations 
better off than they were before. This implies, of course, that some 
system for rationing the licenses among the participating nations has 
been worked out. 
A second difficulty lies in describing the unit of effort that is to be 
licensed. If it is a single vessel, then the temptation would be to build 
bigger and faster vessels in order to get as great a share of the catch 
as possible. This could lead to a race in technological innovation that 
would be economically inefficient. It could also lead to depletion of the 
resource and heavier costs for future harvesting. These effects might be 
overcome by licensing a vessel of a certain size and catching power, 
but this would then prevent technological innovation from taking place. 
There could be periodic revision of the standard vessel in order to permit 
new techniques to be applied, but if these increase catching power, then 
the number of licenses would again have to be reduced. 
Any system that permits the economic rent to accrue to the license 
holder is certain to encounter difficulties because of the temptation to 
break the intention of the regulation.12 But an even greater difficulty 
would lie in the acceptability of such a scheme. If the licenses are 
granted only to those nations with historic rights in the resource, then 
the non-participating nations would either be excluded or have to buy 
a license from a retiring licensee. This would mean that a nation would 
have to purchase what is now a free right of access, and it would 
mean that the wealth of the seas would lie, essentially, in the hands 
of those with historic rights. It is unlikely that this proposal would 
receive wide acceptance. 
If, in order to overcome this, free right of access is to be maintained, 
then the exercise of this right would mean either the granting of addi­
tional licenses (and the breakdown of the scheme) or the loss of licenses 
on the part of the participating nations; a loss they would be unwilling 
to accept. 
The Appropriation of Economic Rent.—A second and less direct 
method for controlling entry would be by the appropriation of the 
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economic rent produced by the industry. A license fee, determined by 
auction or other means, would add to the costs of effort and discourage 
the excess producers from participating in the fishery. The same result 
could be achieved by an appropriate tax on the yield. Those who remain 
in the industry would be no worse off than before. Society, in the long 
run, would be better off by having achieved a more rational allocation 
of capital and labor and by the acquisition of a rent that was formerly 
dissipated. 
But some of the same difficulties of the license limitation scheme 
would attend this proposal. There would be difficulties in determining an 
appropriate license fee or tax, in describing the unit of effort, and in 
allowing for a rational rate of technological innovation. Also, the right 
of access would no longer be free. 
But the essential difference between this proposal and the license 
limitation method is that the wealth of the seas would be appropriated 
by a single agency rather than by the participants. This raises the 
question as to how to distribute the wealth. Some, of course, would 
have to be devoted to administering the arrangement and managing the 
resource, but there is likely to be considerable surplus above this. The 
formula for distribution would have to be worked out by all nations. 
It might be distributed on the basis of length of coastline, size of popu­
lation, area, or perhaps on the basis of need. Or it might be turned over 
to an international agency to be used for scientific research, aid to 
underdeveloped countries, or for some other purpose that would meet 
commonly accepted goals. Such a distribution might make many nations 
more willing to accept the loss of free access to the resource. 
The Appropriation of the Resource.—The third method for limiting 
entry is by the appropriation of property rights to the resource itself. 
If a single managing agent has full control of the resource and of all 
access to it, then the common property characteristics are removed. 
In this case, the problems of economic efficiency, technological innova­
tion, flexibility of management, and similar problems, would be no more 
difficult than those of an ordinary farmer or businessman. The manager, 
or owner, would invest only as much capital and labor as would produce 
the maximum net revenue. 
He would buy his inputs in the cheapest market and sell his products 
in the dearest market. He would have little difficulty in choosing how 
much of each species to produce, since the market would be his guide. 
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His investment in new equipment could be amortized over an appropriate 
number of years. In short, his ownership of the resource would eliminate 
almost all of the difficulties that presently exist in the exploitation of 
marine fisheries. 
It is important to point out that this case calls for the appropriation 
and use of exclusive rights by a single managing agency. Nothing is 
gained, for example, by an agency's acquiring these rights and then 
granting open access to those producing units under its jurisdiction. 
The case of the Pacific salmon and the doctrine of abstention is illustra­
tive of the failure to use exclusive rights for the purpose of increasing 
economic efficiency. 
The appropriation of the resource removes most of the consequences 
of common ownership, but it is, in essence, an appropriation of the 
sea's wealth and raises, therefore, the question of acceptability. There 
are two ways in which appropriation can take place. First, it could be 
achieved by the unilateral extension of a coastal state's fishing rights. 
Or second, it might be achieved by granting exclusive rights to an 
international agency or authority. Examples of the former would be 
the extension of rights to cover the continental shelf, or the unilateral 
assertion of the doctrine of abstention. Obviously many nations would, 
and do, oppose such attempts, and it is unlikely that this approach would 
be successful. But even with this approach, there will be no gain in 
wealth unless the appropriating nation rationalizes its own effort. 
Appropriation by an international authority would also meet con­
siderable opposition. The authority might choose to exploit the resources 
directly, by buying its own vessels and marketing its products. Or, 
instead, it might lease its rights to a single nation. But in either case, 
open access to the resource would be very definitely precluded. The 
advantages of this system, however, should not be lightly discarded. It 
would permit a rational and economically efficient fishery to develop. 
It would ease the course of technological innovation. But of more 
significance, the individual nations may be willing to give up their 
rights of access for a right to share in the economic rent that would be 
produced. This would be in keeping with the view that the sea's wealth is 
the property of the world community to be shared by all the nations. 
Earlier in this paper, I set forth different interpretations of owner­
ship of world fisheries. It was suggested that the world community as 
a whole has a degree of ownership of the resources lying outside the 
exclusive rights of coastal states. It was postulated that this degree of 
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property rights might be extended to include the right of exclusion. 
The rationale for this step lies in the necessity for preventing excessive 
entry into world fisheries. For individual nations, three different inter­
pretations of rights of ownership were advanced—a generalized right 
of access; an historic right of access that permits exclusion; and a right 
to share in the resource. When the first interpretation is maintained, 
and there are no restrictions on access, the wealth of the sea will be 
dissipated, to the loss of both the world community and the individual 
nations. Under the second interpretation, economic rent could be pro­
duced, but this would be appropriated by a few nations to the exclusion 
of others. The third interpretation ties in with the postulate about the 
expansion of world ownership rights. This would permit the rational 
production of wealth and grant each nation a share of this wealth. In 
essence, individual nations would be trading their right of access for 
a share in the economic rent. 
Just as nature abhors a vacuum, society abhors a common property, 
and all pressures are for filling in the vacancy. This vacancy can be 
filled by the assertion of historic rights, by the unilateral extension of 
coastal states' rights, or by the world community's assumption of exclu­
sive rights. The world may select any of these alternatives or a com­
bination of them. One can only hope that the selection will be based on 
rational objectives; on clear foresight; and that it will be made with a 
sense of equity and generosity. 
* I am indebted to Robert C. Lind, Jay Polach, and other colleagues at Resources 
for the Future for their critical comments on an earlier version of this paper. 
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Discussion of Chapman and Christy 
1. There is a critical need for social science research (particularly 
in economics) on the problems associated with the development and 
use of ocean resources. The wealth in the seas is primarily a function 
of the economic forces of supply and demand, and these must be fully 
understood and anticipated if we are to arrive at a rational and orderly 
regime for the seas. Arrangements, to be viable, must recognize and 
accommodate the diverse developmental interests. 
2. Debate centered around the different goals of (a) maximizing the 
sustainable yield, and (b) maximizing the net economic revenue. It was 
pointed out that under conditions of open access to the resource, labor 
and capital would continue to be applied until the industry's total costs 
were equal to its total revenues. This is true because any shareable 
profit produced by the industry will simply attract more producers, 
thereby diminishing the share available to each. Under these conditions, 
the profit that would be produced if the resource were under single 
ownership is wasted, going to neither the producers nor society. As 
demand for the product increases, the increased revenues will attract 
more inputs of labor and capital. Eventually, this will tend to deplete 
the resource. When this happens, the same (or greater) amounts of 
total revenue can be produced by far fewer units of capital and labor and 
far less cost. 
3. The economists argue that the goal of maximum net economic 
revenue is preferable to that of maximum sustainable yield, but if 
society chooses the latter, then the economists would urge that it be 
done at the least cost. Most conservation regulations seeking to achieve 
the maximum sustainable yield, serve to increase the costs of the 
industry. In the case of the halibut fisheries of the North Pacific, 
regulations are based on a total quota that can be taken in any one 
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season. When that quota is reached, all fishing must stop until the 
next season. Under these conditions, the fishermen work as fast as 
they can to get as great a share of the quota as possible before the 
total is reached. This results in a very short season, leading to higher 
costs of processing and distribution and to uneconomic uses of capital 
and labor during the rest of what used to be a nine-month season. This 
is a form of management that produces economic waste. 
4. One of the problems of the goal of economic efficiency is the 
difficulty of defining it. Countries competing for the same resource may 
have very different costs of labor and capital, as well as different 
prices for the end product. As a result, they may have quite different 
views as to that amount of effort which will produce the greatest net 
economic revenue. Most fishing countries now agree on the biological 
concept of a maximum sustainable yield. This concept, based on natural 
laws, can be scientifically determined and can be agreed upon easily 
by all participants. There is question as to whether nations could define, 
and agree to, a goal based on economic costs and returns. Even though 
the maximum economic yield may not be definable, it may be possible 
to demonstrate that each nation can gain from a system that controls the 
amount of effort. Research on this is vitally important. 
5. In a management system either with a goal of maximum sus­
tainable yield or maximum economic efficiency there is the problem of 
eventually limiting entry. This may not be too serious a problem if 
only a few countries having the necessary technological capacity are 
involved (as in the 1911 Fur Seal Treaty, which, to the economist, is 
an extremely rational one in that maximum sustainable yield is produced 
at the lowest cost). But demand for fisheries products throughout the 
world is increasing, more countries are getting into the fisheries, and 
technological innovations are developing rapidly. By analogy with the 
fisheries the oil and gas industries through mutual agreements through­
out the world regulate production and thereby cut down on economic 
waste. 
6. If one is going to operate an ocean fishery successfully, he must 
control the stock, which is not a matter of miles, or distance from shore. 
In some fisheries, such as the anchovy, there is wide variation from 
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year to year in the stock, depending on the survival of the young of 
a particular species. This survival rate may be found to be dependent 
largely on the temperatures of the water (or, in the case of the anchovy, 
of the upwelling conditions during the time of spawning and early 
growth of the organism). You cannot posssibly find out where you 
want to stop a fishery or reduce the effort without a close understanding 
of the biology of the organism you are dealing with, the environment 
in which it is living, and the effects of one upon the other. And before 
any fisheries management scheme is adopted at the international level, 
there must be agreement within the national government as to a desirable 
ocean management program. 
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Chapter Eight: 
A SYMPOSIUM ON NATIONAL INTERESTS 
IN COASTAL WATERS 
CHAPMAN: 
To persons not acquainted with the national interests of the United 
States in the world as a whole, or not concerned therewith, the national 
interest in our coastal waters is to establish boundaries as far out into 
the ocean as we can get away with and establish exclusive jurisdiction 
over everything therein to the United States. 
The trouble with this parochial view is that whatever the United 
States can do in this respect it has to agree that other countries can do 
the same thing. The reaction we got from the blunder of issuing the 
Truman Proclamation on Fisheries in September, 1945, is that other 
countries will claim more than any new claim the United States makes, 
deliberately interpret the new claim the United States makes in their 
favor, and use our new claim, their new claim, and their misinterpre­
tation of our new claim, as substantiation for any action they wish to 
take over and above what the United States wants to do. The parochial 
view noted in the first paragraph above pushed us into this invidious 
position in 1945, and we should guard carefully against repeating that 
mistake. 
The over-all, world-wide, national interests of the United States in 
coastal waters is best served by a national policy containing all of 
these elements: 
1.	 Internal waters demarcated in accordance with the terms of the 
1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone. 
2.	 A territorial sea three marine miles in breadth demarcated in 
accordance with the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and 
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Contiguous Zone, and as set out in the "Outer Continental Shelf 
Act of 1954" as adjudicated by the United States Supreme Court. 
3.	 All fisheries, both inside and outside the territorial sea, in which 
we have an interest managed in accordance with the provisions 
of the 1958 Convention on Fishing and the Conservation of the 
Living Resources of the High Seas. 
4.	 No fishery jurisdiction outside the three mile limit beyond that 
authorized in the 1958 Convention on Fishing and the Conserva­
tion of the Living Resources of the High Seas. 
5.	 Sole jurisdiction over the resources (as defined in the 1958 
Convention on the Continental Shelf) of the adjacent continental 
shelf (as defined in the 1958 Convention on the Continental 
Shelf). 
6.	 Jurisdiction over the resources of the adjacent continental shelf 
divided as among the government of the states and the Union in 
accordance with the provisions of the "Submerged Lands Act 
of 1953" and the "Outer Continental Lands Act of 1953," as 
adjudicated by the United States Supreme Court. 
7.	 The regime of the High Seas managed in accordance with the 
provisions of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas. 
8.	 The administration of ocean affairs in the United States govern­
ment organized along the lines of the Muskie Bill, S. 2251. 
9.	 Adequate support funds from the United States Budget to 
implement the research and other activities called for by the 
recommendations above. 
10.	 Adequate attention at the White House level to a National Ocean 
Strategy, a National Ocean Program with which to implement 
it, and a National Ocean Budget with which to fund the Program. 
CHRISTY: 
There are two major problems facing the rational and orderly exploita­
tion of international fisheries. The first is the problem of production, and 
the second, the problem of distribution of the wealth. These problems are 
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discussed in some detail in my paper and need not be repeated here. 
Instead, I shall discuss four of the different possible systems that might 
evolve for the distribution of the sea's wealth in fisheries. These are the 
continuation of the present system of open access; a distribution on the 
basis of "historic rights"; unilateral appropriation by coastal states; and 
some form of international control on behalf of the world community. 
Under the open access system, presently maintained, the wealth is 
distributed on the basis of a nation's willingness and ability to invest in 
exploitation. No nation is excluded, and every nation may, if it wishes, 
exercise its option to participate in a fishery. 
The chief difficulty with this system is that the wealth of the seas is 
wasted. The open access to the fishery leads to much greater applications 
of capital and labor than is economically justified, and total costs rise 
while total revenues are relatively fixed. In addition, this system will 
necessitate much more stringent conservation regulations in order to 
prevent depletion. Such regulations will either prohibit technological 
innovation or impose other, severe, costs on harvesting. The losses will 
be borne both by the world community and by the fishery industries. 
It is clear that this system of unrestrained access cannot be maintained. 
The three other systems permit controls on the number of fishermen. 
But since some exclusion is required, these systems face, head-on, the 
problem of wealth distribution. 
One of these systems is to divide the fisheries on the basis of "historic 
rights." Under this system, where a fishery has been developed and is 
being exploited wastefully, the participants would agree among them­
selves to controls on the amount of effort. They could, as in the North 
Pacific Fur Seal Treaty, leave exploitation in the hands of a single 
producer and then share the profits. Or they might agree to propor­
tionate reductions in effort so that the relative amount of effort of each 
nation would remain the same as it was before the agreement. An 
additional alternative would be to reach agreement on a quota for the 
total catch and then divide the quota among themselves, permitting 
each nation to determine its own level of effort. This has been done for 
the Antarctic whales. 
A system based on historic rights would distribute the wealth among 
those nations that have already made a significant investment in the 
fishery, and its success would depend upon the ability to exclude other 
nations. Historic rights are of obvious importance in reaching agreements 
on fisheries, but there are questions as to whether or not such a distri­
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bution scheme would be equitable or acceptable over the long run, and 
as to the effect on the rate of exploitation. There would, of course, have 
to be some definition of an historic right, based on the amount, duration, 
and continuity of investment. But whatever the definition, there would 
be an incentive for nations to invest in the exploitation of a new fishery, 
not only on the basis of immediate rewards, but also in order to acquire 
a right to the resource. That is, by not exercising its option to participate 
in a developing fishery, a nation might find itself forever excluded when 
entry controls become necessary. This could well precipitate an un­
economic race to exploit new fisheries; establish historic rights; and 
acquire as large a share as possible of the future wealth of the seas. 
Looking at this system on the basis of current trends in national 
fishing effort, it is clear that this would lead to distribution in favor of 
the Soviet Union and the Japanese. The extension of these nations' 
distant water vessels to all corners of the sea would give them strong 
claims to the resources, if the principle of historic rights should become 
the guide for distribution. This might, in fact, be one of the motivations 
behind the rapid growth in the fishing effort of the Soviet Union and 
other East European countries. Unless the United States were to radi­
cally change its fishing industries, it might forever lose access to those 
vast fisheries in which it has little or no present investment—saury, hake 
in many areas, most whales, the fisheries of the Indian Ocean, the South 
Atlantic, Antarctic, and elsewhere. Most other nations of the world 
would also find themselves excluded from many of the world's fisheries. 
Permanent distribution on the basis of historic rights is not likely, there­
fore, to be widely acceptable. 
A third system for distribution, and one that would also receive con­
siderable opposition, is that of unilateral appropriation of resources by 
the coastal states. Some claims along these lines have already been 
asserted. Chile, Ecuador, and Peru have claimed exclusive rights out 
to 200 miles from their shores. Under the doctrine of abstention, the 
United States and Canada have claimed exclusive rights out to the 
middle of the Pacific Ocean to salmon that spawn in their streams. A 
twelve mile limit of exclusive fishing rights has no biological or economic 
rationale. Its political rationale is based only on the fact that a large 
number of nations have asserted claims out to that limit. In view of 
growing demands and increasing competition for scarce fishery resources, 
there will be growing pressures (already evident) to emulate or exceed 
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the assertions of the C.E.P. countries. Only a relatively small number 
of nations would benefit from such a distribution scheme. 
Under the fourth system, internationalization, the distribution of the 
sea's wealth in fisheries could follow any of several different patterns. 
Initially, some of the wealth produced under this system might be used 
to "buy out" historic rights, i.e., to help those nations with large invest­
ments to ameliorate the transitional hardships that would accompany the 
loss of access to the resource. An international authority could, for 
example, buy the whaling fleets of the Japanese, Norwegians, and Soviet 
Union so that they would incur no loss in giving up their rights to take 
whales in the Antarctic. But as the international authority would pro­
duce some income above and beyond these and other management costs, 
some other formula for distribution would have to be developed. Several 
different schemes or combination of them could be followed—population, 
need, length of coastline—or the income could be used for some generally 
accepted purpose. But whatever the scheme, it would have to be worked 
out by all nations, and it would have to be demonstrated that this system 
for distribution is better than the alternatives. The United States might 
find this system more to its advantage than one based on historic rights, 
and the Soviet Union might prefer it to a system based on unilateral 
appropriation by coastal states. And both nations would be likely to 
prefer it to the continuation of the open access approach. 
While it is impossible to foresee the eventual course that will be 
followed, it is important to anticipate and understand the alternatives. 
Decisions based on immediate advantages and disadvantages may be 
very costly over the long run. 
BAXTER: 
The current dispute between New Zealand and Japan concerning the 
fisheries zone established by New Zealand is not a tale of high drama; 
there is no fisheries "war" in progress. The whole affair has been lacking 
in color and excitement for several reasons: The first is that although 
there is a substantial amount at stake economically, these fisheries do not 
bulk large in terms of the total economies of the two countries. Secondly, 
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with all respect to New Zealand, it has not the physical means of waging 
a fully effective war against the Japanese fishermen. And finally, out­
right conflict has not arisen because both countries have simply been 
altogether polite about their differences. 
Up until September of 1965, New Zealand had the normal three-mile 
limit for its territorial sea. There were some cases of fishing within this 
area by Japanese fishing vessels, but all of these incursions were taken 
care of in the diplomatic manner I mentioned a moment ago. The 
Japanese government would be asked to do something about these fishing 
vessels, and, so far as I have been able to ascertain, the government 
of Japan responded by seeing to it that offending vessels left the terri­
torial waters of New Zealand. 
The fisheries that are now the source of controversy between the two 
countries take place not only within the three-mile limit of the territorial 
sea of New Zealand but also within a newly-established outer zone of 
nine miles and in the high seas contiguous thereto. The fish are bottom-
dwelling fish, the names of which I shall not venture to lay before you. 
The wet fish which were landed in a recent year were worth New 
Zealand £ 1,900,000, and more than half of these came from outside the 
three mile limit. 
On September 10, 1965, New Zealand enacted the Territorial Sea 
and Fishing Zone Act 1965.1 The act laid out a New Zealand territorial 
sea following the sinuosities of the coast and three miles in breadth, with 
twenty-four mile closing lines across bays 2—all quite orthodox in terms 
of the Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous 
Zone of 1958.3 The more important aspect of the legislation is that it 
created outside the three mile territorial sea an exclusive fisheries zone 
of nine miles,4 which entered into effect on January 1, 1966. There was 
not, as other countries had provided in connection with the establishment 
of new fisheries zones, any phase-out period for foreign fisheries. Neither 
New Zealand nor Japan is a party to the Geneva Convention on the 
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone of 1958. 
At the time of the adoption of the new legislation, there was concern 
in New Zealand about how that country's coastline of about 4,000 miles 
could be policed. Assigned to this task New Zealand had only seven 
vessels, actually nothing more than motor launches, and the government 
was making energetic plans to bring in a mine-sweeper to supplement 
this armada. The government pointed out in their defense that aircraft 
were also available for policing. Members of Parliament representing 
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fishermen were, I think, justifiably concerned about what could be done 
to keep Japanese, Russian, and other fishermen out of the newly-estab­
lished zone. Questions were also raised about what sanctions could be 
employed against the intruders. One, I suppose, would be the seizure of 
the gear of such vessels, but not being any more of an expert on the 
criminal law of New Zealand than I am on the fisheries law of that 
country, I cannot say whether this would be an appropriate and effective 
sanction in terms of the law and needs of that country. 
The enactment of the new legislation led to talks—again on a very 
polite level—with Japan. And at the end of last year (1965), Japan 
declared that it was prepared to take this matter to the International 
Court of Justice, a proposal which heartened international lawyers 
because the Court was about to run out of business. Both countries have 
accepted 5 the optional clause 6 concerning the compulsory jurisdiction of 
the Court, but what remains is the framing of the specific question to be 
put to the Court. There has not yet been any clash, any specific factual 
dispute, that could be the basis for proceedings before that tribunal. 
Japan has now prepared a draft of the question or questions to be passed 
upon by the court and has submitted its text to the government of New 
Zealand. Mr. Holyoake, the Prime Minister, mindful of the fact that the 
Japanese government had taken several months to work out the text 
and convey it to New Zealand, very artfully said, "This is an important 
issue and I need hardly say that from the legal viewpoint the draft will 
be receiving in the next few months the same amount of careful exami­
nation and scrutiny on the New Zealand side as has been accorded to 
it by the Japanese Government in devising its terms." 
There have been protests since January of this year from the fisher­
men of New Zealand that nothing has been done about incursions of 
Japanese vessels. It would seem that they may be less concerned about 
the Japanese vessels themselves than about the Russian fishing boats 
that have a way of following in their wake. There has apparently been a 
desire on the part of both the government of New Zealand and the 
Japanese government to avoid any showdown or incidents. New Zealand 
is in the position of having to balance conflicting interests in connection 
with its legal case. That country may well be worried that a clash 
between a New Zealand patrol vessel and Japanese fishermen might 
lead the court to order interim measures of protection.7 If matters did 
suddenly come to a head, the specific factual context in which the clash 
might arise would not necessarily afford the best possible footing for 
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putting the case of New Zealand before the court. On the other hand, I 
suppose that if no action is taken against intruding Japanese vessels, 
failure to protest or to take action might be considered to constitute 
acquiescence in the fishing by Japan and lead the Court to hold that 
Japan had acquired a right to fish—or had maintained its right to fish— 
within the nine mile fisheries zone.8 Providentially for New Zealand, 
Japanese fishermen have for the most part been keeping out of the new 
zone, although, as I have mentioned, there have been a few incursions. 
How and when the case will be put before the International Court of 
Justice depend on agreement upon the question to be submitted to the 
Court. The case of New Zealand will probably be grounded on the 
proposition that it is not prohibited by any rule of international law 
from establishing such an exclusive fisheries zone off its shores and that 
there is solid precedent for establishing such exclusive fisheries zones 
adjacent to the territorial sea. It will look to precedents set by the United 
Kingdom, by Canada, and by numerous other countries. On the other 
hand, Japan may be expected to maintain that any zone extending 
beyond the three mile limit is unlawful, particularly in respect of the 
relationships between two countries that are not parties to the Geneva 
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone; that New 
Zealand had arrogated to itself a portion of the high seas by its wholly 
unilateral measures; that there were no international consultations 
regarding the new fisheries zone; that Japanese fishermen had already 
been fishing in the area and had acquired rights there; and that, while 
Japan cannot acquiesce in the fisheries zone, it nevertheless would be 
willing to negotiate about terms on which both New Zealand and Jap­
anese fishermen might be able to exploit these fisheries. 
1. 1965, No. 11, S International Legal Materials 1 (1966). 
2. Sees. 5 and 6. 
3. Done at Geneva, 29 April 1958, arts. 1, 6, 7, pars. 4 and 5, 15 U.S.T. 1606, 
T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 2 United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Official 
Records 132 (A/CONF.13/38) (1958). 
4. Sec. 8. 
5. Japanese Declaration of 15 September 1958 and New Zealand Declaration of 
1 April 1940, [1964-1965] I.CJ.Y.B. 53 and 57. 
6. Stat. Int'l. Ct. Just., art 36, par. 2. 
7. Under article 41 of the Statute of the Court. 
8. On the basis of the Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v. Norway), [1951] 
I.C.J. Rep. 116. 
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ALLEN : 
Various elements of the United States fishing industry are united as to 
certain practical aspects which affect their approach to government and 
law and are divergent as to other aspects. 
All unite in desiring competency in the fishery divisions of federal 
and state governmental agencies. This was demonstrated recently in the 
unanimous support for upgrading the fishery division of the Department 
of State. Also, they all avidly support oceanographic research. But they 
are divergent as to ocean fishery protection. 
Although no fishery people openly disclaim their attachment to the 
cause of conservation, some emphasize the necessity for its being applied 
right now to coastal fisheries, whereas others contend that the potential 
of ocean fisheries is so great as to negate necessity for high seas limita­
tions. Those who oppose restrictions on ocean fishery exploitation point 
out that almost any kind of fish can be made into flour to meet the 
protein needs of billions of people; hence, that the beautiful phrase 
"freedom of the seas" must be kept pure, sacred and absolute, whereas 
the first group, while not disparaging the value of fish flour, suggest 
that, in this country at least, people prefer to know that they are eating 
salmon, tuna, shrimp, pampano, or cod, rather than risk a diet of spoon-
fed conger eel and rat fish powder; hence that practical protection of 
coastal fisheries is more important than some theory. 
These two divergent approaches to the law of the sea met at Geneva 
with the result that the fishery convention adopted there in 1958 was 
a compromise; hence its complexity. Although the fisheries convention 
purported to endorse freedom of the seas, both it and the Continental 
Shelf Convention in fact contain provisions demonstrating that such 
freedom is neither absolute nor sacrosanct, thereby leaving the principle 
open for rational application. This fisheries convention was the last of 
the four Geneva conventions to secure enough ratifications to bring it 
into operation. The United States attached a reservation to its ratifica­
tion, and the convention need not be considered to be the last word 
on the subject. 
Hugo Grotius, champion of freedom of the seas, was no theoretical 
dreamer, but a great advocate. The English translation of the title to his 
thesis is "The Freedom of the Seas or the Right which Belongs to the 
Dutch to Take Part in the East Indian Trade," that is, freedom of the 
Dutch to course the Indian Ocean and to break into the Portuguese 
monopoly of the highly profitable East Indies spice trade. Though not 
133 
THE LAW OF THE SEA 
specifically mentioning the herring fishery off the British Coast, he 
made his appeal sufficiently broad so as to justify this Dutch monopoly. 
Factually there is as much reason in the twentieth century as in the 
seventeenth to avoid curtailing trade and communication between na­
tions, and a territorial sea width of not more than three miles is highly 
desirable as to navigation. But with mechanical power, refrigeration, 
floating canneries, radar, sonar, power blocks, and nylon nets, today's 
ocean fishing has an efficiency beyond imagination in the Hugo Grotius 
days when fishing was done from row or sail boats and it was believed 
that ocean fisheries were inexhaustible. 
The American Bar Association in 1964 passed a resolution urging 
our government to seek international agreement giving wholly separate 
consideration to freedom of the seas for navigation, and to the distinct 
problem of conservation of ocean fisheries. 
International law should be kept abreast of the times. If protection of 
coastal fisheries is essential to their preservation, this should not be 
hampered by the popularity of an attractive phrase. 
PONTECORVO : 
Virtually unnoticed among the substantive issues confronting the con­
ference is one technical problem that, in my opinion, is really a major 
obstacle to further analytical progress: the question of communication. 
Given a conference attended by marine biologists, physical oceanograph­
ers, lawyers, social scientists, and intelligent laymen, how can these 
people talk to each other ? At first glance this may seem a trivial question, 
but I feel strongly that this is not the case and offer as an illustration 
some subjective bits of evidence. 
Several years ago at a similar conference in Ottawa I suggested in 
a paper that one of the essential economic aspects of the North Atlantic 
lobster fishery was that it was an inefficient albeit workable unemploy­
ment insurance scheme. This casual remark did not awaken any of the 
economists quietly sleeping in front of me, but administrators, repre­
sentatives of several governments, and other defenders of the faith 
reacted with fury greater than that which would have been elicited 
by a savage attack on marriage. The essence of their argument was that 
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since the fishery in question provided "employment" it could not be 
"unemployment insurance." 
With this illustration in mind, let us look at the meaning of a 
deceptively simple word: "overfishing." To the biologists, the concept 
involves first of all the determination of a physical yield function. For 
a biologist to say that a given species has been overfished implies that 
fishing effort has pushed yield somewhere to the right of the hump in 
the yield function. In these circumstances a reduction in fishing effort 
would actually increase the physical yield. Note that overfishing does 
not imply elimination of the stock; it is simply the imposition of a 
particular mortality rate on the population. If the industry changes the 
rate of mortality by reducing the fishing effort, the population will 
grow more rapidly and, therefore, the yield will actually increase. 
We must note that overfishing is a particular condition applicable to 
a given population which has a given yield function. We might also 
note that in economic terms this illustration is an example of partial 
equilibrium analysis. By this the economist means that the yield and 
the conditions necessary for that yield, for only one species, out of 
many in the ocean, is considered. 
We have discussed overfishing as a condition of a particular popu­
lation, but the yield potential for an area of the ocean for all species has 
not been mentioned. The concept of general overfishing of wide areas of 
the ocean is so much more complex that thus far it has defied meaningful 
analysis. 
To the conservationist, overfishing is a moral proposition, and it 
is evil. The destruction of the salmon in Alaska represents a waste (in 
1960 the catch was less than one-third of 1936). To the conservationist 
the reduction in the salmon stocks is identical to the destruction of any 
valuable national asset. For this reason the conservationist is furious at 
the biologist who refuses to assert that historically overfishing took 
place in Alaska—in the absence of knowledge of yield functions. 
To the economists, neither view makes much sense. The question 
posed by overfishing is just another problem in capital theory and not 
a very interesting or unique one at that. Within the framework of 
analysis of the yield from any asset, i.e., a stock of fish, the determinants 
of the rate of utilization are the matrix of prices and costs (originally 
derived from tastes—note this because international differences in tastes 
imply different economic equilibrium) that defines the level of output 
that will maximize the net economic yield from the resource. 
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Fortunately for the conservationists' blood pressure this particularly 
physical quality is usually, but not always, less than the biologists' 
maximum physical yield. For example: there is some evidence that the 
decision in the early 1930's to "save" or conserve the halibut stocks of 
the northeastern Pacific was non-economic, i.e., the nation as a whole 
would have been better off if the then remaining stock of halibut had 
been overfished or fished out for as long as it paid to do so. If this 
position is correct, probably today we are poorer not richer as a result 
of this conservation move to "prevent overfishing"—the halibut offer 
no comment on the debate. 
Faced with these apparent contradictions and this semantic confusion, 
those responsible for the law of the sea may select an alternative policy 
at random but they do so at their peril. There are, as indicated above, 
both questions of scientific fact and interdisciplinary ignorance and 
confusion in policy alternatives. In Burke's words we need more 
sophisticated objectives. In the words of an economist we need objec­
tives that fulfil the necessary conditions for long run stability and 
maximization. 
In more recent times, these objectives have been criticized as being too limited, 
as over-emphasizing the biological condition of the resource to the exclusion of 
other considerations; and recommendations are increasingly offered that more 
sophisticated objectives must be conceived so that the entire social context of 
fishery exploitation can be taken into account in regulating access to the 
1resources.
For most cases of resource use, the relevant physical quantity of yield 
that maximizes human material welfare is the one that maximizes the 
net economic yield, not the maximum physical yield. Therefore, I offer 
as a basic theorem the proposition that any international legal agreement 
based solely on physical yield is doomed to economic and probably 
biological failure. 
What is the remedy ? This lies in conferences that force the adversaries 
to face the difficulties in interdisciplinary semantics and in theoretical 
papers that eliminate apparent contradictions. 
1. William T. Burke, Ocean Sciences, Technology, and the Future Inter­
national Law of the Sea ("Pamphlet Series of the Social Science Program of the 
Mershon Center for Education in National Security," No. 2 [Columbus: Ohio State 
University Press, 1966]), p. 76. 
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Discussion: 
The panel addressed itself primarily to the problem of the distribution 
of the living resources of the sea beyond territorial limits. National 
control of fisheries out to twelve miles from the shore seems to have 
become generally accepted, as a result both of the large number of 
countries now claiming extraterritorial fisheries zones and of the recent 
statements by State Department officials at Congressional hearings to 
the effect that establishment by the United States of a nine-mile extra­
territorial fisheries zone would not be contrary to international law. 
New Zealand's recent adoption of a twelve mile fisheries zone, however, 
is being protested by the Japanese on the grounds that such an extension 
of jurisdiction is contrary to the rights of Japan and of all other 
countries. 
Any seaward extension of a coastal state's jurisdiction over fisheries 
may involve claims by foreign countries to historic rights to those 
fisheries. Many of the newer countries of the world have no history 
of fishing off foreign coasts; thus they have no such historic rights, and 
no particular interest in recognizing this concept as international law. 
May a coastal state have rights to its own extraterritorial fisheries which 
place it in a more favored position than foreign newcomers to the area ? 
How long should a country exploit a resource before it acquires historic 
rights ? 
Historic rights have economic value only to the extent that they are 
based upon the presumption of exclusion. Historic rights are implicit 
in most multilateral fisheries conventions, although such conventions 
today are generally "open-ended," permitting subsequent entry by other 
countries into the agreement. 
One method of limiting entry into high seas fisheries is licensing. 
Under this system, licenses would be issued only to the appropriate 
number of vessels. The appropriate number would be determined by an 
evaluation of the yields, revenues, and costs, so that the desired amount 
of catch could be achieved at the least cost. The superfluous vessels 
would be excluded from the fishery. Such a system, according to 
economists, would be preferable to the conservation controls that attempt 
to regulate the amount of catch but permit wasteful applications of 
capital and labor. 
But what organization would manage the licensing, and what would 
be the criteria for allocating licenses? One authority for handling the 
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licensing program might be the United Nations or one of its specialized 
agencies, to which revenue might be forthcoming from the licensing 
fees. But advocates of United Nations control were attacked on a number 
of grounds, among them the obvious disinclination of powers such as 
the United States and the Soviet Union to vest control of their high 
seas fisheries in a political organization such as the UN. Equally 
important was the question of criteria for issuing licenses. Should it 
be on the basis of bids, of ability to exploit the fisheries, of national or 
regional quotas, of historic rights, or of some other scheme? And how 
would the fisheries be policed in order to insure compliance? Might 
not better results be obtained from the normal give and take of 
interested parties? 
Again the need was stressed for greater biological and economic 
study of the living resources of the sea. National control of fisheries 
more than a few miles from shore should not be designed primarily to 
protect inefficient producers; nor should it result in extensive stocks 
being underutilized, when there is actually foreign effort ready to harvest 
the fish. The Geneva Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the 
Living Resources of the High Seas has just come into existence; it is 
based on the principle of demonstrable biological need. Is this convention 
already becoming outdated through new economic rationale, new fisheries 
techniques, and new demands for national jurisdiction over high seas 
fisheries ? 
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K. 0. Emery 
Chapter Nine: 
GEOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF SEA-FLOOR SOVEREIGNTY* 
I. Abstract 
The present seaward limit of national sovereignty is denned as the edge 
of the continental shelf or the depth to which the sea floor can be 
exploited. Exploitation appears to be a poor criterion in these days 
of rapidly expanding marine technology. All reasonable geological 
boundaries of the sea floor (shoreline, shelf edge, base of continental 
slope, toe of continental rise, axes of trenches, deepest parts of abyssal 
plains, and the mid-ocean rift) are described according to their origin 
and value as seaward limits of national sovereignty for mining purposes. 
All contain uncertainties or deficiencies stemming from present inade­
quate knowledge of bathymetry, ambiguity of definition, or unreasonable 
relationship to areas of possible mineral resources. Perhaps the best 
seaward boundary for coastal nations is the 1,000 meter depth contour 
(of the main ocean basins) with some form of international jurisdiction 
applied to the deeper areas of ocean floor. Straight-line boundaries are 
suitable only for lateral separation of adjacent claims. 
II. Introduction 
A century ago little need was evident for extending political bounda­
ries seaward and precisely defining seawardmost limits of sovereignty 
for other than coastal defense. During the past two decades, however, 
many nations have so greatly increased their military and economic 
capabilities at sea that their areas of interest and potential sovereignty 
of the sea floor have begun to overlap. 
The sea floor, Antarctica, and the moon have in common the fact 
that no serious consideration was given to their political subdivision a 
few years ago, but present or future potential exploitation of these 
hitherto inaccessible areas can now lead even to military action to 
THE LAW OF THE SEA 
determine sovereignty. Naval action on the gunboat level made headlines 
during the past decade when Iceland, Israel, Korea, Lebanon, Peru, 
and probably other countries attempted to regulate deep-sea fishing 
off their coasts. Legal action has been more common, particularly in 
connection with attempts of community, state, and federal agencies in 
the United States to increase their "rightful" portions of tax revenues 
derived from sea-floor production of mineral resources by private in­
dustry. Overlapping political demands have a habit of developing 
wherever new sources of revenue are found, whether the competing 
political units are on the same side of the disputed sea floor (as for 
the United States) or on opposite sides (as in the Persian Gulf and the 
North Sea). 
Before we consider the possible geological control of political bounda­
ries on the sea floor, let us review the control that geology has exerted 
upon political boundaries on land. Difficulty in finding up-to-date maps 
of international boundaries illustrates the fact that military or political 
power is continually shifting the boundaries. Even casual inspection of 
any good world map shows two main kinds of international boundaries: 
irregular (following rivers or mountain crests), and straight lines (arbi­
trary boundaries). The sixteen-inch National Geographic Society's globe 
of 1962, supplemented by the Times Atlas of the World (Bartholomew, 
1955-59) was chosen as the basis for a quantitative analysis. The lengths 
of the several kinds of boundaries between all nations of the world and 
between the states or provinces of the United States, Canada, and 
Australia were measured on the globe. For comparison, the lengths of 
ocean shorelines were also measured. The precision of the measurements 
was limited by the scale of the globe (1 inch = 800 km.), which required 
that all irregularities smaller than about 100 km. be ignored. 
TABLE 4 
KINDS OF INTERNATIONAL AND INTERSTATE 
POLITICAL BOUNDARIES ON LAND 
INTERNATIONAL: INTERSTATE: UNITED STATES, 
T H E WORLD CANADA, AND AUSTRALIA 
KIND 
Km. Per Cent Km. Per Cent 
Irregular
Straight
Shoreline
 157,000
 26,000
 307,000
 32.0
 5.3
 62.7
 17,000
 36,000
 73,000
 13.4 
 28.7 
 57.9 
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The resulting Table 4 shows that international boundaries are 
dominantly irregular (rivers and mountain crests) and that state or 
province boundaries are dominantly straight lines. Irregular geological 
boundaries mostly separate peoples of different languages or dialects, 
and straight surveyor's boundaries separate peoples having the same 
languages. The irregular geological boundaries evidently serve as lines 
of defense for limited military power. Most straight-line boundaries 
appear to have been established in areas having little contemporary value, 
and many were drafted thousands of kilometers from the ground sites. 
Many statistical relationships could be explored, but the fact is evident 
that international boundaries on land are chiefly geological ones. Perhaps 
the seawardmost boundaries of national sovereignty that eventually are 
recognized will also be geological ones, but almost certainly the lateral 
boundaries (between adjoining territories claimed by different nations) 
will be straight or broadly curved lines drafted ashore. The straight lines 
are to be expected because detailed topographic knowledge is lagging 
far behind claims, and also because few of the potential topographic 
boundaries constitute obstacles to the movement of ships. Probably more 
disputes will arise from these straight-line political and military lateral 
boundaries than from most of the seaward boundaries of sovereignty 
that are the main subject of the following discussion. 
III. Shoreline 
Shorelines of both marine and non-marine bodies of water are con­
venient boundaries for many purposes because they separate areas having 
greatly different properties with respect to habitation, engineering needs, 
and resources. However, shorelines are rarely international political 
boundaries because the precise line is not easily defended. Large interior 
bodies of water are usually divided along medial lines so that bounding 
nations or states are sovereign over the parts that adjoin their land 
areas (Dead Sea, Lake Superior, and Lake Tanganyika). International 
boundaries in oceans and their adjoining seas and gulfs have generally 
been taken as three miles from the nearest shoreline, presumably the 
area that could be dominated by shore guns or, as put by Mouton, the 
"hypothetical range of an imaginary gun" 1 in the late eighteenth century, 
or simply a unit of one league. As the guns improved, one would suppose 
that the boundaries would have marched seaward; instead, little change 
occurred until recently when a great demand for fish and mineral 
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resources coincided with the development of intercontinental ballistic 
missiles and of world-encircling satellites. 
Even though the designation of shorelines as international boundaries 
is impractical, their use as local property boundaries warrants a brief 
discussion of their permanency. Changes of the position of the shoreline 
come about from worldwide changes of sea level, local changes of land 
level, and local imbalance of erosion and deposition. The major trend 
of sea level during the past 19,000 years has been one of rise owing to 
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FIG. 5.—Positions of the shoreline along the Atlantic Coast of the United States 
during the past, present, and future. Positions are based on present bathymetry 
guided by the sea-level data supplied in Fig. 4, and are supplemented by information 
on the raised shorelines of Canada (Farrand and Gajda, 1962; and Boms, 1965). 
The insert diagram shows the changing position of past level derived from radio­
carbon ages of shallow-water shells and peat deposits. 
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the return of water formerly in the ocean, but temporarily stored as 
glacial ice on land. Four major glacial ages occurred during the past 
one to three million years known as the Pleistocene Epoch. Growth and 
melting of the ice sheets was irregular, so that minor variations of sea 
level were superimposed upon the major trends. One of the lowest sea 
levels occurred about 19,000 years ago when the level was about 120 
meters2 below the present one (Figures 4 and 5). Virtually the entire 
continental shelf was then exposed, as indicated by world-wide sub­
merged terraces, shorelines, and relict sediments and by local discoveries 
of submerged forests, peat deposits, subfossil intertidal oysters, and 
elephant teeth. Early man probably roamed almost the entire width of 
the continental shelf off the Atlantic coast of the United States as early 
as 12,000 years ago, but the slow advance of the rising sea gradually 
forced him from the shelf. If all of the remaining glacial ice were to 
melt, sea level would rise another sixty meters, returning the shore to 
approximately its preglacial position and drowning most of the major 
cities and densely inhabited regions of the world. 
Direct evidence of rising sea level during the past 12,000 years is 
revealed by radiocarbon dating of submerged oyster beds and peat 
deposits, during the past 5,000 years by radiocarbon dating of submerged 
salt-marsh deposits, and during the past few decades by tide-gauge 
records (Figure 4). Differences in rates of rise recorded at particular 
localities reflect complications caused by local geological processes among 
which are faster uplift of a local land area than rise of sea level (such 
as due to rebound of the land after the melting of an ice load). Else­
where a rapid subsidence of the land caused by compaction of deltaic or 
marsh sediments accentuates the advance of the sea. An example is the 
flooding of Saint Mark's Square and of many public and private build­
ings in Venice during high tides of recent years. An outstanding example 
produced by man's activities is the more than 7.5-meter subsidence of 
the land surface near the shore of Long Beach, California, evidently the 
result of the withdrawal of large quantities of petroleum from beneath 
the same area.3 
Another kind of modification of the shoreline is due to local erosion 
of beaches and cliffs, particularly of cliffs composed of loose sediment. 
Many examples throughout the world come to mind, from the remains 
of undermined trees (Hawaii), ancient towns (Israel), Indian or 
Eskimo graves (Alaska), property lines (England), and lighthouses 
(Cape Cod, Massachusetts). Local excess deposition of sediments at 
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the mouths of rivers has converted once prosperous seaports into 
abandoned inland ruins (Ostia, Ephesis, and Tarsus among others in 
the Mediterranean Sea). Prograding of valuable beach property in 
southern California has resulted in many lawsuits to determine whether 
the accretion was due to natural processes (when the accretion belongs 
to the owner of the adjacent upland property) or artificial (when it 
belongs to the state). Other lawsuits have resulted from extensive 
erosion downwave from groins that were built to retain sand that 
normally moves continuously downwave. A basis for future additional 
suits may be the trapping of sand by dams across streams, thus pre­
venting the free movement of sand to replenish beaches of the shore 
zone (a current example is the Aswan High Dam of Egypt, which 
probably will cut off most of the supply of beach sand to Israel). 
The determination of the extent of natural and artificial movement of 
the shoreline is commonly tied to an estimation of an "original" position 
of the shoreline—or the position at a given time during the past. For 
this reason, old charts are in great demand for legal purposes. Most 
old charts, however, are unsatisfactory due to their lack of precision 
and to subsequent destruction of the landmarks that were used in the 
original surveys. Doubtlessly, as man continues to crowd into shore 
areas and as both natural and artificial changes of the shoreline increase, 
the legal demand for past precise surveys will increase greatly. 
IV. Seaward Edge of Continental Shelf 
The next natural boundary seaward of the shoreline is the edge of 
the continental shelf, commonly known as the shelf edge or shelfbreak. 
The International Committee on Nomenclature of the Sea Floor 4 pro­
posed the following definitions: 
Continental shelf, shelf edge and borderland. The zone around the continent, 
extending from the low-water line to the depth at which there is a marked 
increase of slope to greater depth. Where this increase occurs the term shelf 
edge is appropriate. Conventionally, the edge is taken at 100 fathoms (or 200 
meters) but instances are known where the increase of slope occurs at more 
than 200 or less than 65 fathoms. When the zone below the low-water line is 
highly irregular and includes depths well in excess of those typical of continental 
shelves, the term continental borderland is appropriate. 
The same definition was used by Guilcher, et al.,6 in their description of 
the continental shelf for UNESCO that presumably was considered when 
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DISTANCE IN KM 
FIG. 7.—Selected geological profiles across the continental margin off the 
Atlantic Coast of the United States. Compiled from continuous seismic reflection 
profiles, dredgings, test wells on the sea floor, and oil wells on land. As described 
by Emery (in press). 
the Convention on the Law of the Sea was adopted by the United 
Nations Conference at Geneva during April, 1958. The present United 
States Board of Geographic Names (1964) likewise denned the shelf 
edge as "The line along which there is a marked increase of slope at 
the outer margin of a continental (or island) shelf." 
While sovereignty for mining purposes is related to the full width of 
the continental shelf, many nations claim the overlying waters for addi­
tional purposes. Many have separate claims on belts having differen' 
widths for their territorial seas, customs, fishing, neutrality, and sani 
tary regulations, as shown by a tabulation that was prepared in 1960 
147 
THE LAW OF THE SEA 
for the Second Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea.6 Several of 
the claims reach 200 miles from shore, especially for fishing rights. 
Continental shelves are characterized by structure and stratigraphy 
that are similar to, or are natural continuations of, the structure and 
stratigraphy of the adjacent land. A general impression of the similarity 
is given by a highly generalized geological map of the United States 
and its adjacent sea floors (Figure 6). In cross-section the continuity 
is even more evident (Figure 7) for areas where investigation has been 
adequate. These and other studies have shown that the continental shelf 
is merely a seaward continuation of the continent. Off most mountainous 
coasts the shelf appears to be largely erosional in origin because it is 
shallowly underlain by bedrock. Off most flat coasts deposition has been 
more important, coupled with relative subsidence, so that the shelf is 
underlain by a thick sequence of sedimentary strata that gently dip 
seaward. 
Economic resources found on land may continue seaward, expand 
seaward, or be replaced by different resources. Oil and gas are highly 
valuable examples. Some oil fields in southern California continue sea­
ward (in fact, the Summerland oil field that was discovered on land was 
followed seaward by offshore drilling during 1896). Some oil fields 
(such as the Wilmington field) are centered offshore so that only a 
fringe underlies the land. Other fields on the sea floor are isolated from 
the land, but some of them are associated with salt domes that pepper 
both sea floor and land off Louisiana and Texas; others are almost 
restricted to the sea floor (illustrated by recently found gas fields off 
England in the North Sea). 
Altogether about one-sixth of the annually produced ten billion 
barrels of oil comes from the sea floor. Within a decade or two the 
marine production should more than double its share even with a 
doubled total production. The value of this resource has led to many 
legal disputes over ownership of confined shelf areas having high pro­
duction. Some offshore recovery of sulfur and salt occurs off Louisiana 
and Texas in close association with oil and gas. Additional mineral 
resources on the continental shelf are sand (for land fill and concrete 
aggregate), shell (for land fill and cement), and potentially phosphorite 
(for fertilizer and chemicals). 
The great value of mineral resources on the continental shelves led 
to the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act by which Congress in 1953 7 
claimed the subsoil and sea bed of the shelf adjacent to the United States 
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as subject to the jurisdiction, control, and disposition of the United 
States, but it does not affect the international rights of navigation and 
fishing. Jurisdiction over the inner three miles is left to individual states 
by the Submerged Lands Act of 1953,8 but many legal battles have 
resulted from differences in interpretation of the baseline for measure­
ment as related to bay mouths and offshore islands; still other lawsuits 
came from confusion about original charter rights to three marine leagues 
(rather than to three geographical miles) off Texas and other states 
that border the Gulf of Mexico.9 Rights for all coastal nations extending 
beyond those claimed by the United States in 1953 were approved by 
the 1958 United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea10 and 
ratified by the last of the required twenty-two nations on June 10, 1964. 
Legal battles are certain to develop from any definition of the outer 
limit of the continental shelf, because this limit is an imprecise one. 
The steepening of declivity at the shelf edge occurs in a distance of less 
than 1 to more than 10 km., and locally two or more separate zones of 
steepening are present. Differentiation by depth alone is impractical, 
because the shelf edge ranges from 20 to 550 meters and averages 133 
meters deep.11 Adding to the difficulty is the fact that important economic 
resources lie on the sea floor at greater depth: within the continental 
borderland off southern California (between the true continental shelf 
and the true continental slope), on the continental slope in many areas 
of the world, and perhaps even on the deep-sea floor. 
V. Base of Continental Slope 
The next seaward geological boundary beyond the shelf-break is the 
base of the continental slope. The continental slope is approximately the 
true limit of the continents, or the general boundary between the light 
rocks of the continents and the denser rocks of the sea floor. Because of 
the density contrast and the thick section of light rocks that underlie 
the continents, this boundary is probably the most important geological 
one of the Earth. Unfortunately, little is known (but much is speculated) 
about its origin and the fundamental cause of the separation of continents 
and ocean basins. 
One general line of speculation has an original continent12 split apart 
during Early Mesozoic time (about 135 million years ago), so that the 
rift is now reflected in the approximately matching outlines of the west­
ern margins of Europe and Africa with the eastern margins of North 
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America and South America. Analogies are represented by the similar 
close matches between opposite coasts of the Red Sea 13 and of the Gulf 
of California,14 both of which opened during the Tertiary Period (during 
the past sixty-three million years). This splitting and moving apart of 
continental masses is referred to as continental drift, a concept developed 
by Wegener 15 and others during the early twentieth century, largely 
abandoned two decades ago, and recently resurrected by evidence pro­
vided by paleomagnetic studies.16 Several objections remain, including 
the origin and the present position of the original outer boundaries of 
the precontinent, the origin of the precontinent itself, and the fact that 
the present opening of the oceans appears to be restricted to a mid-ocean 
rift, as described by Heezen,17 rather than to the continental-slope bound­
ary between continents and ocean basins. Other complications in the 
meaning of the continental slope result from the fact that the oldest rocks 
of the continents generally crop out near their centers, with progressively 
younger rocks usually occurring toward their perimeters. In fact, recent 
geophysical evidence18 indicates that the continental slope off eastern 
United States prograded seaward 7 to 35km. by deposition of sediments 
during the past sixty-three million years. 
As shown by Heezen, Tharp, and Ewing,19 the continental slope is 
bounded on its seaward side by the continental rise, a vast apron of 
debris from the continent and of calcareous skeletal material from near 
the sea surface. The apron shape reflects the landward source of most 
of the sediment (brought by turbidity currents and suspended sediment) 
and its movement and redeposition by bottom currents that appear to 
flow parallel to the contours.20 
The boundary between the continental slope and the continental rise 
is not everywhere clearly marked, owing to inadequate soundings and 
to the fact that sediments of the continental rise overlap the continental 
slope21 and can eventually bury it.22 For convenience in identification, 
Heezen and his associates take a steepness of 1:40 as the boundary 
between slope and rise. The boundary is unrelated to depth, for it ranges 
from less than 1,000 to more than 4,000 meters. A proposal once was 
made to extend the territorial limits of the United States to the 1,000 
fathom contour. The intent presumably was to avoid the imprecision of 
the shelf-break and to include some of the economic resources seaward 
of the shelf-break. In a geological sense a 1,000 fathom seaward limit 
for the maritime nations is about as unreasonable as a 6,000 foot land­
ward boundary for them, but the precision and legal advantage of a 
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1,000 fathom, or better a 1,000 meter, limit may be so great as to eclipse 
geological considerations. 
The continental shelves and slopes of the world have an area of about 
55.4 million km2.23 This area is more than one-third the 149.8 million 
km2 of the subaerial parts of the continents. If added to the sovereign 
territory of adjacent nations it would expand some of them by a factor of 
more than ten while adding nothing to the areas of such inland nations 
as Bolivia, Czechoslovakia, and Mongolia. This is obviously an unfair 
distribution of new territory, depending only upon the chance that deter­
mined the positions and shapes of existing nations. It also fails to include 
potentially important mineral resources that are located still farther 
seaward. 
VI. Deep-Sea Boundaries 
Several geological boundaries occur beyond the base of the continental 
slope (Figure 8). Some are worthy of consideration as seaward limits 
of national sovereignty of the sea floor. One is the toe of the continental 
rise, where it adjoins an abyssal plain. Heezen and his associates have 
found that this junction is approximately indicated by a change from 
steeper than to gentler than 1:1,000. The continental rise is wide where 
the supply of sediment from the continent is large, narrow where the 
supply is small (low rainfall, small drainage area, nearshore sediment 
traps), and it is absent where the continental slope is bordered by a 
deep-sea trench (Figure 9). The main advantage of including the conti­
nental rise under the sovereignty of bordering nations is the potential 
value of petroleum in the upper part of the rise. Source beds are organic-
rich sediments that slowly accumulate on the continental slope in a depth 
zone of oxygen-deficient water; later some of these sediments slide away 
down the slope, accounting for a hummocky topography near the tops 
of some continental rises. Intermittent deposition of sand layers by 
turbidity currents may provide adequate reservoir beds.24 The volumes 
of the continental rises are enormous (the largest sedimentary deposits 
of the Earth) and the quantities of oil and gas may well be commen­
surate. The main obstacle to the investigation and exploitation of these 
possible oil and gas resources is the great depth of water above them 
(1,500 to 4,500 meters) ; in contrast, few oil wells now produce from 
beneath water depths of more than 150 meters. 
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A geological boundary nearer the middle of the ocean is provided by 
the line of greatest depth (other than in trenches), that is located along 
the seaward sides of the abyssal plains (Figure 8). Another boundary 
that seemingly would provide an all-ocean sovereignty is the mid-ocean 
rift25 that stretches 75,000 km. through the world ocean (Figure 9). 
However, the rift is not present off all coasts; locally it forks, and where 
well known, it consists of discontinuous units separated by offsets pro­
duced by strike-slip faults. One might suggest as a substitute a medial 
line through all oceans as the ultimate boundary. Although such a line 
was drawn by Menard,26 its position is not unequivocal, mostly because 
of uncertainties and differences of opinion about how to select shore 
points and how to strike arcs from them. 
Subdivision of the deep sea will be required if all areas of manganese-
oxide nodules are to be included under national sovereignties, for the 
nodules are widespread on abyssal plains and on seamounts throughout 
the oceans.27 However, the writer wishes to point out that subdivision 
of the deep sea floor is unlikely to be necessary for the purposes of 
manganese mining alone because of the low concentrations of the man­
ganese (relative to silicon) and its associated cobalt, copper, and nickel.28 
The cost of metals extracted from the nodules probably will be greater 
than the cost of metals from land mines for many years unless heavy 
special sea-floor subsidies are granted. 
VII. Depth of Exploitation 
The 1958 United Nations Conference at Geneva in its Convention on 
the Continental Shelf stated as follows: 
For the purpose of these articles, the term "continental shelf" is used as referring 
(a) to the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but 
outside the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 meters or, beyond that 
limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation 
of the natural resources of the said areas; (b) to the seabed and subsoil of 
similar submarine areas adjacent to the coasts of islands.29 
The key word, exploitation, is not defined. Does the recovery of a few 
manganese nodules as curios constitute exploitation? How many tons of 
nodules per year per unit area constitutes exploitation ? Is profit on a free 
and open market required, or will large governmental subsidies substi­
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tute for profit? Manganese nodules with their content of cobalt, copper, 
and nickel are the chief deep-sea resources that generally receive mention, 
but does the recovery of a few million dollars worth of these metals per 
year warrant assignment of sovereignty to huge areas of the earth? 
What happens if sovereignty is assigned and a few years later the mining 
is considered unprofitable ? 
The convention fails to set any real limits. Accordingly, the half-dozen 
nations that now are or soon will be competent to drill or otherwise 
exploit mineral resources of the deep-sea floor are likely to have different 
interpretations of what is thine and what is mine. For example, if mining 
of manganese nodules should prove profitable, the United States theo­
retically could mine the Blake Plateau off Florida (where the nodules 
are abundant) and continue mining down the continental slope and 
across the continental rise and abyssal plains, up on the Mid-Atlantic 
Ridge and down into the next abyssal plain, continental rise, and con­
tinental slope. England could do the same from the European side to 
North America. The territories of interest can widely overlap. What 
then is the role of distant offshore islands (such as the Azores) as centers 
for radial claims ? Fortunately, this confused state of affairs is not likely 
to develop from international greed for manganese nodules, because 
technical aspects of the extraction of their metals may render them 
worthless. Moreover, the restriction of potential deep-sea oil fields to the 
tops of the continental rises should largely eliminate conflicting claims; 
so may the high costs of exploitation. Nevertheless, the development of 
new methods of sea-floor mining and of milling and the discovery of 
presently unforeseen mineral resources may translate fantasy into reality 
in a few decades. Pressure of conflicting claims for mining of the sea 
floor may parallel those for fishing rights that already extend far beyond 
some shelf-breaks and beyond the continental slopes as well. 
VIII. Results of Sea-Floor Claims upon Research 
One might suppose that the need for knowledge about the sea floor 
that is required for proper basing of territorial claims would increase 
the pursuit of that knowledge. In fact, however, no obvious increase of 
data has resulted from territorial claims. The small countries have 
neither the money nor scientific talent for effective work. The efforts of 
large countries have been increasing for many years, but for military and 
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scientific reasons rather than for gaining knowledge to better define 
political boundaries. Sufficient reason exists for believing that the present 
conflict of demands for sea-floor sovereignty tends to reduce research. 
The present Convention on the Continental Shelf (Article 5, Par. 
8)30 says: 
The consent of the coastal State shall be obtained in respect of any research 
concerning the continental shelf and undertaken there. Nevertheless, the coastal 
State shall not normally withhold its consent if the request is submitted by a 
qualified institution with a view to purely scientific research into the physical 
or biological characteristics of the continental shelf, subject to the proviso that 
the coastal State shall have the right, if it so desires, to participate or to be 
represented in the research, and that in any event the results shall be published. 
One can readily imagine that permission may often be refused or so 
delayed that the effort required to gain permission will exceed the effort 
needed for actual sampling; then, of course, the marine scientist turns 
his attention to more fruitful work. In one instance the writer had to 
abandon an effort to learn about the topography of part of the Mediter­
ranean shelf because permission to enter claimed territorial waters was 
delayed by suspicion about possible military motives. Probably more 
common are delays caused by inertia and lack of interest on the part 
of government officials. 
IX. Conclusions 
At present the assignment of geological limits to sea-floor sover­
eignty seems unlikely because of inadequate precision of these limits and 
because some of the geological limits do not include all of a potential 
mineral resource or do not exclude conflicting claims. Straight-line 
boundaries are likely to cut across mineral deposits. Any kind of contig­
uous sovereignty greatly favors nations that span a great length of coast 
for unrelated reasons. Depth of exploitation heavily favors nations that 
are highly industrialized or that are willing to subsidize offshore mining. 
We gain nothing by delay in better defining of sovereign limits through 
hope that the problem will "go away," because the problem is bound to 
increase as the half dozen active nations continue to develop their capa­
bility for undersea investigation and exploitation. Recent evidence is the 
development of deep offshore drilling, continuous seismic profiling, deep-
diving research submarines, and long-period accommodation to man to 
the undersea environment. 
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A suggestion about seaward boundaries can be made from the view­
point of mineral resources and certainty in identification. All presently 
exploited sea-floor resources and many potential ones would be encom­
passed by bordering nations if the seaward limit of sovereignty were put 
at the 1,000 meter contour of the deep-sea floor (exclusive of relatively 
small closed basins off southern California, in the West Indies, and in 
the East Indies, for example). Mineral resources at greater depth may 
be developed eventually, or perhaps be given up as hopeless. While the 
various nations are developing their capability for exploitation (and 
learning more about the sea floor), the sea-floor regions deeper than 
1,000 meters might well be left to the control of the United Nations or 
to some other more effective international group. Tax revenues, if any, 
could serve to defray costs of administration, with excess revenues being 
distributed to land-bound nations that otherwise might not share in the 
possible future wealth of sea-floor resources. 
•Contribution No. 1824 of the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution. After 
making the first draft of this article, the author profited from discussions with 
several active marine geologists, especially B. C. Heezen and H. W. Menard. The 
final draft incorporates some of their suggestions. It is the author's hope that this 
published version will serve as the basis for further investigation, especially on 
the part of those whose greatest competence is in the field of international law. 
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Willard Bascom 
Chapter Ten: 
MINING IN THE SEA 
I am not certain that my remarks are particularly pertinent to the legal 
boundaries in the oceans and on the continental shelf. That is a subject 
about which I have a distinguished ignorance and so advised the 
organizing committee. However, I do have some knowledge, which may 
be of value, about mining in the sea. I am not going to review again 
the statistics on how many tons of bromine there are in a cubic some­
thing-or-other of sea water or how many square miles of manganese 
nodules pave the floor of the ocean. I have no knowledge of such 
matters. Rather I represent a group of practical mining people now 
engaged in undersea mining around the world for a number of different 
minerals and in a number of ways. As a matter of fact, after hearing 
the session at the Marine Technology Society the other day, we made 
the calculation that if only people who were experienced in the ocean 
talked at such meetings and they only talked about things they had 
actually done, instead of about what they propose to do, it would cut 
a three day meeting down to about an hour and fifteen minutes. There 
is a lot of rather wild speculation about undersea mining, but there is 
some actually going on in the world. 
Let me explain briefly about our company and how we got into this 
business, and that will set the stage for what I have in mind later. Ocean 
Science and Engineering, Inc., was started just over four years ago, 
and it spawned a series of subsidiary companies, mostly in ocean mining. 
It was formed by six men brought together by a project not connected 
with mining, but by coincidence three of us were mining engineers, 
and so it was natural that our interest should turn toward undersea 
operations of that kind. Mainly we are design engineers. We design 
ships, buoys, control systems, winches, all sorts of hardware that goes 
into the ocean. The devices we build work, we stand behind them, and 
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so we know quite a lot about what is possible to do, how one deals 
with dynamic stresses in a seaway, how to anchor heavy ships under 
difficult conditions, and so on. 
One of our earliest major contracts had to do with the surveying of 
a major part of the coast of south and southwest Africa. We got this 
job because we managed to present a proposal to the management of the 
DeBeers Corporation at precisely the right moment, with exactly the 
right words in it. We offered to evaluate a series of undersea mining 
concessions, and eventually we did an extensive geophysical survey of 
about 600 miles of the coast between Waives Bay on the north and the 
Oliphants River to the south. I believe that we know that piece of the 
African coast as well as any 600 miles of the United States coast is 
known. We were trying to find diamonds. If one finds a diamond— 
which is a very small object indeed—he must go back and be able to 
find the one next to it. So the survey work was done with great pre­
cision. We found a great many diamonds. We prospected in great 
detail four of the five undersea diamond concessions, and on one of 
these we mapped at least ten million carats of diamonds spread among 
thirty separate areas. We cannot really define these areas as ore bodies 
yet because, by definition, ore is a mineral which can be mined at a 
profit. No profit has yet been obtained by mining these diamonds, but 
in my opinion a proper management and engineering organization 
would succeed in making very substantial profits out of the operation. 
As a result of our experience in Africa, our company and the DeBeers 
group joined forces to set up a new company to do ocean mining around 
the world. It is known as Ocean Mining A.G., of Zug, Switzerland. 
This company is about half owned by us and half by DeBeers; our 
operations are financed in various ways from various sources. Ocean 
Mining's offices are in Washington, D.C., but we are mainly operating 
in the outside world with capital whose origin is unknown. This is most 
important in some parts of the world which are not particularly friendly 
either to South Africa or to England itself. 
Ocean Mining began by making a rather extensive paper study of 
where one might look for ore deposits. We did, I suppose, the obvious 
thing. We examined the geologic situations offshore, around the world, 
opposite places where successful mining had been done onshore. We 
looked for such things as steep stream gradients, which would move 
these minerals into the sea, and for places where there is substantial 
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oceanic motion—both wave motion which would create a natural 
processing mechanism, and current motion which would sweep away 
the gangue material which is not wanted. We sought grooved and 
chinked rocks in which the heavy materials would remain more or less 
indefinitely as though on a riffle bed. As a result of studies of this nature 
we determined there were about fifty places that looked like they were 
possible ore targets. We assigned priorities to these and dispatched teams 
into the field to examine them in the order of priority to see how they 
looked. We were concerned with many subjects besides geology and 
oceanography. We investigated the legal aspects including how one can 
own underseas concessions in various parts of the world (in some 
countries the rules are rather sticky—although generally they compare 
favorably with the United States laws). 
Our first experience with direct prospecting at sea was in Alaska 
where last summer we worked on our own claims up there for about 
three months under rather miserable conditions. Our company holds 
about 55,000 acres of undersea land off the coast of Alaska, largely in 
Norton Sound between the towns of Nome and Bluff, but also some 
areas around some of the islands and some near Goodnews Bay. Ocean 
Mining A.G. spent some $150,000 to send a small ship up there to run 
several hundred miles of sonic traverse, to determine the thickness of 
the undersea gravels and sands and to determine where the stream beds 
were buried. We had along a small sampling device which we named the 
Mickey Mouse—it was too small to really tell us much about the sub-
bottom conditions, but it gave a rough qualitative indication of whether 
or not there was gold present. In some seventy-five holes that we drilled 
up there, we found gold in every one. This indicated we were in the 
right part of the world, but none of these assayed high enough to get 
us really excited. However, although we are not going to be in Alaska 
this summer, perhaps we shall go back next summer and look a little 
more. In this business, as I suppose in most other areas of oceanography, 
persistence is the greatest virtue. One must keep looking in spite of 
discouragements. 
From Alaska we then proceeded to New Zealand, which was our next 
target; there we made a rather extensive geological reconnaisance on 
shore, by air, and by small boat. For reasons which I will not go into 
here, we decided against the area for the present; we simply lowered 
its priority on the list and moved to Tasmania. At this moment our 
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company (I should say our group of companies because there are six 
or seven companies involved in our group at the moment) hold about 
10,000 square miles of undersea property off Tasmania and off Australia. 
Some of this is off the east coast of Tasmania at Oyster Bay; some is 
on the northern coast of Tasmania; some is around King and Flanders 
islands; and there are some areas that extend well out from shore. 
All of the Bass Strait area, that is, the area between Tasmania and 
Australia proper, is shallow water—rarely over a couple of hundred feet 
deep—and the geological possibilities look rather good for tin and 
heavy minerals (rutile, zircon, ilmenite) and so on. We are now involved 
in the early stages of prospecting and have completed about 2,000 linear 
miles of sonic surveying. These data are used to make detailed maps of 
the bedrock topography and the surface topography; from these we get 
at the thing we are most interested in—the relationship between the 
thickness of the sediment and the sub-bottom structure. We have also 
picked up rather substantial areas along the coast of Australia proper— 
in Queensland, in New South Wales, and in western Australia. 
In order to get the money to operate this Tasmanian concession 
(10,000 square miles was obviously going to take a lot of money—we 
estimated the cost of a prospecting venture down there as $800,000), 
we put together a joint venture called the Tasmanian Offshore Explora­
tion Company, which includes several major worldwide companies. We 
also have people in the Philippines, in Thailand, and in Malaya, and 
several other countries, which I shall not name, working on undersea 
mining problems. We are just completing a new drilling rig for taking 
samples in a new way beneath the sea floor. The ship on which it is 
mounted sails from our Long Beach offices for Australia the end of 
this week. This rig is known as the Horton Mining Sampler, and we 
have great hopes that it will take clean efficient samples beneath rough 
water. 
But discovering the extent of the mineral deposit even when you know 
its quantity and grade, and can make a reasonable estimate of the future 
markets in it, is only a part of the problem. That is to say, a detailed 
chart of the deposit is only half the job. In order to determine whether 
or not one can make it into a successful mine, one must know exactly 
what to do with it. That is, what sort and capacity of dredge would be 
used? How deep must it work? How thick are the gravels, and how 
rough is the bedrock? How much material would be processed each 
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day (or to what level does one process aboard) ? What is to be done 
with the tailings? What kind of people are required? What support 
ships? Shifts? Salaries? etc. We are in the process now of designing 
several dredging systems to fit various properties. Mining is a marginal 
business in the sense that it is not something you can do with an all-
purpose tool. Design studies begin with a specific ore body of known 
extent and grade for which you can calculate the markets over some 
period into the future; then you determine property life and set an 
amortization rate for the machinery which hopefully is written off to 
zero on the day that the mine is worked out. 
We are in the process of making such studies for several properties 
now, and in each case the equipment will be rather different. There will 
soon be new kinds of dredges that scoop up material from the sea floor, 
treat it in a plant on board, get rid of the tailings, and send the 
concentrates ashore. However, each mine in each country has a lot of 
local complexities—for instance, where does one keep the crew? Is it 
worthwhile to keep them on the beach and trade them back and forth 
every day, or maintain them at sea for twenty days at a time and 
send them back at the end of that time, and so on? Religions cause 
food problems and holiday problems. 
I should perhaps note that in our search for undersea minerals, we 
began at the top of the scale with diamonds, and then we descended 
through platinum and gold, tungsten, tin, and we are getting down to 
the lower levels now. I think we may never get down to manganese 
nodules. 
We have had a series of legal problems connected with these various 
operations; there are complexities to setting up companies in parts of 
the world where the natives are not used to our system. Even in a 
country like South Africa—which, at least to the casual observer, is 
similar to the United States (it is disappointingly like home)—American 
methods of operation are so different that an American is clearly an 
outsider even though he looks the same and speaks the same language. 
There are many currency problems that one encounters—foreign ex­
change control problems, such as: How does one move money out of a 
country after it has been made? 
How does one determine how much comes out and how much stays 
there. In Mexico, for example, outsiders are not allowed to own sea-coast 
property or, presumably, offshore property. In Thailand and the Philip­
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pines, American companies are favored. The point is that each country 
has special laws and customs which one must learn. Few countries, 
including the United States, have clear offshore mining laws. 
I would like to mention other kinds of problems, including the ethical 
problems with which one could become involved. Please understand, 
there is more to running a mining company than simply worrying about 
where the ore is. Sometimes I think that finding the minerals is the 
very least part of our problem: the other parts of management are 
much more difficult. 
In the course of these examinations and explorations we have had 
a series of problems with local laws and with political pressures and 
with ethics. Of these, the legal problems seem to me to be simplest 
because although these laws may be unfair, or badly written (perhaps 
they are not even written at all), or archaic, or difficult to observe, 
they at least offer a set of guidelines and are sort of an indication of 
what the local people would like done. We have been able to get along 
without any serious legal problems that could not be straightened out 
by the lawyers we retain around the world. 
Politicians are somewhat more difficult because it is hard to identify 
their objectives. But, once it is discovered what their objectives are, 
they are relatively easy to deal with. However, I have felt that my own 
most difficult problems were those of business ethics. Often the question 
is: what compromises can be made of one's own standards in return 
for the concessions one hopes to obtain from the local people? I have 
set down a series of sample problems: Should one tell the Minister of 
Mines of some unspecified country who owns his Swiss company ? Some­
times the Minister of Mines rather specifically does not want to know. 
He wants somebody to come in and develop his country; he does not 
particularly want to deal with any of a dozen companies which he has 
on a blacklist. If he does not ask, should he be informed of exactly 
whom he is dealing with? 
Should one ever pay squeeze or graft to a politician, a government 
official, or a bureaucrat? If one does not, an official may take one's 
application for prospecting permits and summarily reject them or quietly 
bury them. And I have personally been propositioned by the representa­
tive of a West African country in the United Nations lounge; he wanted 
a substantial sum to pass our concession request on to the proper 
minister and help it. Finally the attorney with me said, "Well, sir, 
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instead of this direct appropriation, do you suppose that if we were to 
donate to your country a traveling medical unit with your president's 
name painted on the outside of it, that that would be a suitable sub­
stitute?" And he said, "Oh, yes sir, that is exactly what I had in mind 
all along." Well, we decided against it, but no bribe means no concession 
in several countries. 
Should one buy currency on the black market when his competitors 
are doing it? In Vietnam today piasters sell for about eighty to the 
dollar on the official trading rate at the bank, and one is required by 
law to deposit the money in the bank. The official military rate is 120 
piasters to the dollar: at the back door of the military exchange there 
is a sort of unofficial military rate of 135 piasters per dollar; and on 
the open black market, which is any place outside the doors of a 
fenced-in military establishment, piasters sold recently for about 170 to 
the dollar. What does one do? In Vietnam there really is not the com­
petition in the same sense as in other parts of the world, but it is a 
perfectly good example. While I was in Indonesia, the black market 
rate escalated by a factor of five in two days. You are a darn fool if you 
don't and perhaps unethical if you do. 
Should one give the customs inspector a case of liquor to encourage 
him to process an incoming shipment a week earlier? He couldn't care 
less whether the parts needed to make machinery operate are on time. 
He will get to it in his own good time; as a matter of fact if he thinks 
there is an possibility of collecting a "tip" he will be even slower about 
it because he knows it will be offered eventually. 
Should a chartered boat be insured for more than it is worth with 
Lloyds ? In a recent experience, we chartered a vessel in Thailand, and 
when it was inspected by the local ship surveyor he valued it at $35,000, 
which was very generous. But the owner said if it is not $50,000, the 
boat cannot be had! We are covered by Lloyds, with whom we have a 
very good relationship, so we simply reported the whole story to our 
broker at Lloyds. He said, "Don't worry about it. Put it in at $50,000." 
I do not know why Lloyds was willing to do that; it surprised me. But 
what does one do? We could not be in the position of attempting to 
cheat our good friends at Lloyds. Luckily, we did not have to, but we 
needed the boat in the worst way. 
Most basic is the question: Should standards of ethics be different in 
South America or the Orient than they are at home ? We have had many 
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discussions about this, and we have never reached any final conclusion. 
I honestly do not know what is right. All of these problems that I have 
mentioned have arisen in the last year (plus a lot more which are even 
stickier which I decided I would not mention). 
[EDITOR'S NOTE : The following is a verbatim transcript of the questions 
and answers following Mr. Bascom's paper. These are included because 
of their technical value as a supplement to the paper.] 
QUESTION : I would like to ask Mr. Bascom how these concessions are 
obtained to these mines. Do the mines go from the shores to the con­
tinental shelf or is there a more precise definition? 
BASCOM : In every country it is a bit different. For example, South­
west Africa operates as a state of South Africa. In the southwest the 
concession lines go out to the "edge" of the continental shelf, which 
happens to be poorly defined because there the shelf slopes gradually 
off into about 6,000 feet of water. In South Africa, under the same 
federal government, concessions go to the three-mile limit. The some­
what more difficult problem is where the shore line is because the shore 
line changes every day and there are very valuable diamond concessions 
that run up to what is described as the shoreline. Legal discussions of 
the true meaning of a word like "foreshore" have consumed many days 
of debate down there. In one area this finally was decided when DeBeers 
simply bought both sides. 
QUESTION : When you are permitted to go to the "continental shelf," 
I wonder if you've run into the question of the extremely ambiguous 
definition given in the 1958 Convention of "200 meters or beyond, 
depending on technological conditions"? 
BASCOM : Well, up until now, technological conditions have not brought 
us to that brink. Most of the deposits with which we have been concerned 
are in as close to shore as you can get. The reason is, I think, funda­
mental. You are not likely to have substantial ore deposits of an alluvial 
nature on the outer shelf. I have really been discussing placer deposits 
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all this time, perhaps I should have said so earlier. These placer deposits 
are mainly submerged beaches which are like windrows, parallel to 
the shore, created by lower stands of the sea at various times in the 
geologic past. The lowest stand that I remember anybody mentioning 
is on the order of a couple of hundred feet below present sea level. Most 
of our operations have been between about 150 feet of water and in as 
close to shore as we can get. Our problem has been that the ships are 
just barely outside the breakers all the time and they have some rather 
hair-raising experiences. Perhaps you have read about the seven vessels 
that have been lost off the coast of southwest Africa in the course of 
the diamond exploration down there. 
Every country is quite different. In the Bass Strait area the shelf 
extends for several hundred miles in each direction. It is a submerged 
piece of flat land and the edge of the shelf is distant and more or less 
immaterial. In other places of the world the situation is more difficult. 
In Alaska, for example, our claims are granted by the state of Alaska and 
they extend to the three mile limit; beyond that is federal land which 
may very well be auriferous, but they are not willing to discuss it with 
you. There are no ground rules, and they won't talk about it. We send 
them letters, and they write back and say, write us again next year. 
QUESTION : You mentioned that 150 feet is your maximum depth. How 
much of this prospecting is done by bringing up samples and how much 
is done by scuba diving or hard hat diving ? 
BASCOM : I said I would talk about gear and I didn't ever get to it. By 
the way, there is no immediate technological limit on the kind of equip­
ment that we use. Off the coast of Africa we were using a vessel named 
the "Rockeater," which we designed and built to operate with a whole 
series of specialized equipment. When you finance a ship you go to the 
bank and the first thing the bank says to you is, "When the present 
contract blows up then what will you do with the ship?" And so we 
had to be able to say, "We'll put it to work in the oil business." Now, 
in order to be used as an oil prospecting vessel the drill has to have a 
reach of at least 6,000 feet, even for very modest oil prospecting opera­
tions. So this ship that we were using in 150 feet of water was at least 
capable of drilling to 6,000 feet if it had any reason to. 
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The difficulty in sampling is in obtaining samples which the geologists 
will accept. The problem is to get a sample of the bottom which is clearly 
representative of it. This is particularly true in the diamond business 
where the multiplication factors are exceedingly high. That is to say, 
if you drill a hole and find a diamond you start multiplying the volume 
of this hole by the volume of the deposit as a whole and the multiplying 
factor may be as much as a million. So, if you have missed a diamond, 
or if somebody steals a diamond from you, which happens, it multiplies 
out to a tremendous error. In our system we rotated a drill bit down, 
using high pressure jets ahead of it and air-lifting the material to the 
surface through a pipe. We had endless arguments with the geologists 
about whether the water from the jets pushed material outside of the 
bit or whether at times the suction on the inside was so great that it 
pulled extra material in; whether the hole had caved at the sea floor 
and how much material sloughed into the hole; and whether the bit really 
got down to bedrock. 
Mostly we did not use divers for sampling although we used them to 
make studies of the bottom. Once in a while they come back with an 
exceedingly useful piece of information. There has been a lot of talk 
about using small submarines and divers and so on. I submit the people 
who say that have never really seen a mine. We're talking about moving 
10,000 cubic yards a day and I can't imagine a diver wanting to get 
anywhere near the cutting head of such a dredge. 
Our Rockeater is a truly remarkable ship; in its first year at sea 
Rockeater drilled 6,045 holes in the bottom, which must be nearly ten 
times the previous world's record. It brought the drilled material on 
deck, processed it for diamonds, and the geologists had the answer in 
diamonds on the ship within fifteen or twenty minutes. But, Rockeater 
was a fairly expensive vessel. We had about $1,500,000 in it, which was 
cheap for such a ship but still a lot of money. So we recently devised a 
tool called the Horton Mining Sampler which vibrates a six-inch casing 
into the bottom to take a perfectly clean sample with a virtually 
undisturbed core. 
QUESTION : I suppose that about 90 per cent of the gold and diamonds 
that you find are in the bottom 10 per cent or so of the overburden? 
My figures may be a little off but maybe they are of that order. 
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BASCOM : Yes, sir. That is about right. 
QUESTION : That is the most difficult part to tackle, I would assume. 
BASCOM : It is. 
QUESTION: And particularly the bottom one per cent. The most 
important part to get is the most difficult. 
BASCOM : In the main, what you've said is true. It certainly is true of 
the heavy minerals, particularly the very heavy minerals like gold and, 
to some extent, tin and tungsten. Diamonds are a bit different though 
generally what you say is true. In our sonic work we determined that 
in some areas there was a very clear "second layer" of sedimentary 
material above the bedrock there. In our drill records that layer was 
100 per cent correctable with the occurrence of diamonds and in that 
second layer the diamonds appeared to be more or less distributed 
through it. This would suggest that there was a concentration throughout 
that layer in some previous geologic period, and it has now been covered 
by overburden of some more recent age. 
QUESTION : Well, would you say the gold lies mostly on top of the 
bedrock—the top of the bedrock is quite irregular—and if it is hard rock 
it would be a very difficult thing to get most of the gold out of the 
cracks and so forth? 
BASCOM : Yes. It is always hard to get the gold from the cracks. In 
rather protected waters off Phuket, Thailand (where there are tin 
deposits now being mined at a profit), the sub-bottom material is soft, 
and the bucket-type dredge simply cuts into it and takes tin, cracks 
and all. 
QUESTION : Aren't the problems of underwater mining such that it is 
hard for you to be competitive with your competitors in the land-mining 
business ? 
BASCOM : We feel no competition at all. Metals are sold on the world 
market at a specified price. The problem is, do you wish to sell your 
material at that price. It is unrelated to what anybody else is doing in 
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the world. The prices go up and down as you know. Tin has been high 
lately, and, of course, a very high price and a restricted supply forces 
people to find substitutes. The best thing that can happen is for the 
price of tin to drop to somewhere near where it was a couple of years 
ago. I think it is quite irrelevent to say that ocean mining must wait 
until ore deposits have been discovered and mined out on land. It doesn't 
seem to me to make any difference. Nobody in the metal market knows 
or cares whether the material came from sea or land. 
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A SYMPOSIUM ON LIMITS AND CONFLICTING 
USES OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF 
BURKE: 
I only want to make two or three non-controversial points. First, about 
the definition of the shelf, I think we have probably labored that pretty 
much already, but I did want to emphasize what has already been said, 
that the convention, despite the literal interpretation that seems to be 
current among some people, obviously envisages a limit on the shelf. 
I do not think this can be said too often because it does seem that the 
information doesn't get around very fast or at least that it isn't heard 
by some people. 
The second point is that with the concern that many people are 
expressing these days about ocean exploitation and with the extension 
of boundaries for various purposes, sometimes even for the purpose of 
claiming national sovereignty, it is possible that we shall overlook an 
area in which industry plays a role, but it is not in terms directly of 
production of wealth, and that is the area of scientific research. It is 
possible that these extensions of boundaries—and this has happened, 
of course, with respect to certain boundaries in the ocean already—that 
these extensions will hamper, perhaps very gravely, the conduct of 
scientific research for gathering knowledge about the ocean on which 
all of these other activities will ultimately be based. The Continental 
Shelf Convention in particular has already in certain instances led to 
interference with what appeared to be purely scientific research. I have 
heard of three or four incidents of this kind occurring, that is, of outright 
refusals by the coastal states for research, including research in the 
water above the shelf. The convention requires the consent of the 
coastal state for research undertaken in the shelf, apparently attempting 
to distinguish between that research and the research in the waters 
above. The paper which I have written, which I am not going to give 
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tomorrow—I shall give something else—has passages about this and 
about the difficulty of making this supposed distinction (at least I think 
that is the distinction that is written into the convention.) I believe that 
this is a matter that is presently of some seriousness and may be of 
increasing seriousness in the future as scientific activities are expanded. 
And I think that as a part of the process of expansion, it is the responsi­
bility of government officials especially to see that these unwelcome 
intrusions on scientific endeavors are minimized. Scientists already have 
enough of a burden with the activities of the immediate operation without 
adding diplomatic complications and communications to them as well. 
I am aware of, but not familiar with, the military implications of this 
provision on scientific research in the Convention, and I think part of 
the emphasis that I spoke of ought also to be that the military restrain 
itself as much as possible in this area so that research by industry or by 
universities or others may be carried on. 
The third and last point I wish to make deals with part of the 
title here: conflicting uses of the continental shelf. The projections for 
technological development in the next ten to twenty years call for an 
extremely high number of varied activities in continental shelf areas. 
We already do have some problems of conflict immediately, and in the 
area of the North Sea, about which Dick Young has written, the 
problems are likely to come upon us rather quickly in view of the 
intensity and variety of activity in that area of water. It is likely that 
institutional mechanisms will have to be established on a continuing basis 
to deal with these problems because the area of the North Sea, large 
as it is, is still likely to lead to difficulties. 
There is the possibility that I think is emerging that states are going 
to extend controls over the continental shelf outside the Continental 
Shelf Convention. This has already occurred in one instance: the 
Netherlands North Sea Installations Act extends Netherlands legis­
lation, any legislation that may be authorized by the Netherlands govern­
ment, to any installation on the continental shelf no matter what its 
purpose. Now there may be a number of reasons for placing installations 
on a shelf, among them scientific, I am thinking particularly of marine 
geodetic equipment which is serving a legitimate purpose. It is not 
necessarily used for direct exploration and exploitation, although it could 
be employed for that. I think that the Netherlands legislation, when 
adopted by other states, may be used as a precedent for very undesirable 
interferences by coastal states with legitimate, non-threatening activities 
that take place on the continental shelf. 
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ELY: 
When we speak of the continental shelf, in whatever terms we define it, 
we are referring to a very substantial piece of real estate. If the definition 
is restricted to areas of the sea bottom which are submerged to a depth 
of less than 200 meters, these areas total about 20 per cent of the exposed 
land masses. The continental shelf adjoining the United States, so 
measured, amounts to more than 850,000 square miles. This is half 
again bigger than Alaska, almost equal to the combined area of Texas 
and Alaska. One writer has commented that when the Convention on the 
Continental Shelf went into effect in 1964, the jurisdiction of the United 
States was confirmed over an area about as great as that acquired by 
the Louisiana Purchase. Another has said that if the sea should drop 
in elevation only half of 200 meters, an area as big as Alaska would 
appear in the Bering Sea, and a new continent as large as Australia 
would surface in the Southwest Pacific. 
When the expression "continental shelf" is used, most of us think 
of a sloping submarine plateau, an extension of the shore and its beaches, 
bounded on its seaward side by the beginning of a steeper slope to the 
ocean floor. The question of definition would be one for the geographers 
and the geologists, not for the lawyers, but for the fact that within the 
last quarter-century there has been such an acceleration of interest in 
the minerals of this zone that a whole new chapter of international law 
has hastily evolved. 
As recently as 1939 a distinguished arbitrator in a dispute between 
an oil company and a sheikhdom of the Arabian peninsula decided that 
there was no international law at all on the rights and powers of a 
coastal state over the submerged lands beyond its territorial seas, but 
that, as a matter of common sense, the coastal state should have some 
degree of control and jurisdiction. In 1942 the ice was broken by an 
agreement between Great Britain and Venezuela respecting the Paria 
Gulf. In 1945 President Truman issued his proclamation that 
. . . the Government of the United States regards the natural resources of the 
subsoil and sea bed of the continental shelf beneath the high seas but contiguous 
to the coasts of the United States as appertaining to the United States, subject 
to its jurisdiction and control. 
But, he added: 
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The character as high seas of the waters above the continental shelf and the 
right to their free and unimpeded navigation are in no way thus affected. 
This proclamation extended to the sea the legal principle of multiple 
use of a resource, with which we are familiar on the public lands and 
in the navigable streams of this country. Importing a third dimension to 
this principle, the Truman proclamation established a distinction between 
the use of the sea bed and the use of the overlying water. It is the 
distinction between the concept of the use of the sea bed as a potentially 
valuable mining property which is covered by some very wet and 
unstable overburden, and the concept of the use of this overburden, a 
column of fluid valuable for its content and for its ability to support 
buoyant vehicles, which we call the high seas. 
Within a few years thereafter, some two dozen nations had eagerly 
issued similar proclamations, some of them not so modest in disclaiming 
jurisdiction over the surface and content of this wet overburden. 
In 1958, at Geneva, under United Nations auspices, the nations of 
the world signed four conventions. One was captioned "The Continental 
Shelf." It is to be read in connection with another, on the subject of 
"The Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone," because this fixes the 
landward scope of the continental shelf convention. The other two 
agreements deal with "The High Seas," and "Fishing and Conservation 
of the Living Resources of the High Seas." All four have since gone into 
effect. It is significant that the international law thus formalized in the 
Convention on the Continental Shelf had coalesced in less than twenty 
years, whereas the other three conventions are concerned with subjects 
that have involved several hundred years of evolution of the law of 
the sea. 
The Convention on the Continental Shelf, which went into effect in 
June, 1964, provides that it shall be subject to review and revision five 
years after that date. Today, therefore, we are about half way into that 
five years. 
The Convention on the Continental Shelf deals in general with the 
lateral extent of the exclusive jurisdiction of coastal states over the 
exploitation of the sea bed, and the vertical planes of division of juris­
diction as between adjacent states and as between states which confront 
each other across a body of water. With respect to the sea bed, the real 
estate, the coastal state is apparently confirmed in the same exclusive 
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proprietary and sovereign rights, as against a stranger, that it enjoys 
with respect to its fast land. With respect to the overlying water 
column, its content and its surface, the community of nations is confirmed 
in its inclusive right of access to these resources as high seas. 
Since I am in the company today of some of the men best qualified, 
in the whole United States, to discuss the problems of international 
boundaries and of the conflicting multiple uses of the sea overlying the 
continental shelf, I shall defer the discussion of those two aspects of 
these interlocking conventions. Instead, I shall move to the other topic 
of this discussion, the limits of the continental shelf, and share with you 
some of my confusion on this subject. I find that I am not alone in 
this condition. 
The problems of limits are primarily on the seaward side. How far, 
and how deep, does the coastal state's flag march under water? 
Article I of the convention says: 
For the purpose of these articles, the term 'continental shelf is used as 
referring (a) to the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the 
coast but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 metres or, 
beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the 
exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas; (b) to the seabed and 
subsoil of similar submarine areas adjacent to the coasts of islands. 
By definition, the coastal state's exclusive jurisdiction over the sea 
bed does not end at the 200 meter depth. How much farther does it 
extend ? 
The continental shelf is defined by Webster in this fashion: 
A submarine plain of variable widths forming a border to nearly every 
continent. The water above it is comparatively shallow (usually less than 
100 fathoms). The rapid descent from it to the ocean depths is known as the 
continental slope. 
Does the coastal state's jurisdiction extend beyond the 200 meter 
depth line, but stop at the commencement of the continental slope, as 
the dictionary's definition does? The convention's definition is not in 
dictionary terms. Read literally, it is a legal fiction, extending right on 
down the submarine slope or precipice to whatever depths, and out to 
whatever distance, the exploitation of the sea bed becomes possible. How 
deep, how far out ? I once expressed my puzzlement in this fashion: 
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If some stranger proves, by doing it, that wells can be drilled at very 
great depth at a distance of hundreds of miles from the nearest coast 
line, then, if this language means what it says, he has automatically 
established, ex post facto, the exclusive jurisdiction of some coastal 
state which was incapable of this technical exploit itself, did not license 
this exploration, indeed, never heard about it, but now acquires sovereign 
powers to prohibit it, or police its operation, and collect taxes and 
royalties and control disposition of production. Perhaps this is a good 
and necessary result, but it is a curiously casual one. Is the coastal state 
bound to maintain order in this new outpost of its sovereignty and 
protect it from other powers ? What are the limits, if any, on its ex post 
facto jurisdiction, if aimed away from any other islands below the 
horizon ? 
Moreover, wherever this ambient jurisdiction ends, the sea bed of 
the high seas begins, and we encounter a new problem: by what regime, 
if any, are the super-hazardous investments in the sea bed beneath the 
high seas to be controlled and protected? Since the outer limit of the 
coastal state's jurisdiction is apparently determined by the status of the 
art of undersea exploitation, and this art is in its infancy, we are perhaps 
discussing at this point the boundary between the unknown and the 
unknowable. 
But the pressure is on us for some kind of blueprint. This pressure 
comes from the foreseeable competition of military necessities, and from 
the foreseeable requirements of the world's mineral industries. 
Four general alternative concepts have been suggested: 
1. The solution recently proposed by a Committee on Natural 
Resources and Development to the White House Conference on Inter­
national Cooperation was this: Treat the minerals beneath the high 
seas as the common property of mankind, but recognize that "producers 
must have exclusive mining rights to areas that are sufficiently large to 
permit them to operate economically and without fear of congestion or 
interference. And if rights are to be granted for resources that are the 
common property of the world community, then decisions on the 
allocation of these rights or on the methods of acquisition must be made 
within the framework of international law. A specialized agency of the 
United Nations would be the most appropriate body for administering 
the distribution of exclusive mining rights." My comment is that this 
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administrative solution is a long way off, and will become necessary 
only after some major discovery is made at great depth, and touches off 
competition. Right now, there is plenty of room. 
2. Assume, until the contrary develops, that all practicable undersea 
mineral development is sufficiently close to a coastal state that the 
Convention on the Continental Shelf applies, and that the nearest coastal 
state therefore should have plenary jurisdiction. This factual assumption 
will quite probably be correct for a long time, but it begs the question 
of the control of resources which, by hypothesis, are outside the scope 
of the convention. 
3. Treat the sea bed beneath the high seas as open to appropriation 
and occupancy by all, free of the licensing authority of any state or 
international organization, but subject to the qualification that conflicting 
appropriations must be accommodated either by agreement or by resort 
to some rather general principles of reasonableness of use, to be evolved 
case by case, as need arises. This simply postpones the questions of 
what nation's laws shall govern and what the content of those laws 
should be. 
4. Let the exploratory operation carry the flag of some nation with 
which it has a "genuine link"—this is the test of recognition of the 
flag of a vessel under the High Seas Convention. This is what is 
required as long as the operation is both sea-borne and mobile, and it 
is arguable that there is no reason to change that status when it 
establishes permanent contact with the sea bottom. As a practical matter, 
the explorer thereby appropriates a segment of the sea bed, and the 
jurisdiction of his flag attaches to the discovery. When the first signifi­
cant discoveries are made, the flag nations of the sea-borne exploitation 
mechanisms, if they are in conflict, are likely to arrive at an accommo­
dation, just as Venezuela and Great Britain did in the Gulf of Paria. 
If they fail at an accommodation by agreement or arbitration, and if 
enough nations sense an interest of their own in the outcome, then 
the problems will justify the negotiation of a modification of the con­
vention—perhaps even at the end of the current five-year trial period. 
The Convention on the Continental Shelf crystallized international 
law very rapidly when need arose, and did so precisely to the extent 
necessary to enable the exploitation of the shelf to go forward to the 
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full extent justified by the state of the art. We can expect similar 
advances in the law to accompany further advances in the art. 
YOUNG: 
I share the concern of my colleagues over the problems that arise from 
technological advance and new competing uses of the sea and from the 
uncertainties of existing law. These are major issues and require the 
fullest study. But merely for the sake of variety in the menu of our 
discussion I propose to take up briefly a different set of problems: 
those relating to the establishment of boundaries on a continental shelf 
shared by two or more states. While these matters do not involve great 
questions of principle, they do present practical problems which are 
both difficult and of immediate concern to exploitation programs now 
under way. 
As you know, Article 6 of the Shelf Convention provides that in 
the case of states whose coasts are opposite one another, the boundary 
on the shelf between them shall—in the absence of agreement or unless 
another line is justified by special circumstances—be a median line. 
A median line is defined as a line equidistant at all points from the 
nearest points on the baselines from which the territorial sea of each 
state is measured. In the case of adjacent states on the same coast, the 
boundary shall be—again in the absence of agreement or special circum­
stances—a line equidistant throughout from the nearest points on the 
respective baselines. 
I have no quarrel with this general principle of equidistance as a 
fair method of determining a boundary. The trouble comes in its 
application to specific situations where the general language of the 
convention fails to provide a clear or adequate answer. This is the more 
regrettable because Article 6 gives the appearance of furnishing an 
automatic solution on which one could rely when the states concerned 
could not agree. In my experience, this expectation has often proved 
illusory. Let me illustrate by suggesting two or three types of such 
difficulties. 
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One type of difficulty, which arises from the wording of Article 6 
itself, relates to the baselines from which the boundary is to be measured. 
Suppose states A and B are opposite each other and both are parties 
to the Shelf Convention, but that only B is a party to the Territorial 
Sea Convention. A measures its territorial sea from baselines further 
seaward than those specified in the Territorial Sea Convention. Under 
a literal interpretation of Article 6, the shelf boundary between A and B 
is the line equidistant between the baselines, even though A thereby 
acquires substantially more shelf area than B, whose baselines have 
been restrained by the convention rules. A similar displacement of the 
line will occur in cases where the states concerned are adjacent to one 
another rather than opposite. 
A second class of difficulties arises from geographical facts rather 
than legal attitudes and is exemplified by the problem of islands. What 
role is to be assigned to islands in determining the equidistant boundary 
line ? In narrow seas, this can make a great deal of difference. The Shelf 
Convention is silent on this point, except to affirm in Article 1—rather 
unhelpfully in the present context—that islands also possess appurtenant 
shelf areas. Article 6 speaks only of baselines, not "mainland" or "island" 
baselines. If state A possesses islands three-quarters of the way across 
the sea toward state B, does this mean that state A gets seven-eighths 
of the shelf between itself and B? If B possesses other islands close 
to A, does the shelf boundary zig-zag accordingly? In narrow seas, 
I can assure you that some rather peculiar lines can be projected which 
cannot be called contrary to the language of the Shelf Convention. You 
can imagine for yourselves a wide selection of other variations on this 
island theme. 
Still a third group of problems, non-legal in nature but still a practical 
obstacle to determination of a line, relates to the charts or maps used 
in establishing the baselines and constructing the boundary. Sometimes 
no accurate large-scale charts exist; sometimes they are grossly in 
error; sometimes the official charts of state A differ substantially from 
those of state B. I know of at least one case in which the charts of the 
two countries were based on wholly different datums, with noticeable 
discrepancies resulting. The convention rules do not resolve this kind 
of dilemma. 
Lastly, the convention fails to define the "special circumstances" in 
which it recognizes that a boundary other than the line of equidistance 
may be justified. The omission is quite understandable, but it leaves the 
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way open for raising all kinds of allegations regarding "special circum­
stances" in order to prevent the application of the equidistance rule. 
I fully appreciate that all these obstacles can be readily removed, 
as the convention provides, by agreement among the states concerned. 
The progress that has been made in the North Sea demonstrates this. 
Such an agreement need not even be an agreement directly on the line; 
it can be an agreement to submit the matter to some form of impartial 
third-party determination. (The convention, of course, contains no re­
quirement for such submission.) But those who may become involved in 
these boundary problems should be aware that the convention rules do 
not furnish guaranteed and automatically applicable solutions, even in 
cases where the parties are bound by them in principle. The convention 
is only a point of departure for negotiation. 
JACOB: 
I shall dwell a moment, I think, on the Convention on the Continental 
Shelf and the problem which the dual criteria raises. The particular 
problem, I think, is that it provides a ground for an indefinitely ex­
tensible claim into the ocean for mineral exploitation purposes. I do 
not think that a determined proponent of this reading of the convention 
will be embarrassed either by its language or by such legislative history 
as is available. I am not either especially comforted by the words 
"adjacent to the coast" which Mr. Stone mentioned this morning. That 
phrase seems only to indicate the people who are to play in this game 
and not the prize they are to win. So neither the language of the 
convention nor its legislative history will embarrass a coastal nation, 
say in Africa or South America which sees in deriving a rent from 
deep ocean exploitation a kind of handy kit for turning itself into a 
new Saudi Arabia or Iraq or Iran. 
I do not suppose that even this kind of delight in the wonderful new 
resources that one might have will fail to affect even the United States. 
Certainly we got into the whole continental shelf game by claims made 
by the United States. Nevertheless, I think we have to begin to examine 
each kind of deep ocean exploitation and such exploitation in a projected 
181 
THE LAW OF THE SEA 
aggregate as we come to know it, as problems that have to be considered 
without reference to the convention; for, first, the convention may not 
be accepted as applying, and, second, even if it is, it may not prove 
workable. Now, that means that the status of deep ocean exploitation 
is uncertain. Will that uncertainty retard deep ocean exploitation? 
Perhaps. Certainly Oliver Stone was right in saying that he would 
expect that people who are interested in making the considerable 
investment in such exploitation will demand an assurance of exclusive 
right to development. However, I shall point out that petroleum ex­
ploitation on dry land has developed despite a considerable number of 
situations that could only be characterized as a "license to catch," 
that is, the right of all superjacent owners to exploit at will a given 
pool. The petroleum industry has generally worked out this problem by 
the most diverse and indirect means, and yet it has not been noticeably 
retarded in its development. And I think the same thing applies to deep 
ocean mineral exploitation. It is to some extent, as we heard, going on, 
and apparently it will increase greatly, leaving us lawyers in the 
embarrassing wreckage of the Convention on the Continental Shelf 
to work out the problems as or just before or—most likely of all—after 
they arise. 
HARLOW : 
One may wonder why the Navy is interested in the legal meaning and 
extent of the continental shelf regime. It is primarily because it may 
not be long before some U.S. citizen or corporation asks for protection 
in these areas of the high seas. The Navy will certainly play an 
important role in affording the protection that may be legally and 
properly granted. The Navy has, therefore, given considerable in-house 
thought to this problem, but my remarks do not represent an official or 
final Navy position on this matter. Now as mentioned previously, 
Article 1 defines the continental shelf as an area adjacent to the coast 
to a depth of 200 meters or beyond that limit to the extent that the 
depth of the water permits exploitation of the natural resources. This 
is a double-barreled definition—depth of 200 meters or depth of exploit­
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ability. The United States Department of the Interior has already leased 
land for resource extraction on the outer portion of the continental shelf 
to a depth of 250 meters which, in a conceptual sense, is beginning down 
the slope toward the deep ocean floor. Therefore, the question is upon 
us today of how far out a coastal nation may claim exclusive sovereign 
rights over natural resources pursuant to this open-ended provision. 
Although the continental shelf concept has existed since 1958, usage 
and judicial decisions are not available to establish a customary or 
agreed limitations on the maximum scope of this legal concept. Several 
qualified observers have maintained that under this open-end provision 
a nation may legally claim exclusive rights to ocean resources any 
distance from its coast or down to any depth, perhaps to the mid-ocean 
areas, so long as that nation has the capability of exploiting those 
resources. One delegate to the 1958 Geneva Convention expressed 
concern that the Continental Shelf Convention could be so construed 
and would thereby permit the big powers to claim vast ocean areas 
conceivably up to another nation's continental shelf. 
The legal status of the areas within the territorial seas affords little 
difficulty because the coastal nation has full sovereignty over the super­
jacent water as well as the sea bed and subsoil. But beyond the territorial 
seas are the high seas, so to speak beyond the borders of any single 
state. What then is the legal rationale underlying the exclusive right 
of resource development which is granted to a coastal state by the Con­
tinental Shelf Convention in an area which is admittedly beyond its 
borders and which retains its superjacent character as high seas. An 
understanding of the legal rationale and basis of this convention is 
essential in making a judgment concerning the logical and proper limits 
of its application. 
It is submitted that the basis in law for these extraterritorial rights 
accorded to coastal states by the convention can be summarized as 
follows: first, the existence in a geological sense of the continental shelf. 
In other words, superior rights accrue to a coastal state simply because 
there is a distinctive geological area which can be distinguished from 
the deep oceans in general. This is evident not only in the legislative 
history of the convention but also by the repeated use of the geological 
term "continental shelf" in the convention itself. Dr. Chapman referred 
to the records of the Eighth Session of the International Law Commis­
sion which had spent a great deal of time on this problem. To a great 
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extent the final convention did incorporate the thoughts and language 
as recommended by this law committee. And I think it is significant to 
note that although they did depart to a certain extent from the geological 
concept of the continental shelf, thereby changing this concept from a 
strict geological sense into perhaps a unique legal sense, they neverthe­
less retained the terminology "continental shelf." Some members of the 
commission recommended that because of these changes they should 
refer to these areas as "submarine areas," but in the final analysis the 
majority of the commission decided to retain the term "continental shelf" 
because it is in current use and because the term "submarine areas" 
would not give sufficient indication of the nature of the area in question. 
The second basis appears to be a superior natural right of the adjacent 
coastal state. This right appears to be based on the fact that the con­
tinental shelf is a natural continuation of the above-water land mass 
that is already within the state's complete domain. The limitation of 
this natural right is evident when one considers that the convention 
defines the area in which the coastal state enjoys these superior rights 
as being "adjacent to its coast," a point which was well emphasized by 
Mr. Stone, and further when one considers the abrupt slope which 
signals the falling away of the continental land mass. 
In view of this rationale, then, how far into the ocean may a state 
properly make exclusive claim pursuant to the Continental Shelf Con­
vention ? It is submitted that a state may not claim the right of exclusive 
resource development to any great distance down a continental slope 
without doing violence to the intention and purpose of this convention. 
The further down the slope one goes, the less it appertains to the land 
mass and the geological definition of the shelf, and hence the legal regime 
of the continental shelf, and the more it appertains to the deep oceans. 
WRIGHT: 
The present international law of the sea provides for freedom of the 
high seas for navigation and fisheries with recognition of the need for 
regulation of fisheries for purposes of conservation; for sovereignty of 
the maritime belt by the adjacent state subject to the right of innocent 
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passage by vessels of all states; and for exclusive right to exploit the 
resources of the continental shelf by the adjacent state. 
As the use and exploitation of the sea and the sea bed increases with 
increase in the world's population, the need for more extensive and 
precise rules of international law on the subject has been recognized, 
but the different policies and interests of the states has made it difficult 
to establish such rules. There should be a clear definition of the seaward 
limits of the maritime belt sufficiently flexible to fit the various con­
ditions of the sea coast as recognized in the Norwegian Fisheries Case. 
It is even more important that the limits of the continental shelf be 
fixed in order to avoid serious international controversy, as the develop­
ment of technology permits exploitation of the resources of the bed 
of the sea at great depths. It is unfortunate that the Continental Shelf 
Convention qualified the 200 meter depth definition by the uncertain 
concept of technological capability. 
Finally, and most important of all, is the establishment of the status 
of the bed of the sea beyond the continental shelves. Presumably the 
concept of "freedom of the seas" covers the bed of the sea, as well as 
the waters above it, but obviously the situations are very different. 
Exploitation of the bed of the deep sea requires a clear and exclusive 
right for a period of time by the exploiter to an area far more than does 
a high sea fishery. The agreements concerning the Antarctic continent, 
outer space, and celestial bodies point the way to a general agreement 
on the bed of the high seas. 
It seems clear that the principle that states can not acquire title to 
any portion of the high sea, accepted after a vigorous debate in the 
seventeenth century, is even more applicable to the bed of the high seas. 
If the principle of acquisition by discovery and occupation were applied 
to this vast area, as it was to the American continents after their 
discovery by Europeans, the world would be faced by rivalries and 
wars even worse than those of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth 
centuries among the maritime nations. 
In the interests of world peace, of efficient exploitation of vast 
resources, and of equitable opportunity to develop and utilize these 
resources by all nations and peoples, the bed of the sea and indeed the 
sea itself should be controlled by a world agency competent to make 
appropriate regulations and to license rights of exploitation in prescribed 
areas and for defined periods of time. In giving such licenses, consider­
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ation should be given to the technological capability of the company 
or nation applying for a license, and to fair distribution of such oppor­
tunities among the nations and people of the earth. The sea and its 
bed should be considered a heritage of mankind, and as its utilization 
proceeds, all should share equitably in its benefits. 
Discussion 
1. Persons interested in exploiting the resources of the continental 
shelf might wish for precision in the definition of its outer limits, yet 
the delegates at the 1958 Geneva Conference were purposely imprecise 
in defining these limits because of their lack of knowledge of the resource 
potential beyond the 200-meter isobath. Actually, the decision by a 
government whether to push for a broad or a narrow continental shelf 
depends in part on what the status of the bed of the high seas will be. 
The Continental Shelf Convention may be subject to review and revision 
five years after its coming into effect (i.e., 1969), and greater precision 
in defining the outer limits may prove to be both desirable and possible 
at that time. 
2. With respect to the U.S. continental shelf, the Department of 
the Interior has issued leases for exploratory drilling off the west coast 
in depths exceeding 1,500 feet. So far as the state-federal boundaries on 
the shelf are concerned, it was noted that the possibility of changes in 
the configuration of the shoreline may affect such boundaries in the Gulf 
of Mexico, but not off the coast of California, inasmuch as the Supreme 
Court recently fixed a permanent baseline in that state from which the 
outer limits of state control would be measured. 
3. Several alternatives were suggested concerning the status of the 
sea bed beyond the limits of the continental shelf. One was that any 
development of the minerals of the sea bed or subsoil beyond the shelf 
might be seen as justifying an extension of the shelf itself, with no limit 
placed on the depths involved. But would the extension of one country's 
capabilities (and control) to depths, say, of 600 meters, imply that all 
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other coastal countries might also lay claim to the sea bed off their 
own coasts to an equal depth ? If actual exploitation becomes the criteria 
for claims beyond the 200-meter isobath, would this not favor the 
technically advanced countries to the detriment of other coastal states? 
Or would it turn out that any country which has exploitable resources 
on or beneath the sea bed off its coasts might permit exploitation of 
these resources by one of the technically advanced countries and thus 
would be able to claim the sea bed, out to and including the site of 
these resources, as its own? 
A second alternative might be that nationals of a particular coastal 
state might secure possession of the sea bed off that country's coast in 
the name of the country—as a result of exploitation—but possession 
would be limited to the immediate site of the resource development, 
without affecting the status of the rest of the sea bed. 
On the other hand, it might be that any country could secure posses­
sion to a limited area of the sea bed in any part of the world on the 
basis of exploitation, the only criteria being that one of its own companies 
is actually exploiting the sea bed and that there is a "genuine link" 
between this company and the country making the claim. 
Still another possibility would be to rest ownership of the bed of 
the high sea with the United Nations, or some other international 
agency, with the power to lease portions of the sea bed to companies 
which will exploit the resources. Rent from the leases could revert to 
the international agency. 
Finally, it was suggested that the wisest course is to resist any new 
laws and to wait until situations develop in which some arrangements 
are necessary for ownership of the sea bed. 
4. Questions arose as to the compatability of the doctrine of owner­
ship of the bed of the high seas and the freedom of the high seas them­
selves. Would the principle of possession, based on discovery and ex­
ploitation of the sea bed resources, justify ownership? One opinion 
expressed was that the mineral resources of the sea bed are so vast 
that it will be a long time before serious problems of ownership emerge, 
but this was countered by the statement that from an economist's point 
of view, even now, there is not so much room in the sea that problems 
of ownership can be considered as being unimportant. 
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Chapter Twelve: 
FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION 
I. Introduction 
Navigation of warships on the high seas is free for all nations in 
time of peace. The United States Navy has therefore opposed any 
significant reduction in the world's high seas whether it be by con­
vention or by unilateral state act. For many years it has been and 
continues to be today the Navy's policy to completely, absolutely, and 
categorically support: (1) The United States adherence to a territorial 
sea three miles in breadth; (2) The United States view that it need 
not recognize foreign territorial sea claims in excess of three miles. 
I suggest, however, that the time is ripe for a reappraisal of certain 
aspects of this policy. I should emphasize that I am writing as an 
individual and that my thoughts do not represent the position of the 
United States Navy, Department of Defense, or any other agency of 
the United States government. 
Few aspects of the international law of the sea have provoked more 
controversy or elicited more divergent views and opinions than the 
question of the breadth of the territorial sea. The practice of states with 
regard to territorial claims, particularly in recent years, has been in a 
state of accelerating and—to many people—alarming change. 
International law has long recognized that a coastal state may 
exercise jurisdiction and control within its territorial sea in the same 
manner that it can exercise sovereignty over its own land territory. 
In a legal sense, the territorial sea constitutes an integral part of a 
state's domain, and, as such, is treated accordingly—with one important 
exception. In time of peace, international law accords the right of 
innocent passage to ships of other nations through a state's territorial 
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waters. Passage is "innocent" so long as it is not prejudicial to the 
peace, good order, or security of the coastal state. 
One may ask: How does the territorial sea concept affect the mobility 
of our naval forces in time of peace in view of the fact that the law 
recognizes the right of "innocent passage" ? Several points in this regard 
should be made clear. First, it is entirely possible that coastal states may 
unreasonably restrict this right—thus, while the right of innocent passage 
is clear in theory, it could be highly ambiguous and restrictive in actual 
practice. Secondly, several states, such as the Soviet Union, argue that 
warships generally do not possess the right of innocent passage. Thirdly, 
aircraft, civil or military, do not possess the right of innocent passage— 
hence, territorial waters can be overflown only with permission of the 
coastal state. Finally, there are specific restrictions limiting the right of 
innocent passage. For example, in territorial waters a submarine must 
navigate on the surface and must fly its national flag. Under certain 
conditions the right of innocent passage may be temporarily suspended 
in portions of the territorial seas (see Article 16[3] of the Convention 
on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone). From the foregoing it 
is apparent that an increase in the breadth of the territorial sea could 
substantially restrict the mobility and flexibility of our naval, air, and 
sea forces. 
II. Background 
The territorial sea concept has existed as a cornerstone principle of 
the law of the sea for many centuries. This concept derived its origin 
and historic rationale from the fact that coastal states have always 
deemed it essential to exercise effective jurisdiction and control over a 
belt of seas adjacent to their sea coast in order to secure, and maintain, 
the security of their citizens. 
The territorial sea concept had its most significant origin in the 
seventeenth century, developing through a process of state action and 
interaction, claim and counterclaim. By this process there became estab­
lished, during this period, a fairly widespread and generally accepted 
body of customary international law indicating that, except for limited 
territorial sea claims, the seas were free for the reasonable use of all 
states. Thus the territorial sea concept developed through the gradual 
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establishment of an international consensus as evidenced by widespread 
custom and practice, and not through any particular international treaty 
or convention. By the nineteenth century, there was a general consensus 
among the major maritime powers that a coastal state could legitimately 
claim as its territorial sea, a three mile belt immediately adjacent to 
its coast. 
Many of the classic legal writers during this formative period, in 
discussing the vague and often ill-defined national policies with regard 
to territorial sea claims, often made reference to what is commonly 
termed today as the "cannon shot rule." This theory, in essence, was 
that since the territorial sea concept was based on a state's natural right 
of security and self-preservation, a state could legitimately claim a 
belt of seas adjacent to its coast out to a distance that its shore batteries 
could reach. In other words—out to the limit to which that state could 
effectively exercise this natural right. During much of this period, three 
miles was the maximum effective range of most shore batteries. Implicit 
in the cannon shot rationale, however, is that the increased range of 
shore-based guns or other technological changes in weaponry, would 
permit a state to legitimately claim a broader belt of territorial seas. 
This is historically correct, provided however—and this is an element 
that is often overlooked—that the security requirements of the state 
otherwise warrant such a claim. That is, in order to justify a territorial 
sea claim a state must be able to demonstrate a need for the claimed 
zone in terms of security or self-preservation as well as an ability to 
effectively satisfy that need within the claimed zone. 
Placing this historic rationale for a unilateral territorial sea claim, 
in todays's context, it becomes clear that it is not legally sufficient to 
argue that simply because a state possesses defensive weapons with an 
effective range greater than three miles, that state may ipso facto uni­
laterally claim a proportionally larger area of high seas as its territorial 
sea. 
The United states made a provisional claim to a three-mile territorial 
sea in 1793, initially, for the purpose of protecting its neutrality. A letter 
to the British minister, written by Thomas Jefferson, included the fol­
lowing statement: "Reserving, however, the ultimate extent of this 
[speaking of the three-mile limit] for future deliberation, the president 
gives instructions to the officers acting under his authority as restrain­
ing them for the present time, to one league or three nautical miles from 
the seashore." For the 170 years since that time, the United States has 
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consistently adhered to the three mile limit. The Supreme Court has re­
ferred to the three mile claim as "the law of the land." 
In spite of the once general international acceptance of the three mile 
territorial sea, this century has seen an increasing number of states 
claiming territorial seas in excess of three miles. There are at present 
some fifty-three states which claim territorial seas greater than three 
miles, while the list of nations claiming three miles stands at approxi­
mately thirty-two. Many claims range from six to twelve miles and a few 
extend well beyond that distance. 
Some of the claims in excess of three miles have been longstanding. 
For example, Sweden claimed four miles in 1779, Norway claimed four 
miles in 1812, the Soviet Union claimed twelve miles in 1909, Mexico 
claimed nine miles in 1935. At the present time, one state claims 130 
miles and two claim 200 miles. 
There have been three unsuccessful attempts to reach international 
agreement on the breadth of the territorial sea—at The Hague in 1930 
and at Geneva in 1958 and again in 1960. The 1960 conference failed 
by one vote to reach agreement on a six-mile territorial sea with an 
additional six miles in which a coastal state could regulate fishing. 
A majority of the International Law Commission of the United 
Nations, in 1956, following exhaustive study, concluded that Interna­
tional custom and practice was no longer uniform in regard to terri­
torial sea claims but that international law would not permit a claim in 
excess of twelve miles. 
The Commission, however, was unable to decide whether a state 
possessed the right to unilaterally fix the limit of its territorial sea be­
tween three and twelve miles. 
At the close of the 1960 Geneva Conference, failing agreement to 
the contrary, the United States reaffirmed its adherence to the three 
mile rule and, more importantly, expressed the view that there was no 
obligation on the part of states adhering to the three mile rule to recog­
nize claims on the part of other states to a greater breadth of territorial 
sea. 
III. Need for Reappraisal 
Meanwhile, however, the relentless proliferation of jurisdictional 
claims in excess of three miles has continued. Recognizing that one of 
the sources of international law is the custom and practice of states, it 
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seems clear that the United States is approaching the point in time, 
when it will be difficult, if not impossible, to maintain that a state may 
not legitimately claim, in accordance with accepted principles of inter­
national law, a territorial sea belt in excess of three miles, up to twelve 
miles. 
It is this growing practice of states which, in my estimation, requires 
a reappraisal of the territorial sea concept. One compelling reason is 
that a clear change in international law, which would permit a state to 
make a unilateral territorial sea claim, from three to twelve miles, 
would invalidate the present United States position that it has no legal 
obligation to recognize foreign claims in excess of three miles. For, if 
a state may legally make such a territorial claim, other states must 
recognize it and abide by its terms. As stated in Article 2, of the United 
Nations Charter: 
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or 
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
state. 
In the event one were to conclude that international custom and 
practice does in fact point to an impending compromise of United 
States policy in this regard, it would be appropriate to search for, and 
discover, if possible, viable alternatives to this policy. Alternatives which 
will preserve that which is essential to the Navy and vital to the security 
of the United States—the world-wide mobility of its forces. 
At the same time, there are strong domestic pressures for a reappraisal 
of our three mile policy. It is well publicized and disturbing to many 
Americans that the Soviets have intelligence gathering vessels off our 
coasts. Such vessels also maintain stations off our Guamanian waters. 
They are, of course, at present, free to navigate passively on the high 
seas as long as they stay more than three miles from our shores. 
Another problem of great political and economic concern is that 
foreign fishing vessels are exploiting what we have, in the past, con­
sidered to be primarily United States fishing grounds. You will recall 
the furor that was created a few months ago when it was discovered 
that a Soviet fishing fleet was working the waters off the coast of 
Oregon. For years Soviet trawlers have been present in large numbers 
off our Eastern shore. 
It is evident, therefore, that the United States policy-makers are 
presently faced with a dilemma. On one hand, there is impetus to 
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expand our territorial sea claim because of domestic concern for security 
and fear of oceanic resource depletion in areas adjacent to our shores. 
And on the other hand, there is a military need to preserve freedom of 
navigation by maintaining a narrow territorial sea; for if the United 
States were to unilaterally declare an expanded territorial sea, it could 
no longer refuse to recognize foreign claims to a like or larger amount. 
Such action would, furthermore, encourage other states claiming only 
three miles to increase the breadth of their own territorial seas. 
Claims to expanded territorial seas would have a marked effect on 
the mobility of United States military forces; for the passage of the 
ships of one nation over the territorial sea of another must be "innocent" 
—must not, that is, prejudice the peace, good order, or security of the 
coastal state—and aircraft are granted no right of innocent passage 
over territorial waters. Consequently, very serious problems of access 
arise when a ship must pass over narrow straits that lead from one 
area of the high seas to another when these straits are claimed as 
territorial waters. Under the present three mile limit, for example, 
passage of the Strait of Gibraltar is possible over a narrow strip of 
water belonging to the high seas. If a twelve mile limit—or even an 
eight mile limit—were imposed, the Strait would become exclusively 
territorial water. In the same manner, the Straits of Dover now permit 
passage of the English Channel over a narrow strip of high seas not 
covered by the three mile limit that would completely disappear if a 
twelve mile limit were effected. This same expanded limit would lengthen 
the present route from Saigon to Guam, now following a strip of high 
seas traversing the Suriagao Strait, by a sufficient number of miles to 
add one day of sailing to the time now required to reach the Vietnamese 
port. 
And so it is in many parts of the world. By accident of geography, 
most of the more important narrow passages which link the oceans 
around the world are high seas with a three mile limit, and territorial 
waters with a six or twelve mile limit. 
We have determined that a six mile limit would result in fifty-two 
major international straits coming under the sovereignty of coastal 
states, and that a twelve mile limit would likewise affect 116 straits. 
One possible solution to the territorial sea dilemma is to create special 
zones of limited jurisdiction without increasing the territorial sea claim 
itself. Such jurisdiction might be for the limited purpose of preventing 
foreign intelligence activities or fishing. You are, of course, aware of 
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the bills before Congress at present that adopt this concept. In par­
ticular, the bill sponsored by Senators Bartlett and Magnuson would 
create a twelve mile fishing zone without altering our territorial sea claim 
of three miles. There is legal precedence for making such a distinction 
in the contiguous zone concept. As stated by a leading writer on inter­
national law, "The distinction between a right of sovereignty over a 
particular area and a right to exercise a preventive or protective juris­
diction over or within an area that is outside of the national domain is 
a real one." 
As mentioned in earlier discussions, at the present time, New Zealand 
and Japan are contemplating referring this particular question to the 
International Court of Justice in connection with New Zealand's recent 
unilateral claim to a nine mile exclusive fishing zone, which Japan 
feels will unduly and illegally interfere with the fishing activities of its 
nationals on the high seas. Other maritime countries will, of course, 
watch these developments with great interest. 
Such a solution, however, may not provide a complete answer. While 
it allows states to protect their fishing interests without extending their 
territorial seas, it does not guarantee that they will not make extensive 
territorial claims. 
Another possible solution that bears analysis is to negotiate, on a 
multilateral or bilateral basis, for the maintenance of high sea passage­
ways through international straits. This would permit extensions of the 
territorial seas without unduly jeopardizing the mobility of our naval 
forces. In this event, it seems clear, however, that international safe­
guards would necessarily have to be established; as they have been in 
international waterways such as the Suez and Panama canals or the 
Dardenelle Straits. Such safeguards would be essential as a substitute 
or quid pro quo the protection afforded coastal states by the present 
concept of innocent passage. 
It is impossible at present for anyone to penetrate the fog of coming 
events and identify or seize all the essential factors which will determine 
the final and correct solution to this problem. While the final outcome 
is not clear, what is clear is that it is essential to launch a searching 
appraisal of the evolving law of the territorial sea in relation to the 
requirements of the United States in the international system of 
tomorrow. Such an appraisal is essential not only to fully protect the 
security interests of the United States but its economic and political 
interests as well. 
194 
Gerard E. Sullivan 
Chapter Thirteen: 
INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF COMMUNICATIONS 
FOR OCEANOGRAPHIC EQUIPMENT 
An almost sudden curiosity—man's reaction to his intellectual neglect 
of the vast sea regions surrounding him—has led to and characterizes 
today's accelerated activities in ocean research. The early voyages of 
the English corvettes, Beagle (1831) and Challenger (1872), and the 
converted American "man-of-war," Porpoise (1838), cast the traditional 
mold for data acquisition, i.e., extended scientific cruises, occupying 
consecutive "oceanographic stations." From the standpoints of efficiency, 
in terms of time and coverage, and scientific value, in terms of simul­
taneous reporting and analysis, the mode of operation has obvious 
limitations. Recognition of these limitations together with the broadening 
scientific and geographic scope of these research activities has in turn 
fostered plans for the use of stationary platforms to acquire and record 
vital data. Timely and profitable use of these data, however, presents 
unique problems to the marine scientist, problems that are completely 
divorced from his usual concerns in the ocean spaces. They are legal, 
technical, and administrative at the same time. They are the problems 
of ocean communications. 
Probably the first formal recognition of the need for radio com­
munications in oceanography—in the United States at least—can be 
traced to a study conducted by the National Academy of Sciences 
Committee on Oceanography (NASCO) in 1959. The NASCO study identi­
fied two general uses for systems of oceanographic communications: 
nearly simultaneous data transmission from multiple buoy systems and 
"command nets" linking individual research units with shore-based 
laboratories and evaluation facilities. 
Undeniably, the two needs are closely related in terms of use, but 
they pose separate and distinct problems from the standpoint of radio 
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technology and frequency allocation. This discussion will concern itself 
with the first and most pressing of these needs, long range synoptic 
reporting of data in the context of international regulation. 
The subject of radio communications in oceanography came under 
international scrutiny when the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Com­
mission (ioc) a co-operative scientific organization operating within 
the framework of UNESCO, commissioned by Resolution at its First 
Session, a Working Group on Communications (UNESCO/IOC, Res. 
1-6). At its first meeting, during August of 1962, this body recom­
mended certain engineering standards for data transmission which would 
permit a nominal 300-bit capacity message, transmitting a maximum 
of 100 bits per second, using a 300-cycle maximum bandwidth for 
messages, and limiting antenna output to 100 watts. Frequency require­
ments were stated as a minimum of one 3 Kc/s channel in each of the 
six mobile maritime exclusive frequency bands, assigned for the sole 
use of oceanographic and meteorological communications. These assign­
ments would be from those band sections reserved for single-side-band 
work. The six bands in question are: 
4063 to 4438 Kc/s 
6200 to 6525 Kc/s 
8195 to 8815 Kc/s 
12330 to 13200 Kc/s 
16460 to 17360 Kc/s 
22000 to 22720 Kc/s 
In addition, a 3.5 Kc/s channel was requested in the 510 to 525 Kc/s 
band exclusively for Arctic and Antarctic use, since auroral disturbances 
usually render higher frequencies useless.1 
Before proceeding further it may be worthwhile to give very brief 
consideration to the other alternatives which were before the ioc at the 
time they were formulating their requirements. The following sketch 
of frequency alternatives is abstracted from a report entitled "Ocean 
Engineering," prepared under the auspices of the National Security 
Industrial Association.2 
I. VLF and LF Bands (10 kc to 300 kc) 
Although frequencies in these bands have been very effective for 
reliable long-range communications and electronic navigation, their 
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limitations in antenna efficiency and signal-to-noise ratio, make them 
less than desirable for oceanographic purposes. High transmitter power 
is required to correct the noise difficulties and large antennas impose 
an unmanageable metacentric height in light of stability requirements 
and buoy size. 
II. MF Band (33 kc to 3 me) 
Frequencies in this band have been characterized by reliable ground 
wave propagation over moderate distances (100 to 300 miles), but 
ionic conditions, particularly during daylight hours, severely limit sky 
wave propagation. Again antenna size—though smaller than VLF and 
LF—is not compatible with contemplated platform size. 
III. VHF and UHF Bands (30 me to 3000 me) 
For all practical purposes, radio wave propagation in these bands is 
limited to line of sight with a resultant transmission range of 30 miles 
or so, at the outside. Longer ranges have been obtained using small 
antenna configuration and low to moderate power, but these results 
have been attributed to "radio refractive ducting," a phenomenon which 
possesses as many disadvantages, as it does advantages. 
IV. Satellites 
Although satellite communications may become the ultimate solution 
to the oceanographer's dilemma, their use today is not—in the minds 
of most—economically justifiable. Experimental use in an ancillary 
operation may be within manageable limits in the near future, but their 
use for these purposes alone cannot be said to support an independent 
launching.3 
So what are the oceanographers left with? To be sure, they are 
left with the immediate need for a synoptic data reporting system, and 
the indispensable communication structure to support that system. And 
today, it surely appears that scientific comprehension of the oceans 
can best be served by the use of frequencies in the HF band, at least 
until developments in other areas can provide more effective means of 
communication and data transfer. From the standpoint of economy, 
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the HF band, with its already existing facilities and well-developed 
technology, offers the most promising means, for a number of years 
to come, for collecting oceanographic data from sources spaced over 
wide areas.4 
Having delineated the requirements, let us examine the international 
framework within which they will either be met or rejected. 
In essence, the mission of the International Telecommunication Union 
(ITU) is to preserve order and eliminate chaos in the conduct of global 
communications. By treaty, ventures into the realm of the radio-
frequency spectrum—which must be viewed as a finite resource or 
commodity, subject to use by everyone—are regulated by the ITU, 
through the joint actions of its member states. Or in the words of 
the ITU Convention, which is the Organization's Charter, jurisdiction 
extends to: "Any transmission, emission or reception of signs, signals, 
writing, images and sounds of intelligence of any nature by wire, radio, 
optical or other electromagnetic systems." 5 With regard to these trans­
missions, the stated purposes of the ITU are the maintenance of inter­
national co-operation respecting the rational use of all telecommunica­
tions and the development of technology for improving the efficiency 
of communication services so as to make them available for public 
use to the maximum extent possible. To achieve these general goals, 
the Union shall: 
a) effect allocation of the radio frequency spectrum and registration of radio 
frequency assignments in order to avoid harmful interference between radio 
stations of different countries; 
b) coordinate efforts to eliminate harmful interference between radio stations 
of different countries and to improve the use made of the radio frequency 
spectrum ;6 
Unlike most of the other Specialized Agencies within the United 
Nations which came into being following the creation of the UN itself, 
the ITU traces its history to earlier times and is in fact the oldest of all. 
Grave concern over the prospects of a telecommunications monopoly 
headed by the astute English Marconi interests, prompted the delegates 
of twenty nations to assemble in Paris in May, 1865. 
On May 17 of that year, a Convention was signed creating the ITU 
and bringing uniform regulation to Europe's international telegraph 
system. Only England—because of the private nature of its telegraph 
system—was not numbered among the major signatories. Of almost 
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equal importance was the 1868 Vienna conference establishing a 
permanent headquarters, and a Secretariat staff in Berne, Switzerland. 
The International Telegraph Union was then on its way to a permanent 
posture in the international agency structure. 
Remarkable achievements in telegraphy and the birth of radio were 
on the world scene when the First Radio Conference was convened in 
Berlin in 1906. The conference drew up the first International Radio 
Regulations which among other things adopted the SOS distress signal 
and of even more consequence obligated the ship and coastal radio 
stations of signatory nations to accept transmitted messages, regardless 
of the nationality of the message originator, or that of the equipment 
manufacturer. The introduction of the broadcast method in the 1920's 
confronted the ITU with one of its most serious and continuing prob­
lems—intelligent radio frequency allocation. The first attack on this 
problem was launched at the Washington Radio Conference of 1927 
which allocated frequency bands to all of the different radio services 
including maritime and broadcasting.7 In 1947, the organization became 
a specialized agency of the United Nations by special agreement and 
its headquarters were transferred to Geneva.8 By this agreement, ITU 
structure assumed its present form which includes four permanent 
subdivisions: 
1.	 The General Secretariat 
2.	 The International Frequency Registration Board (IFRB) 
3.	 International Consultative Committee for Radio (CCIR) 
4.	 International Consultative Committee for Telegraphy and

Telephony (CCITT).

A recent ITU achievement pertinent to this discussion is the 1963 
World Space Radio Communication Conference in Geneva which allo­
cated 6,000 mcs (approximately IS per cent of the entire radio fre­
quency spectrum) for outer space work.9 
Procedurally—or as Professor McDougal termed it when he launched 
these discussions "constitutively"—the functions of the ITU are carried 
out by the following organs in the following manner: Members of the 
union meet in Plenipotentiary Conference at intervals of approximately 
five years. Since the Plenipotentiary Conference is the supreme authority 
of the ITU, it is responsible for general policy, reviews the union's work 
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since the last conference and of primary importance—revises the con­
vention if such revisions are considered necessary. It also elects Members 
of the Union to serve in the Administrative Council as well as the 
Secretary-General and Deputy Secretary-General. 
With respect to the administrative conferences, there are three held 
by Members of the Union: ordinary, extraordinary, and special or 
regional conferences. Most important are the ordinary administrative 
conferences whose major task is to revise the separate radio, telegraph, 
and telephone regulations, the principal documents which govern the 
international operation of these basic communication forms. Extra­
ordinary and special conferences are periodically convened to consider 
unique telecommunication matters, or to revise specific parts of a given 
set of regulations. It should be further noted that ordinary adminis­
trative radio conferences elect the members of the all-important Inter­
national Frequency Registration Board (IFRB). They also review the 
actions of this board. 
The IFRB is composed of eleven independent radio experts, not more 
than one from the same country. Their main task, which is of a con­
tinuing nature, is to decide whether frequencies which countries assign 
to their radio stations (notice of which assignments have been served 
to the board) are in accordance with the convention and with the 
current radio regulations. If the board's finding in a particular case 
is favorable, the frequency is recorded in the master international fre­
quency register which is kept by the IFRB. It is in this manner then, 
that a frequency obtains formal international recognition and protection. 
Also germane to oceanographic considerations is the fact that the IFRB 
works out seasonal high frequency broadcasting schedules, based on 
environmental data evaluations. 
Within this "constitutive" structure then, what recourse is available 
to the marine scientist in his quest for the technological and regulatory 
support so vital to his investigations? Article 14, Section 2 of the con­
vention states that the provisions of the convention are completed by 
the following sets of administrative regulations which shall be binding 
on all members and associate members; namely, the telegraph, telephone, 
radio, and additional radio regulations. The radio regulations in turn 
stipulate that final allocation of frequencies to any service can be made 
only by an appropriate administrative radio conference. Accordingly, 
it became incumbent on the proponents of the ocean data service (an 
international scientific concept) to present most vigorously their needs 
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to their individual national representatives in the ITU in the hope of 
obtaining sufficient national support and ultimate consideration by the 
appropriate Administrative Conference. 
The focal point within the United States for such "case presenting" 
is the Interdepartmental Radio Advisory Committee (IRAC) which 
advises the President through his telecommunication adviser/officer. 
The IRAC also co-ordinates government use of radio frequencies; the 
FCC, which is represented on the IRAC, regulates the non-governmental 
use of frequencies. In this sense then, IRAC may be said to be the 
"management agent" for the Department of State in developing United 
States policy and positions, and the general handling of the U.S. 
activities in international communications. Ultimate policy determina­
tions of course continue as a function of the latter department. This is all 
before the fact. When these specialized conferences are complete—some 
lasting as long as seven or eight weeks—joint consultations between the 
IRAC and FCC produce a "blue book" of frequency use by public and 
private entities under United States jurisdiction. 
In spite of the able and dedicated leadership of several persons in 
this country—Mr. James Snodgrass of the Scripps Institution of 
Oceanography just to mention one—progress to date has been slow. 
To an individual not at all familiar with the problem, it has been 
almost imperceptible. It is fair to say, however, that the diligent efforts 
of these people have succeeded in convincing national authorities 
that a very real and valid need for exclusive oceanographic frequencies 
exists. In fact by March of last year, accommodations had been reached 
with United States authorities whereby one 3.5 Kc/s channel in each 
of the designated bands could be obtained for oceanographic use on an 
"experimental basis." 10 In turn these national authorities or "adminis­
trations" are confronted by exercises of discretion in terms of the proper 
timing, estimates of support from other nations, and the judicious 
guarding of general U.S. interests with respect to the entire r-f 
spectrum.11 
Leadership has come from other sectors as well as witnessed by the 
most recent oceanographic effort at the Aeronautical Extraordinary 
Administrative Radio Conference in Geneva during March and April 
of 1966. This conference also serves well to illustrate the close relation­
ship between international legal procedures, politics, and diplomacy, 
as well as the increased possibilities when international organizations 
are able to co-operate. The delegation from the Federal Republic of 
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Germany to the Fourth Session of the Intergovernmental Oceanographic 
Commission suggested to the ioc that its delegation to the pending ITU 
Conference this spring would be willing to give favorable consideration 
to the following proposal as an interim solution to oceanographic diffi­
culties : That one 3.5 Kc/s band from each of six bands already allocated 
to the Aeronautical Mobile Service be—not reallocated either to this 
service or to an oceanographic service—but rather, consigned to no one 
and reserved for considerations of future use in oceanography. Again 
feelings of optimism which existed in some quarters proved to be 
unjustified. Nevertheless this same approach (termed "tactically in­
genious" by at least one authority) may be taken at a future time of 
which I will speak shortly. 
Other efforts at an interim solution were made including a French 
proposal for the use of frequencies in the bands allocated to the fixed 
service in conformity with Article 9 of the Radio Regulations. Con­
siderations were also given to the latitudes expressed in Article 3, 
Section 3, wherein frequency usage is authorized " . .  . on the express 
condition that harmful interference shall not be caused to services 
carried on by stations operating in accordance with the provisions of 
the convention and of these Regulations." 
Last month, at the Sixth Meeting of the Bureau and Consultative 
Council of the ioc, this country's delegation to that meeting was asked 
if the United States would consider representing the ocean data interests 
at the Maritime Mobile Conference in 1967. This was done at the behest 
of the German delegation and with the full approval of the Bureau and 
Council. Assistance would be provided by the Republic of Germany in 
the form of a detailed report of its experiences at the Aero Mobile 
Conference this spring. Should no policy objection be interposed—and 
I am aware of none as of this date—the German experiences, and 
possibly their proposal of which I spoke earlier may be combined with 
an effective argument in favor of the intrinsic relationship between 
oceanographic and meteorological uses (as perceived in the plan for a 
World Weather Watch), and the ends sought to be met by the Maritime 
Mobile service. 
Notwithstanding the frustrations encountered in these undertakings, 
I think it is well to note that communications in oceanography can be 
considered a microcosm of one of the principal themes with which we 
are dealing here—namely the equitable disposition of a finite commodity, 
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subject to use by all, and demanding our most conscientious and 
intelligent efforts within an established legal order. 
1. Report of the First Meeting, Working Group on Communications, UNESCO/ 
IOC, Paris, 6-10 August, 1962. 
2. Richard D. Terry, of North American Aviation, served as report director 
and editor. 
3. NSIA, "Communications and Navigation," Vol. II, Ocean Engineering, 
Western Periodicals Co., 1966. 
4. Ibid., p. 23. 
5. International Telecommunications Convention, Art. 31 and Annex 3, 12 UST 
1761, TIAS 4892, 1959. 
6. Art. 4, Sec. 2. 
7. 45 Stat. 2760, TS 767, 94 LNTS 97, 1927. 
8. 63 Stat. 1399, TIAS 1901, 1947. 
9. Partial Revision of 1959 Radio Regulations, 15 UST 887, TIAS 5603, 1963. 
10. J. M. Snodgrass, "Communications Problems of the Oceanographer," Signal, 
Vol. XX, No. 2, October, 1965. 
11. E.g., mention by Snodgrass, Ibid., of ITU Admin. Council Res. 564 asking 
member administrations for their views on ocean communications for possible 
consideration at a Maritime Mobile EARC during 1966 or early 1967. 
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Chapter Fourteen: 
LAW AND THE NEW TECHNOLOGIES 
I. Introduction 
A currently favorable theme in international law is that of calling 
attention to the difficulties experienced or to be expected in adjusting 
the international decision-making process to changed conditions in the 
world social process. The recent growth in attention to science and 
technology in the development of the ocean, and the consequent concern 
of many for effective exploitation of this environment, has evoked a 
widespread interest in the law of the sea, past and future. The following 
discussion examines the interplay of some technological developments 
in ocean exploration and use with international law. For this purpose 
inquiry centers upon the continental shelf, scientific research, and 
fishery operations. 
II. The Continental Shelf 
Easily the most important technological advance affecting ocean law 
since World War II, excluding military instruments and operations, 
is the emergence and rapid spread of offshore oil exploration and 
exploitation.1 Offshore oil drilling prior to 1945 did occur on a minor 
scale, but the great expansion in this industry came thereafter and 
primarily in the past decade. The effects of this achievement upon inter­
national law (and upon domestic law) have been extensive and profound 
and major impacts are still to be experienced. In a relatively few years, 
indeed with very great speed as these matters go, states accomplished 
the task, through the media of reciprocally recognized unilateral pro­
nouncement and of explicit multilateral agreement, of allocating the 
resources of the continental shelf.2 In addition, by agreement states 
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sought to provide for the accommodation of mineral resource exploita­
tion with other important activities on the shelf or in that region. 
Despite the speed of this adjustment, however, it is instructive to note 
that some very important problems were not finally resolved and others, 
perhaps because of the alacrity of state action, were anticipated in less 
than desirable ways. 
Thus, although states were able to agree, both tacitly and by explicit 
arrangement, that the mineral resources of the shelf were to be disposed 
of by the coastal state, such agreement does not extend to specification 
of the area to be defined as the continental shelf. The Geneva Convention 
formula, incorporating the outright cession of the area within the 100 
fathom line and the contingent further incorporation of the area in 
which exploitation becomes feasible, is in practical effect a means of 
postponing decision regarding the limit upon exclusive exploitation. 
Although delegates were aware that technology could expand the area 
feasible for exploitation, it was apparently the general belief that the 
100 fathom criterion was ample for a substantial period of time. In this 
light is it worthwhile to note the preparatory document by Dr. Mouton 
which sought to provide the conference with "the latest technical in­
formation concerning the possibility of exploiting the mineral resources 
of the subsoil." 3 Although not made entirely clear, the conference could 
reasonably surmise from this document that definition of the shelf in 
terms of 100 fathoms would embrace exploration and exploitation for 
the next twenty years, i.e., until 1978.4 In terms of this projection the 
situation in 1966 is in remarkable contrast, for offshore drilling rigs 
are now working in water depths of 1000 feet, and, with certain ship 
positioning systems, drilling can be, and has been, carried out in 12,000 
feet depths.5 Moreover, exploitation, the actual production of oil or gas, 
is reportedly feasible, if not yet economical, at 1,000 foot depths. The 
observation that the situation just described prevails within eight years 
of the Geneva Conference and only two years after the Shelf Convention 
came into force provides ample illustration of the problem of anticipating 
the pace of technological and economic change. 
Moreover, other impending changes in conditions of access to the 
deep ocean floor could portend even greater difficulty arising from the 
definition of the shelf in the 1958 Convention. Although evidence of 
serious commercial interest is not easy to come by, there is no doubt 
of a growing interest in the exploitation of hard minerals on the deep 
ocean bed.6 Here, too, the Geneva conferees were, understandably, 
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without sure guidance, for in the same preparatory document noted 
above it was asserted that this form of exploitation need not be taken 
into account for boundary purposes because either the concentration of 
minerals was too insubstantial to warrant exploitation, or mining was 
not commercially feasible when sufficient quantities did exist.7 Despite 
this fact, and despite other evidence that the conference did not conceive 
of the ocean mining problem, many believe that the Shelf Convention 
prescribes for the division of the sea bed underlying entire oceans.8 
In considering the provisions of the Shelf Convention aimed at the 
accommodation of mineral exploration and exploitation with other uses 
of the ocean, more stringent commentary is warranted. Here, too, as 
with the boundary problem, the strategy adopted was, at least for 
navigation, fishing and conservation, that of leaving the problem for 
subsequent resolution. The prescription of Article 5(1) that there must 
be no "unjustifiable interference" with these activities is, as others have 
observed, so general that the details of accommodation in specific con­
texts must now be worked out on an ad hoc basis, with little, if any, 
authoritative guidance from the convention.9 Perhaps the uncertainties 
then felt about future developments and about the many and varied 
concrete circumstances to arise made this appear to be the only appro­
priate alternative. But in view of the rapidity with which intensive 
offshore oil exploration and exploitation are evolving, threatening (and 
already imposing in certain instances) interference with valuable fishing 
and shipping operations, more determined effort at general guidance 
would have been highly desirable. 
If uncertainty about the future explains the reluctance to cope with 
this problem, it is even more difficult than otherwise to understand, 
much less appreciate, the lack of temerity displayed by the framers of 
the Shelf Convention in disposing of the problem of scientific research 
in the shelf region. For in this instance there was no discernible tendency 
to postpone consideration to the future. This attitude would not matter, 
of course, if the provisions adopted offered satisfactory protection to 
research activities in the shelf area, but there appears to be reason to 
doubt that this was achieved. 
In seeming contrast to the qualified protection afforded the other 
activities on the shelf, the convention provides that there must be no 
interference with "fundamental oceanographic or other research carried 
out with the intention of open publication." The stated purpose of this 
provision was to permit the conduct of research without obstruction by 
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coastal states. At the same time, however, Article 5(8) requires the 
consent of the coastal state "in respect of any research concerning the 
shelf and undertaken there," and also declares that this consent shall 
not normally be withheld "if the request is submitted by a qualified 
institution with a view to purely scientific research into the physical or 
biological characteristics of the shelf, subject to the proviso that the 
coastal state shall have the right if it so desires, to participate or be 
represented in the research, and that in any event the results shall be 
published." 
To the extent that careful reading of a rather jumbled, and certainly 
summary, record of debate can be expected to disclose meaningful 
interpretative data, and surely caution is advisable in reaching con­
clusions from such examination, these provisions are to be construed 
harmoniously by confining the consent requirement to research into 
the shelf as an operation which is wholly distinguishable from research 
into the waters above. While it may be true, and this judgment is left 
to those qualified to make it, that this distinction can sometimes be 
made, it seems also distinctly possible that no such line can easily or 
conveniently or usefully be drawn on many occasions. This means, to 
be clear about it, both that research into the waters above may neces­
sarily require research into the shelf below and that the reverse is 
true.10 Hence, the requirement of consent might be far more extensive, 
in this interpretation, than the intended distinction suggests. Further­
more, assuming the two types of research are distinguishable, the con­
vention is far from requiring the coastal consent envisaged. Even if 
the institution seeking consent is fully "qualified" and pursues "purely 
scientific research" into the specified characteristics of the shelf, the 
coastal state need not grant the request. There is little of an imperative 
nature in the injunction that it should "normally" not withhold the 
consent. The failure to provide criteria for what is and is not "normal" 
could, in the absence of continued attempt at clarification, result in 
repetitive deference to arbitrary unilateral decisions. 
Furthermore, it should be evident that this article contains an ample 
number of vaguely specified conditions that enable, whatever the facts 
may be, a reasonably imaginative government official to support the 
contention that the request does not qualify for the "normal" consent. 
It does not require an enlarged creative capacity to perceive the various 
themes that can be played about the terms "qualified institution," 
"purely scientific research," and so forth. 
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To be sure the coastal state is authorized to require agreement to 
certain protective measures and this, it was hoped, would minimize the 
possibility that consent would not be forthcoming. But perhaps the 
realism of these opportunities for protection can be questioned. If the 
richest nation in the world finds difficulty in producing adequately 
trained oceanographers, it is at least conceivable that many far less 
well-endowed states find relatively cold comfort in the opportunity to 
participate in the scientific research in question. Either persons with 
the necessary talent are lacking altogether or, if theoretically available, 
are engaged in work more directly related to the coastal states' own 
interests. If there is apprehension about the research involved, but 
still a genuine desire to co-operate, it may be impossible to divert the 
necessary skilled people to the operations concerned. Finally, the publi­
cation requirement might ring a little hollow if the interval between 
research and publication becomes elongated, as there might be good 
reason to expect. The problems of data collection, analysis, and dis­
semination have their own demands and these may require many months 
and years for processing and publication. 
All these horrible imaginings are merely irrelevant if states do not 
seek to invoke the requirements of the convention to obstruct research. 
Solid evidence of difficulties in obtaining consent, under conditions in 
which it might be expected, has not been discovered, but some incidents 
are known to have occurred in which consent has been refused out­
right.11 Given the fluid and uncertain character of relations between 
states it would seem reasonable to speculate that more than a few such 
occasions arise or will do so. Apart from the possible refusal of clearance 
for a particular research undertaking, the additional administrative 
and diplomatic problems imposed by the procedure for securing consent 
are undesirable additions to the already ample burdens of scientists. 
In any event, since the Shelf Convention is in effect, and since even 
states not parties to it may claim that consent for shelf research must be 
obtained,12 the problem is how to minimize the interference with 
legitimate research efforts. In view of the critical nature, for many 
purposes, of research into the ocean environment in shelf regions (which 
are, it is worth reiteration, not well defined for some legal purposes), 
and especially considering the interdependency between the "parts" of 
the ocean, any trend toward excessive coastal intrusion into legitimate 
scientific research warrants grave concern on the part of all affected, 
including government officials with responsibility in this field. The 
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pertinent provisions of the convention are phrased in very general terms 
and questionable applications of them to the detriment of research merit 
every feasible effort in response to assure reasonable interpretations 
which do not threaten closure of important areas to scientists. At present 
levels of research activity, isolated refusals of consent to research may 
not inflict consequential harm beyond the immediate project, but if, as 
seems likely, the scientific study of the ocean environment is to intensify 
further, refusals could become more frequent and more damaging to the 
general interest in knowledge of the sea. 
Focus upon potential difficulties arising from the Continental Shelf 
Convention should not obscure the need for an equivalent concern about 
the extension of coastal state controls over shelf installations and 
activities based on alleged general principles of international law, for 
it is quite probable that recent developments in this direction could 
impose undesirable restraints on ocean research and development. The 
recent developments mentioned consist of the promulgation in December, 
1964, of the North Seas Installations Act by the Netherlands. A recent 
study of this legislation, and the events leading to it, assures us that 
this enactment is not based upon the Continental Shelf Convention 
and that 
There is . .  . every reason to conclude that the action taken was based 
upon a new rule of international law, which may be summarized as being that 
a coastal state may exercise jurisdiction over all installations erected on the 
soil of its continental shelf, no matter for what purpose.13 
The authors of this study, Drs. van Panhuys and van Emde Boas of 
the University of Leyden, confidently predict that "there is no likeli­
hood" that "the future practice of states might lead to a rejection of 
the (alleged) new rule." 14 
If this prediction is borne out it does not seem to take any great 
prescience to anticipate grave difficulties in gaining access to, and 
making effective use of, the ocean regions of the continental shelf 
adjacent to many states. To support this statement it is necessary to 
describe and to assess the provisions of this legislation and the legal 
theories underlying it. 
The genesis of the Netherlands Act consists of the construction and 
operation of a radio and television station outside the territorial sea but 
on the continental shelf adjacent to the Netherlands.15 The station was 
designed to, and did, transmit programs into the Netherlands, apparently 
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in violation of Netherlands law which establishes a monopoly over broad­
casting in five broadcasting associations, each of which, it is said, 
"represents an important religious or political faction of the popu­
lation." 16 Although it was a purpose of the North Sea Installations 
Act to provide domestic authority for dealing with the radio and tele­
vision station, the government explicitly sought to accomplish a much 
broader purpose, namely that of regulating any and all shelf installa­
tions no matter who emplaces them and whatever the purpose sought. 
Since the Shelf Convention is concerned only with installations for 
resource exploitation, it was felt necessary to base the legislation on 
supposed principles of general international law. The language of the 
North Sea Installations Act, including even its title, was chosen so as 
to avoid reliance upon the Continental Shelf Convention. The act in 
its entirety appears as follows:17 
Whereas We have deemed it desirable to make provision for the protection 
of legal interests in respect of installations on the bed of that part of the 
North Sea the boundaries of which correspond with those of that portion of 
the continental shelf which appertains to the Netherlands, until such time as 
the matter is regulated by international agreement; 
So We, having heard the views of the Council of State and with the advice 
and consent of the States-General, have approved and understood, and do 
approve and understand, the following: 
Section 1. In this Act the term "sea installation" shall mean an installation 
erected outside territorial waters on the bed of that part of the North Sea 
the boundaries of which correspond with that portion of the continental shelf 
which appertains to the Netherlands. 
Section 2. The criminal law of the Netherlands shall apply to all such 
persons as commit any offense on a sea installation. 
Section 3. Provision may be made by Order in Council that any provisions 
of the statutory law of the Netherlands shall apply on and with respect to sea 
installations. 
Section 4. Provision may be made by Order in Council for the extension 
to sea installations of the jurisdiction of authorities and officials entrusted with 
the implementation of the provisions referred to in Section 3 above, or with 
the investigation and prosecution of offenses or with the bringing to trial of 
those responsible or with the execution of any sentences that may be passed 
by any court. 
Section 5. Provision may be made by Order in Council that the criminal 
law of the Netherlands and such statutory provisions as are referred to in 
Section 3 shall not apply to such sea installations as are described in such 
Order in Council or shall apply to such installations only to a limited extent. 
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Section 6. If, within three months of the coming into force of an Order 
in Council, issued in terms of Section 3 or Section 5 above, We have not had 
a bill laid before the States-General to replace such Order in Council, or if 
such bill is withdrawn or defeated, We shall without delay repeal such Order 
in Council. 
Section 7. Regulations may be made by Order in Council in respect of 
installations erected or to be erected outside territorial waters on the bed of 
that part of the North Sea referred to in Section 1, in the interests of shipping, 
the fishing industry, the conservation of the living resources of the sea, pure 
scientific research, the laying and maintenance of submarine cables and pipe­
lines, and the prevention of the pollution of the sea, as well as for the pro­
tection of such other interests as are recognized by international law. 
Section 8. Any contravention of regulations made under Section 7 shall be 
punishable by a fine not exceeding ten thousand guilders. Such contravention 
shall be considered to be an "overtreding" [corresponding to the French 
contravention, i.e., a minor infringement of the criminal law]. 
Section 9. This Act may be cited as the "North Sea Installations Act." 
Section 10. This Act shall come into force on the first day following the 
date of its publication in the Official Gazette. 
Be it ordered that the above be published in the Official Gazette and that 
all government departments, authorities and officials concerned do conscientiously 
enforce it. 
Given at Our Palace of Soestdijk, this third day of December 1964. 
JULIANA 
The immediate occasion for this legislation, the closure of Radio 
and TV Noordzee, appears to provide ample basis for some coastal 
action, and it may turn out that this legislation will have little impact 
upon legitimate activities offshore the Netherlands. However, the blanket 
provision for the extension of national law to any installation on the 
shelf could, both in this case and in others involving governments less 
concerned for free access to, and use of, the ocean floor than the Nether­
lands, be employed to inhibit and even prevent efficient use of this area. 
Certainly there would seem to be little doubt that legislation so broadly 
conceived and phrased would permit the extension of any provision 
national decision-makers chose to adopt, without regard to effects upon 
the use of the area. Nothing in this legislation suggests standards or 
criteria for determining what laws should extend to offshore installa­
tions, and it seems to me rather obvious that officials in some states 
could, pursuant to identical legislation, harass and perhaps completely 
frustrate legitimate scientific or other operations in the adjacent shelf 
region. 
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There appears to be no doubt, of course, that some installations, 
such as the radio-television operation offshore the Netherlands, can 
have undesirable impacts within a coastal state and that coastal officials 
should be competent to prescribe and apply local policies to such installa­
tions and activities. However this may be, it does not at all lend support 
to the far-reaching claim underlying the Dutch legislation that all 
installations are subject to the legislation of the adjacent coastal state. 
At least it would seem that the coastal state has the heavy burden of 
demonstrating that because certain installations may have detrimental 
effects upon the coastal social order it is therefore necessary to assert 
authority to extend unilateral controls over any and all such activities 
in the area. The problem of reconciling the interests involved would 
seem to require more sophisticated and selective treatment than that. 
Insofar as I am able to judge, the legal justification offered by the 
Netherlands in support of this legislation falls far short of discharging 
this burden. 
As described by Drs. van Panhuys and van Emde Boas the Nether­
lands relies on a "legal vacuum theory," the protection of legal interests, 
and the notion of contiguity.18 The "legal vacuum" theory assumes that 
there is no authority over shelf installations and activities thereon unless 
it is that of the adjacent coastal state. The protection of legal interests 
also justifies the exercise of jurisdiction on the high seas, the interests 
being those of the acting state or of the international community. Finally, 
and supposedly supplementary, the notion of contiguity is invoked to 
identify the adjacent state as the one to fill the vacuum and protect 
certain interests. It is upon highly legalistic, and in part unsound, 
reasoning of this type that the Netherlands now proposes to control 
all installations on the adjacent shelf. Only the second theory mentioned 
appears to have any real substance since it is obviously true that 
protection of certain interests warrants the exercise of "jurisdiction" on 
the high seas. However the key word here is "certain" since it is not 
assumed, and certainly need not be, that coastal state interests are always 
detrimentally affected by offshore installations. The other theories smack 
of convenience and expediency and in any event neither stretches far 
enough to provide a firm foundation for the Dutch legislation. 
These general comments may be given more precise focus by 
examining certain more specific potential (or actual) legal problems of 
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research into the ocean. The following remarks are concerned with the 
employment of fixed oceanographic stations, especially buoys, practices 
in geological and archeological investigations, and prospective develop­
ments in marine geodesy. 
III. Scientific Research 
Actual and anticipated use of ocean buoys, and of other devices under 
the general heading of fixed oceanographic stations, suggests a great 
many legal problems only some of which can be mentioned here.19 
Questions of jurisdiction and substantive issues of liability for accidental 
damage to ships and to the buoys call for study in terms of admiralty 
law principles which is beyond the scope of this discussion. It suffices 
to say that this could be a task of very considerable dimensions which 
merits the creative energies of students of admiralty law. 
The major issues for purposes of this discussion involve the areas 
in which research buoys may be used as a matter of right. In 1962 a 
joint "preliminary report" to the Inter-governmental Oceanographic 
Commission from the UNESCO-IMCO Secretariats made the suggestion 
that "freedom of research" on the high seas should be recognized as 
explicitly as other rights of use of the high seas, such as navigation 
and fishing, and that such right of research extended to the use of buoys 
for scientific purposes.20 Whether or not the "freedom of research" is 
expressly regarded as a component of freedom of the seas is not as 
significant as the fact that in practice scientific investigation is a fully 
established right in the use of the ocean. So far as can be discovered 
no state has ever asserted any authority to interfere with or prohibit 
scientific research, except when such authority purportedly derived from 
international agreement and then only for a certain type of research. 
Insofar, therefore, as an area is considered as part of the "high seas," 
i.e., beyond the territorial sea of any state, there is a right under 
customary international law to emplace buoys, subject to the reasonable 
requirements of safety of navigation. Moreover, it is not at all necessary 
to rely only upon customary international law for support of "freedom 
of research" as one of the protected aspects of freedom of the seas. 
Article 2 of the Convention on the High Seas expressly states that 
there are freedoms other than the four enumerated in the article and 
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it may be recalled that in its comment appended to the corresponding 
draft article the International Law Commission declared that the freedom 
to engage in scientific research was one of the freedoms of the seas.21 
If this were all that was involved, problems would be minimal. 
Unfortunately, as mentioned above, the Convention on the Continental 
Shelf not only contains a provision seeking to preserve the superjacent 
waters as part of the high seas, but also authorizes the coastal state 
to prohibit, by withholding consent, certain research in the shelf area. 
Does such authority include the power to prohibit the use of scientific 
research buoys by any state or group other than the coastal state? In 
view of the purpose sought by Article 5(8) of the convention the answer 
seems to me to be that the coastal state would very seldom, if ever, 
have any such authority. The purpose of Article 5(8) apparently was 
to prevent the surreptitious exploration of the shelf for commercial 
purposes under the guise of scientific research for advancing knowledge. 
Unless buoys can be made to serve as exploration devices in a con­
sequential manner the conclusion should be that the coastal state has 
no authority over them. More explicitly, coastal authority extends only 
to research "concerning the continental shelf and undertaken there" 
and if buoys are used only for other research, as into water charac­
teristics, the coastal state would be without any competence whatsoever.22 
Emplacement of buoys as part of a meteorological network would thus 
appear to be beyond any control of the coastal state. 
The territorial sea is another area within which coastal states might 
claim control over emplacement of buoys by a foreign state or group. 
The joint UNESCO-IMCO Report concludes that the coastal state has 
complete authority over research buoys in the territorial sea. Relying 
primarily upon Article 1(1) of the Convention on the Territorial Sea, 
which provides that state sovereignty extends to the territorial sea, the 
report states: 
From the foregoing basic rules, it would seem that the following tentative 
conclusions may be suggested as respects the territorial and internal waters. 
1.	 The coastal state may exercise its sovereign rights in governing the use 
of oceanographic research buoys. 
2.	 The coastal state may freely permit or deny permission to employ such 
devices. 
3.	 The coastal state may interpose such restrictions, limitations or regulations 
as it deems fit on the placement, purpose or use of oceanographic buoys, 
subject to the safety rules discussed herein. 
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4.	 No one may claim an absolute international right to place oceanographic 
buoys in the internal or territorial waters of any state without the express 
or implied permission of the government of that state.23 
These conclusions, though tentative, deserve serious consideration and 
constructive criticism. One may assume that on occasion it is desirable 
or even essential to place buoys within the territorial sea for legitimate 
scientific purpose, but nothing inherent in the notion of the territorial 
sea dictates the conclusions reached in the UNESCO-IMCO Report. The 
reference to "sovereignty" over the territorial sea in Article 1(1) of 
the Convention, if considered in isolation and without consideration of 
other factors, certainly does suggest that a very comprehensive coastal 
control over buoys is contemplated by present international law, but 
there are other factors to be weighed that might put the matter in a 
different perspective. 
The legal regime of the territorial sea is not weighted completely in 
deference to the coastal state and, in fact, certain provisions of the 
Convention on the Territorial Sea seek to accommodate the general 
community interest in freedom of use of the ocean. Thus the provisions 
for a right of innocent passage for foreign vessels, according to which 
these vessels have a right of access to the territorial sea under certain 
conditions, are an attempt to reconcile the coastal interest in self-
protection with the wider community's interest in making efficient use 
of the sea for transportation. In this instance the "sovereignty" of the 
coastal state does not mean that the coastal state may "freely" prohibit 
passage by foreign vessels. 
When these basic policies are considered in this new and different 
context it seems wholly reasonable to seek to make a similar accommo­
dation. The problem here is to evolve an arrangement which preserves 
in substantial measure the exercise of the freedom to engage in scientific 
research by means of buoy technology and at the same time permits 
the coastal state to exercise sufficient authority to protect its legitimate 
interests. The assumption underlying this approach is that for purposes 
of research the ocean cannot be fragmented by political boundaries 
anymore than it can be for making effective use of it for transportation, 
and that freedom of research ought, therefore, to be accorded protection 
from unwarranted interference within territorial waters in a fashion 
similar to that accorded transportation. Because of possible hazards 
to navigation the coastal state obviously must exercise some regulatory 
authority, such as specifying reasonable requirements for location, 
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lighting, marking and communications. But this authority need not be 
conceived or expressed in terms of an absolute discretion to forbid buoy 
emplacement nor need the regulatory authority be exercised to have 
that effect in practice. 
Under this proposal it would probably be necessary to require notifi­
cation by the sponsoring agency to the coastal state concerned so that 
the above problems could be appropriately resolved. Such notification 
would properly include information on the characteristics of the buoy 
and associated equipment. Assurance of a right to emplace the buoy 
might be achieved by requiring reply, specifying reasonable conditions 
of access, by the coastal state within a specified period. 
This problem, if in fact it is one, suggests the more general observa­
tion that previous experience in the law of the sea was limited almost 
entirely to manned vehicles and that considerable care should be taken 
in drawing upon this experience for use in the context of unmanned 
objects. What seems to be necessary in this situation, as it always is 
when new issues emerge, is to place the emphasis upon all of the 
fundamental policies involved and not upon the details of specific 
prescriptions. 
The surprising scope of the potential legal problems involved in 
oceanic research may be further illustrated by the employment of 
"photographic" sonar for archeological research in submarine areas 
and for geological research for purely scientific purposes.24 The reason 
a question, and potential problem, arise is that this device is reported 
to be useful, and has been used, for oil exploration. A coastal state 
might, therefore, seek to impose a requirement of consent for operation 
of this equipment in the shelf area, even if it is employed for archeolog­
ical or non-commercial geological purposes. Such a condition might be 
regarded as falling within the scope of coastal authority granted in 
Article 5(8) of the Shelf Convention which calls for consent to "any 
research concerning the shelf and undertaken there." In such a determi­
nation it seems obviously relevant that photographic sonar is a multi­
purpose device, one purpose of which relates directly to the "sovereign 
rights" of the coastal state in exploration for natural resources. On the 
other hand, despite the breadth of the convention reference to research, 
it is doubtful that archeological investigation was regarded at the time 
as one of the critical activities for which consent should be sought. 
Since the convention contemplates that "purely scientific research into 
the physical or biological characteristics" of the shelf would normally 
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receive consent, such activity as historical research, which is not even 
directed at these aspects of the shelf, would probably have been regarded 
as beyond even the need for a request for consent. Unfortunately, what­
ever the intent of the framers, the development of devices useful for 
varying purposes, including one unrelated to the coastal interest in the 
resources of the shelf and one directly related, suggests a legitimate 
concern by the coastal state warranting the application of Article 5(8). 
If, however, proper safeguards can be established to assure the use of 
the equipment for archeological or non-commercial geological purposes, 
then refusal to consent for such inquiry appears to be an unreasonable 
application of Article 5(8). Ample protection of coastal interests could 
be secured by observance of these safeguards coupled with the presence 
of coastal representatives. 
Another potential problem, in some ways similar to those just dis­
cussed, is suggested by recommendations for the establishment of a 
world-wide marine geodetic system. This network would involve the 
permanent emplacement of equipment on the ocean floor for locating 
and identifying bench marks useful for a variety of purposes. A recent 
report by Mr. George Mourad of Battelle Memorial Institute sum­
marizes the advantages of this system as follows: 
Among the activities that would benefit from an ocean geodetic grid system 
are spacecraft recovery, ocean engineering, open ocean tide measurement, 
calibration of inertial and electronic navigational systems, and seismic and 
magnetic mapping. Surface and underwater highways could be established on 
the basis of such a system. Surveying of ocean farming and mining areas 
would also be facilitated. The grid system could also be used as a basis for an 
ocean meteorological network of weather observing stations.25 
In general the kinds of legal issues raised by the proposed network 
could include rights of access to particular areas or submarine regions, 
the accommodation of the system, or units of it, with other activities 
that might involve conflicts in use, and the allocation of competence 
to prescribe and to apply prescriptions regarding liability for damage.26 
The degree to which these issues will emerge as real problems depends, 
among other things, upon the characteristics of the system in terms of 
the numbers, size and distribution of the equipment required. For 
example, if the United States establishes a system only in regions 
adjacent to the United States, the potential problems may be fewer 
than if this country sought to create a regional or hemispheric or 
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larger network. Additionally the exact kind of equipment involved 
would appear to be an important factor. The range in size of individual 
installations might effect the kind of accommodation necessary with 
other uses. Relatively small units would probably fit in better with 
other uses than huge installations. The type of communications system 
employed could be important for assimilation with other systems. The 
number of bench marks required, which might vary according to the 
purposes served, obviously has a bearing on the need for access to 
particular areas. 
Finally, the degree to which a marine geodetic system, emplaced on 
a global basis, serves widely shared interests would seem very significant 
in determining the likelihood of legal controversy. The impressive 
catalogue of beneficial uses, quoted above, suggests that there may be 
a genuine common interest among most states in provision of the net­
work. But at the same time the interests served most obviously are 
those with the most sophisticated techniques in ocean development and 
use, a group of very few states. Moreover, if the major advantage, or 
consequential gain, accrues to the military, the chances may be greater 
that particular states would object to emplacement of units in the 
system in "their" adjacent coastal regions. 
IV. Fishery Operations 
Recent experience with the world fishing industry indicates that 
technological change not only creates problems but also occasionally 
provides the favorable climate for resolving them. Since World War II 
rapid and extensive technological developments in fishing, in all aspects, 
have had substantial repercussions upon the law of the sea. Improve­
ment in boat design, engines, and gear, and innovations in fishing and 
processing practices, increasingly permit the industry generally, but 
more noticeably in a few states, to extend operations throughout the 
entire world ocean. The impact of this more widespread, as well as 
intensive, activity and of the more sophisticated fishing techniques 
employed is reflected in the numerous, now familiar, demands for 
changes in, and additions to, the structure of international legal prescrip­
tions. Accompanying these demands, and in major part inspired by 
them, are critical commentaries by observers, including social scientists, 
lawyers, and fishery policy-makers, also calling for reappraisal and 
change. 
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In appraisal of the events of the past twenty years it seems apparent 
that the course of change is steadily demanding far more sophisticated 
institutional arrangements than have been envisaged by those responsible 
for decision. The first demands to reflect the perceived pressure of 
distant water fleets upon local fishing operations began to impinge 
upon the international legal process soon after World War II. The most 
consequential initial response, which as we can now see presaged more 
far-reaching decisions, came from the most unlikely place, the Interna­
tional Court of Justice in its decision in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries 
Case in 1951. Although the roots of the dispute there involved went 
back for many years, as early as the first two decades in this century, 
the significance of this case extends far beyond the issues immediately 
at stake. For while this decision resolved a relatively localized dispute, 
it has been generalized in subsequent widespread agreement to extend, 
at least colorably, to numerous other situations around the world. 
Moreover, more importantly, the outcome of that case not only 
indicated that the legal structure was sufficiently flexible, or could be 
made to be, to protect local fishing interests against more dynamic 
foreign competitors in a specific situation, but also helped provide the 
impetus for further and different methods to protect such interests. For 
even as the Fisheries case was moving through the litigation process, 
the impact of changes in fisheries practices began to be evident in a 
variety of places around the world. In moves which were also destined 
to provoke changes in the legal structure, if in less drastic ways than 
demanded, Iceland and the Latin American states began the agitation 
for enlarged exclusive fishing areas, an agitation that has been pursued 
unilaterally and multilaterally with mounting intensity in the past fifteen 
years. Again the legal structure has been affected, the first indications 
appearing unmistakably in the Geneva conferences of 1958 and 1960, 
and the change is now rapidly approaching, if it has not already 
achieved, the status of new principles of international law in the form 
of acceptance of the exclusive fishing zone of moderate width as part 
of that law.27 
Two major conditions are prominent in shaping those decisions. First, 
military considerations have been most influential in diverting the 
demand for change from enlargement of the territorial sea to expansion 
of exclusive fishing areas beyond a more or less, although not completely, 
static territorial sea.28 Secondly, and of comparable but not as great 
influence, the technological changes in the industry which first led to 
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the claims to exclusive fishing areas have opened the way to their 
recognition. This too became apparent at Geneva in 1960 when in 
desperate effort to secure agreement the United States and Canada 
urged their six-plus-six plus modified historic rights proposal. The 
notable point about this, for present purposes, is that the full impact 
of the six mile exclusive fishing zone was to be postponed for ten 
years, hopefully providing time for the industry to adopt its practices 
in ways that would lessen the impact of the larger exclusive fishing 
area. Whether or not ten years were required for the transition, and 
whether there was any great need for a transition period, the belief 
apparently was that the pace of change in the industry was adequate 
to compensate for losses supposedly to follow from the exclusionary 
effects of the new policy. In the five years since, there is some evidence 
suggesting that improvements in the industry may continue to have 
pronounced effects upon the willingness of states to accept exclusive 
fishing zones. The European Fisheries Convention adopted in 1964 
provides for a limited transitional arrangement relating to part of the 
exclusive fishing zone there established, although for most of the zone 
it seeks to maintain certain "historic rights" seemingly for the life of 
the convention.29 
If, however, the fishing industry is, by reason of technological im­
provements, generally able to withstand the modestly enlarged exclu­
sive fishing zones now being established rather commonly around the 
world, and thus assists in alleviating the political controversy which 
attend nation-state differences on this matter, it does not at all follow that 
further conflict is not to be expected. It is unwise to accept for one 
moment the notion that all the exotic gear and futuristic practices that 
are apparently on their way to becoming standard in the fishing industry 
will cause fishery conflicts to disappear. Indeed it seems more likely 
that worse problems may have to be confronted than thus far experi­
enced. These problems will probably involve, first, vastly enlarged 
demands for exclusive fishing areas and, second, conflicting demands 
for allocating scarce resources beyond exclusive fishing areas. 
The reason for anticipating that states will seek even more expanded 
exclusive fishing zones rests on the assumption that the supposed gain 
or protection from the present exclusive fishing zones will not be realized 
or, if some gain is realized, that there will still be the urge to enlarge 
it by extending the exclusive fishing zone even further out to sea. It 
seems none too soon to anticipate this possibility despite the recent 
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comment by Christy and Scott that this form of recognizing the supposed 
"special interest" of coastal states has "very little relevance to the 
principles by which the high seas might be governed." 30 If the word 
"might" here is understood as "ought," this is a cogent statement 
(though in contradiction to later statements) ; but if it is intended to 
indicate the shape of the future, perhaps doubts can be entertained. 
The question is, for present purposes, what will be left as "high seas" 
for fisheries purposes if states continue to expand, and make effective, 
exclusive fishing limits. 
If, one inquires, further expansion were contemplated by particular 
states, what limit would be adopted? The answer, and it does have 
relevance in my opinion if one is concerned about economic efficiency 
in allocation of fishery resources, is that states would look to the fishery 
resources of the continental shelf. Some states already have made such 
choices, of course, and we are assured by so eminent a participant and 
observer as Dr. Wilbert M. Chapman that a proposal of this kind to an 
international conference would receive the support of the majority of 
states in attendance.31 In addition, as is well-known, within the United 
States there is strong sentiment in some quarters for just this arrange­
ment.32 It perhaps lends little enchantment to this prospect to recall 
that the "continental shelf," as defined for purposes of the convention 
thereon, can extend beyond the geological conception of the shelf. 
Even if this projection proves inaccurate, and the current, relatively 
modest, exclusive fishing areas satisfy coastal states, the increased tech­
nological efficiency of the industry coupled with increasing demand for 
fishery products will probably require the creation, alluded to above, 
of far more sophisticated arrangements in allocating the yield to be 
obtained. The point is that if technology facilitates acceptance of limited 
exclusive fishing areas, so that fleets may operate in the deeper waters 
more distant from the coast in many parts of the world, it will also 
place greater pressure on high seas resources and the need will then 
have to be faced of creating institutional mechanisms, policies, and 
procedures for determining the level of exploitation efforts and allocating 
the yield. 
V. Conclusion 
These brief remarks, and extensions that could be made of them, 
do no more than emphasize again the need for more conscious, con­
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tinuing efforts in provision of a legal framework within which effective 
ocean exploitation can be pursued to the common advantage. Although 
there is an evident need for establishing international institutions, 
endowed with adequate authority, policies, and procedures for coping 
with a rapidly changing situation, it would be a mistake to attempt to 
place too much confidence in the capacity of the international political 
system to respond to the new demands. This does not mean that progress 
in creating new international institutions, and improving those already 
operative, is beyond achievement, but it does mean that recommendations 
for improvement should take careful account of the many social, political, 
economic, and military factors that will very likely shape international 
decisions in this matter. Perhaps there is no need to state that no such 
accounting is attempted in this paper. 
However, it may be desirable in this connection to make brief 
appraisal of one recent proposal for a new international institution. The 
Commission to Study the Organization of Peace in its Seventeenth 
Report, published in May, 1966, recommends that title to the entire 
ocean (beyond a twelve mile limit for fish and a specifically defined 
continental shelf for minerals) "be vested in the international community 
through its agency, the United Nations."33 The reasons offered in 
support of this are: the avoidance of controversy arising from com­
peting claims, the assurance of the "economically effective use" of ocean 
resources, the prevention of military uses, the avoidance of contamination 
from various sources, the more equitable allocation of profits from ocean 
exploitation, and the provision of an independent income for the United 
Nations. In implementation of this "title" the Commission recommends 
the establishment of a UN Marine Resources Agency with the following 
functions and duties: 
It should control and administer international marine resources; hold 
ownership rights; and grant, lease or use these rights in accordance with the 
principles of economic efficiency. It should function with the independence and 
efficiency of the International Bank. However, it should distribute the returns 
in accordance with directives issued by the United Nations General Assembly. 
Such an agency would present a viable alternative to the anarchy that now 
prevails and it would, therefore, be in the legitimate interest of most nations 
to encourage and support the UN Marine Resources Agency.34 
With deference to the members of the eminent group sponsoring this 
proposal, it appears to me to suffer the common malady of attempting 
222 
LAW AND THE NEW TECHNOLOGIES 
to divorce the treatment of a complex problem from the social and 
political environment which affects it and which accounts for its diffi­
culty. No doubt many will willingly concede the wisdom of the long-
range objective of complete internationalization of the better part of 
the ocean by means of organized management, control, and even opera­
tion, but, unfortunately, the bare recommendation of this objective 
hardly advances the prospect of achieving it. Serious recommendations 
of this sort would gain far greater influence if accompanied both by 
acknowledgment of the obstacles which must be surmounted and by 
suggested strategies by which the campaign can be conducted. Here, as 
in many areas of international relations, we are far less in need of blue­
prints for Utopia than of immediate guidance in influencing the social, 
and especially decision, processes which must be affected enroute to the 
goal. In this specific connection, for example, the commission's report 
can be searched in vain for acknowledgment of one obstacle that seems 
perfectly apparent, namely that the proposed UN Marine Resources 
Agency has very little, if any, chance of birth unless the General Assem­
bly is itself reconstituted so that its decision-making processes, especially 
those disposing of the new source of wealth to be placed in its control, 
more faithfully reflect the present distribution of power, wealth, and 
skill among the members. Elsewhere in its report the Commission 
acknowledges the need for this revision, but this particular substantive 
recommendation regarding the ocean apparently is intended to stand 
by itself. 
Other, more specific, factors inhibiting the prospect of establishing 
an agency with this scope of authority and responsibility can be cited. 
The report rather casually recommends that military activities in the 
deep sea and sea bed be prohibited by the General Assembly. This seems 
to be what is intended by the cryptic reference to prevention of military 
use as a reason for a General Assembly declaration of "international 
title" to ocean areas and by another recommendation "that the General 
Assembly should declare that the deep sea and the sea bed must not 
be used by nations as an environment in which to install or operate 
weapons, or for purposes intended to further research on potential 
weapons or their development." If this idea is understood correctly, and 
unless the Commission is in possession of some special information 
unavailable to this writer, it seems difficult to conceive of a proposition 
more suitably designed to insure the most vigorous and powerful opposi­
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tion to this method of internationalizing the ocean. The effect of this 
recommendation appears to be to intertwine, probably to share the 
same fate, a far-reaching proposal for partial disarmament of the major 
powers with one for international control and management of the ocean. 
I am indebted to Professor McDougal for what appears to be an appro­
priate comment on this: to snap at a gnat it isn't necessary to swallow 
an elephant. The problems of ocean exploitation are no doubt more 
faithfully depicted than by characterization as a gnat, but surely there 
are ways to make progress in their resolution without calling for 
simultaneous settlement of the gargantuan puzzle of disarmament. 
Quite apart from the strategic error in inviting the opposition of the 
most powerful states of the world, since both the U.S. and the Soviet 
Union are deeply committed to ocean weapons systems, the suggested 
prohibition of military activity hardly seems to be a necessary conse­
quence of organized international exploitation of the ocean, and in fact 
the commission does not make such a bald suggestion. Indeed a close 
scrutiny of the Commission's Report fails to disclose any unique stated 
reason for preventing military use of the "deep sea and sea bed." In 
September, 1966, the supplementary papers, on which the report is 
based, are to be published, and this may shed light upon this aspect of 
the report. In the meantime, there are no a priori reasons in evidence 
which justify singling out the "deep sea and sea bed" as prohibited 
areas for military activities or for research on "potential weapons or 
their development." The supposed Antarctic analogy, citing the 1959 
agreement that Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes only, will 
not stand even cursory examination. It is one thing to prohibit military 
activities in an area of the most minimal strategic significance; it is 
far different to contemplate such an agreement regarding the ocean, 
an area which has been, and is extremely likely to continue to be, of 
the highest concern to national defense. 
One final comment concerns the frequent references in the Report 
to the desiderata of economic efficiency in exploitation of ocean resources. 
The assumption is made that the proposed Marine Resources Agency 
is the institutional modality by which this goal can be attained. Perhaps 
in the long run this is so, but the minimal effort now devoted to inquiry 
into economic criteria for the exploitation of fishery resources suggests 
that present prospects for successful international administration of the 
high seas fisheries of the entire ocean are dim to say the least. Although 
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unified management schemes are desirable, a more productive approach 
would probably entail less comprehensive management efforts, aimed at 
regional groupings rather than a universal system. 
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Discussion of Harlow, Sullivan, and Burke 
1. A state, for security requirements, may temporarily suspend 
the right of innocent passage for all foreign vessels through its terri­
torial sea. These restrictions, in cases such as weapons testing, gunnery 
practice, and the like, need not apply to the entire territorial sea. 
Innocent passage itself may be open to question. For example, would 
passage be innocent if a foreign ship was using electronic gear to 
monitor the coastal state's radio broadcasts, chart the sea floor, or 
interfere with normal radio communications? Actually a state has the 
right, according to one speaker, to protect itself against hostile acts 
in the waters adjoining its coasts, regardless of whether such acts 
occur within, or beyond, the limits of its territorial sea. A complication 
here, of course, is the definition of the term "hostile." 
Countries have, in the interests of testing atomic weapons or other 
military devices, utilized parts of the high seas for short periods of 
time to the virtual exclusion of use of that area by other countries. 
Foreign ships could proceed through the designated area, but at con­
siderable risk; in practice, if ships navigate through the area in defiance 
of notice, military operations are suspended until the navigation is com­
pleted. In some instances fishermen have been compensated for the 
loss resulting from the fishing activities they were forced to suspend 
during the operations. The United States also has aircraft identification 
zones which extend out over the high seas and which in a sense infringe 
on the freedom of action of civil aircraft in that within these zones they 
must identify themselves. 
2. When considering the use of straight baselines in archipelagos, 
discussants noted that there has been "quasi-compliance" by the United 
States in certain straight baseline delimitations. For political reasons 
we have tended to avoid test cases, while at the same time withholding 
recognition of the legality of such claims. When navigation by U.S. ships 
has been made within the straight baselines, the foreign country involved 
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has not attempted to make arrests. Discussion of the use of straight 
baselines in archipelagos brought out the point that one of the keys as 
to whether islands could or could not be enclosed within the baseline 
has been not only the distance from the coast, but also whether or not 
the waters between the islands and the mainland can be treated as inland 
waters. Yet up to now there has been no real agreement on what are 
the criteria of the regime of internal waters. 
3. With respect to Mr. Sullivan's paper, it was pointed out that 
for the past twenty-five years the Coast Guard has been operating 
manned weather stations in the ocean, which transmit meteorological 
data on assigned frequency. The Navy also maintains manned buoys. 
Among the problems in the future will be not only the status of un­
manned, transmitting buoys, but also the assignment to them of trans­
mission frequencies. 
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Chapter Fifteen: 
JURISDICTIONAL, ADMINISTRATIVE, AND TECHNICAL 
PROBLEMS RELATED TO THE ESTABLISHMENT 
OF CALIFORNIA COASTAL AND 
OFFSHORE BOUNDARIES 
In view of the monumental two-volume work Shore and Sea Boundaries 
by A. L. Shalowitz (retired from the United States Coast and Geodetic 
Survey), it might appear presumptuous to suggest that there are new 
as well as continuing problems in this field that have not been analyzed 
nor resolved within practical limits currently. Despite the scope of 
Volume I of the aforesaid work, "Boundary Problems Associated with 
the Submerged Lands Cases and the Submerged Lands Acts," published 
in 1962, followed by Volume II in 1964, these volumes could not include 
analyses of the practical application of the Convention on the Territorial 
Sea and the Contiguous Zone,1 which became effective September 10, 
1964, nor the Supplemental Decree of the Supreme Court of the United 
States on January 31, 1966, in United States v. California.2 
In 1937 attention was focused on the interrelationship of jurisdiction 
and coastal and offshore boundaries by the introduction of a Congres­
sional resolution seeking to "establish the title and possession of the 
United States to the (coastal) submerged lands . . . and all petroleum 
deposits underlying the same. . . . " 3 For California the questions of 
jurisdiction and boundaries were affected in 1947 by an Order and 
Decree of the Supreme Court in United States v. California* in 1953 
by the Submerged Lands Act,5 and currently in 1966 by the Supple­
mental Decree. 
Shore and Sea Boundaries states that in proceedings before a Special 
Master (1948-52), "Valuable oil reserves in the vicinity of Huntington 
Beach (Orange County, California) made the determination of the 
inland waters of San Pedro Bay a crucial question." 6 This basis for 
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interest by the federal government was exemplified further in an 
announcement in November, 1965, by the Department of the Interior 
that bids would be sought for oil and gas leases on California outer 
continental shelf lands, three months before the Supplemental Decree 
on January 31, 1966, establishing the geographic limits of state and 
federal jurisdiction in the California offshore area. 
By specification of criteria and definitions from the convention, the 
court has eliminated a series of uncertainties, including the comparative 
value of a geographic mile (or marine or nautical) and an English mile, 
as well as establishing the absolute magnitude of the geographical mile 
and criteria for location of the coastline, generally at the line of mean 
lower low water. However, evaluation of the application of these 
definitions and precise distance standards along the California main­
land coast and around the off-lying islands and rocks has already pro­
duced problems and questions, as well as the recognition of the need 
for development of topographic and hydrographic survey technology. 
Although this review will relate only to the application of the effective 
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, it must be 
noted that application of the provisions of the Convention on Fishing 
and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas to establish 
adequate controls for California coastal waters is of extreme current 
importance. 
Some of the boundary location problems that have been identified 
are listed in the following: 
1. As stated in Sovereignty of the Sea, "With respect to the geo­
graphic situation along the world's seacoasts it must be granted that 
distribution of land and water and shoreline configuration produce a 
pattern which in no place is a duplicate to that of any other place. It is 
little wonder, therefore, that the application of an effective jurisdictional 
pattern to so complicated a physical setting encourages biased interpre­
tations and meets with so much controversy." T 
Administrative and jurisdictional problems were already in the open 
in California through what must be a unique set of conditions for a 
determination of governmental regulatory jurisdiction. Pacific South­
west Airlines (PSA), as a California intrastate air carrier since 1949, 
has always been subject only to the regulatory control of the California 
Public Utilities Commission. Following the Supplemental Decree de­
fining the submerged lands of the state as located " . .  . within three 
231 
THE LAW OF THE SEA 
geographical miles seaward from the coastline. . . .  " 8 it has been 
alleged that PSA is now subject to Federal Civil Aeronautics Board 
jurisdiction as an interstate air carrier. This allegation of extension of 
jurisdiction is based on the analysis that in flying the direct routes 
established for sixteen years between San Diego-Los Angeles, and Los 
Angeles-San Francisco, PSA planes are approximately twelve nautical 
miles offshore opposite Oceanside, California (Figure 10), and approxi­
mately four nautical miles offshore when crossing Santa Monica Bay 
(Figure 11). Thus on a flight San Diego-Los Angeles-San Francisco, 
a PSA plane leaves and re-enters the state of California (and the United 
States) twice, and therefore purportedly is now subject to a juris­
dictional classification of interstate air carrier. 
This problem could possibly be resolved inefficiently for PSA by the 
assignment of new longer air routes landward of the high seas. The 
allegation of extension of jurisdiction, however, appears to be based 
upon a misinterpretation of the effect of the 1965 decision in United 
States v. California,0 which will be considered in greater detail here­
inafter. 
2. "Both to the hydrographer and the topographer the low-water 
line is one of the most uncertain and difficult features to delineate." 10 
" 'Mean lower low water' means the average elevation of all daily lower 
low tides occurring over a period of 18.6 years. . . . " u 
It is a reasonable estimate that only a minority of use & GS tide 
gauge stations on the California coast have recorded measurements over 
a complete tidal cycle of 18.6 years. The precision with which the 
elevation of a tidal datum plane may be established depends on the 
extent of tide gauge observations, ranging from a value correct to 
within 3.0 inches from one day of observations to a value correct within 
1.2 inches from one month of observations.12 Within these limits the 
relative rise of sea level along the Pacific Coast at 0.06 inches per year 
is not of particular short-term significance, but does represent another 
element of instability in the absolute location of the mean lower low-
water line.13 
" 'Low-tide elevation' means a naturally formed area of land sur­
rounded by water at mean lower low water, which is above the level 
of mean lower low water but not above the level of mean high water." 14 
This definition corresponds with earlier practice by the use & GS in 
designating "rocks awash." Modern practice by the use & GS identifies 
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"rocks awash" on the Pacific Coast as including rocks with an elevation 
down to two feet below mean lower low water. The current use & GS 
Hydrographic Manual provides that when it is not practicable for a 
hydrographer to land on a rock, its height is to be estimated for 
identification upon the survey chart. This practice was employed in the 
preparation of the 1933-34 charts published for the California coast, 
which makes the applicability of low-tide elevations and the slightly 
submerged rocks as shown on the hydrographic surveys very uncertain 
as base points for location of the coastline. 
3. What are the results of difficulties in delineation and lack of 
precision in the location of the line of mean lower low water? With 
the current level of survey technology sufficiently precise locations 
(horizontal control) can be determined for both onshore and offshore 
features such as islands and rocks. However, inasmuch as the location 
of the coastline is determined by the intersection of the plane of mean 
lower low water with the land forms, similar precision is now required 
for the determination of elevations (vertical control). As pointed out 
in the previous section, heretofore it may not have been considered 
necessary to determine a precise elevation for an offshore low-tide 
elevation. Actually, it is not currently possible to make elevation determi­
nations of sufficient precision, particularly for the most distant offshore 
features, to permit positive identification of low-tide elevations as valid 
base points, nor to establish accurately the coastline for all of the off-
lying islands. Such determinations, even for islands, will become feasible 
only after extensive tidal datum determination projects, whereas the 
need for offshore state boundary establishment is immediate to permit 
the federal government to proceed with the leasing of the seaward outer 
continental shelf lands for the development of oil and gas. In this 
connection the inaccuracies of boundary location due to current tech­
nological limitations could result in misallocations of areas of large 
economic significance. 
4. What structures or elements are contained within the " . .  . 
outermost permanent harbor works that form an integral part of the 
harbor system within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention of 
the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone" ?15 
5. If the coastline includes a breakwater as part of the "outermost 
permanent harbor works," what is the nature of the transition from the 
seaward end of the breakwater coastline to the mainland coastline ? The 
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outermost permanent harbor works for the ports of Los Angeles and 
Long Beach is a breakwater, as shown on Figure 12. Identification of 
the coastline requires a continuation of the baseline marking the seaward 
limit of inland waters at the easterly end of the breakwater to a juncture 
with the mainland coastline. 
This juncture could be accomplished through any one of a number 
of possible alternatives, including: (1) A median line could be drawn 
from the mainland coastline to connect with the end of the breakwater 
baseline, by analogy with the criteria in the Convention for division of 
the territorial sea between adjacent states, " . .  . the median line every 
point of which is equidistant from the nearest points on the baselines 
from which . . . measured." 16 (2) The baseline on the seaward side 
of the breakwater could be projected easterly to an intersection with 
the mainland coastline. However, a more realistic result would appear 
to be obtained by determination of the juncture of the limits of the 
territorial sea utilizing the easterly end of the Los Angeles-Long Beach 
breakwater and the most easterly Anaheim Bay jetty (Figure 12) as 
basepoints and then delineating this limit as a straight line parallel to 
the straight baseline between harbor works. 
6. What criteria should be recommended for establishment of 
boundaries for division of the territorial sea in negotiations with adjacent 
coastal states (nations) ? The adoption of the convention has focused 
attention on the need for establishment of the offshore international 
boundary on the Pacific Coast between the United Mexican States and 
California. On the upland the boundary was established by the Treaty 
of Guadalupe Hidalgo of 1848, but the text description of the boundary 
line starts at the coast and proceeds inland. 
Section I, Article 12, of the Convention provides: 
1.	 Where the coasts of two States are opposite or adjacent to each other, 
neither of the two States is entitled, failing agreement between them to 
the contrary, to extend its territorial sea beyond the median line every 
point of which is equidistant from the nearest points on the baselines from 
which the breadth of the territorial seas of each of the two States is 
measured. The provisions of this paragraph shall not apply, however, where 
it is necessary by reason of historic title or other special circumstances to 
delimit the territorial seas of the two States in a way which is at variance 
with this provision. 
2.	 The line of delimitation between the territorial seas of two States lying 
opposite to each other or adjacent to each other shall be marked on 
large-scale charts officially recognized by the coastal States. 
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Mexico is not currently a signatory to the convention. Mexico claims 
a nine mile territorial sea, compared with the three mile territorial sea 
claimed by the United States. A map incorporated into the Treaty of 
Guadalupe Hidalgo (Figure 13) shows the boundary line projecting 
into the Pacific Ocean as an extension of the upland boundary. This 
extension is not included in the treaty text and therefore may be 
questioned as to validity as a binding agreement line. 
Possible alternative locations for the international boundary are shown 
on Figure 14, depicting the anomalous condition of Mexican territorial 
sea contiguous to, and seaward of, California submerged lands. 
7. Finally (at least for this review), a problem must be pointed 
out that seems to have been ignored by many persons considering the 
effect of the 1965 decision in United States v. California.17 The court 
in that decision expressly refused to consider the seaward location of 
California's political boundaries as being relevant to the question there 
involved. Rather, it decided that the seaward extent of the state's pro­
prietary ownership extended only to the outer limit of the territorial 
waters of the United States as denned in the convention. 
As appears to be clear from the 1960 decisions in United States v. 
Texas and United States v. Florida,18 it is entirely possible for the 
political boundaries of a state to extend six geographical miles beyond 
the outer limits of the territorial sea. If California has properly inter­
preted the state constitutional boundaries, as approved by Congress, 
the state political jurisdiction for domestic purposes extends three 
geographical miles seaward of the off-lying islands and includes all 
intervening waters. Although this jurisdiction cannot, of course, be 
exercised in a matter which would violate international law and must 
take into consideration the express terms of the Outer Continental 
Shelf Lands Act,19 it may well be effective for many purposes. For 
example, if a gambling ship operated by United States citizens should 
be anchored within Santa Monica Bay, but more than three geographical 
miles from shore, California would certainly assert the applicability of 
the state criminal laws and the enforceability by state officers. 
The seaward extent of California's governmental power and the 
circumstances under which this power may be exercised are very much 
open questions, not settled by Supreme Court decisions, and must 
receive the most careful attention by state governmental authorities and 
legal counsel. 
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FIG. 13.—Exhibit incorporated in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, 1848. 
FIG. 14.—Possible alternative locations of the international boundary between 
the United States and Mexico in the territorial sea. 
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Discussion of Boundary Problems and Delimitation 
1. The problems of state jurisdiction in coastal waters were dis­
cussed, with particular reference to California. There are many aspects 
of regulations and inspection criteria for geological and geophysical 
exploration on the continental shelf which can, through agreement, be 
handled to the mutual satisfaction of the Department of the Interior 
and the individual states, regardless of where the state/federal boundary 
line on the shelf happens to be. It does not necessarily follow, because 
the territorial jurisdiction of the state extends three miles out, that 
criminal jurisdiction and other state jurisdictions terminate at that 
point. Conditions vary considerably in different parts of the United 
States, and additional research is needed in denning how far into the 
sea state jurisdiction extends, and for what purposes. 
2. When considering the extent of the territorial sea, discussants 
noted that the waters between the individual Hawaiian islands were 
held by the Supreme Court to be international in nature, beyond the 
three mile limit. The same is true between the southern California 
islands and the mainland, although the islands lie within the state's 
historic boundaries as they were ratified by Congress at the time of the 
Act of Admission. The baseline from which California's three mile 
offshore boundaries are measured was decided by the Supreme Court to 
be the mean lower low water line as shown on the Coast and Geodetic 
Survey charts. By constructing breakwaters and jetties California might 
be able to extend the outer limits of its jurisdiction; but structures of 
this type require the approval of the U.S. government through the Army 
Corps of Engineers. 
3. A presentation of boundary lines drawn on Coast and Geodetic 
Survey charts was presented by officials from the survey. These lines 
did not represent official U.S. policy, but were attempts at experi­
mentation, according to the articles of the Geneva Convention on the 
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Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone. These articles pertain to 
international boundaries and are not necessarily germane to boundaries 
between individual states. Although earlier in the Law of the Sea 
Institute Conference it was stated several times that one should not 
draw a precise line unless absolutely necessary the Coast and Geodetic 
Survey officials disagreed, feeling that boundaries of the states' juris­
diction should be delimited on maps and charts as accurately as possible, 
even before the need for such precision arises. 
4. In the case of boundaries between individual states the principle 
of the median line is followed. However, disagreements may come up 
as to the exact position of the median line and the question arose as 
to how such disagreements should be settled—by the State Department, 
by Congress, by the Supreme Court, or by agreement between the states 
themselves? One opinion held that boundaries between the states is a 
matter for Congress to decide. Congress may determine the location of 
the boundaries or give consent to the states to make an agreement or 
compact between themselves. 
5. One technical point which was raised involved the use of tidal 
datum planes. In some areas along the Gulf Coast the tide is at one 
time of the month semidiurnal, that is, high or low twice daily, and 
at other times of the month, high or low only once daily. There is also 
considerable difference among the various high waters or low waters 
(mean low, lower low, lowest low, etc.) ; as a result it is extremely 
difficult to establish a permanent baseline along this coast from which 
the outer limits of the territorial sea can be determined. There are islands 
along the Louisiana coast which tend to move up and down with relation 
to sea level. These are mostly piles of damp shell and sand lying on top 
of oyster beds, and no matter how often they are surveyed their con­
figuration cannot be precisely established. There are also meteorological 
variables which show up in tidal observations. 
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Chapter Sixteen: 
THE LAW OF THE SEA CONFERENCE, 
1958-60, AND ITS AFTERMATH* 
In developing my topic for discussion, I shall focus not on the width 
of the territorial sea but on the legal problems of the continental shelf, 
particularly the legal problems posed by the rapidly developing offshore 
oil and gas operations of the petroleum industry, such as in the 
North Sea. 
The invaluable guidelines and policies embodied in the 1958 Geneva 
Convention on the Continental Shelf have, of course, been the principal 
response under international law to the legal problems raised by develop­
ment of the natural resources of the continental shelf. In addition to 
examining this convention, and several other international agreements 
relating to the continental shelf, I should like to review a variety of 
problems in connection with the continental shelf which have arisen 
under United States domestic law, both state and federal. 
Until quite recently man expended natural resources as though they 
were inexhaustible. Finally, however, in the last few decades, people 
have begun to realize that the supply of many minerals and foodstuffs 
essential not only to our economy but also to civilization as we know it, 
is finite in quantity. Two results of this realization have been the wide­
spread initiation of conservation programs and the exploration of new 
areas in search of mineral resources. 
The quest for untapped resources took man to the sea; there the 
search has been quite rewarding. In addition to fishery resources, 
enormous quantities of oil and gas, in particular, have been uncovered 
in offshore fields along the continental shelves of several countries. 
These valuable finds, like the discoveries of gold in California and 
Alaska, have led to disputes provoking cries of "claim-jumping." In 
this instance, however, many of the "claim-jumpers" are not individual 
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prospectors or, for that matter, large corporations, but cities, states, and 
even nations. Problems of international law, of federalism, and of private 
law have arisen in the aftermath of practically every offshore find, 
varying in intensity in direct proportion to the value of the discovery 
involved. 
These problems have necessarily required legislation—on the inter­
national level, treaties—for their solution. Sometimes the "solution" 
has been less a panacea than a Pandora's box, but quite frequently it 
has proved feasible. 
Perhaps the best solutions, some that might well serve as models 
for settling future disputes, have been those agreed upon at the inter­
national level, particularly the Geneva Convention on the Continental 
Shelf, to which thirty-five states have become parties. 
There is an understandable reluctance on the part of national govern­
ments to enter into agreements with other countries binding them 
irrevocably to future action or inaction. Circumstances, science, and 
technology change, and nations should not always assume obligations 
into the indefinite future for better or for worse. As a general rule, 
therefore, most nations prefer to work out ad hoc arrangements with 
other countries rather than to enter into formal agreements which might 
prove unduly restrictive in the light of later knowledge. 
This natural inclination to avoid any rigid treaty is especially pro­
nounced when the dimensions of the subject matter of a potential 
treaty are relatively unknown and, accordingly, where the eventual 
effect of agreement can least be gauged. When the activity sought to 
be regulated by treaty has just commenced, so that customs and practices 
with respect to it have not crystallized, treaties—which draw much of 
their text and support from customs and practice—will seldom be found. 
Since exploration of the continental shelves is still in the early stages, 
it is not surprising to find merely a few international agreements defining 
and distributing rights among the various coastal nations. In addition, 
it is only to be expected that where no significant offshore discoveries 
have been made there will be no treaties. 
I. The Convention on the Continental Shelf 
Fortunately, however, a number of thoughtful principles were promul­
gated in the Convention on the Continental Shelf, a product of the 1958 
Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea, and in the other conventions 
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there adopted.1 These principles can feasibly be invoked as guidelines in 
settling disputes involving any body of water dividing governments, 
even though the Convention binds only those nations signatory to it, 
and even though by its terms it applies only to geological continental 
shelves. 
The convention codifies the basic premise, suggested in President 
Truman's September 28, 1945, Proclamation concerning the continental 
shelf, that each nation has sovereign rights over the exploration and 
exploitation of the natural resources2 of its continental shelves.3 From 
this starting point it proceeds to define the term "continental shelf," * 
to specify procedures for dividing a shelf between nations whose claims 
might otherwise overlap 5 and to make suggestions for accommodating 
exploitation of undersea resources with other offshore activities, such 
as the laying and maintenance of submarine cables, fishing, research, 
and navigation.6 
Article 1 of the Convention defines "continental shelf" as that body 
of land off the coast of a continent which extends from the coastline to 
the point (1) where the sea is 200 meters or (2) "where the depth . . . 
admits of the exploitation" of the "shelf," whichever is farther.7 This 
dual standard accords the coastal nation a minimum area of sovereignty 
to 200 meters depth, and a maximum that is limited only by the actual 
extent of the shelf and technical ability in the exploration of the 
shelf itself. 
Article 6 of the convention sets forth three procedures for dividing 
the shelf among littoral nations. These three procedures might be 
analogized to contract, legislation, and litigation. 
The first and preferred procedure is agreement among the nations 
concerned, strongly advocated by the convention. 
In the absence of such agreement, however, the convention declares 
that the "principle of equidistance" is to be applied. By this principle 
all claimant nations would have exclusive rights from the baselines from 
which their territorial seas are measured to that point at which equi­
distant lateral lines drawn from their baselines would meet. 
The third procedure is an optional protocol, not ratified by the United 
States, which provides for the compulsory settlement of disputes by 
submission to the International Court of Justice or to an arbitral 
tribunal.8 
The prophylactic character of the Convention on the Continental 
Shelf is underscored by several concrete suggestions which evidence a 
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farsighted anticipation of and attempt to avoid certain areas of dispute 
which might arise in the future. 
Significant in this respect is the provision in Article 6(3) that 
boundaries should be fixed by reference to permanent points on land, 
obviating the possibility that future coastline changes might provoke 
disagreement. The provisions of Articles 4 and 5 which attempt to 
achieve an accommodation between exploitation of the resources of the 
continental shelves and other undersea activities should also reduce 
future disputes. 
While the convention is laudatory in its attempts to foresee and avoid 
disputes over the continental shelves, several questions remain un­
answered. Three may be found in the definition of "continental shelf" 
in Article 1 of the convention. 
Article 1 encompasses in its definition of "continental shelf" that 
portion of offshore lands constituting a part of the continental shelf 
and more than 200 meters under the sea "where the depth . . . admits 
of the exploitation" of the shelf. The language is susceptible of at least 
two interpretations: (1) that the outer boundaries of the shelf are 
dependent upon the actual technological ability of the particular nation 
concerned, and (2) that boundaries are determined by the technological 
ability of the most advanced nation. 
Arguments can be made supporting either interpretation. Thus, it 
can be said that to extend the offshore boundaries of a less developed 
nation to the farthest range capable of exploitation by the most advanced 
nation is uneconomical and unproductive. To accord undeveloped nations 
equal rights with technologically advanced nations, the argument runs, 
is perhaps unfairly to deprive the world of large supplies of natural 
resources. 
Consideration and application of the basic principle on which the 
convention was founded at Geneva in 1958 refutes this argument. The 
convention was predicated on the notion that each nation, whether 
technologically advanced or not, has sovereign rights over its portion 
of the continental shelf.8 The convention explicitly provides that its 
rights are not diminished by failure to exploit;10 indeed, allowing off­
shore sources of minerals and foodstuffs to lie fallow might be a prudent 
conservation measure in the best interests of the entire world. 
Wise or not, however, each nation's portion of the continental shelf 
is its alone, to exploit or not to exploit as it sees fit. The principle of 
the equality of nations compels the conclusion that the definition of 
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"continental shelf" is to be the same for each country, that differences 
in technological expertise are not to be reflected in boundary lines. 
A practical difficulty inherent in the contrary view is that it opens 
the door to dispute. To say that the limits of the continental shelves 
vary according to each littoral nation's technology is to allow those 
boundaries to move laterally as well as seaward. A nation slower than 
its neighbors in developing its petroleum drilling facilities could thus 
find itself frozen out—a result clearly not intended by the convention 
and repugnant to the ideas underlying the principle of equidistance. 
Such a result might impel a nation to repudiate the convention. 
Moreover, the degree of technological advancement of most nations 
in fact bears little relation to the extent of exploration and exploitation 
sponsored and undertaken by them. Petroleum exploration affords an 
excellent example. 
Most international petroleum activity is conducted by British, Dutch, 
American, Japanese, and Italian corporations and joint ventures work­
ing in concert with local governments and local interests. Many nations 
that might be classified as comparatively undeveloped technologically 
have nevertheless had the astuteness to employ the technological skills 
of other countries to engage in mutually rewarding enterprises. Thus 
the argument that the limits of the continental shelves are determined 
by actual technological advancement founders on the facts as well as 
on the spirit of the convention itself. 
A second unresolved problem of the definition of "continental shelf" 
contained in Article 1 of the convention is the extent of its application 
to offshore areas that are not, geographically speaking, continental 
shelves at all, for example, the Persian Gulf. The International Law 
Commission, which prepared an initial draft of the convention, clearly 
intended the definition to encompass many such areas and to go beyond 
the geological definition of continental shelves. The conference did not 
depart from the Commission's intent by its use of the term "continental 
shelf" in preference to the alternative term "submarine areas," which 
was suggested by some persons but discarded. 
A third problem unresolved by the definition of "continental shelf" 
in Article 1 concerns the situation where submerged areas of a depth 
less than 200 meters, situated fairly close to the coastline, are separated 
from that part of the continental shelf adjacent to the coast by a channel 
deeper than 200 meters. The question arises as to whether such a 
channel delimits the coastal nation's area of sovereignty. 
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Norway is faced with just this situation in the North Sea.11 Norway 
has taken the position that this channel is only a depression in its con­
tinental shelf and has claimed its full rights under the principle of 
equidistance. Its claim has apparently been accepted by all other 
countries concerned. 
Norway's position may be justified by the history of the convention, 
but some may argue that the solution is not so clear as it could be. 
The International Law Commission's comments to Article 1 state that 
the shallow area close to the coast "could be considered as adjacent 
to . .  . the shelf." Unfortunately, however, the Commission's comments 
leave the question open by declaring that 
It would be for the state relying on this exception to the general rule to 
establish its claim to an equitable modification of the rule. In case of dispute 
it must be a matter for arbitral determination whether a shallow submarine 
area falls within the rules here formulated. 
Although understandably a wide channel might effectively detach 
the coastal area from the continental shelf, the Commission's presup­
position that the channel is "narrow" would seem to obviate such a 
problem. The better practice might be to disregard all channels of less 
than a certain width, especially where the land lying beyond the channel 
seems geologically to be a part of the continental shelf. 
II. Other International Agreements 
To date, international agreements affecting undersea boundaries have 
been executed with respect to only three specific areas—the Gulf of 
Paria, the Persian Gulf, and the North Sea—only one of which, the 
North Sea, is superjacent to land properly classified as a "continental 
shelf" in the geological sense. It is appropriate to discuss here the agree­
ments relating to these areas and the effect on them of the Convention 
on the Continental Shelf. 
The North Sea.—The North Sea has thus far been a fertile site for 
offshore exploration. It is auspicious that undersea boundaries there will 
probably be determined in large part pursuant to the principles of the 
Convention on the Continental Shelf inasmuch as the North Sea lies 
above a continental shelf and five of the seven nations bordering on the 
North Sea—the United Kingdom, Denmark, the Netherlands, Germany, 
and France—have signed the convention.12 
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As far as can be determined, however, only two countries, the United 
Kingdom and Norway, have formally agreed on their entire common 
boundary beneath the North Sea, although Germany has reached agree­
ment with the Netherlands on part of their joint boundary. 
A number of other agreements, still in the draft stage, are being 
negotiated.13 The United Kingdom has announced its intention to enter 
into further bilateral boundary agreements.14 Nations that have not 
entered into formal agreements are laudably employing the median lines 
as a boundary.15 
The United Kingdom-Norway agreement follows closely Article 6 in 
adopting as the common boundary between the two nations a line "every 
point of which is equidistant from the nearest points of the baselines 
from which the territorial sea of each country is measured." 16 This 
agreement is brief and for the most part taken up with the description 
of the dividing line which, as suggested by Article 6(3) of the con­
vention, is shown on a chart annexed to the agreement. 
A unique and quite ingenious provision in this agreement states that, 
should the boundary cross a mineral deposit which can be exploited 
from only one side the parties shall consult with their licensees to 
determine how the exploitaton shall be carried out and how the proceeds 
therefrom shall be divided.17 
The Gulf of Paria Treaty.—Some sixteen years before the signing of 
the Convention on the Continental Shelf, the principle of equidistance 
was used to set the undersea boundaries between Venezuela and Trini­
dad, then a British possession. The Gulf of Paria Treaty, the first under­
sea boundary agreement, divided the Gulf of Paria at the midpoints and 
each signatory party agreed not to claim in the other's area.18 The treaty 
was, happily, not repudiated by Trinidad when it gained its independence 
and remains in force.19 
Since the land beneath the Gulf of Paria is not properly part of a 
continental shelf, and because the only two nations whose coastlines abut 
on the gulf have apparently settled the boundary between them, there 
seems to be no room for the application of Article 1 of the convention 
on the Continental Shelf here.20 
Yet even here the convention provides a useful tool for settling other 
types of disputes. For example, Articles 4 and 5 offer methods of 
accommodating the exploitation of the undersea resources of the Gulf 
of Paria to other offshore activities. 
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The Persian Gulf.—The Persian Gulf, surrounded by or overlying 
some of the largest proven oil reserves in the world, appears to be a 
most fruitful area for offshore drilling and there have, in fact, been 
significant efforts in that direction.21 It is thus imperative, both for the 
countries involved and for the economies of many nations, that principles 
be formulated to provide for dispute-free exploitation of the abundant 
reserves which are thought to lie below the gulf. 
Unfortunately, Iran is the only nation bordering on the Persian Gulf 
which has signed the Convention on the Continental Shelf. Unfortunately, 
too, it conditioned its signing on two reservations, both of which run 
counter to the precepts of the convention.22 
The first reserves to Iran the right to refuse to allow submarine 
cables or pipelines on its portion of the shelf. The second reservation 
states that in special circumstances the boundary determined according 
to Article 6 may be measured from the high-water mark. The significance 
of the high-water mark reservation is that the shore of parts of the 
Persian Gulf coastline of other countries slopes gradually. There is a 
difference of opinion as to whether the traditional low-water mark or 
the high-water mark should determine the shore. By this latter reserva­
tion, therefore, Iran has left the way open for it to claim substantially 
more of the sea bed and subsoil than the convention would normally 
allow.23 This reservation may well be the source of future disputes. 
The only agreement in force in the Persian Gulf area at this time is 
between Saudi Arabia and the government of Bahrein. Neither is a 
party to the Convention on the Continental Shelf, but their agreement in 
large part follows the principle of equidistance adopted by Article 6 of 
the convention for the delineation of shelf boundaries between nations 
whose claims would otherwise overlap. Thus, the boundary runs "on 
the basis of the middle line" between the mainland of Saudi Arabia and 
the Island of Bahrein between points which are, as suggested by Article 
6(3), set out on a map attached to the agreement and in some cases 
defined by latitude and longitude as well. 
A departure from the principle of equidistance, but a solution clearly 
sanctioned by the convention's exhortations to agreement, is the provision 
that a certain six-sided area which would otherwise be partly within 
the area belonging to Bahrein shall "be in the part falling to the Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia," but that one-half of all revenues arising from oil 
exploitation in that area shall be granted to Bahrein. 
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The nations bordering on the Persian Gulf would do well to follow 
the example of the Saudi Arabia-Bahrein agreement within the frame­
work laid down in the Convention on the Continental Shelf. Otherwise, 
prospecting for new fields in the shallow waters of the gulf may cause 
friction between countries competing for fields in disputed areas.25 
In the North Sea, most of the nations, particularly the United 
Kingdom and Denmark, have been negotiating to fix their undersea 
boundaries, or at least to evolve working relationships which will enable 
them to get about the business of leasing. Additional commercial finds 
of oil or gas in the North Sea will doubtless spur the progress of 
agreements. 
There appears less hope for early agreements in other parts of the 
world, which so far lack the impetus to treaty impelled by the rich 
mineral finds made in the North Sea. 
However, with the convenient framework provided by the Convention 
on the Continental Shelf, those nations which wish to do so will find it 
easier to conclude boundary agreements today than in the days when 
the only model for such an agreement was the Gulf of Paria Treaty, 
with its necessarily rather local geographical provisions. It is to be 
hoped that more nations will accede to the convention itself. 
Undersea boundary agreements in those areas where they are most 
urgently needed—where commercial exploitation of the undersea area 
is contemplated or already in progress—must inevitably add to the 
attractiveness of additional investment in such exploitation. The en­
hanced political stability of fixed and reliable boundaries invariably 
facilitates commercial operations. 
III. The United States Continental Shelf 
Conflicting state and federal claims to ownership of the surrounding 
shelf have complicated the situation in the United States. It has taken 
more than a decade to reach the present state of federal-state coexistence 
in this area, and a number of problems remain to be solved. 
The first stage of development of the present federal-state relationship 
was the Supreme Court's rulings in The Tidelands Cases of 1947 
and 195026 that the states had no claim to the United States 
Continental Shelf. 
The second stage was the 1953 enactment of the Submerged Lands 
Act,27 which vested in the coastal states complete ownership of lands 
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beneath navigable waters.28 That act denned navigable waters as those 
within a state's coastal boundaries. It limited coastal boundaries to three 
geographical miles beyond the coastline (except in the Gulf of Mexico 
where, under certain conditions, boundaries might extend up to three 
marine leagues seaward).29 
The third stage was the Supreme Court's determination in 1960 that, 
of the Gulf Coast states, Texas and Florida were entitled to three marine 
leagues and Louisiana, Alabama, and Mississippi were limited to three 
geographical miles.30 
The fourth stage, which has yet to be completed, is the determination 
of the shoreward boundary of the three mile or three league marginal 
belt of the continental shelf owned by the coastal states.31 
The upshot is that, while state law applies to submerged lands between 
the coastline and the three mile or three league coastal boundary, the 
continental shelf lying seaward and outside of the submerged lands 
owned by the states is under the sole jurisdiction of the federal 
government. 
This state of the law is codified in the Outer Continental Shelf 
Lands Act.32 That statute, enacted by Congress in 1953, declares it to 
be the policy of the United States "that the subsoil and seabed of the 
Outer Continental Shelf appertain to the United States and are subject 
to its jurisdiction, control, and power of disposition." 33 
Adopting the rule of The Tidelands Cases, Section 2(a) of the act 
provides that the law applicable to the outer continental shelf is federal 
law, "to the same extent as if the Outer Continental Shelf were an 
area of exclusive Federal jurisdiction located within a state." 34 
Section 4 of the act proceeds to delineate the hierarchy of laws and 
regulations that govern the outer continental shelf lands.35 It provides 
that, in addition to the act itself and the regulations of the Department 
of the Interior promulgated thereunder, all federal laws generally,36 and 
the Longshoreman's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act37 and 
the National Labor Relations Act38 specifically, are applicable to the 
outer shelf. 
This act also gives the Coast Guard and the Secretary of the Army 
authority to regulate certain activities on the outer shelf. 
Finally, it declares that the laws of the adjacent states, both civil 
and criminal, as of August 7, 1953, are adopted as the laws of the outer 
shelf so far as consistent with the laws and regulations already in 
effect or thereafter adopted.39 
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The assimilation of adjacent states' laws at one stroke cut through 
a number of knotty legal problems which were inherent in several 
alternate courses proposed during the debates on this section of the act.40 
Potential problems remain, however. For example, although adoption 
of state laws as of August 7, 1953, freezes the law at that point and 
thus avoids the problem of a possible unconstitutional delegation of the 
federal legislative power,41 as to future state legislation it will result in 
eventual obsolescence of the law unless there is periodic legislative 
review.42 
Another area sure to provoke controversy concerns the extent to 
which state laws are made applicable by the Outer Continental Shelf 
Lands Act. There are really two questions inherent in this inquiry: first, 
is the act itself applicable? and second, if so, is the particular state 
law sought to be applied inconsistent with federal law ? 
A step toward a permanent solution to the first question was taken 
in Guess v. Read.43 There the Fifth Circuit, affirming a decision by 
Judge Wright, held that state law did not govern where an accident 
occurred at sea beyond the boundary of the state but within the area 
subject to the operation of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act. 
The case concerned a helicopter crash into the open sea more than 
three miles from the Louisiana shore. The widow of a man killed in 
the crash brought an action under the Death on the High Seas Act44 
and sought to join insurance carriers under the Louisiana Direct Action 
Statute.45 
The court noted that the provisions of the Outer Continental Shelf 
Lands Act which assimilated state law intended that law to be applied 
only to the subsoil and sea bed of the outer shelf and to artificial islands 
and fixed structures erected on the shelf and concluded that the area 
of applicability of state law did not include the sea and air above the 
shelf.46 
The provisions of the act that the high seas character of the waters 
above the outer shelf be unaffected by the act were cited as bolstering 
the Court's conclusion. It was suggested, however, that a different result 
might have been reached had the helicopter crashed directly upon a 
drilling platform.47 
The case is consistent with the clearly expressed intent of the act 
to restrict the operation of state laws to state territorial waters except 
where made otherwise applicable by the act. 
In the case of Pure Oil Co. v. Snipes*8 decided only a month after 
Guess v. Read, the Fifth Circuit further restricted the scope of the Outer 
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Continental Shelf Lands Act and its adoption of state law by choosing 
to apply the federal maritime doctrine of laches rather than a state 
statute of limitations to an accident occurring on a fixed drilling plat­
form on the outer shelf. 
The court stressed the maritime aspects of the case. It noted that 
while plaintiff had fallen from the platform into the water below sus­
taining injuries en route, a substantial part of his disablement was 
traceable to infection contracted from the waters beneath the platform 
and that "there can be nothing more maritime than the sea." 49 
The pervasive regulations of the United States Coast Guard dealing 
with outer shelf activities 50 as well as the adoption of the Longshore­
man's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act were adduced to show 
a statutory intent that federal maritime law govern the suit. 
It should be noted that the Louisiana one-year statute of limitations 
had expired only ten months before the suit and there was no showing 
of surprise or prejudice which would suffice to support a defense of 
laches. 
An instance in which state law was held applicable on the outer 
shelf is Corrosion Rectifying Co. v. Freeport Sulphur Co.51 This was 
an action on a contract made on an artificial island seven miles off the 
Louisiana coast. A verdict was rendered for the plaintiff in the trial 
court and one of the issues on appeal was whether attorneys' fees were 
allowable as an element of damages. 
The Texas court first held that the issue of attorneys' fees was a 
matter of substantive law for choice of law purposes and that, under 
Texas' conflict of laws rules, the law of the place of making the contract 
controlled.52 
In ascertaining what law applied to the artificial island the court 
construed Section 4 of the Act to adopt the laws of Louisiana, the 
adjacent state.53 No conflict was found with federal law and, following 
Louisiana law, attorneys' fees were not allowed. 
Compensation laws pose especially difficult problems in their applica­
tion to the outer shelf, for there are a number of such statutes potentially 
applicable. Although the Longshoreman's and Harbor Worker's Com­
pensation Act84 is the only federal compensation law specifically men­
tioned in the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act as applying on the 
outer shelf, other federal compensation laws are not thereby excluded. 
Indeed, the Jones Act55 and the Death on the High Seas Act58 
have been frequently applied on the outer shelf.57 A considerable body 
of case law has been generated by the interactions of these laws with 
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each other and with state workmen's compensation laws.58 Which law 
applies may depend upon where the accident which gives rise to the 
cause of action occurs, whether in a state's territorial waters, on the 
outer shelf, or on the seas or in the air over the outer shelf. If on the 
outer shelf, it may also be significant whether the drilling platform 
where the accident occurs is fixed or floating. 
Some guidelines can be discerned. It appears that state workman's 
compensation laws do not apply on the outer shelf,59 being pre-empted 
by the plethora of federal laws there in force. Also, the Death on the 
High Seas Act by its terms applies only "on the high seas beyond a 
marine league from the shores of any state," 60 and could not be invoked 
in the territorial waters of any state except perhaps Texas and Florida.61 
In California, matters are further complicated by the presence of a 
third body of potentially applicable law, municipal law. The state of 
California has made a number of grants of offshore lands to the littoral 
municipalities without reserving any mineral rights.62 As a result, much 
of the offshore land in California and most of the present producing area 
is subject to the law of adjacent municipalities as well as to state law. 
The effect of the laws of the littoral municipalities on the submerged 
lands within the state boundaries depends on whether the state has 
granted those lands to the municipality, as appears from a comparison 
of the two cases of Monterey Oil Co. v. City Court of City of Seal 
Beach 63 and Higgins v. City of Santa Monica.6i 
In the Monterey case petitioner, the operator of an oil rig located 
one and one-half miles offshore from the city of Seal Beach, successfully 
applied for a writ of prohibition to prevent the city court from exercising 
jurisdiction in a criminal prosecution for violation of an ordinance 
which declared unlawful drilling for oil within the city limits. The 
court found no proprietary municipal interest in the offshore lands and 
hence no power to prohibit drilling on the lands. The court also noted 
that the state had fully occupied the field relative to the control and 
leasing of state-owned submerged lands and an ordinance in that area 
was therefore invalid.65 
In the Higgins action, the facts were the same as in the Monterey 
case except that the state had granted the adjacent submerged lands 
to the city.66 The Supreme Court of California held that the ordinance 
was constitutional and a valid exercise of the city's discretionary powers. 
Petitioner's argument that, by the enactment of certain statutes re­
lating to state-granted submerged lands, the state had wholly occupied 
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the field and invalidated the ordinance,67 was rejected, the court 
declaring: 
Although the statutes show a preemption by the State with respect to the 
mode and manner in which a city may execute oil leases to tide and submerged 
lands granted to it by the State, there has been no preemption of the field of 
determining whether or not such lands should be developed for oil or gas.88 
It may be concluded that, absent a grant, the powers of the littoral 
municipalities in the submerged lands are to be exercised at the suffer­
ance of the state and are subject always to being overridden by the 
state and by federal law. 
A very important area of current conflict between state and federal 
laws concerns the seaward boundaries claimed by five states. Four states, 
Alaska,69 New York,70 Maine,71 and Virginia,72 have enacted statutes 
purporting to extend the outer boundaries of their states to submerged 
lands and the superjacent seas "to the extent that jurisdiction is claimed 
by the United States of America, or to the extent recognized by the 
usages and customs of international law or by agreement to which the 
United States of America or the state is a party." The fifth state, 
Florida, claims three marine leagues off the Atlantic Coast.73 
It would appear that the claims of Alaska, Maine, New York, and 
Virginia are in direct conflict with the ruling of the Supreme Court in 
The Tidelands Cases74 and with the doctrine of the Submerged Lands 
Act.7B If so, then the states are entitled to only three miles (or, in 
some cases, three marine leagues) from the coast line, and the applicable 
statutes are invalid. 
It is argued that Florida's claim stands on better reasoning: Although 
Florida has been awarded a boundary of three leagues only in the Gulf 
Coast, the same consideration which impelled the Supreme Court to 
grant it three marine leagues there, the fact that Florida's claims were 
approved by Congress, would seem to support Florida's claim in the 
Atlantic as well. 
IV. Conclusion 
We have come a long way since President Truman's September 28, 
1945, Proclamation concerning the United States continental shelf, and, 
as more and more deposits of minerals and foodstuffs are discovered 
beneath the sea, it will become increasingly important that methods 
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exist for the dispute-free exploitation of the ocean's resources, par­
ticularly those underlying the continental shelf.76 
On the international level, the Convention on the Continental Shelf 
is an important step in that direction. It is hoped that more and more 
nations will accede to its terms. 
Insofar as the United States continental shelf is concerned, the aim 
must be to define the respective jurisdictions of the cities, states and 
federal government with clarity, for the risk of litigation can effectively 
impede offshore exploitation. 
* The writer wishes to express his gratitude to his associates Robert P. Borsody, 
Lester L. Cooper, Jr., and John E. Donnelly for assistance in the preparation of 
this study. 
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will soon be sought. See Wall Street J., Dec. 14, 1965, p. 32, col. 1. In the interim, 
leasing in the unsettled area has continued, see e.g., 29 Fed. Reg. 2703 (February 
26, 1964), for state and federal agreements have settled the ultimate disposition of 
revenues received from the area, see A. W. Lewis, "The State-Federal Interim 
Agreement Concerning Offshore Leasing and Operations," 33 Tul. L. Rev. 331 
(1959). See also 67 Stat. 467 (1953), 43 U.S.C. §1336 (1958); La. Rev. Stat. 
§30:179.11 (Supp. 1964) ; Cal. Pub. Res. Code §6301.5 (1963) ; Alaska Stats. 
§38.05.137 (Supp. 1964). 
32. 67 Stat. 462-71 (1953), 43 U.S.C. §1331^3 (1958). 
33. The territorial extent of the outer continental shelf is not defined in the act. 
Both the Senate and House Committee Reports on the bills regard the outer 
limit as coinciding with the beginning of the continental slope which is described 
as occurring at a depth of approximately 600 feet, see S. Rep. No. 411, 83d Cong., 
1st sess. 3-4 (1953) ; H.R. Rep. No. 413, 83d Cong., 1st sess. 2 (1953), and the 
press release accompanying President Truman's Proclamation of September 28, 
1945, Presidential Proclamation No. 2667, 59 Stat. 884 (1945), the so-called Truman 
Doctrine, also defines the shelf as extending to the 600-foot line. It may be, 
nevertheless, that the Government's ratification of the Convention on the Continental 
Shelf operated automatically to extend United States jurisdiction "to the seabed 
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and subsoil of the submarine areas . . . outside the area of the territorial sea, 
to a depth of 200 metres or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent 
waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas," 
pursuant to the terms of Article 2(1) of the Convention. 
34. 67 Stat. 462 (1953), 43 U.S.C. §1332(a) (19S8). A detailed analysis of the 
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, with well-grounded insight into the legislative 
background of the Act, is contained in Christopher, "The Outer Continental Shelf 
Lands Act: Key to a New Frontier," 6 Stan. L. Rev. 23 (1953). See also Brumfield, 
"State and Federal Laws and Regulations on Offshore Leasing, Drilling and 
Production," in Oil and Gas Operations: Legal Considerations in the Tidelands 
and on Land, 226 (Slovenko ed. 1963) (hereinafter cited as Oil and Gas). 
35. 67 Stat. 462-63 (1953), 43 U.S.C. §1333 (1958). 
36. See note 34 supra and accompanying text. The specific denomination of 
certain federal laws as applicable to the outer shelf does not mean that any other 
federal laws are not applicable. See 67 Stat. 463 (1953), 43 U.S.C. §1333(g) 
(1958). 
37. 44 Stat. 1424-46 (1927), 33 U.S.C. §§901-50 (1958). 
38. 49 Stat. 449-57 (1935), 29 U.S.C. §§151-68 (1958). 
39. State tax laws, however, were exempted from this blanket adoption. See 
67 Stat. 462 (1953), 43 U.S.C. §1333(a) (2) (1958). 
40. See Christopher, "The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act: Key to a New 
Frontier," 6 Stan. L. Rev. 23, 37-41 (1953). Opposition was expressed during the 
debates to states sharing in revenues from the outer shelf, see 99 Cong. Rec. 7479 
(1953), and there has been some concern that the absorption of state laws would 
provide a foothold for states to lay claim to a share, see Christopher, supra at 43. 
However, the Act specifically states that adoption "shall never be interpreted as 
a basis for claiming any interest in . .  . the outer continental shelf . .  . or the 
revenues therefrom." 67 Stat. 462-63 (1953), 43 U.S.C. §1333(a)(3) (1958). 
41. Cf. Washington v. W. C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219 (1924) ; Knicker­
bocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920). Yet the Federal Assimilative 
Crimes Act, 62 Stat. 686 (1948), 18 U.S.C. §13 (1958), which provides for the 
adoption of future as well as existing state criminal law, has been held con­
stitutional. United States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286 (1958). See generally Annot, 
2 1 . Ed. 2d 1686 (1958). 
42. Moreover, as Circuit Judge J. Skelly Wright noted when a judge of the 
Eastern District of Louisiana, peculiar problems of double jeopardy may arise if 
the states continue their practice of punishing offenses occurring off their coastline, 
since a crime on the outer shelf, if punishable by a state government, could be 
punished by the federal government under the same law for an additional penalty. 
Wright, "Jurisdiction in the Tidelands," 33 Tul. L. Rev. 175; 183-84 (1958). 
43. 290 F. 2d 622 (th Cir. 1961), cert, denied, 368 U.S. 957 (1962). 
44. 41 Stat. 537-38 (1920), 46 U.S.C. §§761-68 (1958). 
45. La. Rev. Stats. §22:655 (1959). This statute allows a plaintiff to sue 
defendant's insurer without having exhausted his remedies against the defendant. 
46. 290 F. 2d at 625. 
47. Ibid. 
48. 293 F. 2d60 (5th Cir. 1961). 
49. Id. at 65 n. 6. 
50. Falling into the sea is a hazard expressly recognized by those regulations. 
Id. at 66-67 & n. 11, citing 33 C.F.R. §§143.15-1, -5 (1956). 
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51. 197 F. Supp. 291 (S.D. Tex. 1961). 
52. Id. at 292-93. Under Texas law attorneys' fees were allowable and under 
Louisiana law they were not. 
53. Id. at 293. The Court noted that although there was scant authority on the 
interpretation of Section 4, 67 Stat. 462-63 (1953), 43 U.S.C. §1333(a)(2) (1958), 
Guess v. Read, 290 F. 2d 622 (5th Cir. 1961), cert, denied, 368 U.S. 957 (1962), 
furnished a hint that Louisiana law would apply in a situation such as this. 
54. 44 Stat. 1424-46 (1927), 33 U.S.C. §§901-50 (1958). The Director of the 
Bureau of Employees' Compensation, United States Department of Labor, has 
promulgated regulations concerning the extension of the Longshoreman's and 
Harbor Worker's Compensation Act to the outer continental shelf which are 
contained in Title 20, Code of Federal Regulations, subchapter H and subpart H 
of subchapter A. 
55. 38 Stat. 1185 (1915), 46 U.S.C. §688 (1958). 
56. 41 Stat. 537-38 (1920), 46 U.S.C. §761-68 (1958). 
57. For comment on the possible exposure of employees to pay compensation 
under several laws and the exposure of employees to risks and dangers, some 
of them unique, see Reese, "Status of an Employee in the Tidelands: The Em­
ployer's Viewpoint," Oil and Gas 520; Kierr, "Status of an Employee in the 
Tidelands: The Employee's Viewpoint," Oil and Gas 509. 
58. A number of thoughtful articles have illuminated this rapidly developing 
field of law. See generally Carrere, "Recent Developments in Personal Injury Law 
in the Tidelands," 32 Tul. L. Rev. 27A (1958) ; Eikel, "Legal Procedures in 
Maritime Personal Injury Litigation," 33 Tul. L. Rev. 323 (1958) ; Lyman, "Barge 
and Dredge Workers as Seamen Under the Jones Act," 32 Tul. L. Rev. 202 
(1958) ; Sims, "General Principles Applicable to Maritime Injuries," Oil and Gas 
496; G. W. Stumberg, "Some Aspects of Offshore Injuries," Oil and Gas 570; 
John Minor Wisdom, "Injuries to Maritime Workers: Landlubbing Longshoremen 
and Seagoing Roughnecks in the Muddy Waters of the Fifth Circuit," Oil and 
Gas 559. 
59. See Goodart v. Maryland Gas Co., 139 So. 2d 567 (Ct. App. La. 1962) ; 
cf. Ross v. Delta Drilling Co., 213 F. Supp. 270, 272 (E.D. La. 1962). 
60. 41 Stat. 537 (1920), 46 U.S.C. §761 (1958) ; cf. Bergeron v. Aero Assoc., 
213 F. Supp. 936 (E.D. La. 1963). 
61. See note 30 supra and accompanying text. 
62. See Krueger, "State Tidelands Leasing in California," 5 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 
427, 429 (1958). Mr. Krueger's article contains a comprehensive discussion of the 
California laws covering offshore oil activities, including the text of selected 
statutes, regulations and forms used in leasing. See also Cal. Pub. Res. Code 
§§6871.1,-.2 (Supp. 1963). 
63. 120 Cal. App. 2d 31, 260 P. 2d 846 (Dist. Ct. App. 1953). 
64. 62 Cal. 2d 24, 41 Cal. Rptr. 9, 396 P. 2d 41 (1964). 
65. A parallel civil action involving a building permit ordinance was decided 
on the same day and with the same result. Monterey Oil Co. v. City Court of City 
of Seal Beach, 120 Cal. App. 2d 41, 260 P. 2d 851 (Dist. Ct. App. 1953). 
66. By Cal. Stats. 1917, ch. 78, p. 90, as amended, Cal. Stats. 1949, ch. 616, 
p. 1114. 
67. The statutes adverted to were Cal. Pub. Res. Code §§7058.5, -59, -60. 
The argument was also made that the city, as trustee of the lands granted by 
the state, had an obligation to see that the trust was as productive as possible. 
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The court disposed of this contention by drawing a distinction between a trust 
with a profit purpose and a trust with a safeguarding purpose, and finding the 
city's trust to be of the latter type. Higgins v. City of Santa Monica, supra at 28-29, 
41 Cal. Rptr. at 12, 396 P. 2d at 44. 
68. Id. at 32, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 14, 396 P. 2d at 46. 
69. Alaska Stats. §44.03.010 (1962) provides: "The jurisdiction of the state 
extends to waters offshore from the coast of the state as follows: 
"(1) The marginal sea to its outermost limits as those limits are from time 
to time defined as recognized by the United States of America by international 
treaty or otherwise. 
"(2) The high seas to the extent that jurisdiction is claimed by the United 
States of America, or to the extent recognized by the usages and customs of 
international law or by agreement to which the United States of America or the 
state is a party. 
"(3) Submerged lands including the subsurface of submerged lands, lying under 
the waters mentioned in this section." 
70. N.Y. State Law §7-a (Supp. 1964). 
71. Me. Rev. Stats. Ann. tit. 1, §2 (1964). 
72. Va. Code Ann. §7-1.1 (Supp. 1964). 
73. Fla. Const, art 1. A 1955 Florida law set the East Coast boundary of the 
state at "three geographical miles" from the coast. Fla. Stats. Ann. §6.11 (1961). 
74. See note 26 supra and accompanying text. 
75. See note 27 supra and accompanying text. Section 6(m) of the Alaska State­
hood Act, 72 Stat. 343 (1958), 48 U.S.C. note preceding §21 (Supp. 1963), specified 
that the Submerged Lands Act should apply to Alaska as a state, and it has been 
held that Alaska "is entitled to such powers as have been given to all states by 
the Submerged Lands Act." Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 174 F. Supp. 500, 
503 (D. Alaska 1959), aff'd, 396 U.S. 60 (1961); accord, Kirkpatrick v. Com­
missioner, Dept. of Nat. Resources, 391 P. 2d 7 (Alaska 1964) ; cf. United States 
v. Alaska, 201 F. Supp. 796 (D. Alaska 1962). 
As a matter of fact, Alaska has already come to grips with the federal govern­
ment over territorial claims but on a different issue. In 1963 Alaska planned to 
lease portions of Cook Inlet and Yakutat Bay after favorable survey reports in 
those areas. The United States filed suit to block the leasing, claiming that the 
state is without authority to lease beyond the three-mile line in bays having a 
headlands closure greater than ten miles, United States v. Alaska, No. A-51-63 
(D. Alaska). The case is currently pending. Alaska, however, hews to the twenty-
four mile closure view which has support in international law. See 1 Hyde, 
International Law Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the United States 473 
(2d ed. 1945). The state has recently provided statutory authority for co-operative 
leasing agreements with the United States in the disputed areas, Alaska Stats. 
§38.05.137 (1964). 
76. Economic activity in the United States continental shelf regions in calendar 
1964 (or fiscal 1965) is estimated at $21.4 billion. Natural resources (oil, gas, 
fish, and so forth) taken from the United States continental shelf regions for the 
year reported amounted to about $1.2 billion and cargo salvage is estimated at 
$6 million. The remaining $20.2 billion is made up of income, investments, and 
expenditures associated with the services, missions, and activities of private and 
governmental pursuits. (U.S. Department of Commerce, Development Potential 
of US. Continental Shelves, pt. II, at 4 [April, 1966].) 
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Chapter Seventeen: 
A SYMPOSIUM ON THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS AND 
THE NEED FOR FUTURE MODIFICATIONS 
REIFF: 
Our topic is a vast subject. A good index of the proceeding would 
reveal several hundreds of suggestions for clarifications, correction, 
amplification, or revision of several new conventions. I for one on 
the panel can offer only a few observations and suggestions. I shall 
proceed by a process of enumeration and brief description and leave 
the argument in support until later, if I am asked to provide it. 
I. Observations and Suggestions 
A. Structuring of a Future Conference 
An effort should be made in the preparatory work to provide for 
arranging the composition of the committees or at least the subcom­
mittees to reflect differentials in interest, experience, and expertise of 
the participating nations. This is not a suggestion to use weighted voting 
in the conference: very likely it will be desired to continue to use the 
principle of one state one vote in both the committee system and in 
the plenary sessions, with majority and two-thirds requirements as 
before. What I suggest is the constituting of committees or at least 
the subcommittees along the lines of the patterns adopted in the Inter­
governmental Maritime Consultative Organization for its Council and 
Maritime Safety Committee, Articles 17 and 28, respectively. Thus the 
sixteen members of the Council are selected from nations with (a) the 
"largest" interest and (b) "substantial" interest in providing inter­
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national shipping services and with (a) the "largest" interest and (b) 
"substantial" interest in international seaborne trade. The Maritime 
Safety Committee similarly reflects categories of interest. Article 28 
reads: "The Maritime Safety Committee shall consist of fourteen 
Members elected by the assembly from the Members, Governments of 
those nations having an important interest in maritime safety, of which 
not less than eight shall be the largest ship-owning nations, and the 
remainder shall be elected so as to insure adequate representation of 
Members, Governments of other nations with an important interest 
in maritime safety, such as nations interested in the supply of large 
numbers of crews or in the carriage of large numbers of berthed and 
unberthed passengers, and of major geographical areas." 
Similar methods of categorization of interest are used in a number 
of commodity conventions, e.g., the Coffee Agreement, which groups the 
participants into producers and users. 
B. With Respect to Fisheries 
In the foreseeable future, we shall probably still have to rely upon 
bilateral and multilateral agreements dealing with stocks or regions, 
made by the interested parties. 
The Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Convention is a particularly serv­
iceable model. Two questions may arise with regard to such agreements: 
(a) An increase in the number of parties to the point of overloading 
the fisheries. In such a case, what criterion could be used to restrict 
the number of participants? (b) The securing of acquiescence in the 
regimes by non-parties. Would it be possible to include in the general 
convention on fisheries an obligation by non-parties not to interfere 
with the treaty arrangement? If so, does this lead to an extension of 
the doctrine of abstention? 
C. Some Thoughts on Obligations and Duties 
Thus far the contributors to this volume have stressed rights under 
the Geneva conventions and generally in use of the sea. I should like 
to emphasize some obligations and duties. This is justified, I believe, 
by our increasing emphasis on the sea as res communis. 
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1. Law of nuisances.—I think that it is time to consider a law of 
nuisances that obligates an individual state not to create nuisances and 
that grants it some authority in their eradication. There is a need for 
systematic preliminary study in this regard. We already have some 
doctrinal examination of the notion in the Trail Smelting Case between 
the United States and Canada. No doubt, considerable materials could 
be gathered together to help in the formulation of such a law. 
Thus far we have dealt with nuisances piecemeal. A good example 
is the Convention on Oil Pollution of Navigable Waters (1954). 
Another is the obligation in Article 25 in the High Seas Convention 
with respect to pollution of the seas by means of radioactive wastes. 
One of the objectives of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty also seeks to 
avoid contamination of the sea by fall-out. 
Such a nuisance law could set up criteria of reasonable care, with 
principles derived from private law. We already have an example in 
the Convention on the Protection of Submarine Cables. 
Other types of activities might, with proper definitions, be considered 
under a nuisance law, such as: dumping of refuse or debris on fishing 
grounds; "pirate" radio stations; failure to notify the emergence into 
the sea of floating islands; the dumping of live ammunition or lethal 
gases in offshore areas where they may create hazards for both fisheries 
and exploitation of the continental shelf; the disposal of hulks at sea 
in places which may interfere with fisheries, submarine cables, or 
exploitation of the continental shelf; and so forth. 
2. Navigational safety.—It may be possible to create some firm 
obligations to light coasts and provide for navigational safety and to 
chart coasts, with an ancillary duty to file navigational charts (but 
not charts indicating territorial water boundaries, or contiguous zone 
boundaries, or continental shelf boundaries) with the Intergovernmental 
Maritime Consultative Organization or the Cartographic Office of the 
United Nations. Obligations such as these might have a salutary effect 
on excessive claims to territorial seas. 
[AUTHOR'S NOTE: In discussion after the panel, it was pointed out 
that national hydrographic services supply each other with their charts 
and also file their charts with the International Hydrographic Bureau 
at Monaco. At a recent date, however, only thirty-nine governments 
were members (International Scientific Organizations, p. 383), among 
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them, naturally, the more enterprising and responsibility-assuming gov­
ernments. The creation of a "firm obligation" to chart and file charts, 
as well as to promote navigational safety along coasts, should, however, 
be additionally considered by IMCO or a future law of the sea conference.] 
D. Additional Minor Suggestions 
1. Clarification of the law relating to treasure trove or archeological 
discoveries in the continental shelf, or beyond, seaward of territorial 
waters.—Consideration should also be given to protection against vandal­
ism in connection with archeological sites or relics. The sovereign rights 
of the coastal state are restricted to exploring the continental shelf and 
exploiting its natural resources. Both the convention and the law of 
salvage should be clarified with respect to both treasure trove and 
archeological research. 
2. Coastal land fills.—There is considerable activity going on in 
various parts of the world—Hong Kong, Japan, the coasts of Florida, 
outside harbors, along shore—aimed at creating additional land areas 
for airports, residential, industrial, and other purposes. These land areas 
reach into the territorial sea. They are not mere "permanent harbour 
works" envisaged by Article 8 of the Convention on the Territorial 
Sea. If the rule of riparian boundary law is used to determine the base­
line from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured, then 
artificial modification of the low-water line creates no new baseline. 
Thus far no serious problem of jurisdiction seems to have arisen inter­
nationally, but it has arisen in relation to the offshore claims of the 
federal government and the state of California. (Shalowitz, Shore and 
Sea Boundaries, I, 101—4.) Internationally, however, certain complexities 
could arise if the creation of such coastal land becomes significant 
enough. Thus, if the riparian rule for the original low-water line is 
used, it is conceivable that new land created on a proper coast could 
extend so far into the territorial sea as to eliminate it as a jurisdictional 
area, leaving the coastal state with only the contiguous zone as measured 
from the original low-water base line. If the riparian rule is not used 
and a new low-water line is recognized at the outer limits of the 
artificially created land, then the coastal state is in a good position to 
extend its territorial sea and contiguous zone seaward. In areas where 
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the land-fill faces a wide-open sea, it would seem no great harm to 
the regime of the high seas would result, provided navigational safety 
is assured. In narrow straits, however, if such land fills were feasible, 
problems would speedily arise with respect to use of the strait. It may 
be premature to deal with this type situation of land fills at any imme­
diately forthcoming conference: there are other, numerous and more 
important, problems to be solved. But the phenomenon may grow and 
require attention at some future date. 
3. Sport fishing.—Increased leisure has led to enormous increases 
in sport fishing in recent decades. Well-managed clubs and tournaments 
provide by rule for non-wasteful disposal of the fish taken. Otherwise, 
however, there must be considerable waste. Some attention might be 
given this matter in any revision of the convention on fisheries. 
4. Artificial reefs.—Attention should be given to the hazards to 
navigation represented by artificial reefs constructed in aid of sport 
fishing, particularly when these are situated beyond the territorial sea. 
5. Fixed geographical stations.—The International Oceanographic 
Commission has asked the IMCO to prepare a convention on both manned 
and unmanned installations. Certainly, general interest in the sea is 
now sufficiently high to justify a forthcoming conference on the law of 
the sea to give its approval, by resolution or otherwise, to such a 
convention. 
6. Navigation lanes through oil fields.—The increased size of oil 
fields located on the continental shelf and the rapidly proliferating 
number of tankers that serve them suggest the desirability of giving 
some attention to the possible hazards to navigation that these operations 
represent. 
II. Continued Leadership of the United States 
The United States has a commendable record, which extends over 
nearly all of the past century, in advancing rational use of the sea, a 
record that is replete with progressive proposals, commitments, and 
instances of co-operation. This nation is in an excellent position to 
furnish leadership to the world in this important area, and it should 
by all means continue to do so. 
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JOHNSON : 
Instead of discussing possible new conventions to follow the 1958 
Geneva conventions on the law of the sea, I should like to comment on 
the proposals by the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, 
by Christy and Scott, in their book The Common Wealth in Ocean 
Resources, and others, suggesting that either the mineral or fishery 
resources of the sea, or both, be turned over to the United Nations or 
some other international organization. Although some of the objectives 
of these proposals are widely lauded, I am convinced that unless the 
proposals themselves are made more realistic they will never be any­
thing more than "pie in the sky." 
Professor Burke has carefully described the existing political and 
power structure in the world and demonstrated why these proposals 
are quite unrealistic at the present time. However, this is not to say 
that the political and power structure of the world cannot change. In 
the past, we have seen such changes brought about by wars, by industrial 
expansion, by changes in the population, and similar major events; such 
events may again occur, or may now be taking place. I would point, 
for example, to the war in Vietnam, and to the potential starvation that 
may result from the anticipated population explosion. Man's attitude 
toward the United Nations, or to the distribution of the resources of 
the sea may undergo a significant change when it appears that ten or 
twenty million people, or more are likely to starve in a given year. 
The goals of these several proposals appear to be: 
1.	 To encourage production of the greatest possible amount of food 
and other resources from the sea. 
2.	 To cause a larger share of these resources to be distributed to 
the less developed countries. 
3.	 To prevent overcapitalization of high seas fishing and mineral 
extraction capacity by the various nations involved in ocean 
resource development. 
4.	 To provide the United Nations with a reliable source of funds for 
its budget. 
Goal No. 2, providing a greater percentage of the ocean's resources 
for the less developed countries, appears to be either implicit or explicit 
in all of the proposals. Apparently, this goal is to be achieved by giving 
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the United Nations control over the resources of the sea along with 
the power to issue licenses for substantial fees, or tax the profits made 
from ocean resource development. As if this were not difficult enough 
in itself, the area of yet greater difficulty concerns how these profits 
might be distributed by the United Nations after they are collected. 
It is one thing to say that the United Nations ought to collect or receive 
such profits, but it is quite another to design an acceptable distribution 
system of those profits after they are in hand. What criteria would be 
used ? Would this wealth be used only for emergency donations ? Would 
it be distributed on the basis of gross national product per number of 
citizens? Would it be distributed on the basis of "need" and if so how 
would this be determined? Would it be turned over to some adminis­
trative agency under the authority of the General Assembly to hand 
out as their discretion dictated? Would the General Assembly itself 
acting something as the Congress of the United States make the distri­
bution as they saw fit ? These are exceedingly difficult questions. 
It seems to me that this distribution problem is one of the most 
troublesome points in the whole proposal, however none of the proposals 
I have seen has made any attempt to solve it. It is one of the very 
early subjects which must be taken up if these ideas are to get any 
further than mere speculation. 
A second problem that is basic to the various proposals concerns the 
distinction between those resources that are already being exploited, 
and to which the nations of the world would claim "vested rights," 
and those that are not yet claimed or vested. It would seem improbable 
in the extreme to think the fishery or mineral resources of the sea 
that are now being exploited would voluntarily be turned over by the 
nations of the world to some international agency. As an outside possi­
bility one might think that the yet unexploited or unclaimed resources 
might be turned over. Then the question is, What resources are now 
subject to vested rights or claims and what not? How does one define 
or separate those resources or geographical areas which are not now 
being exploited or claimed from those which are being exploited or 
claimed? Some of my students and I, this last year, diligently tried to 
compose language which would make this separation. We could not 
do it. Such language must be widely understandable not only in English 
but in the numerous other languages of the world. In our seminar we 
tried various phrases that had some meaning in American law, such 
as "appropriated," "vested rights," "historic rights," and others. None 
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was adequate. With regard to fisheries, one is faced with the special 
fact that several powerful nations of the world have large distant water 
fishing fleets. These nations might be expected to claim "vested or 
historic" rights through the development of these fleets to fish stocks 
in all the high seas fishery areas of the world. Remember that the key 
to the success of such fleets is their mobility, their ability to move from 
one stock of fish or geographical area to another. They were not designed 
to fish a single stock of fish or a single geographical area but were 
designed on the "expectancy" that they would be able to roam the 
high seas and go where the fish are. It would seem unlikely that such 
nations would lightly agree to give up the right to fish any area, of the 
high seas. 
An easier problem it would seem, would concern the nations with 
coastal fisheries only. Conceivably one might argue that they have 
historic or vested rights only to the stocks of fish and geographical 
areas in which they have operated in the past. Not that this would be 
easy, but it would be easier than handling the problem of the nations 
with the distant water fishing fleets. 
As between fisheries and minerals, it is likely that the mineral problem 
would be more easily approached than fisheries. Because fewer minerals 
of the sea have been exploited in the past there are fewer "vested" or 
"historic" claims to them. 
Possibly a better way to approach the whole subject would be to 
turn it around and ask which of the mineral and fishery resources of 
the sea are clearly not subject to any historic or vested claims at present. 
If this approach were used the quantity of fishery and mineral resources 
turned over to the United Nations would likely be smaller than other­
wise, but in the context of political reality such a proposal might have 
more chance of succeeding. 
In conclusion, it might be worth a special effort by the proponents of 
these proposals to try to identify the national interests of the U.S., the 
U.S.S.R., Japan, and the other major sea powers that would be served 
by carrying out such proposals. Maybe such national interests do exist 
which are not now readily perceived (although I, myself, have a great 
difficulty in conceiving of them). For example, what will be the relation­
ship of the population explosion (and the world's growing need for 
food) to the concept of "sovereignty" and to the development of inter­
national organizations in the coming years. I could not say that the 
proponents of these proposals should look forward to the results of such 
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studies with great optimism; however, it should be remembered that 
historically the humanitarian or generous act of one generation often 
becomes the act of necessity for the next. 
GOLDIE : 
There can be little basis, if any at all, for disagreeing with the wide­
spread acclamations which the four Geneva conventions on the law of 
the sea in 1958, and their attendant protocol and resolutions, have 
received. Nor can we cavil at such statements as: 
The United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea held in Geneva from 
February 24 to April 28, 1958, is unquestionably the most important international 
conference ever held on this subject, and one of the most significant attempts 
ever made by governments of the world to codify international law.1 
The only addendum that I would like to make is that the conventions' 
significance derives, not only from the amount of important codification 
achieved, but also from the inclusion of new concepts falling under the 
rubric of "the progressive development of international law." Although 
all the conventions contain many fascinating points of discussion, and 
formulations which invite proposals for modification, I shall restrict my 
discussion to some specific issues which call for modifications to the 
Convention on the Continental Shelf. Furthermore, the discussion which 
follows will be restricted to the problems of offshore boundaries and 
zones and special problems of offshore control. 
I. 
Several different definitions of the continental shelf region have been 
offered. The geographer Bourcart, for example, in his leading treatise, 
Geographic du fond des mers: Etude du relief des oceans, has defined 
the shelf as being the submarine land masses that lie beneath the shallow 
sea areas between the shores and the rupture du pente, or "break of 
slope"—that is, the first substantial falloff, whatever the depth. Bourcart 
has also described this zone as the "ocean rim." 
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Bourcart's concept is predicated on a vision of the continental land 
masses and insular areas beyond the continental regions as standing, as 
it were, on vast pedestals above the ocean abyss. Lying off-shore, but 
underneath the oceans, and between the shores and the depths, a shallow 
shoulder extends for some distance seaward. This terminates in a steeper 
slope and plunges into the ocean abyss. At the point where the slope 
becomes steeper and plunges downward, Bourcart saw the terminating 
point of the continental shelf. Here definition reflects geographical 
reality. Other geographers, taking the view that there is a tendency, 
in many parts of the world, for the rupture du pente to coincide with 
the two hundred meter bathymetric contour line, have proposed that, 
for the purpose of obtaining a useful working definition, the geographical 
continental shelf should be denned as extending from the shore to this 
isobar, without consideration of the actual break in slope. We should, 
perhaps, note that the International Committee on the Nomenclature of 
the Ocean Bottom Features of the International Association of Physical 
Oceanography at Monaco (a member of the International Council of 
Scientific Unions) favors the latter mode. 
Following the majority of oceanographers, ocean biologists, and 
ocean zoologists, the International Law Commission proposed, and the 
1958 Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea accepted, the 200 meter 
bathymetric contour line as one of the two criteria for determining the 
existence of the legal continental shelf (as distinct from the geographi­
cal). Article 1 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf 
states: 
For the purpose of these articles, the term "continental shelf" is used as 
referring (a) to the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to 
the coast but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 metres 
or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits 
of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas; (b) to the 
seabed and subsoil of similar submarine areas adjacent to the coasts of islands. 
Can the two tests, that of the 200 bathymetric contour line and that 
of exploitability, be taken in conjunction? The history of the Conference 
shows that the exploitability test was inserted into Article I to have a 
supplementary and subordinate function. It was intended to permit a 
coastal state to exercise sovereign rights over continental shelf activities 
carried out on the continental slopes and in the continental borderland 
in the continuation of activities begun, or connected with those carried 
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out, in the zone between its territorial sea and the 200 meter bathymetric 
contour line. The test was thus a practical measure, and one intended 
to give a practical solution to day to day problems which would arise 
if the 200 meter bathymetric contour line were accepted as a complete 
and final cutoff line. 
Both of the tests for determining the submarine regions to be 
designated the "continental shelf" of the coastal state for the purposes 
of the convention are admittedly fictitious. Be that as it may, the 
definition of the continental shelf by reference to the 200 meter bathy­
metric contour line may, especially, perhaps, in the seclusion of the 
study, the atmosphere of the classroom, and that of the courtroom, give 
an impression of having at least a tenuous connection with Bourcart's 
geographical shelf. In any given case the coincidence of the break in 
the slope with the 200 meter line will be accidental. The geographical 
and the legal shelves may, in concrete situations, be widely divergent; 
but there is a general and perhaps abstract congruence. On the other 
hand the test of exploitability has no claim to verisimilitude with geo­
graphical reality. It is clearly quite independent of the geographical 
and oceanological concept of the pedestal upon which the land masses 
rest—the geographer's notion of the part the continental shelf plays 
in the depiction of the world's oceanographic features. Indeed this test 
is as free of any empirical connection with the geographical shelf as 
are the much-criticized 200 miles seaward "continental shelf" claims 
of Peru, Ecuador, Chile, and Costa Rica. Like these claims, furthermore, 
the exploitability test provides no criteria limiting the claims short of 
median lines, or perhaps thalwegs, in the abysses in the middle of 
the oceans. 
Certain present-day developments, although now almost entirely in 
their experimental phases, underscore this point. Direction drilling for 
oil and gas, Captain Jacques-Yves Cousteau's Conself I, II, and III, 
the United States Navy's Sea-Lab, the developments in submersibles 
by the aerospace industry, Edwin Link's Man-in-Sea Project, the 
discovery of the beckoning wealth of mineral nodules (as well as subsoil 
minerals including petroleums) existing at great depths on the ocean's 
floor, all point to the pending obsolescence of the 200 meter bathymetric 
contour line test. They place emphasis on the exploitability test. These 
two tests (i.e., depth and exploitability) may be seen as not only distinct, 
and mutually exclusive, but also in potential competition. For, whereas 
the 200 meter bathymetric contour line was chosen as a test because 
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it clearly and unequivocally indicated the outer limits of the submarine 
areas wherein states could exercise their rights, the exploitability test, 
largely thanks to its indeterminacy, permits the assumption of sovereign 
rights without consideration of depth. It is, hence, a test which may be 
available to excuse extensions to rights beyond the limiting depth of 
200 meters vertically, and horizontally beyond the land-encircling 200 
meter bathymetric contour line. This points to the final paradox: The 
test which was conceived in 1958 as having a subordinate function 
promises, in the next decade, to supplant that to which it had been 
originally attached as a supplementary and supernumerary concept. 
In addition to the expected effect upon claims to "offshore boundaries 
and zones," the impending transfer of contemporary experimental 
developments to industry will affect current activities connected with 
the North Sea's bed and subsoil. As the common continental shelf of 
its littoral states, this provides another warning against a facile adoption 
of the exploitability test. At the outset we should note that the North 
Sea states have departed, in some cases to quite a considerable degree, 
from "what the law allows," when the "law" is taken to be the Con­
vention on the Continental Shelf. It was tempered, if not with mercy, 
then at least with equity. Thus, on at least one interpretation of Article 1 
(and this arguably, the interpretation most consistent with the apparent 
intention of the framers of the convention at Geneva), the United 
Kingdom could have validly asserted sovereign rights over the whole 
of the North Sea's sea bed and subsoil lying above a depth of two 
hundred meters from the surface of the sea and which lies to the north 
of a parallel of latitude subtending westerly from the most southerly 
point on the south bank of the Norwegian Trench lying at the depth 
of 200 meters. Alternatively a British claim could have been asserted 
to a slightly smaller area which may be seen as lying above a depth of 
200 meters and to the north of a section of a parallel of latitude drawn 
westerly from the most northerly point of a boundary line running south 
from the southerly 200 meter bathymetric contour line of the Norwegian 
Trench, and establishing a north-south boundary between the British 
and Danish submarine zones of the North Sea. 
Application of either of these alternative systems of measurement 
predicated on the 200 meters of depth criterion would entail the ex­
clusion of Norway from what we have been led to believe to be the 
impending North Sea oil and gas bonanza. In contrast with these 
possibilities, the British proclamations made due allowance for a Nor­
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wegian claim extending at least as far west as a median line between 
the two states. Was this an acknowledgment of a possible valid Nor­
wegian claim predicated on the exploitability test? A study of con­
temporary British publications, both official and unofficial, would lead 
to a negative reply. The British restraint arose from the pragmatic 
desire to proceed as quickly as possible and to avoid time-consuming 
disputes, and an acknowledgment that equity would appear to be on 
the side of opposition to a greatly extended British claim reaching to 
the Norwegian Trench. 
Because, however, some writers have sought to predicate the Nor­
wegian claim upon the exploitability test, and have done so with 
considerable persuasiveness, it becomes clear that, to these writers at 
least, the test is no longer subordinate and supplemental. Analysis 
might be helped, I would suggest, by asking the question: What would 
be the effect upon Norway's claim to share in the wealth of the North 
Sea's bed and subsoil if the exploitability test were deleted from the 
legal definition of the continental shelf? I submit, none. In the actual 
circumstances of the North Sea states' situation, the government of 
the United Kingdom, in terms of equity, comity, and respect for Nor­
wegian claims, unilaterally promulgated a claim only out to a line 
some miles west of a true median between the Norwegian and British 
coasts. (The claim was not asserted as far to the east as the median line 
would allow so that later adjustment could be worked out, if necessary, 
in terms of unclaimed areas.) It might be argued that such a respect 
for the equities might not obtain in other, and perhaps less developed, 
or friendly regions. My submission is not that Anglo-Norwegian diplo­
matic relations provide a substitute whereby parties might ignore claims 
in terms of "exploitability" on the one hand, and "continuity" on the 
other, but that the hard facts of proximity on the same shelf, and a 
need to observe standards of good neighborliness (involving self-
restraint) provide the guidelines of settlement. In this context, it 
should be observed, an adherence to the exploitability test as provided 
by Article 1 could provide a vehicle for the manifestation of chauvinistic 
self-assertiveness. 
In his excoriation of the then developing legal doctrines of the 
continental shelf (in his important article "Plateau Continental et Droit 
International"),2 Professor Scelle pointed out that such developments 
may do no more than excuse an ever-increasing series of claims into 
the common domain of the high seas, both upward to embrace the 
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superjacent sea and the superambient air, and outward further into 
the oceans until a thalweg in the abyss is reached. He envisaged the 
free high seas as finally being enclosed in the territories of the coastal 
states. I submit that these encroachments need not occur, provided the 
definition of the legal continental shelf given by the 200 meter bathy­
metric contour line (in preference to the test of the break in slope of 
the realist, or geographical concept of the continental shelf, only because 
of the definitional difficulties and legal problems which may be involved 
in any concrete situation) is rigorously adhered to. On the other hand, 
the exploitability test, now included in Article 1, encourages the over­
throw of the simple, if formalist, concept of the shelf which the 200 
meter line provides. It need not provide an essential argument in the 
development, and recognition, of Norway's claim to share in the riches 
of the North Sea's continental shelf. It will encourage those encroach­
ments into the oceans, made feasible by recent scientific and technological 
developments, against which Professor Scelle forewarned us. My first 
proposed modification of the Continental Shelf Convention is, accord­
ingly, that the exploitability test should be deleted from Article 1. 
If, despite the arguments in the preceding pages, the exploitability 
test is not to be eliminated as a legal definition of the continental shelf's 
extent, or if it is to be retained, with a view to possibly providing (on 
mistaken premises, I submit) solutions for problems arising in such 
areas as the North Sea, the Mediterranean, the Caribbean, the Persian 
Gulf, the Red Sea, and the Arafura Sea, then Article 1 should be 
modified. It should be redrafted so that the two tests can function side 
by side, each in its own area of effectiveness. Such a redrafting should 
eliminate the present ambiguities and sources of conflict between the 
tests by spelling out the scope of the rights which are to depend on 
the test of depth plus continuity (the 200 bathymetric contour line test) 
and the scope of the rights which are to depend on the exploitability 
test. Furthermore, we should be told the conditions which permit 
valid reliances on the 200 meter depth once the first bathymetric contour 
line of that depth has been passed and when an adjacent shallow sea 
area of less than 200 meters—for example, a submarine mount—is 
reached, and when reliance should be placed on exploitability. Secondly, 
the Convention should clarify the conditions of when, and whether, 
rights dependent upon the depth of sea are to prevail over those 
supported by exploitability, and vice versa. Thirdly, the Convention 
should clearly state whether the exploitability test allows a state to 
278 
THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS 
leapfrog deep areas (on an analogy, perhaps, with the World War II 
military strategy of "island hopping"). Does it permit the United States, 
for example, to assert a claim to the Cortes Bank, a submarine mount 
some two hundred miles from the coast of California—and Mexico's 
Baja California del Norte? Although this paragraph points to the need 
for the modification of Article 1 in the event of the retention of the 
exploitability test, the difficulties this discussion points to, namely those 
attendant on the inclusion of equal and conflicting criteria, are equally 
strong arguments in support of the elimination of the exploitability test 
altogether. 
II. 
Although the deletion of the exploitability test from Article I of 
the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf would solve the prob­
lems just indicated, such a deletion would give rise to others—especially 
in view of the fact that man can now exploit, and will soon be able 
to live and work for extended periods, below the depth of 200 meters. 
The question may be asked whether the elimination of the exploitability 
test would, on balance, create greater difficulties than its retention. 
How could legal titles over appropriated resources be secured if states 
may not extend their legal systems into areas where the resources are 
being won? How can access to resources beyond the continental shelf 
regions be limited and regulated so as to prevent the supervention of 
the anarchy which so frequently attends claims based on the doctrine 
of occupation? Finally, how, in the absence of a state exercising regu­
latory powers ("sovereign rights"), or in the absence of an international 
authority (for example, as suggested as one of three possible develop­
ments by Drs. Christy and Scott in their book, The Common Wealth 
in Ocean Fisheries and advocated by the Commission to Study the 
Organization of Peace in its Seventeenth Report),3 can the taking of 
sea bed and subsoil resources below the 200 meter bathymetric contour 
line be regulated, so as to prevent overcapitalization and overproduction 
and costs of congestion? In reviewing these questions I would suggest 
they are so complex and ramifying that to rely simply on the exploit-
ability test for their solution would be illusory. They require no less 
than a treaty regime which would assure exclusive titles regarding the 
taking of mineral resources from the sea bed and subsoil of the oceans 
below the two hundred meter depth. This treaty regime should be gov­
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erned, I suggest, by additional articles to those already existing in the 
Geneva Conventions. They may be cast into the form of a fifth conven­
tion, the "Convention on the Resources of the Seabed and Subsoil of 
the High Seas." (Alternatively the articles I am suggesting could be 
formulated as additional articles to the Convention on the High Seas.) 
However characterized, these articles should be formulated so as to 
assure firm titles to minerals recovered from the sea bed and subsoil of 
the oceans beyond both the territorial limits of states and their continental 
shelves. The underlying theory, I suggest, should be an equivalent, 
among the signatory states, to a regime of recognition, or of "Full Faith 
and Credit" to be accorded by the authorities of all the states who are 
parties to the resources won from the bed and subsoil of the deep oceans. 
To be more explicit: my intention, in what is to follow, is to propose 
the principles of a regime governing the assurance of titles created under 
the municipal law of each state by their recognition in the courts of all 
the others through an international agreement and by means of establish­
ing, under public international treaty law, conflict of law obligations 
of recognition. 
Before I spell out the principles of such a regime I should utter 
two warnings. The first is that the doctrine of occupation, in whatever 
guise of "first come first served" it may appear, should be conscientiously 
eschewed. Any analogies which one may be tempted to discuss between 
the proposed articles and the occupation provisions of the Berlin Con­
vention on the Congo, 1885, for example, are illusory. The second is 
that I feel the moment to be not yet ripe to invest in an international 
agency discretionary powers of granting territory to states, or the right 
to win and appropriate resources to individuals. Here the emphasis is 
on the power to grant. Perhaps I should add that my own feeling is 
that the accordance of such a granting power, if only it were currently 
feasible, would be highly advantageous, and would be in the interests 
of humanity. Be that as it may, rather than enter into frustrating con­
flicts now, the main policy goals of secure titles, limited access to a 
resource to insure the prevention of over-capitalization, overproduction 
and congestion, and the avoidance of "first come first served" tactics 
and the ensuing conflicts, could be gained if regional agencies (with, 
necessarily, a central index in the United Nations Secretariat) could 
be established to carry out evidentiary (notice) and recording functions. 
We might, perhaps, and with great profit, note that at least one United 
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Nations agency, namely the International Telecommunication Union 
(ITU) performs a similar function to the one I am proposing. Its 
function is, moreover, relative to those increasingly valuable property 
interests, radio frequencies—increasingly valuable because they are be­
coming increasingly scarce. Minimally therefore, the proposed draft 
articles would include, in broad terms: 
1. The recognition of a right inuring in signatory states to acquire, 
and have recorded, specialized zones of jurisdiction and control whereby 
they would be enabled to give legal title over resources appropriated 
from the sea bed and subsoil to their citizens (whether individuals or 
corporations) under their own municipal laws. Such zones of special 
jurisdiction would, in addition to clothing physical appropriations with 
legal rights, enable the recording state, under whose jurisdiction the 
zone was recorded, to protect the enterprises working the areas within 
its competence from piracy, theft, violence, trespasses of all kinds, and 
a general disregard of the legal validity and consequences of appropria­
tions made in the zone. 
2. The establishment of international recording agencies, organized 
on regional bases, with a central index in the United Nations Secretariat. 
When activated by a state with a valid claim, these agencies would have 
power to issue instruments defining the recording state's Zone of 
Special Jurisdiction. 
3. (a) On an analogy with the Guano Islands Act of 1856,4 the 
originating initiative could well be left to the citizens of the signatory 
states. In fact a two-step function is envisaged. First, an individual or 
an enterprise would record, with the state of its nationality (presumably 
with the consulate closest to the location of the resource), its claim 
to a sea bed resource beyond the continental shelf (and, a fortiori, beyond 
the territorial limits) of any state. This would be a municipal law claim, 
operating only within the law of the state with which that claim had 
been recorded, (b) The country with which the claim to explore for, 
and exploit, the resource had been recorded would then record, in its 
own turn, its international claim to exercise jurisdiction and control 
over the individual's (or enterprise's) activity with the agency indicated 
in §(2) above. The decision to lodge an instrument of international 
recordation would be left to the state concerned. The provisions I am 
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proposing would not impose an obligation to record, as a result of a 
private citizen's initiative, upon a signatory state—simply a right. But 
once a state has recorded, then its laws would govern the winning of 
the resource. 
4. The system of recordation of the title to the property taken 
from the sea bed and subsoil as a result of the private individual's or 
corporation's initiative should be determined by the law of the state 
exercising jurisdiction and control. To accord immediate legal validity 
to these titles in the courts of other signatory states would not be a 
function of international treaty rules. In enacting their domestic legis­
lation the states adhering to the international regime could choose to 
follow principles of recordation of title or of registration under analogies 
with the Torrens or other systems. Whatever the form of the domes­
tically created titles, the international regime would call for their 
recognition, in terms of an international parallel to a federal Full Faith 
and Credit clause, in the courts, and by the authorities, of all the other 
signatories to the international convention (whatever domestic system 
of recordation and/or registration the state called upon to recognize a 
title in any case may follow). 
5. Although, in their municipal laws, states might, on an analogy 
with the mining laws of many states of the United States and of 
Australia, as well as with a number of the provinces of Canada, accord 
priority between competing claimants on the basis of "pure race" con­
cepts, I submit that the international recording systems should bear 
closer analogies to the "race notice" principle than to the "pure race" 
principle. (The dispute between the United States and Great Britain in 
1867-77 over the Western Australian Lacepede Islands gives strength 
to this proposal.) 
6. The authority of a state exercising the jurisdiction and control 
permitted in these articles should be limited to the working of the 
specific resource which had been initially recorded (or registered) 
with it. Thus recordation with the appropriate international regional 
agency of a state's claim to exercise jurisdiction and control over the 
winning of manganese nodules by one of its citizens (whether an indi­
vidual or a corporation), would not give it any authority whatever to 
exercise sovereign rights over nearby sulphur deposits or oil pools— 
let alone fisheries in the superjacent sea. Thus the zone of special juris­
diction would receive its first limiting characteristic—that of purpose. 
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7. Secondly, the special jurisdiction should be limited as to time. 
A state's authority over a submarine area should not survive the period 
that area is actually worked. Thus the termination of the exploration 
and/or the exploitative activity of an individual or corporation should 
terminate the state's jurisdiction and control. 
8. Thirdly, states' sovereign rights over recorded zones of special 
jurisdiction should be limited as to areas. What the precise areas should 
be is, clearly, dependent upon a great number of variables, e.g.: con­
centration of the resource, the cost of winning, processing and marketing 
it, the reserves required, and the projected demand. Again, states 
should be obligated to require and supervise rigorously the prompt 
working of claims recorded (or registered) with them, prevent the 
possibility of conspiracies between individuals or corporations to enter 
claims under fictitious names, and exclude "dummying" activities. The 
convention should, further, establish requirements of minimum times 
within which a resource should be proved, and the minimum investment 
allowable for both exploration and exploitation in order to keep a 
claim fresh and valid. Finally, states which record instruments giving 
notice of their sovereign rights over the working of a resource with 
the appropriate international regional agency should be required to 
exercise effective control over the working. Indeed, I suggest that an 
inability to exercise effective control should be a valid excuse for states 
to deny recognition of title to appropriations not subjected to the 
effective control of the recording state. 
9. The Convention should contain assurances that charges in the 
international recording agency for the recordation of the requisite instru­
ments should not defray any costs other than those incurred by that 
agency for purposes of administering its recordation system. 
10. So far the issue of military activities and national defense have 
not been canvassed. My suggestion is that these activities should fall 
within a distinct regime (or number of regimes) from those suggested 
for the proposed convention. The defense regime should also be indi­
cated here. My suggestion is that, on an analogy with the relevant 
Trusteeship Articles of the United Nations Charter, states seeking to 
establish fixed defense installations on sea mounts and on the sea bed 
should give notice to the effect that such areas are taken for defense 
purposes and are not to be viewed as being any longer within the gen­
eral regime of the sea bed and its subsoil. Upon such an announcement 
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the state in question may, further, establish security zones. The rights 
asserted would be analogous to those in the Australian Defence (Special 
Undertakings) Act, No. 19 of 1952 (proclaiming the Porto Bello Islands 
to be a "prohibited area" for the conduct of atomic tests), rather than 
the Notice to Mariners concept followed by the United States and the 
Soviet Union in their nuclear weapon testing areas on the high seas. 
(Naturally the proclamations of defense areas would be accompanied 
by notices to mariners.) Naval submarines would not, of course, fall 
within this regime. They will have to take their chances, as heretofore, 
as they clandestinely move about under the cover of the seas. 
In concluding this outline of the Draft Articles on the Resources of 
the Sea Bed and Subsoil, I would like to add the observation that indi­
viduals, corporations, and, indeed, states should be perfectly free to 
invoke, or not to invoke, at their discretion, the foregoing principles. 
They might, conceivably, prefer to carry on a specific submarine activity 
outside this regime and in secret. If, for example, states do not invoke 
the procedures suggested above, then their citizens may still mine in the 
sea bed and subsoil beyond continental shelf regions and outside the 
zones of special jurisdiction of other states; but only on the basis of 
the general international law privilege of taking the resource. Should, 
for example, a dispute as to title come before the courts of a third state 
(or before an international tribunal) over a shipment of oil taken from 
a sea-bed operation outside continental shelf regions (as defined by the 
200 meter bathymetric contour line), between a state (or its citizens) 
asserting ownership under the general and traditional privilege of appro­
priating items of the sea's wealth and a state (or its citizens) which was 
acting under the regime proposed in this paper, then, analogously with 
the "race-notice" recording statutes with which we are all familiar, the 
rights established under the regime should prevail over those derived 
from traditional concepts and practices permitting appropriations on, or 
under, the high seas. 
Again, a state placing a higher value on secrecy with respect to an 
installation on the sea bed than on the regime envisaged in §(10) above 
could stay outside that regime and rely on whatever protections general 
international law might allow. Primarily, reliance would, clearly, be not 
on any legal concepts, but upon secrecy and camouflage—in the widest 
sense. (This is, of course, the present position.) Outside the regime a 
state could not demand the immunities and protections, nor the exclusive 
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rights, which the regime would afford, any more than today the U.S. 
Navy can demand exclusive rights on the high seas when its exercises 
excite the curiosity of Russian trawlers. In brief, a state opting to bring 
a fixed submarine installation into the regime gains immunity, but at 
the cost of the secrecy of that installation's general location—but not of 
its exact location, nor of its characteristics. If the state prefers the 
shield of secrecy, it will stay outside the regime; but at the cost of im­
munity if the secret should be broken, or the installation discovered. 
Finally, I would like to suggest that a treaty regime embodying the 
principles I have just suggested would achieve two important objectives. 
First, it would secure titles to appropriated goods, and by limiting access 
to any given resource, tend to reduce overcapitalization and losses due to 
overproduction and congestion. Second, it would meet, and answer, by 
offering a more certain alternative, the usual arguments supporting the 
exploitability test—namely the need to secure titles to resources taken 
from beyond the shelf region and to prevent a free-for-all on the 
continental slopes and in the continental borderland. The regime I have 
suggested spells out in detail how those evils may be averted. It does not 
suffer from the weaknesses of the disabling indeterminacy inherent in 
Article l's exploitability test. 
III. 
Article 2(4), which purports to define the natural resources of the 
shelf, the exploration and exploitation of which fall within the coastal 
state's "sovereign rights," is as follows: 
The natural resources referred to in these articles consist of the mineral and 
other non-living resources of the sea bed and subsoil together with living 
organisms belonging to sedentary species, that is to say, organisms which, at 
the harvestable state, either are immobile on or under the sea bed or are 
unable to move except in constant physical contact with the sea bed or subsoil. 
Commenting on this paragraph, a leading participant in its drafting, 
Sir Kenneth Bailey of Australia, has commented: 
In an attempt to work out a scientific and legally exact definition, the Australian 
delegation at Geneva was encouraged to organize a Commonwealth working 
party, in which marine biologists were associated with lawyers. There resulted 
the definition which is now to be found in the convention. I am myself too long 
in the tooth as a lawyer to wish to be dogmatic about the meaning that will 
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be given hereafter to any form of words, however meticulously prepared. 
This definition, however, certainly resulted from a most heartening piece of 
Commonwealth co-operation. It is the earnest hope of its draftsmen that it will 
be found in practice to exclude the shrimp and the sole from the natural 
resources of the continental shelf just as unequivocally as it includes the mother-
of-pearl shell, the pearl oyster, the beche-de-mer, the trochus and the green 
snail, as well as the sacred chank of India and Ceylon. If it turns out to do 
these things, Australia has good ground for being pleased with the result, 
and for being grateful for staunch support from her associates in the Common­
wealth and also from the United States, France, Norway and others.5 
Sir Kenneth Bailey indicates that the framers' intention was, on a 
perhaps extended analogy with crops as partes soli, as for example, 
formulated in Duchess of Sutherland v. Watson,6 to include sessile 
creatures only, and to exclude shrimp, and one may infer, crabs (in­
cluding the Alaska king crab?), lobsters, langoustes, and other edible 
and mobile crustaceans from paragraph (4) as well as demersal fish 
(indicated by the reference to one species, i.e., the sole). That para­
graph, unfortunately, while clearly formulated in its indication of what 
is included, does not indicate (unlike Sir Kenneth Bailey's explanation) 
what is explicitly excluded from its scope. A significant fact in the history 
of paragraph (4)'s drafting is that the Fourth Committee had originally 
accepted a proviso to the paragraph, and it ran " . .  . but Crustacea 
and swimming species are not included in this definition." The plenary 
session of the 1958 Geneva Conference rejected it.7 
With this point of history in mind, Sir Kenneth Bailey's exclusion 
of the shrimp and the sole (i.e., crustaceans and demersal fish) would 
appear to rest upon a negative implication to be derived from the words 
which the conference permitted to remain in paragraph (4). Apart from 
questioning the propriety of detecting a negative implication after the 
plenary session had deleted the express negative proviso, one should, I 
think, point out that negative implications have traditionally been, in the 
context of interpreting federal constitutions no less than that of treaties, 
uncertain guides. Indeed, in the subsequent history of paragraph (4), its 
negative implication has fared little better than most others—especially 
those which have been casualties in the constitutional histories of the 
United States and of Australia. 
For example, in 1962, the dispute, journalistically and graphically 
labeled "The Lobster War," arose between Brazil and France with the 
arrest on January 2, 1962, of the French vessel, the "Cassiopee." 8 The 
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occasion of this "war" was the enterprise of Breton fishermen who, 
moving from their more traditional lobster-fishing grounds off the 
Atlantic coast of North Africa, began fishing the langoustes which in­
habit the Brazilian continental shelf. Maintaining that the lobsters were 
not only sojourners on the national continental shelf, but resources of it, 
Brazil decreed a prohibition of the French fishermen. France claimed that 
the langoustes were a resource of the high seas, and if found beyond 
Brazilian territorial waters, might be lawfully fished by all off the 
continental shelf. Was France right ? If we assume Sir Kenneth Bailey's 
illustration of "the shrimp" was a stylistic device indicating all crus­
taceans of the sea bed, then langoustes would fall outside the scope of 
paragraph (4) no less certainly than shrimp. (Arguing by the usual 
lawyers' device of analogy from shrimp to langoustes would produce a 
similar result.) Clear as Sir Kenneth Bailey's position may be on 
langoustes, on December 10, 1964, an amicable settlement was reached 
between the conflicting interests of both countries—-the Breton lobster-
men on the one hand and the Brazilian group which sought its govern­
ment's intervention in the first place on the other. By this accord, 
twenty-six French vessels were permitted to fish for five years in the 
prohibited zones; but they were obliged to give tribute in lobsters and 
fish to the private Brazilian group for the privilege. 
Professor Rousseau considers that the agreement, being "purement 
professional et corporatif," leaves unsolved "la problem juridique . . . 
entre les deux gouvernments." 9 But does it? May not the ad hoc solution 
create difficulties—should France refuse to acknowledge that the disputed 
crustaceans are indeed to be viewed as resources of Brazil's continental 
shelf? May not the Breton lobstermen have, by the undertaking to de­
liver a percentage of their catch off the Brazilian continental shelf, placed 
themselves in an unfavorable position, namely one analogous to "con­
tractual licensees" in the common law? And may not France, by not 
intervening to prevent this resolution of the immediate problem, be 
viewed as having tacitly acquiesced in the Brazilian claim? 
A second and perhaps less ambiguous development is to be found in 
the United States note, dated November 25, 1964, in the exchange of 
notes constituting the Japanese-United States Agreement on King Crab 
Fishing off Alaska, Washington, 1964. It stated, inter alia: 
The Government of the United States of America is of the view that the king 
crab is a natural resource of the continental shelf over which the coastal state 
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(in this case the United States of America) has exclusive jurisdiction, control 
and rights of exploitation.10 
True it may be that the Japanese have not agreed with us on this 
specific point. Not yet. But before 1958 they were disputing with equal 
tenacity that the mother-of-pearl oyster on Australia's continental shelf 
was not a natural resource of that country's continental shelf either. 
Surely, once one type of animal (and the creatures listed by Sir Kenneth 
are animals—any analogy between them and emblements on dry land is 
biologically, but of course, not necessarily legally, false) is viewed as a 
natural resource of the shelf, then interest groups and nations will press 
analogies from one sessile animal to another, and perhaps not quite so 
sedentary, creature. The green snail, one could argue, since it moves 
about on the sea bed, is closer to the king crab than the mother-of-pearl 
oyster which during its adult life remains fixed to one spot. Perhaps a 
criterion of some limiting value may be that of the Article 2(4) test 
of immobility at the moment of harvesting. This would exclude crus­
taceans. But what is its value? Whereas the immobility of the oyster 
may result from its being affixed to the sea bed, the immobility of the 
chank and the green snail, like that of the shrimp, the langouste, and 
the king crab may be no more than an immobility occasioned by fright 
at the immediate prospect of being harvested. 
The addition of biological resources to the category of the "natural 
resources" of the shelf has led to confusion, and to encroachments on 
the freedom of fishing on the high seas. These will continue, as more 
and more species will be brought within the category, on one ground 
or another, of "resources of the continental shelf." To prevent an "en­
closure movement" from developing further, I would like to propose that 
the resources of the continental shelf which are to be subjected to a 
coastal state's sovereign rights should be limited to mineral resources. 
Article 2(4) is an inappropriate place for formulating the rights of 
coastal states over sedentary fisheries. I am not, for a moment, advocat­
ing that the rights of all states in such fisheries should be abolished. In 
place of overloading the concept of the continental shelf and that of "its" 
resources (thereby rendering the notion of the resources of the continen­
tal shelf more indeterminate than its limitation to minerals would re­
quire), I would suggest the revival (subject to an alteration to be pro­
posed at the appropriate point) of the International Law Commission's 
1951 Draft Article on Sedentary Fisheries.11 That Article states: 
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The regulation of sedentary fisheries may be undertaken by a state in areas of 
the high seas contiguous to its territorial waters, where such fisheries have 
long been maintained and conducted by nationals of that state, provided that 
non-nationals are permitted to participate in the fishing activities on an equal 
footing with nationals. Such regulations will, however, not affect the general 
status of the areas as high seas. 
If this provision were followed the rights of states to whom historical 
sedentary fisheries appertain, such as those of Tunis, Libya, Ceylon, 
India, the Persian Gulf, and Australia, would be preserved. On the 
other hand, the limited terms of the article would prevent continued 
accretions of species which could be caught within the indeterminate 
phrase "natural resources of the continental shelf," but which do not 
fall into the above article's definition of historic sedentary fisheries, and 
would prevent extending the denotations of the continental shelf theory 
from sessile forms to all the other creatures of the benthos (including 
demersal fish, e.g., plaice and flounder, which are nektonic but inhabit the 
benthic division), and to wrecked ships, sunken bullion, and perhaps 
eventually to the whole nektonic division of the seas, including pelagic 
fish and animals. 
There is one point of disagreement I should like to register with the 
Sedentary Fisheries Article as formulated in 1951. I submit that the 
proviso "provided that non-nationals are permitted to participate on an 
equal footing with nationals" should be deleted. In its place the phrase 
"with non-nationals enjoying, subject to the principle of abstention, 
such historical privileges as they may have acquired by long usage" 
should be inserted. The traditional concept of the rights of coastal states 
over historic sedentary fisheries was well expressed in the "Examination 
of Legal Principles" of the British in the Bering Sea Arbitration,12 
which was as follows: 
. . . [And] so as to oysters and coral beds when they are within the waters 
over which international law recognizes an exclusive fishery right, this right 
becomes equivalent to a right of property because they are attached to the soil. 
But in animals which move from this area into the high sea no such property 
can be acquired. 
The traditional view, which the British Case outlined, held that both 
imperium and dominium were vested in the coastal state. The present-
day climate of opinion would not, so it seems to me, be amicable to 
divesting coastal states of either one. Secondly, the principle of abstention 
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may be invoked (with, probably, more effect by smaller and newer 
countries with few developed resources than by the United States or 
Canada) to call for recognizing a coastal state's exclusive rights in a 
sedentary fishery. The principle of abstention has been defined in the 
following terms: 
According to this principle when a country has fully developed a fishery and, 
as a result of continuing scientific study, is regulating it so as to obtain the 
maximum sustained yield, newcomers who are parties to the treaty agree to 
abstain from fishing the stocks concerned.13 
IV. 
My final suggestion is that the provisions in Article 5(8) regarding 
free scientific research should be modified. That paragraph provides: 
The consent of the coastal state shall be obtained in respect of any research 
concerning the continental shelf and undertaken there. Nevertheless, the coastal 
state shall not normally withhold its consent if the request is submitted by a 
qualified institution with a view to purely scientific research into the physical 
or biological characteristics of the continental shelf, subject to the proviso that 
the coastal state shall have the right, if it so desires, to participate or to be 
represented in the research, and that in any event the results shall be published. 
Although I am in full agreement with Article S(8)'s provisions re­
quiring the publication of results, and permitting the participation of the 
coastal state, either actively or by means of an observer, or representa­
tive, I feel that that paragraph is too weakly formulated. I submit that 
there should not only be an obligation of "not normally withhold [ing] 
. . . consent" on the part of the coastal state; but further a positive 
duty of supporting, or at least refraining from interference with, bona 
fide scientific researches carried out on its contiguous and adjacent 
shelves, and of restraining its nationals from so interfering. These obli­
gations should, of course, be subject to the coastal state's essential re­
quirements in connection with national defense. In addition, possible 
threats to, or restrictions on, future scientific research should be a cri­
terion for granting or withholding the recordation of claims by a state 
of exploration and exploitation licenses to individuals and business enter­
prises. My proposal here is that exploration and exploitation policies, 
no less than conservation policies, should be developed which take ac­
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count of the enormous value of scientific research to the development 
of the shelf regions. 
Secondly, what should be the position of scientific research beyond 
the shelf? In regions unaffected by exploitative activities (in connection 
with either minerals or fish including sedentary species), the traditional 
situation could continue for the time being at least. When, on the other 
hand, exploitations take place outside the scope of the draft articles I 
have outlined, then the exploiting entities or individuals should be 
required so to conduct their enterprises as neither to interfere with, 
nor diminish the value of, any neighboring scientific activity. A right 
to collect damages for such interference should be provided. Also pre­
ventive procedures should be available. Similarly, in the event of 
scientific activities' being conducted near an exploitation which has been 
registered under the procedure I have proposed, then the economic 
activity should not be carried on in any manner which might unreason­
ably impair the value of the scientific activity. The state which recorded 
the claim with the United Nations agency should, however, have all 
the privileges and rights—participating in the activity or sending 
observers—which have already been recognized as inuring, in the 
Continental Shelf Articles, to the coastal state. In addition, the results 
of the research should be published. Thus the policy of Article 5(8), 
with the additions I have proposed thereto in connection with the con­
tinental shelf region, should be extended to zones in the deep oceans, 
whatever the depth, where states have established their control and their 
sovereign rights. Again, the conductors of the scientific research should 
be able to obtain preventive relief from unjustified interferences, and 
obtain damages for breach of this obligation. This benefit should be 
theirs on account of the inclusive nature of their activity. 
In connection with fixed defense installations under the sea, the 
preceding principles should not apply. I would like to suggest that 
here, again, when an undersea area is dedicated for defense purposes 
the state in question should be entitled, on an analogy with Article 
82 of the United Nations Charter (the "strategic areas" provisions 
in Chapter XII "International Trusteeship System"—apart from the 
authority therein of the Security Council in Article 83), to pro­
claim the area as a zone to be used solely for defense purposes. 
The effect of such a proclamation would be to take the area proclaimed 
outside the articles I have suggested—including those according privi­
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leges and immunities to scientific research. As with the other proposed 
draft Articles regarding defense installations on the sea bed, these 
defense areas provisions are not intended to be relevant to submarines in 
motion. They would, however, be relevant to submarine pens on the 
sea bed. 
Finally, a state might choose not to proclaim a defense area under 
these proposals. In such a case it would choose to rely on secrecy and 
be exposed to the possibility of discovery. Furthermore, should scientific 
research develop in the area, the claims of the state relying on secrecy 
rather than on the treaty regime should be subordinated to priorities 
and claims favoring research under the treaty regime. A state has a 
choice between the immunities provided by the articles as a matter of 
law and those which may be obtained from secrecy. The attendant bene­
fits of both are different. In choosing one or another the state balances 
its conveniences. It must, however, choose, it cannot, in my suggestion, 
have the advantages of both, nor can it escape the restrictions of either. 
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MERO: 
I am not an attorney but an engineer, concerned primarily with the 
development of the various resources of the ocean. My particular field 
of interest is the development of the mineral resources of the sea. In 
many cases, in fact in most cases, practical law is quite a negative thing. 
Engineers seldom bring attorneys in on matters until there is trouble 
and legal assistance is needed. However, in resource development in 
the sea, there is an opportunity for the law fraternity to indulge in some 
creative lawmaking—to design a system of law which will actually 
encourage the formation of what can be a very substantial industry and 
provide substantial material resources for all of the people of the world. 
As an example I shall cite the legal system that Australia has, as 
versus the one in the United States, concerning the granting of mineral 
exploration concessions off their coast. The system in Australia en­
courages groups to take concessions, with the result that about 65 
per cent of the coast of Australia is taken up in mineral exploration 
concessions; and a great deal of activity is going on in that nation at 
this time to develop an offshore mining industry. In the United States 
the competitive bidding system that we have does not encourage the 
initiation of exploitation or exploration of offshore mineral resources. 
We have no mining industry off our coast to speak of. A properly 
designed legal system can be a boon in initiating new industries such 
as offshore mining. 
Viewed in the context of the atmosphere in which it was formulated, 
the Geneva Convention on the Law of the Sea is truly a remarkable 
document, and I can think of no major revisions to this document 
which would necessarily encourage exploitation of the resources of 
the sea, especially the mineral resources. I do, however, feel that some 
of the definitions of this convention could be tightened a little. For 
example, the statement of this convention that the "seabed and subsoil 
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of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside the area of 
the territorial sea to a depth of 200 meters, or beyond that limit to 
where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation 
of the natural resources of the area," as the definition of the continental 
shelf, or the definition of that area to which an adjacent nation may 
lay claim to the resources of the ocean floor, can be most misleading. 
The outer edge of the continental shelf, or at least the distance in 
the sea to which a nation may lay claim to the resources of the sea 
floor, should be fixed and stated and not left indefinite for future 
adjustments that may be protested. There is nothing that companies 
or groups fear more than having political boundaries moved back and 
forth over a property in which they have invested a great deal of money 
to develop. Especially when capital investments in such developments 
may run into hundreds of millions of dollars. 
It was probably not the intention of the delegates of that convention 
to imply that a nation may lay claim to the deep sea floor a thousand 
miles or so off its coast simply because some national of that nation 
is mining material from the ocean floor, but the present wording of 
the convention indicates that such is so. Possibly one can say that 
the distance to sea which a nation can make claims hinges upon the 
word adjacent, but how far is adjacent. The moon is really adjacent 
to the earth as far as distances in space are measured. 
I think that all ocean miners would like to see some definite lines 
on a map indicating the point off a nation's coast at which that nation's 
control ends and which is considered, for purposes of mineral exploita­
tion, open ocean. This line can be drawn somewhere between the 200 
meter depth contour and the 2,500 meter depth contour lines. In 
practically all cases, the distance between these two lines is not great. 
The 2,500 meter contour then would be the outer limit to which any 
nation may make claim to mineral resources of the ocean floor. Such 
a line would include most basins and shoals off any nation's coast, 
such as the deeps within the California borderland area or the trenches 
off Norway. But it would also leave free for exploitation by the rest 
of the nations of the world the bulk of the remainder of the ocean floor. 
We might also include provisions for individual groups to lay claim to 
a certain area surrounding some fixed point on the surface of the earth 
in which that group has exclusive exploitation rights for a period of 
time, providing the group spends a certain amount of time and effort 
in exploring the deposits and then developing them. If such work were 
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not carried out, the claim would lapse and the territory claimed would 
go back to the general domain. Such claims should not be parceled out 
indiscriminately, and the claiming groups must do the exploration and 
development work themselves. 
Thus, we would provide a means for the ocean miner to secure some 
measure of security that he has exclusive rights to mine in an area in 
which he has spent a great deal of time, effort, and money in finding 
and developing. Whether the miner chooses to lay claim to such an area 
with right of protection to his claim from possible poachers should 
remain optional, but at the miner's option. If he does lay claim, of 
course, he should expect to pay a fee for it and the ensuing protection. 
And I would suggest that the administration of this claim be laid in 
the hands of the United Nations. I would also suggest that nationals 
of no nation be allowed to claim an aggregate area containing more 
than about fifty years' reserves of minerals as measured by domestic 
consumption in that nation. Such a law, I think, would prove a boon 
to ocean resource exploitation and probably would remove one of the 
risks from an extraordinarily risky business and one which normally 
infuriates engineers, that is, having their elegantly conceived and ex­
pensively executed ventures fail because of uncontrollable political 
situations. 
You may notice that I have a small ax to grind in this particular 
case, but I feel it is rather justified because mineral resource people have 
not been represented in the past at various law of the sea conferences. 
MELAMID : 
A geographer opened this conference—and now another geographer is 
closing it. In between, we looked at many maps and heard many 
geographical definitions. Almost everything that could be said about 
the Geneva conventions has been said. So there is nothing left for me 
to do but try to torpedo the whole system. 
If you want to, you can interpret the Geneva conventions as a series 
of loopholes connected by loopholes. Let's start out with a concrete 
case: median lines determine the division of offshore areas. The Geneva 
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convention, under the heading of "special circumstances," permits devia­
tion from median lines. West Germany is now pleading "special circum­
stances" to obtain more favorable boundaries in the North Sea; of 
course Holland and Denmark are opposed to these pleas. Many other 
countries also can plead "special circumstances." Median lines are to 
be determined from base lines, and I do not think anybody has yet 
dared to count the number of "special circumstances" that might be 
pleaded to establish base lines far from shores. In fact, the Geneva 
convention permits the loading of "special circumstances" on "special 
circumstances." As a result, if one wants to (and there are quite a 
few nations that want to) one can continually base his arguments on 
special circumstances, but then what happens to the conventions? 
I have tried to explore the possibility of turning matters over to the 
UN but the idea just does not work. I have seen the United Nations 
in operation, and their administration of territory is pretty bad. The 
way the UN is constituted and the way trends are, I cannot see any 
improvement. I would like to comment on Professor Johnson's argu­
ment about the creation of what is known among geographers as 
neutral territory, or known among lawyers as condominia, out in the 
water. From the studies I have made, I have become dissatisfied with 
the administration of neutral territories. They work best only if adminis­
tered by a third party, such as an oil company, and this is usually not 
regarded as a desirable solution. Overall, I am opposed to any modifica­
tion of the Geneva conventions which suggests giving more power to 
the UN or which suggests an increasing use of condominia. 
As a result of these considerations there is no doubt that we must 
work with the existing arrangements, even if they are full of loopholes. 
Let's be happy that we have at least these Geneva conventions. I doubt 
whether the international community of states would agree on such 
conventions today if we had to establish them in the political climate 
of the 1960's. 
Under these circumstances, what can we do? One thing I would 
suggest is a series of sample studies. Professor Goldie said that the 
world is different; everything is an exception. As a geographer I have 
to teach and to generalize, and we can make some generalizations for 
example regarding coastlines. Some are sinking, some are rising, some 
suffer from four tides a day, some from one and a half, as in Louisiana. 
We can set up a series of case studies and then pass them to a com­
mittee—of ourselves preferably—for evaluation. 
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What I do believe is that we should not turn over the problem of 
"special circumstances" to an international body, but rather keep the 
existing conventions and reduce the loopholes, particularly by case 
studies of certain types of coastlines. When we have done this, I suggest 
that we then go out beyond the continental shelf, for my reading of the 
petroleum press suggests we will soon be ready to drill for oil in mid-
ocean. 
Other model studies can follow covering other groups of geographical 
or economic phenomena so that we can establish watertight rules for 
the application of the Geneva conventions. Further conferences, like this 
one, will be of great importance in this work. For this reason I recom­
mend that we meet at regular intervals so that we can make this 
convention work for the benefit of mankind. 
Discussion: 
1. One system for handling the exploitation of the minerals of 
the sea bed beyond the continental shelf limits would be through a 
world-wide recording and registration system. Individual states might 
register and place the world on notice of their entitlement to exercise 
jurisdiction and control over a specific working on the sea bed beyond 
the 200-meter isobath. Or the claims could be registered with the 
United Nations, although the UN would not necessarily formulate the 
laws under which the mining companies would operate. The mining 
companies might themselves decide how much territory they would 
need in order to operate efficiently. Structures on the sea floor would, of 
course, have to be designed so as not to interfere unnecessarily with 
fishing or other uses, and should be charted, particularly in the interests 
of submarines and other underseas vehicles. 
The registering of claims to the sea bed beyond the shelf might be 
opposed by defense officials who would feel that this might restrict the 
freedom of action of underseas vehicles. 
Much of the confusion about the exploitation of the mineral resources 
of the sea will remain unresolved, according to one speaker, until one 
basic problem has been settled. Do these mineral resources belong to 
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all nations, so that exploitation by one sovereign must somehow be 
shared with the other sovereigns? Or do they belong to no nation, so 
that exploitation by any one sovereign in no way connotes sharing with 
other sovereign nations ? Private enterprise and technologically advanced 
nations, it was suggested, will lean to the no nation-no sharing concept, 
while underdeveloped nations will subscribe to all nations-all sharing 
concept. 
2. A summary statement on the conference noted two underlying 
problems faced by the discussants. The first involves the production of 
the resources of the high seas—the search for a regime which will permit 
the most effective operation of the fishing and mining industries, and 
of the other users of the sea. The second problem concerns the dis­
tribution of the wealth of the sea, a matter on which considerably more 
study is needed than is currently in progress. 
A final theme which ran through the entire conference was the 
desirability of seeking a third law of the sea conference. Are there 
sufficiently important problems at this time to warrant such a conference ? 
Might the United States end up having lost more than it gained at a 
third conference? Is there sufficient flexibility in the present Geneva 
conventions to allow for existing technological, economic, and political 
changes? The conference took no stand on this issue, but it seemed 
probable that the question would be raised again at subsequent 
conferences. 
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Chapter Eighteen: 
COMMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL CONTROL 
OF THE SEA'S RESOURCES 
EICHELBERGER: 
I am grateful to Dr. Burke for initiating discussion of this topic and 
for making it possible for some of the materials prepared by the 
Commission to Study the Organization of Peace to be incorporated 
in the proceedings of the first annual conference of the Law of the 
Sea Institute. I wish to add a few words of explanation to the discussion 
and to express disagreement on a number of points. 
I wish, first of all, to thank Dr. Burke for his very fair analysis. 
He was good enough to point out that the Commission will publish 
a book in the fall of 1966 that may fill in some of the gaps he noticed 
during his study of the report. The Commission to Study the Organi­
zation of Peace, of which I am Chairman, is a research affiliate of 
the United Nations Association. It was started in 1939. We made 
suggestions about what should take the place of the League of Nations, 
and we have been working ever since. The report that Dr. Burke has 
referred to deals with what we think are the major crises before the 
United Nations in the near future. Let me say in the first place that he 
made certain criticisms of the report which I think will be met when our 
full book is produced. On the other hand, if I am accused of putting 
forward Utopia I hardly think a proposal which many people think 
is a rational one for meeting a condition of anarchy which could mean 
rivalry for large part of the surface of the earth can hardly be called 
Utopian. He points out, I think quite rightly, that such a plan as we 
propose cannot be subject to the parliamentary majority of the General 
Assembly. I point out that we do not mean that. We believe that there 
must be a special agency; the agency must be weighted in favor of those 
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with the greatest interest; the agency must function with the efficiency 
of the International Bank. It will take a long time to work out such 
an agency, but we believe that the principle must now be established. 
However, when Dr. Burke said that the parliamentary majority of the 
General Assembly of the United Nations as now constituted could not 
set up such an agency then I would have to disagree. 
I hope you will permit me to take time to give an illustration or two. 
The United States and Great Britain announced to the General Assembly 
a few years ago that they were negotiating a treaty for an international 
atomic energy agency, and that the subject was too involved to be sent 
to the General Assembly. They said they would inform the members of 
the United Nations after it was agreed to. The Assembly disagreed, 
took over the discussion, and the agency was finally created with some 
wisdom from the smaller powers. The atomic agency limped for a while, 
until all of a sudden the governments became afraid of the danger caused 
by a proliferation of nuclear materials. The U.S. government is now 
moving rigorously to place all of its bilateral agreements under agency 
inspection. It is even submitting some of its own reactors to such inspec­
tion in order to show that we are claiming no privileged position. Sud­
denly the atomic energy agency is coming into its own. 
The General Assembly in 1961 unanimously proclaimed that the 
celestial bodies were not subject to appropriation, that the law of the 
charter applied to outer space, and later an Assembly resolution an­
nounced that the nations agreed that atomic weapons could not be 
carried on space ships. Now the Soviet Union and the United States, 
afraid that a resolution of the General Assembly was not sufficient, 
have each proposed a treaty which will accomplish all of these objectives. 
These treaties will probably be consolidated and be ready for the General 
Assembly. But I wonder what kind of reaction there would be to the 
outer space treaty if the General Assembly had not had the courage to 
proclaim that celestial bodies were not subject to appropriation and that 
space ships could not carry weapons of mass destruction? 
Just a point or two more. In the first place, there could be a 
resolution of the General Assembly that the seas are not subject 
to appropriation by any state. And then in the course of time the 
General Assembly could declare that the resources of the sea which are 
the common property of mankind, should be subject to licensing and 
proper control by a special agency that would be set up. Then we 
would hope that there might be an agreement, first in a proclamation 
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by the General Assembly and then agreement by the powers most 
concerned, a vast new area of weapons development might be avoided. 
I am not going into the economics of the problem. Mr. Christy 
covered that most thoroughly in his paper. But there were several papers 
read that have caused me some concern. A distinguished international 
lawyer said there was no vacuum in the deep sea; any state could 
explore and stake out a claim. If any states attempted exploration 
nearby, they could harmonize their problems. That is a concept of 
international law that is essentially European and American. I think 
the Russians, because they are a privileged people, also go along with it. 
International law can be so interpreted to defend those that are the 
strongest and to protect a privileged position. What if the rest of the 
world rejects it? 
For illustration, international law protected the right of the British 
and others to maintain colonies that were swept aside in the movement 
for decolonization. Mr. Chapman in his paper gave what I think was 
a most alarming and brilliant discussion of anarchy of the sea. He 
pointed out that there had been conflict before and that we could expect 
equal conflict in the future. But I ask, Is it necessary for us to have that ? 
Can we not have our economic interests adequately protected, and at 
the same time have a rational economic order? Our forefathers were 
able to take what they wanted in this country and so were the Canadians 
because there was nothing in their way but defenseless Indians. We 
cannot take what we want from the sea in the same way without the 
Russians, or the Japanese, or others wanting to do the same thing. 
Why can we not all enjoy what we want through a rational order? 
We have heard from Dr. Burke about those that are able to go out 
and establish colonies in the sea, but I ask how many nations are able 
to do it? The United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, 
Japan, maybe the Scandinavian countries in combination. But what of 
the vast part of the world that has suddenly come to independence, the 
underdeveloped parts of the world that need resources ? 
I ask us to lift our sights today. Five-sevenths of the surface of the 
earth is composed of the sea. As yet it has not been claimed by sovereign 
powers. Shall we say this vast area will be an area of anarchy in which 
a new struggle for colonial riches, and thus a new power struggle, will 
prevail ? We believe that the privilege of men to explore the ocean's bed 
and to exploit its resources can be better guaranteed, and these resources 
saved from depletion, by co-operation than by anarchy. It should not be 
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necessary for a few maritime powers to embark on another power 
struggle on another frontier, nor to arm the sea in order to make its 
bounties available for the benefit of all mankind. 
CHRISTY : 
During the discussions at the Law of the Sea Institute, there emerged 
several objections to the suggestions for "internationalization" of the 
sea's resources.1 Because debate on this subject is likely to continue, it 
will be useful to attempt a classification of the objections and to point 
out some of the areas where further research is needed and where 
further discussion will be fruitful. Generally, the objections fall into 
three categories, although there is some overlap. The three categories 
are: (a) that there is no need for international authority; (b) that 
international authority would be detrimental to the interests of the 
United States; and (c) that there is no practical means for achieving 
international authority. 
I. The Need for International Authority 
With respect to the fisheries of the high seas, international controls 
are already well established. What is needed is a different form of 
control—an authority that can regulate the amount of effort. The case 
for this has already been presented and need not be repeated here. The 
objections are largely concerned with the difficulties of implementation. 
With respect to minerals lying on, or under, the sea floor beyond 
the depth of 200 meters, the question of need for an international 
authority hinges upon one's views as to which governmental body can 
best provide the guarantee of exclusive rights that will be required by 
the mineral industries. Any industry that is considering the very heavy 
and risky investments that deep ocean mining will require must be 
assured of exclusive rights to the property before undertaking the 
investment. The question is whether the exclusive rights can best be 
guaranteed by an individual nation-state or by an international body 
such as the United Nations. 
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Both of the critics, William Burke2 and Northcutt Ely,3 admit 
that a greater degree of international control than now exists may be 
necessary in the future. Burke rejects "blueprints for Utopia" and 
indicates that the difficulties of implementation (discussed later) will 
prevent any immediate achievement of the long-range objective. Ely 
feels that there is no need for international administration until conflict 
appears; that laws and regulations governing such administration can­
not be written with precision until there is a history of use; and that 
when the need occurs, international law can crystallize as rapidly and 
as effectively as it did for the continental shelf. 
In the "search for appropriate jurisdiction to assure exclusive occu­
pancy of a segment of the seabed," Ely's preferred solution is to permit 
the explorer to appropriate the segment under the jurisdiction (and 
protection, I assume) of his flag. If conflict develops during exploita­
tion, then the flag nations "are likely to arrive at an accommodation," 
and only if that fails will it be necessary to create a "licensing scheme 
for administration by the United Nations." 
It is difficult to separate the question of need for an international 
approach from the question of the distribution of the sea's wealth. 
The United States has technological advantages over most, if not all, 
other nations when it comes to mining deep sea minerals. If the United 
States will guarantee and protect a firm's exclusive rights to a segment 
of the sea bed, the firm may feel that it can operate more freely than 
under an international licensing system administered by the United 
Nations. Under this flag-nation approach, the initial advantage (and 
perhaps temporary) is likely to go to the mineral firms that are involved. 
And by the time conflict develops, these firms, and the United States, 
may have acquired "historic rights" that will permit them to exert 
considerable influence on the system that will be developed for admin­
istering and distributing the sea's minerals. 
This view assumes that the United States (and other coastal states,) 
would be willing to guarantee and protect a citizen's claim to exclusive 
use of a resource beyond the edge of the continental shelf. This 
assumption, or hope, is one of the issues that should receive consider­
able debate and study in the future. What are the costs and benefits 
(political as well as material) associated with the flag-nation approach 
as against the international approach? How would interests (trans­
portation, military, fisheries) other than minerals be affected? What 
would be the effect of establishing either approach as a precedent ? How 
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are other nations likely to view the flag-nation approach as against the 
international one, and what would be the influence of their views on 
the decision? When conflicts develop, can these best be worked out 
by multilateral agreements, or under the aegis of an international body 
already established to administer the licensing of exclusive rights? 
In addition to questions about which governmental body could best 
guarantee exclusive rights, questions were raised about the inability 
to be precise about rules and regulations covering potential enterprises 
and about the ability of international law to meet speedily the problems 
when they arise. I think that the question of precision is irrelevant to 
the issue of international authority. To be sure, deep sea mining of 
minerals is only a potential development, and it is difficult to speculate 
on the needs of an industry with respect to the spatial and legal scope 
of its rights. But this difficulty in precision holds true for both a flag-
nation approach and an international approach. In either case, the 
desire for precision will have to be subordinated to the need for flexi­
bility. And in either case, it will be useful to acquire as much knowledge 
as possible about the needs of an industry for exclusive rights to a 
mining area. That principles can be advanced in the absence of precise 
knowledge of conflict is indicated by the Geneva Convention on Fishing 
and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas which 
anticipates conflict and prescribes certain rules of behavior to deal 
with it. 
Whether or not international law can crystallize rapidly enough to 
meet future conflicts between flag nations is questionable. The analogy 
of the continental shelf law does not appear to me to be a satisfactory 
one. It is remarkably imprecise. While it guarantees the right of a 
coastal state to its shelf resources, it leaves completely open the 
question of resources beyond the edge of the shelf where the real 
conflicts are likely to occur. 
In summary, a guarantee of exclusive rights is essential for the 
development and exploitation of deep sea minerals. The basic issue 
for future discussion and research is whether this guarantee can best be 
secured under an international authority or by individual nations. 
II. The Interests of the United States 
Although it was not stated explicitly, it is clear that some of the 
objections to "internationalization" of sea resources arise from fears 
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that this approach would be detrimental to the interests of the United 
States. This is essentially the question of the distribution of the sea's 
wealth, the question of "who gets what." 
The distribution of fisheries' wealth has already been discussed, 
although no estimates of the effect of different systems on the United 
States economy were made. Such estimates cannot be made without a 
good deal of research, and this is one of the many tasks facing the 
social sciences. It is worthwhile to mention, however, a few of the 
elements important to this evaluation. First, it should be pointed out 
that the catching end of the fishery industries makes only a negligible 
contribution to the economy of the United States. The annual gross 
revenue to U.S. fishermen is about $400 million—less than that from 
potatoes, for example. And because of the wasted applications of re­
dundant effort, the net contribution to the economy is very small. 
Second, unless there is rationalization of fisheries, it is unlikely that 
any high seas regime will do much to increase the contribution of 
fishing industries to the U.S. economy. 
And third, it should be made clear that "internationalization" will 
not mean that the profits to individual fishermen and firms will be 
taken by the international authority. Under this system, where dupli­
cating effort is prevented from entering the fishery, it would be the 
surplus profit (the economic rent) that would be removed. This surplus 
profit is now dissipated because the fishery attracts too much capital 
and labor. With internationalization, the dissipation would be prevented 
and the economic rent would be produced in the form of taxes, leases, 
or license fees paid by the fishermen. And for this payment, the fisher­
men would be receiving the right to participate in a fishery that is 
free from congestion and redundant amounts of capital and labor. There 
would be fewer participants and each would receive a greater share 
of the total supply. The fee would be similar to the purchase, by a 
farmer, of property—property that carries the right of exclusive use. 
Under this form of control, the net gain to the U.S. would depend upon 
the willingness of the U.S. fishermen to invest in this form of property. 
Given the technological advantages of the U.S. and the freedom from 
congestion, the net contribution to the U.S. economy is likely to be 
larger than it is at present. 
For minerals, the problems of congestion and excess applications of 
effort are not fully relevant, because the necessity for exclusive rights 
and the ease of describing the property is much clearer than it is for 
305 
THE LAW OF THE SEA 
the fugitive fisheries. Deep sea mining operations will call for extremely 
large investments carrying great risks. It is unlikely, at present, that 
individual firms would be willing to bid very much for exclusive rights 
to mine a property at the bottom of the deep sea; nor is it likely that 
it would be in the best interests of the world community to impose a 
use fee at this time.4 However, just as there is a market for property 
on the continental shelf, there will, most likely, develop a market for 
property on the deep sea bottom; at least, within the United States 
and other free enterprise systems. In free enterprises, the market guides 
the allocation of resources, and individuals and firms acquire these on 
the basis of their willingness to pay for them. Thus even if there is 
a flag-nation approach to the distribution of the sea's minerals, the 
individual firms would have to bid for, or buy, their rights to exclude 
others (and, in addition, buy the protection of their flag). As the 
value of deep sea mining increases, the value of this form of property 
right is also likely to increase. 
Under internationalization, the right to exclude others would be 
acquired in the world market, with individual firms or nations bidding 
for the privilege. It is difficult to say whether the open world market 
would require higher bids by U.S. firms than the domestic market. 
This would depend upon the comparative advantages among nations. 
It is likely, however, that the capital intensiveness and technological 
requirements of deep sea mining would give the edge to the United 
States firms, so that their bids would not have to be higher under a 
world market than under a U.S. market. 
The major difference would be that under internationalization, the 
payments would go to the world community, which would seem appro­
priate if these resources are considered to be the property of the 
world community. 
In the above discussion, I have assumed that the property right is 
limited and specific; that it refers to the mining of certain minerals over 
a certain length of time and for a fixed area. This is not the appro­
priation of full property rights, nor the acquisition of sovereignty over 
a segment of the sea bottom. Under a flag-nation approach, however, it 
may be difficult to limit and maintain the specificity of the right. Mili­
tary interests, the possible development of other resources and uses 
of the sea bottom, or perhaps a sense of imperialism, may provide 
incentives to extend the rights and claim full sovereignty. To the extent 
that this is permitted, it is likely to lead to what President Johnson 
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has referred to as a "new form of colonial competition among the 
maritime nations." B 
In summary, it is not at all clear that the United States interests, 
over the long run, would be less well off under a system of inter­
nationalization than under a flag-nation or open-access approach. The 
payments made to the international authority would be payments to 
assure efficiency and to guarantee exclusive rights. The gains from 
these are likely to outweigh the amount of the payments. Aside from 
the purely economic aspects of the evaluation, the future discussion 
will also have to take into consideration the social and political values 
of alternative regimes. Evidence of the importance of these relatively 
intangible values lies in the further remarks of President Johnson: "We 
must be careful to avoid a race to grab and to hold the lands under 
the high seas. We must ensure that the deep seas and the ocean 
bottoms are, and remain, the legacy of all human beings." 
III. The Means for Achieving International Authority 
The need for international authority cannot really be considered 
without reference to the means of achieving it. It is possible, although 
I do not hold this view, that the costs of achieving an international 
high seas regime may outweigh the benefits to be obtained. In large 
measure, the objectors to the United Nations approach have taken 
this position. The difficulties are, indeed, great. As some critics have 
pointed out, not a single state of the United States has been able to 
achieve a rationalized fishery. How then, can we hope to rationalize 
international fisheries where the obstacles are so much greater? 
William Burke states that "although there is an evident need for 
establishing international institutions, endowed with adequate authority, 
policies, and procedures for coping with a rapidly changing situation, 
it would be a mistake to attempt to place too much confidence in the 
capacity of the international political system to respond to the new 
demands." 
He then specifies three of the major obstacles that would have to 
be overcome: the necessity for reconstituting the General Assembly of 
the UN so that it will more accurately reflect the distribution of power, 
wealth, and skill, and thereby be able to deal more adequately with the 
problems of international ocean authority; the difficulties of accommo­
dating military uses of the ocean and, as urged in the Report of the 
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Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, of preventing military 
appropriation of the sea bottom; and the fact that there is "minimal 
effort now devoted to inquiry into economic criteria for the exploitation 
of fishery resources." 
These obstacles are certainly difficult, but they are not insurmount­
able. The Commission to Study the Organization of Peace has recom­
mended reconstitution of the General Assembly, and will be working 
toward this goal. Military uses of the sea bottom will, of course, be 
difficult to accommodate, but that does not mean that the machines of 
war should be condoned. It may be true, as Mr. Burke states, that the 
"prohibition of military activity hardly seems to be a necessary con­
sequence of organized international exploitation of the ocean," but it 
is clear that military uses, potential or actual, have considerable influence 
on national policy; viz., the (somewhat specious) military objections 
to extensions of the three mile limit. One of the major, and most 
irreconcilable, problems in the study of ocean policy is that the military 
"requirements" are not made public. This means that the evaluation of 
alternative regimes must proceed as if there were no military uses. 
But Burke's major objection appears to be one of strategy—that 
"the bare recommendation of this objective [internationalization] hardly 
advances the prospect of achieving it. Serious recommendations of this 
sort would gain far greater influence if accompanied both by acknowledg­
ment of the obstacles which must be surmounted and by suggested 
strategies by which the campaign must be conducted." This would, of 
course, be desirable, but the advancement of the principles and the 
delineation of the need without presentation of the details is hardly a 
sufficient basis for discarding the suggestions as "blueprints for utopia." 
I believe that an international approach through the United Nations 
is both necessary and desirable. Others hold contrary views. But all 
who seek to exploit the oceans and all who look forward to the orderly, 
rational, and beneficial development of ocean resources should make 
every effort to explore and discuss as openly as possible, the alternative 
goals, the methods of achieving these, and the difficulties that will have 
to be overcome. 
1. As a member of the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace and 
of the Committee on Natural Resources Conservation and Development for the 
White House Conference on International Cooperation, I have participated in, 
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and supported, the recommendations for United Nations' authority over high-seas 
resources. Early suggestions for international authority over fisheries were pre­
sented by Anthony Scott and me in The Common Wealth in Ocean Fisheries 
(Johns Hopkins Press, 1965), and have been carried forward in my paper, "The 
Distribution of the Seas' Wealth in Fisheries," presented at this conference. For 
minerals as well as fisheries, see the chapter by David B. Brooks and me in the 
forthcoming book by the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace. 
2. William T. Burke, "Law and the New Technologies," supra, pp. 204-27. 
3. See the papers prepared by Northcutt Ely for the American Institute of 
Mining, Metallurgical and Petroleum Engineers; for the Marine Technology 
Society; and supra, pp. 174-79. 
4. This is debatable. The production of manganese nodules could have a 
deleterious effect on some of the less developed, raw-material producing countries. 
Some restraint in production may facilitate adjustment by these countries. 
5. President Lyndon B. Johnson, "Remarks of the President at the Commission­
ing of the New Research Ship, the Oceanographer," July 13, 1966. 
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Chapter Nineteen: 
REFLECTIONS ON THE MEETING OF THE 
LAW OF THE SEA INSTITUTE 
I. Introduction 
During the week of June 27, 1966, the Law of the Sea Institute of the 
University of Rhode Island conducted its first summer conference, 
ostensibly on the subject of offshore boundaries and zones. This topic 
merely served as a frame of reference and a springboard for a wide-
ranging discussion of the problems involved in using the oceans in 
ways other than the traditional ones of surface transportation and fishing. 
The conference also provided a forum for those (the fishing, oil, and 
other mineral industries as well as the Navy) with vital economic and 
other direct interests in the oceans to present, for the record, well-
articulated rationalizations of their positions. This airing of positions 
was a particularly valuable contribution, since it suggested the outlines 
of the future debate and struggle over ocean resource policy. The debate 
also put the question of internationalization of the oceans' resources in 
much sharper focus. The tone of the conference suggested clearly that 
any move in the direction of international control must be based on 
specifics and that the position taken by the White House Conference 
(the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, 17th Report, May, 
1966) must be built up in much greater detail before it can become 
operational. Finally, by bringing together experts from many different 
disciplines (law, marine biology, physical oceanography, economics, 
and administration), the conference illustrated again the difficulties in 
communication between groups of experts. The running argument 
between the physical scientists and economists over the definition of 
optimization of resource use is illustrative of the many real difficulties 
(in addition to merely semantic problems) introduced into the dis­
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cussion by differences in training and outlook, i.e., which variables are 
considered important. 
The historical background of the meeting was the Geneva conferences 
on the law of the sea in 1958 and 1960. The positions taken by the 
United States at that time on the desirable extent of the territorial sea, 
the uses of the high seas and the continental shelf were reasserted with 
no significant shift in position by Arthur Dean, the head of our dele­
gation at the Geneva conferences. The representatives of the Depart­
ment of State also supported specific aspects of this position in the 
debate (although the position of the Navy was ambiguous on several 
key points, specifically on the use of the deep ocean). The cornerstone 
of this position is a territorial sea of six miles (as against the old rule 
of three) with an exclusive fishing zone of another six. In addition, the 
unilateral Truman Proclamation of 1945 is the basis for exclusive claim 
to the mineral resources of the continental shelf. In general, our national 
position is to minimize the width of the territorial sea over which any 
nation may exercise sovereignty and at the same time to reserve 
(primarily for mineral exploitation) the use of the shelf for our nationals. 
This approach to use of the oceans is consistent with the position of 
most, but not all, of our fishing interests (the most obvious difference 
is that between the tuna and salmon fisheries) and the oil and other 
mining companies. 
In preparing this paper I confess to a point of view based on the interests of 
U.S. commercial fisheries, particularly the domestic shrimp fishery. It has 
been to the interest of the shrimp fishery to accent the doctrine of freedom 
of the seas for fishing because the shrimp fishery is classified in part as a 
distant fishery, as is also true of tuna. This position also explains in advance 
the apprehension of this fishery as to attachment to any Continental Shelf 
doctrine.1 
Our position on the use of deep seas beyond the shelf is not clear, but 
as noted above, all our commercial and military interests are very wary 
of any direct and broad-based internationalization of the submerged 
lands and fishery resources lying beyond the shelf. Without delving 
into the complex relationship between the form and content of the 
law and underlying social realities, we may reasonably conclude that 
the real force behind the two recent international conferences on the 
law of the sea and the Rhode Island symposium was growing pressure 
from a rapidly changing technology and therefore the increased capacity 
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to make use of ocean resources. Since these technological developments 
are overlapping and general in all the principal areas of ocean resources, 
fish, minerals, oil and military operations, the pressure for readjustment 
of traditional legal doctrine comes from many sources. In addition it 
is supplemented by expressions of national self-interest on the part 
of developing nations. 
II. Attitudes and Problems 
At the conference, it was widely accepted that pressure from these 
external forces had caused an acceleration in the historically slow rate 
of change in the law of the sea. A major dispute erupted, however, over 
whether future changes in the law should precede or follow the course 
of development of the use of ocean resources. This was, of course, simply 
an aspect of the disagreement over internationalization. It is fair to 
say that the issue of internationalization is so complex that neither 
set of protagonists did it justice. It would also be unfair to describe 
either position in terms of the relatively simple arguments advanced 
at this time. Rather, these arguments seem to be more like the opening 
skirmish in a prolonged debate. It is clear, however, that the burden 
for any move in the direction of international control will fall on 
the internationalists. 
At present, the internationalists' argument runs along the following 
lines: The world is in a disequilibrium situation. The two principal 
disequilibrating forces are the rate of growth of population and the 
growing disparity in real income between nations. (To the interna­
tionalists the vested interests not represented at the meeting were the 
underdeveloped nations of the world.) The technological superiority 
of the developed nations means that they will have the power to 
pre-empt any real net economic gains to be obtained from the use of 
the oceans. The exploitation of these resources will be on a competitive 
basis, and since these are open access resources, the exploitation will 
be wasteful and the net economic yield will be dissipated. Finally, given 
the tensions in the world, the oceans, like space and Antarctica, should 
be kept free from military weapons systems. In these circumstances the 
optimum solution is to turn over the control of these resources to an 
international organization, presumably the UN or some special agency 
thereof. This agency, acting as the sole owner, would then license the 
use of these resources, efficiently capturing the rents created, in the 
price of the license or through some system of taxation. These rents 
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which are currently lost in the fisheries, would then be available for 
distribution among all nations. A by-product of this arrangement would 
be a strengthening of supernational organizations at the expense of 
national sovereignty. 
The direct attack on this position was of the usual kind. Questions 
were raised about the need for any change prior to a clear demonstration 
of need, the inadequacy of a body such as the General Assembly of the 
United Nations to administer efficiently and distribute gains meaning­
fully, and how it would be possible to safeguard the national interests 
of the various states and their nationals. 
III. Conclusions 
The arguments pro and con are, as yet, so primitive that the real 
contribution of the conference was to establish the debate and to indicate 
some of the inadequacy of the reasoning on both sides. Before any 
progress can be made it is clear that criteria for internationalization must 
be developed. There must be some logical, compelling, and specific 
reasons for taking action. In all probability local and regional agreement 
will take precedence over broad ocean-wide compacts. In addition, as 
the broad confusion over the different implications for meaningful 
economic exploitation of the fugacious fish resources and the sedentary 
mineral deposits indicated, a further classification of agreements based 
on resource definition is also in order. 
Hard work on the technical nature of and the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for, agreement on these specifics will focus attention on 
certain points raised by Burke.2 For example, the analogy that compares 
the oceans to outer space. As yet, there are no weapons systems in space. 
But the oceans, certainly the continental shelves, probably sea mounts, 
and possibly even the ocean depths are currently being used for military 
purposes. In these circumstances any general as contrasted with specific, 
move toward internationalization becomes, as Burke pointed out, a 
problem in disarmament and an attack on the Navy's position, not 
simply an attempt to prevent the spread of weapons systems. It will be 
necessary to understand the presence of this type of constraint in 
formulating more limited but nonetheless meaningful international agree­
ments on the use of the oceans. 
Finally, it is desirable to emphasize the technical difficulties faced 
by the conference. As Christy suggested,3 probably the sole international 
agreement in the fishery, that is considered workable by economists is 
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the fur seal treaty in the North Pacific involving Japan, the U.S.S.R., 
Canada, and the U.S. In this case the industry is rationalized and the 
net gains from the resources are distributed among the four participants. 
The only flaw is that the agreement is partial in the sense that seals 
are only a segment of the food chain. If, as some biologists suggest, the 
seals prey on the Pacific salmon, then it becomes impossible to say 
whether gross, much less net, revenue is maximized by conserving 
seals. This difficulty of dealing with partial rather than general equi­
librium models is but one of the technical issues that must be solved 
before we may maximize the net economic yield from the oceans. 
1. W. R. Neblett, "The 1958 Conference on the Law of the Sea: What Was 
Accomplished," supra, pp. 36-46. 
2. W. T. Burke, "Law and the New Technologies," supra, pp. 204-27. 
3. F. T. Christy, Jr., "The Distribution of the Sea's Wealth in Fisheries," 
supra, pp. 106-21. 
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